Federal Court Grants Judicial Review: PRRA Officer Failed to Consider Country Conditions

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260525 Docket: IMM-15971-24 Citation: 2026 FC 669 Ottawa, Ontario, May 25, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. [NAME_1]: [NAME_3] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] [NAME_3] [[NAME_6] or Applicant] seeks judicial review of a negative Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [[NAME_7]] rendered on July 22, 2024 [Decision] by a senior immigration officer [[NAME_8]], pursuant to subsection 112(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , (SC 2001, c. 27) [ IRPA ]. The [NAME_8] found insufficient evidence that the Applicant would face a forward-looking risk of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA if she were to return to Cuba. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is granted.

II. Background Facts [ 3 ] The Applicant is a 22-year-old citizen from Cuba. On July 11, 2021, protests against the [NAME_9] [July 2021 Protests] occurred across the country due to the government’s systemic repression of human rights, mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and failing economic and political agenda. The Applicant participated in the protest that took place in her city. [ 4 ] At the end of January 2022, two police officers visited the Applicant while she was listening to music at a “normal volume” and instructed her to turn off the music before leaving. Minutes later, the Applicant received a notice to appear at the police station, where she was then questioned about her views on the [NAME_9] and was told she could face consequences if she remained silent. A few days later, the Applicant was summoned twice by the Cuban police and questioned about her views regarding the government. After the Applicant refused to answer their questions, the Applicant was issued a fine of 2,000 pesos for previously “disturbing the environment” with her loud music (Applicant’s Record [AR] at p 52). [ 5 ] Fearing persecution, on March 18, 2022, the Applicant fled Cuba. She travelled through Latin America, Mexico and arrived in the United States of America [USA] on July 2, 2022, before entering Canada on July 19, 2022. Upon her arrival, the Applicant made a refugee claim but was found ineligible pursuant to the Safe Third Country Agreement [ STCA ]. The Applicant was issued a one-year exclusion order and removed to the USA on July 19, 2022. [ 6 ] In October 2022, the Canada Border Services Agency [[NAME_10]] was informed that [NAME_6] had re-entered Canada before the expiration of the exclusion order, and a warrant was issued against her. [ 7 ] On September 24, 2023, the Applicant filed a second in-land refugee claim. This claim was not referred to the Refugee Protection Division [[NAME_11]] because the first claim had been found ineligible under section 101(1)(e) of the IRPA and the STCA . [ 8 ] On January 18, 2024, the Applicant was interviewed by the [NAME_10] and offered to submit a [NAME_7] application. [ 9 ] On July 22, 2024, the Applicant’s [NAME_7] application was denied on the following grounds: […] […] the applicant’s statements regarding the times she was summoned by police are vague and does not provide enough information to establish that she was harassed by the police for her political views. Therefore, the applicant provided insufficient evidence to determine the local authorities were harassing her or that the fine was in any way related to her anti-government beliefs. Therefore, I assign little weight. The applicant submitted a signed affidavit from her father and mother stating that their daughter is opposed to the [NAME_9] and was at the protests on July 11, 2021. The applicant’s parents also state that their daughter was fined for playing music in her house. The applicant submitted a letter from her neighbour to state she witnessed the police coming to the applicant’s home when she was listening to music, summoned to appear at the [NAME_12] and received a fine. The applicant provided a copy of the fine she received from the police dated January 28, 2022, for 2000 pesos indicating hygienic-sanitary administrative measures. I acknowledge the statements indicate the applicant was at the protest on July 11, 2021 [sic] and the statements of the situations the applicant had with the local authorities. However, the police asking her questions about her political beliefs or by fining her for a minor incident does not establish a pattern of harassment, persecution or any risk to her life. While I accept that the applicant attended one protest, I find that the applicant has not provided sufficient evidence that the attendance elevated her profile to bring adverse attention of the state or that she was targeted and mistreated after attending this protest. Therefore, I cannot find the applicant faces a personalized risk in Cuba on return. The evidentiary burden lies with the applicant, and she is required to provide evidence to substantiate the grounds of this application. The applicant provides insufficient objective evidence to demonstrate that her allegations of risk have been established on a balance of probabilities. The applicant has not demonstrated that she has been involved in any political dissidence while living in Canada or evidence that she is wanted by the state for her political beliefs. Therefore, I find the applicant submitted insufficient evidence that she faces a forward-looking risk from the authorities in Cuba due to her political beliefs. I accept the country condition documentation provided indicates Cuba is a country that restricts certain rights and freedoms, including freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of expression and the exercise of one s political conscience. I am also convinced that political activists and dissidents are at risk of harassment, violence, arrest and detention at the hands of the [NAME_13], and that detention conditions may be severely unfavourable. However, the applicant has brought forward insufficient objective evidence to reasonably demonstrate that the authorities or anyone in Cuba are currently seeking to cause her harm and I find that on a balance of probabilities, her profile is unlikely to attract the attention of [NAME_14].

III. Issues and Standard of Review [ 10 ] The issue is whether the [NAME_8]’s decision is reasonable and whether an oral hearing had to be granted under subsection 113(b) of the IRPA . [ 11 ] The parties agree that the applicable standard of review for a [NAME_8]’s substantive decision is reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , [2019] 4 SCR 653 [ Vavilov ] at paras 10, 25; [NAME_15] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at paras 7, 39–44 [ [NAME_15] ]). To avoid judicial intervention, the decision must bear the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility ( Vavilov at para 99; [NAME_15] at para 59). The decision must be read holistically and contextually, in light of the evidence, the submissions and the context in which it was rendered ( [NAME_16] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 SCC 21 at para 47 [ [NAME_16] ]; Vavilov at paras 94, 97). A decision may be unreasonable if the decision maker misapprehended the legal constraints of the evidence before it ( Vavilov at paras 99, 101, 105, 108, 111, 125-128; [NAME_15] at para 73). However, the reviewing Court must refrain from “reweighing and reassessing the evidence considered by the decision maker” ( Vavilov at para 125). In determining reasonableness, the reviewing Court must not create its “own yardstick” and use it to measure what the decision maker did ( [NAME_16] at para 48; Vavilov at para 83, and [NAME_17]. v [NAME_18] , 2019 SCC 67 at para 40). Reasonableness review is not a “rubber-stamping” exercise, it is a robust form of review ( Vavilov at para 13; [NAME_15] at para 63). The party challenging the decision bears the onus of demonstrating that the decision is unreasonable ( Vavilov at para 100). Any alleged flaws must be “sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable” or cause the “reviewing court to lose confidence in the outcome reached” ( Vavilov at paras 100, 106; [NAME_16] at para 49). [ 12 ] Regarding the issue of whether an oral hearing out to have been granted under subsection 113(b) of the IRPA , the jurisprudence of this Court is inconclusive as to whether the standard of correctness or reasonableness applies. Some decisions, albeit less recent, have found that the standard of correctness apply ( [NAME_19] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 132 at paras 10-13; [NAME_20] v Canada ([NAME_21]) , 2017 FC 403 at paras 12-17; [NAME_22] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 951 at para 8; [NAME_23] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 534 at paras 16-20). Other decisions have held that this issue should be reviewed under the reasonableness standard ( [NAME_24] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 1132 at paras 23-27; [NAME_25] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2011 FC 106 at para 28; [NAME_27] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2010 FC 1290 at paras 10-12; [NAME_28] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 763; [NAME_29] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 940 [ [NAME_29] ]; [NAME_30] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1640 at para 8 [ [NAME_30] ]). [ 13 ] In [NAME_29] , Justice Gascon made a compelling case that the reasonableness standard should apply, because the issue as to whether a hearing should be held involves the interpretation of the IRPA and that when a matter is considered as one of statutory interpretation, the reasonableness standard presumably applies ( [NAME_29] at para 15 citing Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association , 2011 SCC 61; see also Vavilov at paras 115-116). [ 14 ] However, in [NAME_31]. v Habus , 2025 FCA 152, the Federal Court of Appeal appears to have ruled that the issue as to whether an oral hearing should be held to be one of procedural fairness, even if the holding of a hearing was discretionary under the enabling statute. In that case, the Court of Appeal held that a hearing was not necessary, even in the presence of credibility issues and contradictory evidence, if the parties were still able to assert their rights and know the case to meet (at paras 51-55). The same conclusion applies in the case of [NAME_7] decisions ( [NAME_32] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 1768 at para 37 [ [NAME_32] ] citing [NAME_33] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 749 at para 31; [NAME_34] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2011 FC 647 at para 13; [NAME_35] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 FC 1140 at paras 18-19). As a result, the standard of review applicable in the context of the exercise of discretion to hold a hearing as permitted under an enabling statute remains unclear. That being said, and as discussed below, to the extent that a decision maker makes a credibility finding without affording a hearing under subsection 113(b) of the IRPA when the elements of section 167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227, Part -1 [ IRPR ] are made out, the decision may be quashed regardless of the applicable standard of review. [ 15 ] In any event, since I find that the [NAME_8]’s decision is unreasonable on the substance of their decision, I need not conclusively rule on the issue of the applicable standard of review.

IV. Analysis A. Applicable Statutory provisions [ 16 ] Under subsection 101(1)(e) of the IRPA , an individual is ineligible for an [NAME_11] hearing when entering from a safe third country. Subsection 101(1)(e) provides: Ineligibility 101 (1) A claim is ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division if (e) the claimant came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country designated by the regulations, other than a country of their nationality or their former habitual residence; Irrecevabilité 101 (1) La demande est irrecevable dans les cas suivants : e) arrivée, directement ou indirectement, d’un pays désigné par règlement autre que celui dont il a la nationalité ou dans lequel il avait sa résidence habituelle : [ 17 ] However, a claimant who is ineligible to be referred to the [NAME_11] can, nonetheless, submit a [NAME_7] application pursuant to subsection 112 (1) of the IRPA : Application for protection 112 (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1). Demande de protection 112 (1) La personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n’est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1). [ 18 ] When assessing a [NAME_7] application, the officer may hold a hearing pursuant to section 113(b) of the IRPA , which provides: 113 Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows: (b) a hearing may be held if the Minister, on the basis of prescribed factors, is of the opinion that a hearing is required; 113 Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit : b) une audience peut être tenue si le ministre l’estime requis compte tenu des facteurs réglementaires; [ 19 ] In determining whether a hearing should be held, an officer may consider the factors enumerated in section 167 of the IRPR , which provides: Hearing — prescribed factors 167 For the purpose of determining whether a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b) of the Act, the factors are the following: (a) whether there is evidence that raises a serious issue of the applicant’s credibility and is related to the factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act; (b) whether the evidence is central to the decision with respect to the application for protection; and (c) whether the evidence, if accepted, would justify allowing the application for protection. Facteurs pour la tenue d’une audience 167 Pour l’application de l’alinéa 113b) de la Loi, les facteurs ci-après servent à décider si la tenue d’une audience est requise : a) l’existence d’éléments de preuve relatifs aux éléments mentionnés aux articles 96 et 97 de la Loi qui soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité du demandeur; b) l’importance de ces éléments de preuve pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande de protection; c) la question de savoir si ces éléments de preuve, à supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que soit accordée la protection. B. The Officer did not make a “veiled” credibility finding [ 20 ] The Applicant argues that the [NAME_8] made “veiled credibility findings” by stating that her testimony was “vague” . I disagree. The use of the term “vague” does not automatically connote a credibility finding ( [NAME_32] at para 31). [ 21 ] I would also note that the use of the term “veiled credibility finding” is unhelpful in arguing that a negative ruling on an applicant’s credibility is couched as “insufficiency of evidence” . While the distinction is sometimes difficult to draw, the issue is whether the [NAME_8] made a negative credibility finding against an applicant, or not. If a negative credibility finding has been made, this Court has held that if the three elements of section 167 of the IRPR have been met because t here is a serious credibility issue regarding central evidence that could justify allowing the application , a hearing is generally required ( [NAME_36] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1995 at paras 8-10 citing [NAME_37] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FC 984 at para 34; [NAME_29] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1439 at paras 34-35, 41). A negative credibility finding is therefore erroneous absent of a hearing in these circumstances; but the Court must conclusively rule that the decision maker’s finding is a clear determination of a credibility issue sufficient to trigger section 167 of the IRPR . [ 22 ] Although the distinction between a negative credibility finding and a finding of insufficient evidence may be difficult to identify, Justice Gascon in [NAME_29] at paragraphs 41-44 , has elucidated the distinctions: [41] An adverse finding of credibility is not to be confused with a finding of insufficient probative evidence. As I stated in [NAME_38] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1068 at paragraph 35, “[a]n adverse finding of credibility is different from a finding of insufficient evidence or an applicant’s failure to meet his or her burden of proof”. It cannot be assumed that, in cases where an immigration officer finds that the evidence does not establish the applicant’s claim, the officer has not believed the applicant ( [NAME_39] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 FC 59 at para 32). [42] The term “credibility” is often erroneously used in a broader sense of insufficiency or lack of persuasive value. However, these are two different concepts. A credibility assessment goes to the reliability of the evidence. When there is a finding that the evidence is not credible, it is a determination that the source of the evidence (for example, an applicant’s testimony) is not reliable. Reliability of the evidence is one thing, but the evidence must also have sufficient probative value to meet the applicable standard of proof. A sufficiency assessment goes to the nature and quality of the evidence needed to be brought forward by an applicant in order to obtain relief, to its probative value, and to the weight to be given to the evidence by the trier of fact, be it a court or an administrative decision-maker. The law of evidence operates a binary system in which only two possibilities exist: a fact either happened or it did not. If the trier of fact is left in doubt, the doubt is resolved by the rule that one party carries the burden of proof and must ensure that there is sufficient evidence of the existence or non-existence of the fact to satisfy the applicable standard of proof. In FH v [NAME_40] , 2008 SCC 53 [ [NAME_40] ], the Supreme Court established that there is only one civil standard of proof in Canada, the balance of probabilities: evidence “must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge” and “must always be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the balance of probabilities test” ( [NAME_40] at paras 45-46). [43] The trier of fact may decide to assign little or no weight to the evidence, and hold that the legal standard has not been met. In the same vein, the presumption of truth or reliability of statements made by refugee applicants, as expressed in [NAME_41] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1979 CanLII 4098 (FCA), [1980] 2 FC 302 (FCA), cannot be equated with a presumption of sufficiency. Even if presumed credible and reliable, evidence from a refugee applicant cannot be presumed to be sufficient, in and of itself, to establish the facts on a balance of probabilities. This is for the trier of fact to determine. When frailties have been highlighted in the evidence, it is appropriate for the trier of fact to consider whether the evidentiary threshold has been satisfied by an applicant. By doing so, the trier of fact does not question the applicant’s credibility. Rather, the trier of fact determines whether the evidence provided, assuming it is credible, is sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the facts alleged ( [NAME_42] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 305 at paras 17-18). In other words, not being convinced by the evidence does not necessarily mean that the trier of fact disbelieves the applicant. [44] In [NAME_43] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 FC 1067 [ [NAME_43] ], Justice Zinn provided a useful synopsis of the interplay between weight, sufficiency, and credibility of the evidence. As he stated at paragraph 27, when a trier of fact assesses the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, he or she “is simply saying the evidence that has been tendered does not have sufficient probative value, either on its own or coupled with the other tendered evidence, to establish on the balance of probability, the fact for which it has been tendered”. It is not only evidence that has passed the test of reliability (i.e., credible evidence) that may be assessed for weight and sufficiency. It is perfectly open to a trier of fact to assess the weight and probative value of evidence without considering first whether it is credible or not ( [NAME_43] at para 26). This will occur when the trier of fact is of the view that the evidence is to be given little or no weight, even if it is found to be reliable. [ 23 ] The [NAME_8] accepted the Applicant’s evidence that she had participated in a protest in July of 2021, and that she was summoned by the police three times and issued a fine. The “vagueness” of her evidence is therefore not, as Justice Gascon explained, based on the reliability of her evidence. Rather, the [NAME_8] opined that even if the events occurred as stated by the Applicant, that evidence was not sufficiently “probing” or “sufficient” to discharge her onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that she was harassed as a result of her political opinion and therefore faced a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution, which is the applicable test under section 96 of the IRPA ( [NAME_44] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 881 at para 41 [ [NAME_44] ]). [ 24 ] In that regard, the [NAME_8] specifically stated that the Applicant “has not provided sufficient evidence that the attendance elevated her profile to bring adverse attention of the state or that she was targeted and mistreated after attending this protest” (Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] at p 10). For the reasons set out below, that conclusion is unreasonable. But it is not a negative credibility finding. [ 25 ] In ruling that the Applicant’s evidence was insufficient to discharge her evidentiary burden, the [NAME_8] did not necessarily disbelieve the Applicant or found her evidence to be unreliable. As stated by Justice Gascon in [NAME_29] at paragraph 37, this is not a situation where the language used by the [NAME_8] is obscure or where the analysis conducted can lead to variable interpretations nor is it a situation where, on its face, the Decision appears to be based on implicit, disguised or negative credibility findings (see also paras 36, 39). The [NAME_8] did not refer to inconsistencies in the Applicant’s evidence nor was there any suggestion that she had not been truthful. Otherwise, as held by Justice Diner in [NAME_30] at paragraph 12: “[u]ltimately, if simply reaching a result that conflicts with an applicant’s declared belief of persecution constitutes a credibility finding, then every denied [NAME_7] would call for an oral hearing” . C. The [NAME_8]’s substantive decision is unreasonable [ 26 ] While the [NAME_8] did not make an adverse credibility finding against the Applicant’s evidence in finding that she “has not provided sufficient evidence that the attendance elevated her profile to bring adverse attention of the state or that she was targeted and mistreated after attending this protest [… and] has brought forward insufficient objective evidence to reasonably demonstrate that the authorities or anyone in Cuba are currently seeking to cause her harm and I find that on a balance of probabilities, her profile is unlikely to attract the attention of [NAME_14]” (CTR at p 10, citations omitted), the [NAME_8]’s finding is not consistent with the evidence adduced nor with the legal constraints bearing on the decision. [ 27 ] The [NAME_8] found that there was insufficient evidence of a personalized risk and that the objective country condition evidence did not establish that the state would be interested in someone with the Applicant’s profile. [ 28 ] However, under section 96 of the IRPA , there is no need to establish a personalized risk. As Justice Gascon held in [NAME_45] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 749 [ [NAME_45] ] at paragraph 49, for a claim based on section 96 of the IRPA to succeed, “the applicant does not necessarily have to prove that he or she has personally been persecuted in the past or would be persecuted in the future; the applicant needs only show that his or her fear stems from wrongdoing committed or likely to be committed against members of a group to which he or she belongs, not that it stems from wrongdoing committed or likely to be committed against him or her. It is also sufficient to show that there is a reasonable possibility that the risk of harm associated with that fear will occur, that is, that there is more than a mere possibility that the risk will materialize” (citing [NAME_47] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1990 CanLII 7978 (FCA), [1990] 3 FC 250 at para 17 (FCA); [NAME_48] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2010 FC 559 at para 29; see also [NAME_44] at paras 46-48). [ 29 ] Moreover, an applicant under section 96 must establish that they have a well-founded fear of persecution. If relying on generalized country condition evidence, the applicant must demonstrate that they are sufficiently similarly situated to those described in the objective evidence. Once the link to the Convention ground is established and that there is objective evidence of individuals similarly situated in the country who are persecuted, that general objective country condition evidence regarding members of the group becomes sufficient to establish their own objective personal fear of similar persecution. There is no requirement that the individual must show that their risk is also “personalized” or “individualized” . Indeed, when general country condition evidence demonstrates that members of a class protected on Convention grounds are persecuted, membership in that class may be sufficient to show that the evidence of persecution also applies to the applicant personally (see also [NAME_49] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2020 FC 218 at paras 37 and 38). [ 30 ] In this case, the Applicant provided evidence establishing that she had participated in the July 2021 Protests, that she had been summoned three times by the Cuban police following the protests, that she had been questioned on her political opinion and issued a fine. The [NAME_8] did not question the Applicant’s credibility or the authenticity of the evidence. [ 31 ] Furthermore, the [NAME_8] accepted that the objective country condition evidence demonstrated that “Cuba is a country that restricts certain rights and freedoms, including […] freedom of speech, and freedom of expression and the exercise of one’s political conscience. I am also convinced that political activists and dissidents are at risk of harassment, violence, arrest and detention at the hands of the [NAME_13], and that detention conditions may be severely unfavourable. However, the applicant has brought forward insufficient objective evidence to reasonably demonstrate that the authorities or anyone in Cuba are currently seeking to cause her harm and I find that on a balance of probabilities, her profile is unlikely to attract the attention of [NAME_14]” (CTR at 10, citations omitted). [ 32 ] However, the objective evidence, notably excerpts of Tab 9.9 of the National Documentation Package [NDP] for Cuba, states that over 1400 people were detained and more than 700 remained behind bars as of July 2022 for their participation in the July 2021 Protests. Those individuals included more than 380 protesters and bystanders, including several children. Some specific examples include a pastor who has been sentenced to 7 years in prison, a fisherman sentenced to 8 years, a music student sentenced to 6 years, a grocery store employee sentenced to 10 years, a bricklayer sentenced to 4 years, a farmworker sentenced to 10 years, a [NAME_15]’s assistant sentenced to 15 years, a phone technician to 8 years, all for their participation in the July 2021 Protests (NDP, Item 9.9 Prison or Exile: Cuba’s Systemic Repression of July 2021 Demonstrators, Human Rights Watch, July 11, 2022, Certified Tribunal Record at pp 74, 79-97). [ 33 ] There is no factual finding made by the [NAME_8] distinguishing that objective evidence and ruling that the Applicant does not fit within that class. Most importantly, none of these individuals were “organizers” of the July 2021 Protests or of “elevated […] profile to bring adverse attention of the state” (CTR at p 10) as opined by the [NAME_8] and distinguishing with the Applicant’s profile. Rather, they all appear to be “regular” individuals or bystanders attending the July 2021 Protests, just like the Applicant. Yet they were convicted and sentenced to important and extended prison terms for their participation in the same protests that the Applicant participated in. [ 34 ] The Respondent argues that the Applicant provided no evidence that her profile was sufficient to be targeted by the [NAME_9] and that the fact that she was summoned three times to the police station and questioned, yet not arrested and convicted like the other individuals noted in the NDP, is indicative that the Applicant’s profile is not sufficiently important to be of interest for the authorities. [ 35 ] I agree that even in the context of political opinion and persecution under section 96 of the IRPA , an individual’s profile may be a relevant consideration. For instance, in the context of the support for Khalistan independence, this Court has held numerous times that an individual’s standing in the organization is important and that unless the individual has a high-profile, the NDP for India shows that the police typically does not track peaceful Khalistan supporters (see for example [NAME_50] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 601; [NAME_51] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1985; [NAME_52] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1939; [NAME_52] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 459; [NAME_52] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 244; [NAME_52] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 689). Therefore, even if individuals have political opinions that are contrary to the ruling government, and that the state does indeed persecute some members of the group on that Convention ground, not all are equally persecuted and capable of discharging their burden to establish a forward-looking risk of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA . [ 36 ] As a result, while it may be reasonable for a [NAME_8] to find insufficient evidence of a forward-looking risk of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA based on an individual’s profile, in this case, the objective country condition evidence required a careful and complete assessment. In the specific circumstances of this case, it was unreasonable for the [NAME_8] to conclude that the Applicant “has not provided sufficient evidence that the attendance elevated her profile to bring adverse attention of the state or that she was targeted and mistreated after attending this protest [… and] has brought forward insufficient objective evidence to reasonably demonstrate that the authorities or anyone in Cuba are currently seeking to cause her harm and I find that on a balance of probabilities, her profile is unlikely to attract the attention of [NAME_14]” (CTR at 10, citations omitted), when the objective country condition evidence demonstrated that individuals with a similar degree of participation in the July 2021 Protests had been imprisoned for a lengthy period of time. [ 37 ] The objective evidence therefore appears to establish that individuals similar to the Applicant’s profile were indeed arrested and sentenced to prison terms. Moreover, the [NAME_8] accepted the Applicant’s evidence that she had been summoned to the police station three times and asked about her political beliefs. She has, therefore, at once been singled out by the [NAME_14]. [ 38 ] The [NAME_8] failed to engage with the contradictory objective country condition evidence showing that Cubans who participated in the July 2021 Protests, even those with a “low” profile, have been arrested and imprisoned by the [NAME_14], and failed to explain why the Applicant’s situation differed from theirs such as to not raise a reasonable forward-looking risk of persecution in her specific case ( [NAME_53] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC) at para 17). The failure to grapple with contradictory evidence is sufficiently central to cause this court to lose confidence in the outcome and the [NAME_8]’s reasons are not sufficiently t ransparent, intelligible and justified to distinguish the Applicant’s situation from that of the others mentioned in the objective evidence, such as to provide an outcome that is reasonable ( Vavilov at paras 15, 100, 106; [NAME_16] at para 49). [ 39 ] Finally, I reject the argument of the Respondent that the fact that the Applicant was summoned three times to the police station and questioned on her political opinions, but was not arrested, is indicative that the Applicant’s profile is not sufficiently important to be of interest for the authorities. The [NAME_8]’s reasons do not make this specific finding of fact or distinction, after a careful consideration of the Applicant’s and the objective evidence. Just like it is not open for a reviewing court to do, the Respondent also cannot “fashion its own reasons in order to buttress the administrative decision” ( Vavilov at para 96).

V. Conclusion [ 40 ] This application for judicial review is granted and there is no question of general importance for certification.

JUDGMENT in IMM-15971-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review is granted. There is no question of general importance for certification. "[NAME_1]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-15971-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_3] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: MAY 20, 2026

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS: [NAME_1] J. DATED: MAY 25, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_54] For The APPLICANT [NAME_55] For The RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY_56] and Solicitors Calgary (Alberta) For The APPLICANT Attorney General of Canada Calgary (Alberta) For The RESPONDENT