Federal Court Rejects Challenge to Judge Misconduct Decision

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260522 Docket: T-568-24 Citation: 2026 FC 657 Montréal, Quebec, May 22, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The applicant, Dr. [APPELLANT], is seeking judicial review of a decision dated February 27, 2024 [Decision] rendered by the Honourable Tracey K. DeWare, Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench of [NAME], in her capacity as Vice-Chair of the [NAME] of the Canadian Judicial Council [[NAME]]. The Decision dismissed Dr. [APPELLANT]’s complaint [Complaint] alleging misconduct by the [NAME] of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador [NLSC]. [ 2 ] In his Complaint, Dr. [APPELLANT] made various allegations regarding Justice Noel’s conduct in relation to a decision issued on June 9, 2023, in which Justice Noel refused to recuse himself in a litigation opposing Dr. [APPELLANT] to the [COMPANY] [[NAME]], Dr. [APPELLANT]’s former employer. [ 3 ] In the Decision, the [NAME] dismissed Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint because four of the grounds he raised did not concern judicial conduct but instead fell within the ambit of judicial decision-making and the exercise of judicial discretion [Conduct Grounds]. As such, they fell outside the [NAME]’s mandate. With respect to Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegation of discrimination based on his ethnic origin [Discrimination Ground], the [NAME] found that a mere allegation of discrimination was not sufficient and that Dr. [APPELLANT] did not provide any evidence to show prima facie discrimination. [ 4 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] submits that the [NAME] erred in dismissing his Complaint. More specifically, he maintains that the [NAME] committed the following reviewable errors: (i) the [NAME] failed to properly distinguish between matters that constitute judicial decision-making and matters that threaten the [NAME] as a whole; (ii) the Decision lacks internal coherence and a rational chain of analysis regarding two of the Conduct Grounds; and (iii) the [NAME] denied him procedural fairness by providing an incomplete certified tribunal record [CTR], by delaying the publication of its new review procedures on the [NAME]’s website and by notifying the Honourable Raymond P. Whalen, Chief Justice of the NLSC, of the Complaint. [ 5 ] For the following reasons, Dr. [APPELLANT]’s application for judicial review will be dismissed. Though the Decision could perhaps have been more detailed, I am satisfied that it is reasonable and procedurally fair. In essence, the issues raised by Dr. [APPELLANT] in his Complaint are matters subject to appellate review and not of the nature reviewable by the [NAME]. I [NAME] that the [NAME] meaningfully grappled with Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint and dealt with Dr. [APPELLANT]’s central issues and concerns, thereby meeting the requirements of justification and transparency at the heart of Canadian administrative law. Under the standard of responsive justification, all key arguments raised by a party deserve an answer from the decision maker at hand, however poor such arguments may be, and the [NAME]’s Decision meets this standard. There are no grounds warranting this Court’s intervention.

II. Background A. The factual context [ 6 ] Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint against Justice Noel arose in the context of a lengthy legal dispute before the NLSC between him and [NAME], in which Justice Noel was the case management judge. [ 7 ] In 2023, Dr. [APPELLANT] requested Justice Noel’s recusal as case management judge, which led to the decision in [APPELLANT] v [COMPANY] , 2023 NLSC 86 [ [APPELLANT[NAME] ], aff’d 2024 NLCA 44 [ [APPELLANT] ], leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada [SCC] dismissed, no 41632 (June 5, 2025), in which Justice Noel denied Dr. [APPELLANT]’s request. [ 8 ] In [APPELLANT[NAME] , Justice Noel notably indicated that he discovered, after tracking email communications among the parties, that he had inadvertently signed an earlier version of an order granting leave to [NAME] to file an application for the sealing of records. He therefore attached two different versions of said order to his decision. Dr. [APPELLANT] took issue with this, believing that this error somehow revealed that Justice Noel held ex parte communications with counsel for [NAME] and demonstrated a failure to protect the integrity of court documents. [ 9 ] On June 22, 2023, the [NAME] , RSC 1985, c J-1 was amended by An Act to amend the [NAME] , [NAME] 2023, c 18. The next day, the Canadian Judicial Council Procedures for the Review of Complaints or Allegations About Federally Appointed Judges [2023 Review Procedures] came into force but they were only made public on the [NAME]’s website on October 19, 2023. All complaints received by the [NAME] on or after June 22, 2023 were thus processed under the amended [NAME] and the 2023 Review Procedures ( An Act to amend the [NAME] at sections 14–16). [ 10 ] On July 4, 2023, Dr. [APPELLANT] submitted his Complaint against Justice Noel to the [NAME], in which he made the following allegations in relation to Justice Noel’s decision in [APPELLANT[NAME] : (1) a failure to protect the integrity of court documents; (2) discrimination based on his ethnic origin; (3) provision of inaccurate information to him; (4) publication of confidential information; and (5) refusal to provide information. The four allegations other than discrimination constitute the Conduct Grounds. [ 11 ] The Complaint was first reviewed by a [NAME] screening officer, pursuant to section 89 of the [NAME] . The [NAME] screening officer completed her review on September 21, 2023, concluding that the Complaint had to be considered further since it notably alleged discrimination. Subsection 90(3) and section 91 of the [NAME] indeed require that a complaint be referred to a reviewing member when it alleges discrimination. A [NAME] reviewing member (in this case, Chief Justice DeWare) was thus designated to handle the Complaint. [ 12 ] On or about January 2, 2024, the [NAME] invited Justice Noel and Chief Justice Whalen of the NLSC to comment on the Complaint. Justice Noel did so on January 10, 2024. As to Chief Justice Whalen, Associate Chief Justice Rosalie McGrath responded in his stead on January 31, 2024, as he had heard an application to declare Dr. [APPELLANT] a vexatious litigant on which, at the time, he had reserved judgment. B. The [NAME]’s Decision [ 13 ] On February 27, 2024, the [NAME] dismissed the Complaint on each of the five grounds raised by Dr. [APPELLANT]. [ 14 ] Regarding the Conduct Grounds, the [NAME] found that they did not concern judicial conduct but were rather matters of judicial discretion. In other words, the [NAME] ruled that these issues fell outside of its mandate, since the [NAME] is not a court and has no authority to intervene in court matters. [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FC 692 at paragraph 109 [ [NAME] ], the [NAME] found that the proper recourse for the Conduct Grounds was an appeal of [APPELLANT[NAME] . [ 15 ] As for the Discrimination Ground, the [NAME] determined that a mere allegation of discrimination was not sufficient and that Mr. [APPELLANT] had not provided any evidence to show prima facie discrimination. [ 16 ] I add that, further to a hearing held in September 2023, Chief Justice Whalen of the NLSC declared Dr. [APPELLANT] a vexatious litigant in a decision issued on March 19, 2024, thereby restricting Dr. [APPELLANT]’s access to the NLSC ( [COMPANY] v [APPELLANT] , 2024 NLSC 42 [ [APPELLANT[NAME] 2 ], aff’d 2025 NLCA 22, leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, no 41868 (December 4, 2025)). C. Relevant provisions [ 17 ] The relevant provisions of the [NAME] are paragraph 90(1)(a), section 93, and subsection 94(1), which read as follows: Reviewing Member Examinateur ... [...] Dismissal of complaint Rejet de la plainte 90 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a screening officer may dismiss a complaint if they are of the opinion that it 90 (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), l’agent de contrôle peut rejeter la plainte si, à son avis, selon le cas : (a) is frivolous, vexatious or made for an improper purpose or is an abuse of process; a) elle est frivole, vexatoire ou faite dans un but inapproprié ou encore constitue un abus de procédure; ... [...] Written submissions Arguments écrits 93 The reviewing member shall give the judge who is the subject of the complaint an opportunity to make written submissions about the complaint within the time limit established by the Council for the purpose of this section. 93 L’examinateur donne au juge en cause l’occasion de présenter des arguments écrits à l’égard de la plainte dans le délai établi par le [NAME] pour l’application du présent article. … […] Dismissal of complaint Rejet de la plainte 94 (1) The reviewing member shall dismiss the complaint if they are of the opinion that it should be dismissed for any reason set out in paragraphs 90(1)(a) to (c) or that it is wholly without merit. 94 (1) L’examinateur rejette la plainte s’il estime qu’elle devrait l’être pour l’une ou l’autre des raisons prévues aux alinéas 90(1)a) à c) ou qu’elle est dénuée de tout fondement. D. The standard of review [ 18 ] It is well established that the standard of reasonableness applies to issues relating to the merits of [NAME] complaints ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2026 FCA 45 at paras 6–7 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2023 FCA 203 at para 3; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FCA 219 at para 19; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1434 at para 10 [ [NAME] ]). This is confirmed by the SCC landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ], where the court established a presumption that the standard of reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [ [NAME] ]). [ 19 ] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( [NAME] at para 46; [NAME] at para 64; [NAME] at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility” ( [NAME] at para 99, citing notably [NAME] v [NAME] , 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74). Both the outcome of the decision and its reasoning process must be considered in assessing whether these hallmarks are met ( [NAME] at paras 15, 95, 136). [ 20 ] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion ( [NAME] at paras 46‒47; [NAME] at paras 58, 60; [NAME] at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” ( [NAME] at para 13). Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. Before a decision can be set aside on the basis that it is unreasonable, the reviewing court must be satisfied that “there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” ( [NAME] at para 100). [ 21 ] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence ( [NAME] at para 57; [NAME] at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker ( [NAME] at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 237 at para 3). The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. [ 22 ] Despite the presumption of reasonableness, the approach to be taken with respect to issues of procedural fairness has not changed following [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 23). It has typically been held that correctness is the applicable standard of review for determining whether a decision maker complies with the duty of procedural fairness and the principles of fundamental justice ( [NAME] v [NAME] , 2014 SCC 24 at para 79; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2009 SCC 12 at para 43; Canada (Attorney General) v [NAME] , 2017 FCA 204 at para 8). [ 23 ] However, although the reviewing exercise is akin to correctness review, the Federal Court of Appeal [FCA] has affirmed that questions of procedural fairness are not truly decided according to any particular standard of review. Rather, it is a legal question to be answered by the reviewing court, and the court must be satisfied that the procedure was just and fair having regard to all of the circumstances ( [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2023 FCA 164 at para 22 [ [NAME] ]; [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2023 FCA 74 at para 57; [COMPANY] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2020 FCA 196 at para 35, leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, no 39522 (August 5, 2021); [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 FCA 267 at para 14; [NAME] v [COMPANY] of Machinists and Aerospace Workers , 2019 FCA 263 at paras 24–25; [NAME] v [NAME] , 2019 FCA 238 at para 18; [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at para 54 [ CPR ]). [ 24 ] Consequently, the test is whether, given the particular context and circumstances of the case, the process followed by the administrative decision maker was fair and gave the parties concerned the right to be heard, as well as a full and fair opportunity to be informed of the evidence to be rebutted and to have their case heard ( [NAME] at para 22; CPR at para 56). No deference is owed to the decision maker on issues of procedural fairness ( [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2023 FCA 237 at para 51; Maritime Employers Association v [NAME] ([NAME], Local 375) , 2023 FCA 93 at para 81, leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, no 40828 (March 21, 2024)).

III. Preliminary issues [ 25 ] I must first deal with three preliminary issues: (i) the admissibility of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s additional evidence; (ii) Dr. [APPELLANT]’s concerns regarding the completeness of the CTR; and (iii) Dr. [APPELLANT]’s new argument raised for the first time at the hearing of this application for judicial review. A. Dr. [APPELLANT]’s additional evidence [ 26 ] On February 10, 2025, Dr. [APPELLANT] informed the Court that in addition to citing new jurisprudence, he intended to rely on the following new evidence at the hearing of his application for judicial review: (1) an endorsement by Chief Justice Whalen dated July 23, 2024; (2) an extract from the transcript of a hearing before the Newfoundland and [ADDRESS] of Appeal [ NLCA ] dated September 26, 2024; (3) exchanges between Dr. [APPELLANT] and the [NAME] regarding the CTR; and (4) the Canadian Judicial Council Procedures for the Review of Complaints or Allegations About Federally Appointed Judges , effective 29 July 2015 [2015 Review Procedures]. [ 27 ] On February 12, 2025, the respondent, the Attorney General of Canada [AGC], objected to Dr. [APPELLANT]’s new evidence. The AGC relied on section 312 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [Rules], which provides that in the context of an application for judicial review, additional documents are properly placed before the Court by way of supplementary affidavit and/or a supplementary record. Here, says the AGC, Dr. [APPELLANT] has failed to address the Rule 312 requirements set out in Rosenstein v [COMPANY] , 2002 FCA 503 at paragraphs 8–9, pursuant to which an applicant must demonstrate that the evidence: (i) will serve the interests of justice; (ii) will assist the Court; (iii) will not cause substantial or serious prejudice to the other party; and (iv) was not available prior to the cross-examination of the other party’s affidavits. With respect to the final criterion, the AGC acknowledges that it did not file an affidavit, but notes that the exchanges related to the CTR and the 2015 Review Procedures were available to Dr. [APPELLANT] prior to the submission deadline for his affidavit under Rule 306. [ 28 ] In order for the Court to admit evidence under Rule 312, applicants must also satisfy two preliminary requirements: (i) the evidence must be admissible on the application for judicial review, which requires that the record before the reviewing court must normally consist of, and be limited to, the material that was before the administrative decision maker; and (ii) the evidence must be relevant to an issue that is properly before the reviewing court ( Canada (Attorney General) v [COMPANY] , 2026 FCA 6 at para 62, leave to appeal to the SCC filed, no 42261 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Public Health Agency) , 2023 FCA 199 at para 16 [ [NAME] ]; [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2014 FCA 88 at para 4 [ Forest Ethics ]). [ 29 ] Provided that these two requirements are met, applicants must then convince the Court that it should exercise its discretion in favour of admitting the new evidence ( Forest Ethics at para 5). In this exercise, the following three questions are of relevance in determining whether the admission would serve the interests of justice ( Bossé at para 16; Forest Ethics at para 6): (a) was the evidence sought to be adduced available when the party filed its affidavits under Rule 306 or 308, as the case may be, or could it have been available with the exercise of due diligence? (b) will the evidence assist the Court, in the sense that it is relevant to an issue to be determined and sufficiently probative that it could affect the result? (c) will the evidence cause substantial or serious prejudice to the other party? [ 30 ] In the present case, I agree with the AGC that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s additional evidence should not be admitted, except for the 2015 Review Procedures. It is clear that, besides the 2015 Review Procedures, Dr. [APPELLANT]’s new documents do not satisfy the first preliminary requirement of the Forest Ethics test, as they were not before the [NAME] when it ruled on the Complaint. Indeed, they all post-date the dismissal of the Complaint on February 27, 2024, meaning that they did not exist at the time of the Decision. These materials also do not meet any of the recognized exceptions to the Court’s obligation to solely rely on the material that was before the administrative decision maker ( [NAME] at para 62; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2017 FCA 128 at paras 97‒98; Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v [NAME] (Access Copyright) , 2012 FCA 22 at paras 19‒20). [ 31 ] In any case, I equally [NAME] that the proposed new evidence fails on the second preliminary requirement, as it is of no relevance to the Court in its adjudication of the present judicial review. For instance, Chief Justice Whalen’s July 23, 2024 endorsement refusing to grant leave to Dr. [APPELLANT] to commence a judicial review — as Dr. [APPELLANT] had been declared a vexatious litigant at that time further to [APPELLANT[NAME] 2 — has no relevance whatsoever to the case at hand. It does not help Dr. [APPELLANT] demonstrate that the Decision is unreasonable or that the [NAME] did not afford him appropriate procedural fairness. [ 32 ] However, as mentioned during the hearing, I see no issue in accepting and taking judicial notice of the 2015 Review Procedures. In [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 FC 876 at paragraphs 52–54 [ [NAME] ], I took judicial notice of a similar administrative instrument. I will thus reiterate the reasoning I adopted in [NAME] . [ 33 ] In [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FCA 227 [ [NAME] ], the FCA established that courts cannot “normally” take judicial notice of policies or instructional documents. If such policies, documents or administrative guidelines are relevant to an application, they must be treated similarly to other facts and will normally have to be identified and appended to a supporting affidavit for the reviewing court to consider them ( [NAME] at para 143). Since the 2015 Review Procedures are only an administrative instrument — as opposed to a law or a regulation —, I asked the parties whether I could take judicial notice of the document in this case. At the hearing, neither party objected even though the 2015 Review Procedures were not part of the evidence before me. [ 34 ] It is well recognized that a court may take judicial notice of facts that are either “(1) so notorious or generally accepted as not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; or (2) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy” ( R v Le , 2019 SCC 34 at para 84 [ Le ], citing R v [NAME] , 2001 SCC 32 at para 48). These two criteria are often referred to as the “Morgan” criteria. The approach will, however, be more nuanced and more flexible when the facts at issue do not play an important role in the disposition of a given case or are not disputed by the parties. For example, in [NAME] v Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission) , 1982 CanLII 5204 (FCA), [1983] 1 FC 182 [ [NAME] ], aff’d 1985 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1985] 1 SCR 174, the FCA took judicial notice of a policy of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission that was not disputed by the parties ( [NAME] at 190). [ 35 ] In the present case, I [NAME] that the 2015 Review Procedures easily meet the second [NAME] criterion of facts that can be admitted through judicial notice, since they are still readily available on the [NAME]’s official website. Their contents are therefore beyond reasonable dispute. Moreover, as in [NAME] , the contents of the 2015 Review Procedures are not the subject of debate between the parties, and both parties do not object to their admission via judicial notice. I am therefore satisfied that I can take judicial notice of the 2015 Review Procedures in this case (see, by analogy, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 544 at para 24). B. The appropriate angle for dealing with the completeness of the CTR [ 36 ] As a second preliminary issue, Dr. [APPELLANT] submits that the CTR transmitted by the [NAME] is incomplete and that the omitted information is material to the issues at hand. [ 37 ] In response, the AGC argues that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s objection to the CTR is too late and improper and should not be entertained. More specifically, the AGC submits that Dr. [APPELLANT] failed to bring a motion under Rule 318 regarding the alleged shortcomings in the CTR. [ 38 ] I do not agree with the AGC on this issue. The procedure set out at Rule 318 is clearly not the appropriate forum to address Dr. [APPELLANT]’s concerns with respect to the contents of the CTR. Rule 318(2) provides that a tribunal or party objecting to the production of a CTR under Rule 317 “shall inform all parties and the Administrator, in writing, of the reasons for the objection.” Upon receipt of the objection, the requesting party can either accept said objection or bring a motion to challenge it ( [NAME] v Canada (National Revenue) , 2023 FC 248 (CanLII) at para 50; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FC 1403 at para 58). [ 39 ] Here, Dr. [APPELLANT] is not objecting to the production of the CTR, as he himself requested it. Indeed, he merely submits that the CTR is incomplete. One cannot expect a party requesting the production of a CTR to put forward a motion objecting to their own request. Such an interpretation of Rule 318 would be wholly inconsistent with common sense. In my opinion, Rule 318 may only be used to object to the production of the CTR itself, not its completeness. [ 40 ] In reality, Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations regarding the CTR pertain to procedural fairness and should be examined from this angle, as I will do later in these reasons. C. Dr. [APPELLANT]’s new argument will not be entertained [ 41 ] Finally, during the hearing before this Court, Dr. [APPELLANT] also made an allegation of conflict of interest against Chief Justice DeWare, who wrote the Decision. In essence, he alleges that Chief Justice DeWare should have recused herself from his Complaint, as she used to practice as a lawyer at [NAME], the same firm that represents [NAME] in Dr. [APPELLANT]’s longstanding dispute with the university. However, this allegation is nowhere to be found in Dr. [APPELLANT]’s written submissions on judicial review. [ 42 ] It is well established that absent exceptional circumstances, new arguments not presented in a party’s memorandum shall not be entertained. To do otherwise would risk prejudicing the other party and could leave the Court unable to fully assess the merits of the new argument ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2026 FC 624 at paras 95‒96; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1846 at paras 31‒32; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 1123 at para 19; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 78 at paras 26–28; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 318 at para 81; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 754 at paras 12–14; see also [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 FCA 153 at para 39). [ 43 ] In my view, there are no exceptional circumstances that would warrant departing from this general principle in the case at hand. Dr. [APPELLANT] claims that he only found out recently that Chief Justice DeWare previously worked at [NAME]. With respect, I do not [NAME] this argument convincing. Chief Justice DeWare’s work history before she joined the [NAME] is public information that has been available to all for years (see, for example, Prime Minister of Canada, Biographical Notes, “The [NAME] K. DeWare” (4 June 2019), online: ). Similarly to the 2015 Review Procedures, this information is “capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy” ( Le at para 84). [ 44 ] Considering the publicity of Chief Justice DeWare’s previous employment, Dr. [APPELLANT] could easily have raised her alleged conflict of interest in his Memorandum of Fact and Law or at the very least, he could have sought leave to file a further memorandum and to address the issue at that time. Raising the new argument at the hearing for the first time deprived the AGC of the opportunity to respond in a meaningful way. Moreover, Dr. [APPELLANT] has not provided any persuasive reasons to explain his failure to raise this argument before the hearing. [ 45 ] Based on the foregoing, I decline to consider the new argument raised by Dr. [APPELLANT] regarding Chief Justice DeWare.

IV. Analysis [ 46 ] Turning to the merits of this application for judicial review, Dr. [APPELLANT] challenges the Decision on two fronts: the reasonableness of the Decision and the procedural fairness he was afforded. A. The reasonableness of the Decision [ 47 ] On the issue of reasonableness, Dr. [APPELLANT] asserts that the [NAME] committed two reviewable errors. First, he alleges that the [NAME] failed to properly distinguish between matters that constitute judicial decision-making and matters that threaten the [NAME] as a whole. More precisely, he believes that the alleged failure to protect the integrity of court records falls within the [NAME]’s mandate, as such an allegation undermines the public’s faith in the trustworthiness of the legal profession and in the administration of justice. Second, Dr. [APPELLANT] argues that the Decision lacks internal coherence and a rational chain of analysis regarding his Conduct Grounds, and more specifically his allegations of publication and dissemination of altered documents and the provision of inaccurate information. He claims that the [NAME]’s reasons in fact exclusively address his allegation of discrimination. [ 48 ] With respect, I am not convinced by Dr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments. (1) The legal framework governing the [NAME] and its complaint process [ 49 ] In [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 FC 884 at paragraphs 53–60 [ [NAME] ], aff’d 2021 FCA 193, Justice Catherine M. Kane helpfully summarized the [NAME]’s mandate and its complaint process. I can do no better than reproduce Justice Kane’s passages below, as they remain generally valid despite the recent amendments to the [NAME] : [53] The objects of the [NAME] as set out in subsection 60(1) of the [NAME] are to promote efficiency and uniformity, and to improve the quality of judicial services in the superior courts. In furtherance of these objects, subsection 60(2) of the [NAME] provides that the [NAME] may, among other things, make inquiries and investigate complaints or allegations concerning judges as described in section 63 of that Act. [54] The [NAME] provides that the [NAME] “shall” commence an inquiry into a complaint if the Minister of Justice of Canada or the Attorney General of a province so asks (subsection 63(1)). [55] In other cases, where a person other than the Minister of Justice of Canada or the Attorney General of a province makes the complaint, the [NAME] “may” investigate a complaint (subsection 63(2)). [56] The [NAME] also provides, in paragraph 61(3)(c), that the [NAME] may make by-laws respecting the conduct of inquiries and investigations described in section 63. The By-laws are binding statutory instruments. [57] The [NAME] has also established and published policies and procedures regarding investigations and inquiries, including the Review Procedures . [58] The By-laws and Review Procedures together set out a multi-stage process. [59] At the first stage, the Executive Director of the [NAME] reviews the complaint and decides whether the matter warrants consideration. Early screening criteria are set out in the Review Procedures . If the Executive Director determines that a matter warrants consideration, the Executive Director will refer it to the Chairperson (or Vice-Chairperson) of the [NAME] for review. The Chairperson may dismiss the matter, with reference to the same early screening criteria, or seek additional information. Where additional information is sought, including submissions from the judge, the Chairperson will review the information. [60] If the complaint proceeds, the next stages provide for a Review Panel and possibly an Inquiry Committee. Where an Inquiry Committee is established, it would report to the [NAME]. The [NAME] would then make a recommendation to the Minister of Justice. [ 50 ] Furthermore, as pointed out by the AGC, the leading authority on the distinction between matters of judicial conduct falling within the [NAME]’s mandate and those involving judicial decision-making which are to be addressed through the appeal process is the SCC’s decision in [NAME] v [NAME] (Judicial Council) , 2002 SCC 11 [ [NAME] ]. The SCC explains this distinction at paragraph 60: [60] Part of the expertise of the Judicial Council lies in its appreciation of the distinction between impugned judicial actions that can be dealt with in the traditional sense, through a normal appeal process, and those that may threaten the integrity of the [NAME] as a whole, thus requiring intervention through the disciplinary provisions of the Act. The separation of functions between judicial councils and the courts, even if it could be said that their expertise is virtually identical, serves to insulate the courts, to some extent, from the reactions that may attach to an unpopular council decision. To have disciplinary proceedings conducted by a judge’s peers offers the guarantees of expertise and fairness that judicial officers are sensitive to, while avoiding the potential perception of bias or conflict that could arise if judges were to sit in court regularly in judgment of each other. As [NAME]. made clear in [NAME] , other judges may be the only people in a position to consider and weigh effectively all the applicable principles, and evaluation by any other group would threaten the perception of an independent [NAME]. A council composed primarily of judges, alive to the delicate balance between judicial independence and judicial integrity, must in my view attract in general a high degree of deference . [Emphasis added.] [ 51 ] In [NAME] , the SCC found that a disciplinary process before the [NAME] must only be launched when the conduct of a judge threatens the integrity, independence or impartiality of the [NAME], and when the harm alleged is not curable by the appeal process ( [NAME] at para 58). In short, for a complaint to proceed before the [NAME], it must involve judicial actions that “may threaten the integrity of the [NAME] as a whole, thus requiring intervention through the disciplinary provisions of the Act” ( [NAME] at para 60; see also [NAME] at para 100). Considering this limitation, the [NAME]’s mandate is limited to reviewing improper judicial conduct that affects the ability of judges to execute their judicial duties. The [NAME] does not wield a broad jurisdictional power to review all judicial decisions ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FC 140 at para 20, citing [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FC 93 at para 51). More specifically, “[a]n unbroken line of jurisprudence suggests that matters that can be appealed are not the proper subject of a judicial conduct complaint” ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 193 at para 5, cited in [NAME] at para 8). (2) The merits of the Decision (a) The responsiveness of the reasons provided [ 52 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] first claims that the [NAME] erred by omitting to properly distinguish between matters that constitute judicial decision-making and matters that threaten the [NAME] as a whole. With respect, I disagree and rather conclude that, when read in their totality and holistically —as they should be —, the [NAME]’s reasons clearly addressed this issue. [ 53 ] It is true that, in the present case, the [NAME]’s reasons mostly focused on the Discrimination Ground and dealt more succinctly with the four Conduct Grounds set out in Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint. [ 54 ] However, I underline that in the Decision, the [NAME] described in detail Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations under five headings and specified that four of them (i.e., the Conduct Grounds) could be regrouped under “Judicial Discretion.” In its reasons for dismissing the Complaint, the [NAME] developed three paragraphs to discuss Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations falling under the theme of judicial discretion. The first paragraph stated that the [NAME] had no authority to intervene in court matters. The second paragraph included remarks on the general functions of a judge which fall within the ambit of judicial discretion. In the third paragraph, the [NAME] said that it was “satisfied and in complete agreement with the explanations and submissions provided by Justice Noel” in response to the Complaint and that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations “relate to various rulings, decisions, and reasons” that fall within the ambit of judicial discretion. The [NAME] therefore concluded that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations other than the Discrimination Ground were beyond its mandate, and that the proper recourse was at the appellate level. In support of its position, the [NAME] relied on [NAME] at paragraph 109. In short, the [NAME] expressly affirmed that it was rejecting Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Conduct Grounds because they were matters of judicial discretion, for which the proper course of challenge is the appeal process. [ 55 ] I accept that generic reasons alone do not meet the standard of responsive justification required by [NAME] (see, for example, [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 856 at para 3; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 FC 754 at para 15). However, as short as they may be, the above-mentioned paragraphs of the Decision capture the essence of the [NAME]’s mandate. In my view, they adequately describe the distinction between matters of judicial conduct (within the [NAME]’s mandate) as opposed to matters of judicial discretion in rulings, decisions and reasons (outside the [NAME]’s mandate), citing [NAME] which applies the SCC precedent in [APPELLANT] . Put differently, and contrary to Dr. [APPELLANT]’s assertions, I am not persuaded that the Decision failed to effectively distinguish between matters that constitute judicial decision-making and matters that threaten the [NAME] as a whole. [ 56 ] Quite the opposite, this is exactly what the [NAME] effectively did in its discussion of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s four allegations regrouped under “Judicial Discretion.” These included: (i) the alleged failure of Justice Noel to protect the integrity of court documents; (ii) the alleged provision of inaccurate information to Dr. [APPELLANT]; (iii) the publication of confidential information; and (iv) the refusal to provide information. [ 57 ] I agree with the AGC that, in the circumstances, it was reasonable for the [NAME] to conclude that Justice Noel’s handling of court documents falls within the ambit of judicial discretion, since a mere administrative error cannot rise to the level of judicial misconduct that threatens the integrity of the [NAME]. All the errors allegedly made by Justice Noel in his June 9, 2023 decision could be raised by Dr. [APPELLANT] on appeal. Indeed, this is precisely what Dr. [APPELLANT] did when he appealed the decision in [APPELLANT[NAME] before the NLCA. He was, however, unsuccessful in his appeal ( [APPELLANT] ). (b) The lack of a rational analysis [ 58 ] I am also unconvinced that the Decision lacks internal coherence and a rational chain of analysis regarding Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Conduct Grounds, and in particular his allegations of publication and dissemination of altered documents and the provision of inaccurate information to him. [ 59 ] In my view, the [NAME] reasonably determined that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations regarding the failure to protect the integrity of court documents and the provision of inaccurate information —which are the only two Conduct Grounds singled out by Dr. [APPELLANT] in this judicial review — concerned Justice Noel’s rulings, decisions and reasons. More specifically, as explained by Justice Noel in [APPELLANT[NAME] at paragraph 163, the misconduct alleged by Dr. [APPELLANT] with respect to the court documents stems from an inadvertent administrative error that occurred during the proceedings and cannot rise to the level of judicial misconduct. [ 60 ] Mere administrative errors such as the one made by Justice Noel in no way threaten the [NAME] as a whole and in any event, may be addressed on appeal. In fact, Dr. [APPELLANT] did exercise his right of appeal and challenged these aspects of Justice Noel’s decision in [APPELLANT[NAME] before the NLCA. In the appeal of [APPELLANT[NAME] , the NLCA considered the same allegations made by Dr. [APPELLANT] in his Complaint regarding the handling of court documents and rightfully dismissed them. It is worth reproducing the NLCA’s analysis in that respect, found at paragraphs 27–30 of [APPELLANT] : [27] Additionally, Mr. [APPELLANT] submits that the judge erred in relation to his claim that there were ex parte communications between the court below and counsel for [NAME]. Mr. [APPELLANT] alleges they communicated about an order that the judge had made granting leave to [NAME] to file an application for the sealing of records. There were two different versions of the order, which the judge explained in the Decision at paragraphs 159 to 163. In short, the judge explained that he had inadvertently signed an earlier version of the order in error. He also attached as appendices to the Decision the two versions of the order and the correspondence that accompanied them when filed. [28] Mr. [APPELLANT] does not accept the judge’s explanation and submits before this Court that the judge erred when he concluded that “he could not ascertain” any ex parte communications between his judicial assistant or any other court official and any of the parties regarding the issue. Essentially, the judge found as fact that there were no such communications. Mr. [APPELLANT] alleges this is a factual error. [29] Before this Court, Mr. [APPELLANT] has presented an argument involving tracking numbers and watermarks in an effort to establish that two different versions of the order could not have been received by the judge from [NAME]’s legal counsel in the way the judge stated in the Decision. Mr. [APPELLANT] asserted that one of the versions was “likely” exchanged ex parte between the [NAME] representing [NAME] and the judge’s office (Mr. [APPELLANT]’s Factum, at para. 82). [30] I am not persuaded by Mr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments. He has not succeeded in showing any palpable error in the judge’s assessment of the facts. Moreover, even if there had been some communication between a judicial assistant and the [NAME] about a draft order, nothing turns on it. This was a straight-forward order granting leave to file an application. The ex parte communications that Mr. [APPELLANT] alleges are of an administrative nature only. Even if they occurred, there is nothing to suggest that they could have impacted the judge’s impartiality or his decision not to recuse himself. [Emphasis added.] [ 61 ] Here, there can be no doubt that the issues raised by Dr. [APPELLANT] did not fall within the [NAME]’s mandate and were rather open to potential redress by an appellate court through the normal appeal process. Dr. [APPELLANT] followed that course but was unsuccessful in his attempt to overturn [APPELLANT[NAME] . [ 62 ] I do not accept Dr. [APPELLANT]’s general proposition that courts typically refuse to address issues related to the integrity of court records. Dr. [APPELLANT] erroneously equates the dismissal of an argument with a refusal to consider it. In his case, the NLCA was perfectly within its rights to dismiss Dr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments on the integrity of court records, provided that they were duly taken into consideration, which was clearly the case ( [APPELLANT] at paras 27–29). Nowhere did the NLCA state that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments went beyond its jurisdiction as a court of appeal and should rather be addressed through the [NAME]’s complaint process. [ 63 ] In a similar vein, Dr. [APPELLANT] argued at the hearing that the NLSC’s decision in [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2025 NLSC 4 [ [NAME] ] was evidence that the courts refuse to deal with the integrity of court records and instead punish the complaining party by declaring him or her vexatious. I [NAME] Dr. [APPELLANT]’s reading of [NAME] to be completely detached from reality. In [APPELLANT] , the applicant alleged that the respondents conspired to introduce a forged document into the court’s record, with the intention to harm the applicant’s interests. The crux of the alleged fraud was that the version of the originating application submitted to the NLSC by the respondents was not the same as that filed by the applicant. The NLSC found that the original application lacked a reasonable cause of action for a tort of civil fraud because apart from a few “minor differences,” both versions of the impugned document were identical and that there was no false representation ( [NAME] at paras 51–53). The court’s reasoning in [APPELLANT] in no way supports Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations. [ 64 ] The same is true for this Court’s decision in McIntosh , also relied upon by Dr. [APPELLANT], where Justice Christine M. Pallotta found that the [NAME]’s dismissal of a complaint at the screening stage was reasonable and not procedurally unfair. (3) The sufficiency and justification of the Decision [ 65 ] Throughout his submissions regarding the reasonableness of the Decision, Dr. [APPELLANT] in fact suggests that the Decision is unreasonable because the [NAME]’s reasons are inadequate in light of the “culture of justification” now required in Canadian administrative law ( [NAME] at para 14). He repeatedly states that the Decision was not intelligible and justified to him. [ 66 ] Again, I am not persuaded by Dr. [APPELLANT]’s argument. Even though the Decision is not as comprehensive as what Dr. [APPELLANT] would have preferred, I am satisfied that the [NAME] meaningfully grappled with all allegations of his Complaint and took account of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s central issues and concerns. As pointed out by the AGC, the [NAME] properly summarized the undisputed state of the law regarding the distinction between, on the one hand, matters of judicial conduct which fall within the mandate of judicial councils and, on the other hand, matters that can be addressed through the appeal process. Moreover, the [NAME] possesses the expertise necessary to distinguish between the two. [ 67 ] I acknowledge that further to [NAME] , it is not enough for the outcome of an administrative decision to be justifiable . The administrative decision maker must also justify its decision ( [NAME] at para 86), especially to the individuals subject to it. In [NAME] , the SCC ruled that pursuant to the principles of justification and transparency, an administrative decision maker’s reasons must meaningfully account for the “central issues and concerns raised by the parties” ( [NAME] at para 127). This concept of “responsive reasons” or of “sufficiency of reasons” relates to the duty of procedural fairness, more specifically audi alteram partem — the right to be heard — which requires that individuals should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly. The rationale for this is clearly set out in [NAME] : “reasons are the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate that they have actually listened to the parties” [italics in original] ( [NAME] at para 127). Indeed, reasons explain how and why a decision was made and thus function as a tangible shield against the dangers of arbitrariness and the mere perception of it in the exercise of public power ( [NAME] at para 79). [ 68 ] I underscore, however, that reviewing courts cannot expect administrative decision makers to respond to every argument submitted to them, or to make an explicit finding on each constituent element leading to their conclusion ( [NAME] at para 128). Put another way, written reasons must not be assessed against a standard of perfection ( [NAME] at para 91; [COMPANY] v Sauvé , 2024 FCA 171 at para 16). [ 69 ] In my view, it was open and reasonable for the [NAME], in the circumstances, to agree with the reasons provided by the judge who was the subject of the Complaint — Justice Noel — as that judge’s submissions meaningfully addressed all the main allegations of misconduct at hand. It is true that Justice Noel’s submissions in the context of the Complaint, as contained in the CTR at pages 201–203, mostly pertain to Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations of discrimination. The sole reference to the Conduct Grounds is the following sentence: “[i]n my respective [ sic ] view, the appellate court is the proper avenue to address any errors I may have made, including [the] other grounds of complaint ” [emphasis added] (CTR at 202). That said, I observe that Justice Noel’s submissions on the Complaint must be read in conjunction with his reasons in [APPELLANT[NAME] , which were lengthy and addressed in minute detail Dr. [APPELLANT]’s submissions to obtain his recusal. [ 70 ] The [NAME] could have supplemented Justice Noel’s explanations with its own analysis, likely based on Justice Noel’s analysis in [APPELLANT[NAME] . But the [NAME] had Justice Noel’s submissions in response to the Complaint as well as the detailed reasons he had offered in [APPELLANT[NAME] and it did not need to repeat those in its Decision. In my view, this is a situation where, considering the [NAME]’s Decision, the record before the [NAME] and the underlying decision of Justice Noel in [APPELLANT[NAME] , there are enough dots on the page to allow the reader to connect those dots with the rest of the record and to understand the [NAME]’s reasons regarding the Conduct Grounds ( [NAME] at para 97). [ 71 ] Arguably, the summary reasoning by the [NAME] on the Conduct Grounds and the issue of judicial discretion contrast with its more thorough reasons for dismissing the Discrimination Ground. However, this is far from being a serious shortcoming sufficient to render the Decision unreasonable. It is not surprising to see more detailed reasons on the Discrimination Ground as it is Parliament’s intent that allegations of discrimination against a judge — as well as of sexual misconduct or harassment — must be treated with a heightened degree of seriousness ( [NAME] at subsection 90(3)). The fact that the [NAME]’s reasons regarding the Conduct Grounds are more limited does not mean that the [NAME] failed to provide adequate and sufficient reasons on this front. [ 72 ] In sum, I am not persuaded that the [NAME] did not meaningfully grapple with all the central concerns raised in Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint. I accept that key arguments raised by a party — even by a person who has been declared vexatious in a jurisdiction, such as Dr. [APPELLANT] before the NLSC — deserve a contextually appropriate measure of responsive justification, however poor their arguments may be. I [NAME] that this is precisely what the [NAME] gave to Dr. [APPELLANT] in this case. [ 73 ] An administrative decision maker’s reasons do not need to be comprehensive or perfect. They only need to be comprehensible and justified. I am satisfied that this is the case here. True, it could have been useful and clearer if the [NAME] had provided in the Decision more detailed explanations on the Conduct Grounds, perhaps by engaging with Justice Noel’s submissions in response to the Complaint or by including precise references to Justice Noel’s own decision in [APPELLANT[NAME] . But in this case, it was obvious enough from Justice Noel’s decision and from Dr. [APPELLANT]’s allegations in support of his Complaint that his Conduct Grounds related to issues of judicial discretion that it was not unreasonable for the [NAME] to summarily deal with these meritless allegations, a fortiori given the [NAME]’s expertise in this domain. [ 74 ] I stress that the degree of responsive justification varies. On the one hand, where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect these high stakes. This is the case for decisions with consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood ( [NAME] at para 133). On the other hand, where the stakes are on the lower end — as in the case of potentially frivolous complaints to the [NAME] —, less justification is required, even though some is still needed. [ 75 ] I add one comment on the [NAME]’s reference to paragraph 109 of [NAME] in the Decision. I do not dispute that it is not a particularly helpful citation to understand the Decision. In that paragraph, Justice Kane simply stated the following: “[t]he Respondent’s Record includes examples of correspondence from the [NAME] to Mr. [NAME], which confirms that the [NAME] had repeatedly explained the complaints process and the difference between judicial decision-making and conduct to Mr. [NAME].” This passage does not provide much assistance to explain how, in this case, Justice Noel’s administrative error falls within judicial discretion. But considering the rest of the Decision, this is far from enough to render the Decision unreasonable or unjustified. [ 76 ] Finally, I will make two quick remarks on the limits of the justification expected from the [NAME]. First, despite Dr. [APPELLANT]’s belief to the contrary, the [NAME]’s Ethical Principles for Judges are advisory in nature and do not set standards defining judicial misconduct ( [NAME] at para 60; [NAME] at paras 91–92). The [NAME] was therefore not required to explicitly refer to them or to make an explicit finding regarding whether the conduct at issue contravened them ( [NAME] at para 72). Second, I reiterate that the [NAME] had no obligation to respond to each and every argument raised by Dr. [APPELLANT]. Only key issues merit consideration, and this is what the [NAME] accomplished in the Decision. B. Dr. [APPELLANT] was afforded appropriate procedural fairness [ 77 ] I now turn to the procedural unfairness alleged by Dr. [APPELLANT]. [ 78 ] With respect to procedural fairness, Dr. [APPELLANT] essentially complains about the following three alleged breaches: (i) the CTR is missing various documents that are material to his Complaint; (ii) he was negatively affected by the apparent lag between the date on which the 2023 Review Procedures became effective (June 23, 2023) and the date on which they were published on the [NAME]’s website (October 19, 2023); and (iii) the [NAME] was not entitled to notify Chief Justice Whalen of the Complaint, and said notification exposed him to potential reprisals. [ 79 ] Again, I am not persuaded by any of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments. (1) The allegedly incomplete CTR [ 80 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] submits that the CTR transmitted by the [NAME] is incomplete, and that the omitted information is material to the issues at hand. More specifically, he claims that the CTR lacks the following evidence that according to him, was before the [NAME]: (i) the records confirming the exact date on which the [NAME] issued the 2023 Review Procedures; (ii) the information found at pages 373 and 382 of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s application record; (iii) the [NAME]’s correspondence from January 2, 2024 to Chief Justice Whalen; and (iv) the [NAME]’s correspondence to Justice Noel [respectively, Missing Documents 1, 2, 3 and 4, and together, the Missing Documents]. [ 81 ] An incomplete CTR may be a basis for a breach of procedural fairness, but it “is not always so, especially where there was no actual unfairness” ( El [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 FC 1406 at para 42, citing, inter alia , [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FC 357 at para 17). [ 82 ] In [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 581 [ [NAME] ], Justice Keith M. Boswell summarized three distinct types of scenarios in which a deficient CTR may constitute a breach of procedural fairness. The relevant scenario for the present matter is where a document is known to have been before the decision maker but is not before the Court and cannot be reviewed. In such a case, unless the document is otherwise available to the Court — such as in an applicant’s record —, the Court will be unable to determine the legality of the decision. However, the decision will only be set aside if the missing document was central to the finding under review ( [NAME] at para 16(3)). [ 83 ] As convincingly submitted by the AGC, Dr. [APPELLANT] has failed to explain how the purportedly Missing Documents from the CTR could materially affect the outcome of this judicial review. In the present case, while I admit that the Missing Documents were almost certainly in the possession of the [NAME], they are not central to the [NAME]’s dismissal of the Complaint. Missing Document 2 is also regardless available to the Court, as it is part of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s application record. In consequence, there can be no breach of procedural fairness because of the allegedly incomplete CTR. [ 84 ] First, Missing Document 1 is of no relevance whatsoever. Dr. [APPELLANT] maintains that, under the well-established presumption against the retroactive application of statutes, the 2023 Review Procedures should have come into force the day they were actually made public (allegedly on October 19, 2023 when they were posted on the [NAME]’s website), rather than the day the [NAME] deemed them effective (June 23, 2023). Dr. [APPELLANT] therefore argues that Missing Document 1 could have confirmed that his Complaint — which was submitted on July 4, 2023 — should have been treated under the 2015 Review Procedures, which allegedly would not have required that Chief Justice Whalen be notified. [ 85 ] I [NAME] that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s arguments as to Missing Document 1 are without merit. In essence, even if I were to assume that the Complaint should have been processed under the 2015 Review Procedures, the [NAME] would nevertheless have been entitled to notify Chief Justice Whalen and invite him to provide submissions, as subsection 6(b) and section 8.1 of the 2015 Review Procedures allowed the [NAME] to inform chief justices of a complaint against one of their judges. As a result, knowing which version of the [NAME]’s review procedures should apply to the Complaint is irrelevant, at least regarding the completeness of the CTR. [ 86 ] Second, Missing Document 2 is equally irrelevant. The information at pages 373 and 382 of Dr. [APPELLANT]’s application record is correspondence from Dr. [APPELLANT] to the [NAME] asking whether his amended Complaint was received and requesting an update on the status of his Complaint. Dr. [APPELLANT] has not convincingly explained how this information is of any particular significance, namely, how his amended Complaint materially differs from the original version. In any event, Missing Document 2 is available to the Court, since it is in Dr. [APPELLANT]’s application record. [ 87 ] Third, I accept that Missing Documents 3 and 4 could have been used to confirm that the [NAME] requested submissions on the entire Complaint, instead of exclusively the Discrimination Ground. That said, the evidence at hand suggests that at the very least, the [NAME] effectively transmitted the entire Complaint (including its exhibits) to Justice Noel as well as to Chief Justice Whalen. In his submissions, Justice Noel stated that “the appellate court is the proper avenue to address any errors [he] may have made, including [the] other grounds of complaint ” [emphasis added] (CTR at 202). As for Associate Chief Justice McGrath, in her submissions in replacement of Chief Justice Whalen, she wrote that she has “reviewed the complaint and attachments in their entirety ” [ emphasis added ] (CTR at 204). Justice Noel and Chief Justice Whalen, via Associate Chief Justice McGrath, were therefore well aware of the Conduct Grounds raised by Dr. [APPELLANT] and had the opportunity to provide meaningful submissions on them, even if they ultimately chose to only provide brief ones. [ 88 ] This satisfies me that Missing Documents 3 and 4 had no material impact on the dismissal of the Complaint. (2) The apparent lag in the online publication of the 2023 Review Procedures [ 89 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] raises a specific concern regarding the publication date of the 2023 Review Procedures on the [NAME]’s website. As explained by the AGC, there seemingly was a time lag between the date on which the 2023 Review Procedures became effective (i.e., June 23, 2023) and the date on which they were published on the [NAME]’s website (i.e., October 19, 2023). [ 90 ] However, Dr. [APPELLANT] has not met his burden of showing how the apparent lag in the online publication of the 2023 Review Procedures on the [NAME]’s website prevented in any way his Complaint from being fully and fairly addressed, or how this time lag hampered his right to be heard and his full and fair opportunity to be informed of the evidence to be rebutted and to have his case considered. [ 91 ] I wholly agree with the AGC that this time lag, in and of itself, does not rise to the level of a lack of procedural fairness for Dr. [APPELLANT]. Dr. [APPELLANT] has presented no evidence to show how his ability to participate in the [NAME] complaint process, to raise the arguments he wished to raise and to have these fully and fairly addressed could have been negatively affected by any lag in the online publication of the 2023 Review Procedures. (3) The [NAME]’s informing Chief Justice Whalen of the Complaint [ 92 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] finally takes particular issue with the [NAME] informing Chief Justice Whalen of the Complaint and inviting him to make written submissions in response. Dr. [APPELLANT] believes that by notifying Chief Justice Whalen, who has been case managing matters involving him before the NLSC since September 2023 — notably, the application to declare him a vexatious litigant —, the [NAME] made him a party to the [NAME]’s complaint process and exposed him to potential reprisals at the hands of Chief Justice Whalen. [ 93 ] Again, I am not convinced by Dr. [APPELLANT]’s submissions on this issue. Like the AGC, I [NAME] that the [NAME]’s notice to Chief Justice Whalen was completely appropriate, given that the Complaint is against one of the judges of the NLSC of which he is the Chief Justice. The [NAME]’s notification to Chief Justice Whalen of the Complaint — as well as inviting him to make submissions — was fully in keeping with the [NAME]’s process of informing chief justices of allegations of judicial misconduct against a judge of their court and it did not prevent Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint from being fully or fairly addressed. [ 94 ] Pursuant to section 93 of the [NAME] , the [NAME] reviewing member, who is the Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson of the [NAME], shall give the judge who is the subject of the complaint an opportunity to make written submissions. It does not, however, explicitly provide that at the stage of the reviewing member’s assessment — as opposed to the reviewing panel’s assessment ( [NAME] at section 99) —, the judge’s chief justice is entitled to the same notice and opportunity to make submissions. [ 95 ] But subsection 7.3(1) of the 2023 Review Procedures now provides that the reviewing member “shall” notify the chief justice and permit them to make submissions. In a similar vein, its predecessor provision in the 2015 Review Procedures stated that the reviewing member “may” do so. While the 2015 or 2023 Review Procedures are not contained in a statute or regulation, they nonetheless apply to complaints made after their adoption. Indeed, it is well established that the [NAME] is a federal tribunal, and superior court judges (such as Chief Justice DeWare) in effect serve as members of an administrative tribunal when they act as [NAME] members ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FC 932 at para 18 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2017 FC 1145 at para 21, citing [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FC 93 at para 39). The [NAME] is consequently master of its own procedures, provided that it complies with its governing statute and regulations, as well as with its procedural fairness obligations owed to affected individuals ( [NAME] at para 18, citing [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , 1989 CanLII 131 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 560 at 568–569). [ 96 ] A chief justice is responsible for addressing any potential threats to public confidence in, and the proper functioning of, their court. This includes potential threats posed by allegations of judicial misconduct which, in the most serious cases, may lead a chief justice to sideline a judge from hearing cases and performing other judicial duties. This is why the [NAME] ensures that a judge’s chief justice is informed at every stage of the complaint process ( [NAME] at sections 96, 99, 103(1), 114, 121 and 135), even though it does not explicitly provide that the reviewing member may permit chief justices to make submissions. [ 97 ] Informing a chief justice of allegations of misconduct against a judge of their court and giving said chief justice an opportunity to make submissions has been a longstanding and central feature of the [NAME]’s judicial conduct process, as is amply reflected in the jurisprudence of this Court (see, for example, 2015 Review Procedures at sections 6(b), 8.1; National Council of [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FC 1087 at paras 28–29, 32 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 FC 629 at paras 20, 23; [NAME] v Canadian Judicial Council , 2005 FC 1454 at paras 25–27). There is no turbulence in the case law on this point. [ 98 ] At the hearing, Dr. [APPELLANT] flagged the important distinction between the language used at section 6 of the 2015 Review Procedures with that now used at subsection 7.3(1) of the 2023 Review Procedures. More specifically, while the former uses the word “may,” the latter uses the word “shall.” Section 11 of the Interpretation Act , RSC, 1985, c I-21 provides that “shall” must be construed as imperative, while “may” is permissive. In consequence, under the 2023 Review Procedures, the [NAME] reviewing member is now required to inform the chief justice responsible for the judge subject to the complaint. For example, that distinction in language likely explains why the [NAME] did not notify the concerned chief justice in [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1349 [ [NAME] ], as the complaint at issue was submitted on June 16, 2023, mere days before the 2023 Review Procedures became effective on June 23, 2023. The complaint in [NAME] was accordingly processed under the 2015 Review Procedures, which allowed, but did not require, notification to the chief justice. [ 99 ] That being said, even if the 2015 Review Procedures had applied to Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint, the [NAME] would also have been allowed to inform Chief Justice Whalen of the Complaint, as it was an option then open to the Chairperson. [ 100 ] Lastly, I wish to underline that despite Dr. [APPELLANT]’s belief to the contrary, the [NAME]’s notification of the Complaint to Chief Justice Whalen did not make Dr. [APPELLANT] a party to the complaint process. When applying the factors set out by the SCC in [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) ,   [1999] 2 SCR 817, the duty of procedural fairness the [NAME] owes to complainants falls at the lower end of the spectrum ( [NAME] at para 40, citing [NAME] at paras 198–208; see also Canada ( Attorney General) v [NAME] , 2013 FCA 199 at para 165, leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, no 35606 (February 13, 2014) [ [NAME] ]). This is essentially because complainants only have a legal right to make a complaint, thereby setting the [NAME]’s process in motion ( [NAME] at para 165). Complainants are never parties to [NAME] proceedings, as a [NAME] complaint does not create a dispute between the complainant and the judge subject to the complaint. It is trite law that the [NAME]’s role is merely of an investigative nature, i.e., to investigate the complaint and seek the truth ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 FCA 129 at para 36, leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, no 39379 (February 25, 2021), citing, inter alia , [NAME] v [NAME] de la magistrature , 1995 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 267 at paras 72–73; [NAME] at para 219). [ 101 ] In sum, I fail to see how the [NAME]’s decision to inform Chief Justice Whalen of the Complaint and to allow him to provide his views can have been procedurally unfair to Dr. [APPELLANT].

V. Conclusion [ 102 ] For the reasons set forth above, I [NAME] that the Decision is reasonable and was procedurally fair, and that Dr. [APPELLANT]’s application for judicial review must therefore be dismissed. The [NAME] meaningfully grappled with all grounds raised in Dr. [APPELLANT]’s Complaint and substantially accounted for Dr. [APPELLANT]’s central issues and concerns. Moreover, the process followed by the [NAME] was procedurally fair. [ 103 ] The AGC is seeking costs in the amount of $1,500. In the exercise of my discretion, I conclude that costs in the amount of $750 should be imposed against Dr. [APPELLANT].

JUDGMENT in T-568-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : This application for judicial review is dismissed. Costs in the lumpsum, all-inclusive amount of $750 shall be paid by the applicant to the respondent. “Denis Gascon” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: t-568-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: ST. JOHN’S DATE OF HEARING: FEBRUARY 20, 2025

JUDGMENT AND

REASONS: [APPELLANT] J. DATED: MAY 22, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] For The Applicant (ON HIS [APPELLANT]) [APPELLANT] [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Attorney General of Canada Halifax, Nova Scotia For The Respondent