Federal Court Orders Redetermination of Work Permit Decision Due to Unreasonable Ruling

OUTCOME: Allowed

Date: 20260526 Docket: IMM-4083-25 Citation: 2026 FC 682 Ottawa, Ontario, May 26, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant, Ms. [APPELLANT], is a 21-year-old citizen of Iran, whose parents reside in Canada on [NAME] permits [[NAME]]. She seeks the judicial review of a decision by an Officer of Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada [Officer] dated February 12, 2025, [Decision], refusing her application for an open [NAME] [NAME] [OWP Application] under the [NAME]. The Officer found that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate that she would leave Canada at the end of her authorized stay, as required by paragraph 200(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227 [ IRPR ]. The Officer indicated the two following factors: You do not have significant family ties outside Canada. Your current employment situation does not show that you are financially established in your country of residence. [ 2 ] The Global Case Management System (GCMS) notes, which form part of the reasons for the Decision ( [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 2031 [ [NAME] [NAME] ] at para 7, citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1933 at para 9 [ [NAME] ]), are short. They do not mention any specific document that the Applicant submitted, or any other information contained in her application. They read, in their totality, as follows: I have reviewed the application. I have considered the following factors in my decision. The applicant does not have significant family ties outside Canada. It is noted that both parents are in Canada presently on [NAME]. The applicant's current employment situation does not show that they are financially established in their country of residence, taking into consideration the stability of the applicant's emplyment/personal history. It is noted that applicant is a post secondary student and based on balance would rely on parents for support Weighing the factors in this application, I am not satisfied that the applicant will depart Canada at the end of the period authorized for their stay. For the reasons above, I have refused this application. [ 3 ] The Applicant submits that the Decision is unreasonable for four reasons. First and foremost, the Officer erred in law as concerns the applicable criteria. Second, they ignored her family ties to Iran as well as the assets (in the form of both “valuable real estate” and liquidities in her [COMPANY] account) that she owns there. Third, the Officer erred in finding that her parents “lack stability of employment in Canada” . Fourth, the Decision lacks internal coherence and logic for the Officer acknowledged that Ms. [APPELLANT] is a student who will rely on her parents while faulting her for not having stable employment in Iran and ignoring her [NAME]’s employment. [ 4 ] During the hearing, counsel [NAME] focussed on the first ground identified above, which they alleged is an “obvious” error in law. The Applicant pleads that, while she applied under the “Labor Market Impact Assessment exemption code [NAME] of the [NAME]” which is meant to “enable workers in Canada to reunite with their family members” , the Officer failed to apply the “different set of eligibility and documentary requirements” specific to this program. According to the Applicant, “the [NAME] program does NOT prescribe the tests such as “family ties” or “Employment situation”; rather, it focuses on the genuineness of the relationship and the parents’ employment in Canada, all of which have been satisfied in the case at bar” [Uppercase in the original]. No case law was cited to support this claim, except for the [NAME] principle that operational manuals and instructions ought to guide decision makers in the exercise of their discretion -a proposal for which the Applicant cites three decisions including [APPELLANT] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1726 at para 26. [ 5 ] The Respondent, the [NAME] [NAME] of Canada [AGC] instead submits that the Officer reasonably assessed the evidence and concluded that the Applicant failed to discharge her burden of proving that she would leave Canada at the end of her authorized stay. They plead that the Officer did not err in law for, no matter the exemption code at play, the matter was still governed by section 200 of the IRPR, so the Applicant still had to prove that she would leave Canada at the end of her stay. They submit that the factors assessed by the Officer were those “manifestly relevant” to assessing the strength of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s ties to Iran, which is “the focus” of the inquiry in such a case (citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2011 FC 872 at para 14). Her parents’ presence in Canada was relevant to assess the strength of her family ties outside Canada and her status as a student without employment in Iran was relevant to evaluate her financial establishment in that country. [ 6 ] Ms. [APPELLANT]’s OWP Application was submitted and received by [NAME] on June 27, 2024. It was accompanied by a letter from her counsel which reiterated that the application was made pursuant to the “[NAME] exemption code” and summarized its key points including 1) that the Applicant’s goal was to reunite with her parents; 2) that she has “established family ties” to Iran given her “strong emotional bonds with her grandmother and relative in Tehran” , as well as to many friends and classmates; and 3) that she “has economic attachments to Iran” since she owns real estate there. [ 7 ] This application for judicial review will be granted. The Officer’s reasons are inadequate and do not support a reasonable Decision.

II. Standard of review [ 8 ] While the Respondent identifies reasonableness as the applicable standard of review, the Applicant pleads that two different standards of review apply: reasonableness for the “logical error” and correctness for the alleged error of law she identified. She submits no authority in support of her submission regarding correctness, but instead relies on decisions that speaks to the importance of judicial review for the rule of law and our constitutional government in [NAME] ( Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v [NAME] (Village) , 1991 CanLII 82 (SCC); [NAME] v [NAME] , 2008 SCC 9 at para 27). Her submission on this point must fail. Under the framework set out by the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME],  2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ], errors of law are to be assessed on a reasonableness standard ( [NAME] at para 115; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 683 at para 16). [ 9 ] Hence, the Court finds that the appropriate standard of review that applies to the merits of administrative decisions, such as those regarding open [NAME] permits, is reasonableness, the whole in accordance with [NAME] (see also  [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [ [NAME] ] ; [NAME] at paras 14-17;  [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1746 at para 11 [ [NAME] ]). The recognized exceptions to this presumption do not apply in the present matter ( [COMPANY] and [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2022 SCC 30 at paras 27-28 ). [ 10 ] As stated by Justice Gascon in [NAME]: [14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ([NAME] at para 46; [NAME] at para 64; [NAME] at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” ([NAME] at para 99, citing notably [NAME] v [NAME], 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74). [15] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion ([NAME] at paras 46–47; [NAME] at paras 58, 60; [NAME] at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” ([NAME] at para 13). [16] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires [NAME] to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence ([NAME] at para 57; [NAME] at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker ([NAME] at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]), 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). [17] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” ([NAME] at para 100). [ 11 ] Given that [NAME] Officers have recognized expertise in analyzing and assessing [NAME] applications, the Courts must give considerable deference to decision makers when reviewing their discretionary decisions, especially since such decisions usually turn on questions of fact ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1668 at para 28;  [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 479 at para 19 citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2016 FC 690 [ [NAME] ] at para 12 ). [ 12 ] Although the duty to provide reasons when evaluating temporary resident [NAME] [TRV] applications including [NAME] [NAME] applications is minimal so the reasons can be brief, officers must still provide sufficient reasons demonstrating that their decisions are transparent, justified and intelligible ( [NAME] at para 103; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 2019 at para 18; [NAME] at para 16 citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 620 [[NAME]] at para 7; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 733 at para 36 citing [NAME] at para 32; He v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1027 at paras 18, 20)

III. The Decision is not reasonable A. The Officer did not err in law and apply foreign criteria [ 13 ] First, although the Applicant submits the “[NAME] exemption code” in the supporting letter joined to her application, it should be noted that exemption codes are not identified in the IRPR . They are simply internal administrative codes used by [NAME] in the context of processing matters. As a result, procedures on [NAME]’s website state the following: [NAME] or [NAME] [NAME] holders do not have a field in the application to indicate for which [NAME] ([NAME]) [NAME] [NAME] category (code C41/[NAME] or C47/C48) they are applying. If the applicant indicated in their application that they are family members of a worker, the officer must enter the correct category code that relates to the proof provided in their application that shows the skill level of the principal applicant. Officers should not be refusing applications because the labour market impact assessment (LMIA) exemption code is incorrect. The open [NAME] [NAME] applicant is not responsible for selecting the correct administrative code; that is the responsibility of [NAME]. [ 14 ] That being said, and as Justice Lagacé stated in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 FC 754 [ [NAME] ] at paragraph 20, “there is a legal presumption that a foreign national seeking to enter Canada is presumed to be an immigrant, and it is up to him to rebut this presumption” ( Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ] at paragraph 20(1)b); IRPR at paragraph 200(1)b)). As is clear from the text of paragraph 20(1)b) of IRPA , this requirement applies to all foreign nationals “who seek to enter or remain in Canada” . Paragraph 200(1)b) of the IRPR confirms that it applies to anyone seeking a [NAME] [NAME]. This is true even for TRV that are meant to enable family reunification such as spousal [NAME] permits (see [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 225 at paras 13-18). [ 15 ] Hence, the Applicant was required to establish, inter alia , that on a balance of probabilities she would leave Canada by the end of the period authorized ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 3 at para 17; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1457 at para 17; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 1105 [ [NAME] ] at para 10; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 570 [ [NAME] ] at para 12 citing [NAME] at para 22; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 479 at para 15). The Officer determined that the Applicant failed to do so here. [ 16 ] Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the strength of family ties in the country of origin is a proper consideration when assessing whether a person has proven that they will leave the country at the end of their authorized stay ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 372 at para 30 as cited in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigation ), 2020 FC 451 at para 18, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2026 FC 69 at para 16). [ 17 ] Also contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, a person’s integration into their country of origin’s job market (and their employment situation, including how stable it is) is a relevant consideration. In fact, “economic, social and professional” ties to the country of origin are pull factors that can help assess whether a person is likely to leave Canada (see [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1874 at para 63; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1181 at para 16). [ 18 ] The Applicant did not point to jurisprudence that would stand for the proposal that officers must explicitly grapple with the fact that a [NAME] was sought for the purpose of family reunification, or under a specific program or exemption created to facilitate such reunion, when they dismiss it on the ground that the person failed to prove that they will leave Canada at the end of their authorized stay. To the contrary, [NAME] found that the Officer who dismissed an application for a spousal [NAME] [NAME] on such grounds did not have to engage with the fact that family reunification is one of the purposes of the IRPA ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1254 at paras 10-13). This is again congruent with the fact that all immigrants, including those who come to visit family, must demonstrate they intend to leave the country when required ( [NAME] paras 13-18). [ 19 ] In her memorandum, the Applicant included a screenshot and a hyperlink to the guidelines titled “Family members of foreign nationals authorized to [NAME] in high-skilled occupations (TEER 0, 1, 2 or 3) – [R205(c)(ii) – C41 and [NAME]] – [NAME] – [NAME] ([NAME])” [Guidelines] which are published on [NAME]’s website. She submits that the fact that the eligibility criteria listed on this page do not speak of family ties or employment in the home country, shows that the Officer imported criteria that do not apply to those who apply as children of foreign workers. [ 20 ] First, these Guidelines are not properly in evidence before this Court. They should not have been included in the memorandum for evidence must be introduced by way of affidavit, as section 174 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [ Rules ] states “Every pleading shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies, but shall not include evidence by which those facts are to be proved .” [Underlining added]. In short, for documents to be validly entered in evidence they must be attached to an affidavit. The content of a memorandum is not evidence ( [NAME] c Canada ([NAME]) , 2025 CF 1186 at paras 17-19 [decision currently available only in French] citing Canada (National Revenue) v [COMPANY] , 2023 CanLII 110323 (FC) at para 27; [NAME] v Canada (The [NAME] [NAME]) , 2023 FC 1710 at paras 14-15; [COMPANY] v [NAME] (The) , 1998 CanLII 9120 (FC) at paras 5–6). That said, the Respondent confirms that they do not object to this document being introduced and that it represents correctly what can be found on the public website. [ 21 ] Second, the Guidelines and other instructions are not binding, although they can guide decision makers in the exercise of their discretion, they are not law ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 37 at para 25 and jurisprudence cited therein; [NAME] at para 14 and jurisprudence cited therein; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 2009 at para 19 [ [NAME] ]). Moreover, the Guidelines as they appear are not meant to lay out a comprehensive list of the applicable criteria, instead they explicitly refer to section 200 of the IRPR by stating “ [NAME] permits shall be issued if all of the requirements stated in section R200 are met. Therefore, refusal grounds should be linked to one of those requirements” . [ 22 ] The present matter can therefore be distinguished from [NAME] and other cases in which the Federal Court quashed [NAME] decisions that imported eligibility requirements not found in the applicable laws, regulations and guidelines such as [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1734 [ [NAME] ] and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1928 [ [NAME] ]. Again, given that paragraphs 20(1)a) of the IRPA requires that any [NAME] who is not a permanent resident establish they will leave the country when seeking to come to Canada, and paragraph 200(1)b) of the IRPR reiterates the same requirement for the issuance of all [NAME] permits, the Officer cannot be said to have applied a foreign criteria. [ 23 ] Lastly, the Court is not convinced by the Applicant’s argument included in her Reply memorandum, that the Decision is unreasonable because it ignores “the right of a dependent child to live with her parents, which is unfair and unjust” . She pleads “when a [NAME] is granted [NAME] to stay in Canada, they gain the right to bring with them their dependent children” , a “right” which she submits is a key consideration that justified the creation of the [NAME]. In fact, “including a child’s inherent right to live with their parents, the Minister has decided to design a special program for dependent children” and the definition of “dependent children” at section 1.1 of the IRPR exists to create a “separate class” whose “raison d’être” is to guarantee that right. This argument is submitted in support of the Applicant’s claim that the Officer should not have enquired into whether the Applicant had proven that she would leave Canada in due course. Once again, no case law is submitted in support of these arguments. The Applicant does not adduce either any evidence regarding the intent or considerations that would have led to the establishment of the [NAME], not of her claim that [NAME] created a “right” to live with one’s parents, if they are granted a [NAME] [NAME] in Canada. This unsupported argument must fail. Taken on its face, it would create a standalone right for all dependant children of someone currently in the country, to come and live in Canada, or vice versa. [ 24 ] That said, nothing in the present reasons should be construed as indicating that an Officer can simply fail to consider a [NAME]’s stated purpose of travel -be it family reunification or anything else- or fail to follow the internal guidelines that govern the applicant’ specific situation. In fact, the purpose of travel is important even when the application is not made under a program that is specifically set up to favor family reunification. For example, it has been found unreasonable to dismiss the application of someone who seeks a temporary resident [NAME] to visit relatives on the sole ground that they have strong family ties in Canada (see e.g. [NAME] (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 760 at para 32 [ [NAME] ] ). As more detailed hereinafter, in the present matter, the Officer appears to have failed to give Ms. [APPELLANT]’s purpose of travel sufficient importance. B. The Officer either failed to consider some of the evidence, or failed to articulate why they deemed the evidence insufficient, and they erred in their evaluation of family ties [ 25 ] [ADDRESS]’s jurisprudence is clear that decision makers are presumed to have considered all of the evidence before them ( [NAME] at para 33, citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 958 at para 35 and jurisprudence cited therein; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 773 at para 22; [NAME] at para 28; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 1998 CanLII 8667 (FC) at para 17; [NAME] v Canada ( Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ), [1993] FCJ No 598 (FCA)). [ 26 ] As Justice Little explained in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 160 at paragraphs 48-49, all omissions are not fatal. Instead, in accordance with [NAME] , “the more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the agency’s reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact ‘without regard to the evidence’” (para 17). Justice Little goes on to state: “In [NAME] language, the Court may lose confidence in the decision if the factual finding was untenable in light of the factual constraints, or if the decision maker fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence in reaching its decision” ( [NAME] at para 49). Recently, in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 625, Justice Grammond explained that [NAME]-[NAME] shall be read as mandating that decision makers consider ““the elephant in the room” that is, evidence that so overwhelmingly contradicts the decision maker’s findings that it calls for an explanation” (at para 27). In the present matter, while the Officer made the [NAME] comment that they reviewed the application, none of the evidence submitted by the Applicant is discussed. [ 27 ] In the circumstances of the present case, given the evidence regarding the Applicant’s financial ties to Iran that the Officer seems to have ignored, the Decision will be set aside. Although the evidence left unaddressed on this point might not clearly contradict any of the Officer’s key findings, this is because the barebone Decision essentially makes no findings with respect to the key elements of the OWP Application. Furthermore, it could be said that the proof of property ownership in Iran can contradict the finding that the Applicant’s economic ties to her home country are insufficient. The situation in the case at bar resembles the one in [NAME] (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2020 FC 62 (at para 16). The Decision is also unreasonable as regards the Applicant’s family ties to her country. [ 28 ] With respect to the Applicant’s assets in Iran, she submitted 1) two deeds establishing that she owns, in her own name, two apartments of respectively 47.5 square meters and 54 square meters both located in Tehran for a total value of over $424,000 Canadian dollars; and 2) [COMPANY] statements alongside a letter from a [COMPANY] purportedly showing that she holds assets worth just over 3.7 million Rials (that is $8,697.73 Canadian dollars) in an account in her own name. The valuation of the apartments is only provided by counsel, with no clear evidence in support since the deeds of property do not include any estimated value. This may have been one of the grounds on which the Officer could have concluded that the Applicant had not, in fact, proven the sufficiency of her economic ties to Iran. However, it is not mentioned. Instead, the entirety of the Officer’s “reasoning” as concerns her economic situation reads as follows: The applicant’s current employment situation does not show that they are financially established in their country of residence, taking into consideration the stability of the applicant’s employment/personal history. It is noted that applicant is a post secondary student and based on balance would rely on parents for support. [ 29 ] The Officer needed to explain why he did not find the documents provided as proof of funds and proof of economic ties to Iran sufficient. The reasons do not exhibit the degree of responsiveness to the Applicant’s evidence that [APPELLANT] requires. They leave the Decision unjustified for they do not explain why the Officer concluded that the evidence did not suffice to discharge the Applicant’s evidentiary burden. Even when the reasons are read holistically, it is far from clear that “there is [a] line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived” ( [NAME] at paras 102-103, 126). Again, these requirements apply even in the context of [NAME] decisions ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 198 [ [NAME] ] at para 28). [ 30 ] Although this is typically said in the context of evidence that contradicts some explicit finding, it remains true here also; the reviewing Court cannot be left to speculate regarding what was or wasn’t considered ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 123 at para 30 citing [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1364 at para 14; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 53 at paras 20-21; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 630 [ [NAME] ] at paras 33-35; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 147 at para 25; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 610 at paras 33-34). As they stand, the reasons given would require the Court to speculate and attempt to find a reasoning that would support the outcome reached, but as stated in [NAME] : “it is not enough for the outcome of a decision to be justifiable . Where reasons for a decision are required, the decision must also be justified , by way of those reasons, by the decision maker to those to whom the decision applies.” [Italics in the original] ( [NAME] at para 86, see also para 98). The reasons must “explain how and why the decision was made” because they “help show affected parties that their arguments have been considered and demonstrate that the decision was made in a fair and lawful manner” rather than arbitrarily, and are “the primary mechanism by which administrative decision makers show that their decisions are reasonable -both to the affected parties and to the [NAME]” ( [NAME] at paras 79-81). [ 31 ] As concerns her remaining family ties in Iran, the Applicant has also convincingly rebutted the presumption that all of the evidence she submitted was considered. In this regard, the Applicant’s counsel’ supporting letter explained that she “has strong emotional bonds with her grandmother and relatives in Tehran, Iran” . A few family pictures were attached to support this allegation. This may be slim, but it was evidence that directly contradicted the Officer’s conclusion that Ms. [APPELLANT] “does not have significant family ties outside Canada” . However, there is no acknowledgment of the contradictory evidence, and no explanation as to why this evidence was found to be insufficient. Again, this is enough to warrant quashing the Decision. [ 32 ] But there is more. As mentioned above, when the purpose of a TRV is to visit family members, strong family connections in Canada will often come into play. Our jurisprudence has repeatedly reasserted that these should not, alone, be a sufficient reason to refuse a TRV ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 FC 400 at para 20; [NAME] at para 12; [NAME] at para 32; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 1569 at para 16; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration ), 2026 FC 390 at para 19). Given the cursory nature of the reasons and the failure to mention the evidence that established that the Applicant has at least some familial ties to Iran, this aspect of the Decision seems to rely on a single fact: her parents are in Canada. This is improper. [ 33 ] Further, the fact that she will rely on her parents for financial support is mentioned, but it seems to have been taken as a negative factor proving her lack of self-sufficiency. It should not be. As Justice Shore concluded in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1230 at paragraph 34: “If anything, the Officer should have considered the financial support the Applicant’s family provides as a positive factor. At the very least, the Officer should have justified his/her reasoning: it is unreasonable to infer that Applicant will remain in the country illegally simply because he has strong family ties in Canada” . It should be noted that here, there was ample evidence regarding the financial means of the Applicant’s parents and their ability to support her. [ 34 ] In summary, in the present matter, given the limited reasons provided, the Court simply cannot understand why the Officer found the evidence on file insufficient to prove that the Applicant would leave the country in due time, specifically as it relates to her family and economic ties to Iran. C. The Officer did not find that the Applicant’s parents lack stable employment [ 35 ] Given the above, and while it is not necessary to dispose of this judicial review application, the Court agrees with the Respondent that “[t]he Applicant’s claim that the officer found that the “Applicant’s parents lack stability of employment in Canada” is without foundation in the officer’s reasons” . The Officer correctly noted that Ms. [APPELLANT]’s parents have open [NAME] permits in Canada. That is all. The words stable and stability are not used except [NAME]’s own employment history, and her [NAME]’s [NAME] in Canada is not discussed further. D. The Decision is not internally incoherent as concerns the Applicant’ status as a student [ 36 ] Although, again, this has no bearing on the ultimate disposition of this matter, the Court is of the opinion that it was not incoherent for the Officer to note that a) the Applicant is a student and b) she does not have stable employment in Iran. Contrary to the Applicant’ submissions, this does not demonstrate that the Officer “expected the Applicant, who is admittedly a student, to be stably employed” . It only shows that the Officer looked at her level of integration into the local job market as a relevant consideration, which, as explained above, is proper.

IV. Conclusion [ 37 ] The refusal to issue the [NAME] [NAME] that the Applicant sought does not appear to be based on the evidence in the file, nor does the fact that she was seeking to reunite with her parents seem to have been taken into account. The refusal is not justified by intelligible and transparent reasons. The Decision is therefore unreasonable.

Accordingly, the application for judicial review will be granted and the matter will be sent back to a different officer for redetermination. [ 38 ] Pursuant to section 22 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22, no costs shall be awarded on applications for leave and judicial review except for “special reasons” . Although the Applicant sought costs against the Minister, she does not articulate which exceptional circumstances would justify such an award. The situation is the same as in [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2025 FC 1815 at paragraph 38. No costs will be awarded.

JUDGMENT in file IMM-4083-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is granted. No question of [NAME] important is certified. No costs are awarded. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-4083-23 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: toronto, ontario DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 27, 2026

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: MAY 26, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] [NAME] [NAME] [APPELLANT] [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [APPELLANT] (Ontario) [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] of Canada Toronto (Ontario) For The Respondent