Federal Court Overturns Refugee Appeal Decision Due to Health and Gender Concerns

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260623 Docket: IMM-6478-25 Citation: 2026 FC 857 Toronto, Ontario, June 23, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Brouwer BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review by [APPELLANT] and their adult daughter [NAME] [APPELLANT], citizens of Mexico who sought refugee protections in Canada. They assert, and I agree, that the decision of the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB] dismissing their refugee claim is unreasonable and must be set aside. [ 2 ] The Applicants fled criminal [NAME] extortion in Mexico City, arrived to Canada in 2022 and a short time after arrival made claims for refugee protection. However, while they were waiting for their hearing to be scheduled by Refugee Protection Division [[NAME]] of the IRB, [NAME] [APPELLANT] was diagnosed with breast cancer. At the time of the refugee hearing, October 10, 2024, [NAME] [APPELLANT] was in the care of her oncologist and had recently completed a course of radiation therapy. [ 3 ] The [NAME] determined that although the family’s story about what happened to them was credible, they did not qualify for refugee protection in Canada because they could avoid the risk to their lives and safety presented by the [NAME] who had targeted them by relocating to Mérida, a city 1300 km from Mexico City. The family appealed this finding that they had an internal flight alternative [IFA] to [NAME], and in support of their appeal they adduced updated evidence regarding the availability of medical treatment for breast cancer in Mexico. [ 4 ] [NAME] confirmed the [NAME]’s determination. [NAME] agreed with the [NAME] that the evidence did not establish that the [NAME] would be motivated to pursue the family in Mérida. [NAME] accepted that violence against women is not just a tool of the particular [NAME] feared by the family but is widespread in Mexico, it determined that [NAME] [APPELLANT] and Ms. [APPELLANT] had not established that they would face “a serious possibility of gender-based violence in Mérida” nor that they have “an intersectional profile that would face a serious possibility of treatment amounting to persecution. The [NAME] have not established that they would face a risk of harm in Mérida for any other reason.” [ 5 ] [NAME] found further that it would not be unreasonable to expect the family to relocate to Mérida, noting that to find otherwise “requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize [their] life and safety.” [NAME] accepted new report as evidence showing that “the health sector in Mexico ‘at times, has not always been up to the needs’ of breast cancer patients, including mention of long waits, late diagnoses, indifference, and lack of empathy,” but highlighted that the report “also mentions guidelines being put in place to progressively improve the processes in place for patients and survivors of breast cancer in Mexico.” [ 6 ] [NAME] concluded, regarding the availability of an IFA in Mérida, that “[t]he [NAME] have not met the high threshold of establishing that conditions in Mérida would jeopardize their lives or safety.” [NAME] added: “The importance of not lowering this threshold has been reiterated,” citing [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (C.A.) , 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA) at paras 15-16 [ [NAME] ] and [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (C.A.) , 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA) [ [NAME] ].

I. Issues [ 7 ] The Applicants initially set out no fewer than eight issues for judicial review in their memorandum of argument; however, the determinative issue is whether the [NAME]’s IFA analysis was reasonable. [ 8 ] [NAME]’s decision is reviewable on a reasonableness standard. [ADDRESS] must determine whether the decision is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and is justified in relation to the facts and law bearing upon it ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME],  2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [ [NAME] ]).

II. Analysis [ 9 ] Well-established jurisprudence cited by [NAME] establishes that, when a refugee decision maker identifies a potential IFA, the refugee claimant (or here, the [NAME]) must demonstrate that either (a) there is a serious possibility of their persecution or harm in the proposed location; or, (b) it would be unreasonable in all the circumstances for them to relocate there ( [NAME] at para 597). The Federal Court of Appeal explained in [NAME] that this second prong entails asking “whether, given the persecution in the claimant’s part of the country, it is objectively reasonable to expect him or her to seek safety in a different part of the country before seeking a haven in Canada or elsewhere” (at para 598). [ 10 ] [NAME] also relied on a subsequent well-known Federal Court of Appeal decision, [NAME] , for the proposition that only a threat to life or safety could suffice to meet the standard of unreasonableness under the second prong of the test (at para 15). It was on this basis that [NAME] determined that it would not be unreasonable [NAME] to relocate to Mérida, and it is on this understanding of what is required for an IFA to be considered unreasonable that the Minister defends [NAME]’s determination despite admitting that that the decision may be lacking in sympathy [NAME]’ circumstances. [ 11 ] The Applicants argue that [NAME]’s consideration of the circumstances facing the Applicants, in particular [NAME] [APPELLANT]’s cancer diagnosis and treatment, was unreasonable. I agree. In my view, [NAME] misunderstood the analysis it was required to apply, and this misunderstanding led it to find that the Applicants had not demonstrated that it would be unreasonable to require them to return to Mérida. [ 12 ] The test laid out in [NAME] was explicitly described as “a flexible one, that takes into account the particular situation of the claimant and the particular country involved” (at para 597). As the Federal Court of Appeal explained: “[T]he question to be answered is, would it be unduly harsh to expect this person, who is being persecuted in one part of his country, to move to another less hostile part of the country before seeking refugee status abroad?” (at para 598). [NAME] has never been explicitly varied, nor has it been overturned. Although it is true, as asserted by the Respondent, that in [RESPONDENT], the Federal Court of Appeal emphasized the high threshold to be met under the second prong of the IFA test , I share the view expressed by my colleague Justice Angus Grant in his carefully nuanced judgment in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 818 at paras 26-36 [ [NAME] ], and adopted by Justice Michael Battista in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1909 at para 10, that [NAME] did not “overturn the prior jurisprudence or materially change the test associated with the reasonableness standard,” nor did it create “a narrow, standalone minimum threshold requiring an individual to demonstrate that their actual life, or physical safety would be imperilled in the IFA location” ( [NAME] at para 33). [ 13 ] Although an objective test with a high threshold, the evaluation of whether it would be reasonable to expect a particular claimant to relocate to the proposed IFA nevertheless requires that decision makers engage seriously with the realities faced by the claimants before them. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has explained in its Guidelines on International Protection No. 4:  “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative”  within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/04 (23 July 2003) [ Guideline ]: In addition to there not being a fear of persecution in the internal flight or relocation alternative, it must be reasonable in all the circumstances for the claimant to relocate there. This test of ‘reasonableness’ has been adopted by many jurisdictions. It is also referred to as a test of ‘undue hardship’ or ‘meaningful protection.’ [ 14 ] As observed by Justice Grant, the Guideline identifies several factors to consider as part of this evaluation, including: ●Whether the individual would be able to lead a “relatively normal life without facing undue hardship.” ●The individual’s personal circumstances. ●Psychological trauma arising from past persecution. ●Safety and security in the IFA location. ●Respect for human rights. ●Economic survival. ( [NAME] at para 35) [ 15 ] [NAME]’s sole focus on whether the Applicants had “met the high threshold of establishing that conditions in Mérida would jeopardize their lives or safety” fails to engage with the range of factors relevant to the analysis, most notably [NAME] [APPELLANT]’s cancer diagnosis and treatment status, combined with her gender. Despite explicitly acknowledging the obligation to apply an intersectional analysis, [NAME] applied a narrowly-constrained threshold for unreasonableness based on a single line from [NAME] that sidestepped the actual question to be answered: whether, taking into account “the particular situation of the claimant” including in this case the intersection of [NAME] [APPELLANT]’s cancer diagnosis, gender and need for ongoing treatment “would it be unduly harsh to expect this person, who is being persecuted in one part of [her] country, to move to another less hostile part of the country before seeking refugee status abroad?” ( [NAME] at para 598). [ 16 ] [NAME] at para 90 and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 66 teach that a decision maker’s failure to consider the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context on a particular decision will render the decision unreasonable. I must therefore set aside [NAME]’s decision and remit the matter to a different panel for redetermination in accordance with these reasons. [ 17 ] Although the Applicants identified a number of other errors by [NAME], judicial restraint weighs against deciding more than is required to resolve the judicial review, and the Applicants have not presented any reason for doing so. [ 18 ] Neither party proposed a serious question of general importance for certification under s. 79 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27, and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-6478-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application is granted. The appeal is remitted to a differently constituted panel for re-determination in accordance with these reasons. No question of general importance is certified. "Andrew J. Brouwer" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: IMM-6478-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT], [NAME] [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: toronto, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: february 25, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: BROUWER j. DATED: JUNE 23, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [[NAME]] [NAME] & [NAME], [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent