Federal Court Upholds CRA Decision on MAP Time Limit

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260623 Docket: T-1567-22 Citation: 2026 FC 854 Ottawa, Ontario, June 23, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ngo BETWEEN: [NAME_1] Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant, [NAME_1] [Applicant], seeks judicial review of a decision by the Minister of National Revenue [Minister], through the Canada Revenue Agency [[NAME_3]] that denied his request to initiate a “Mutual Agreement Procedure” [[NAME_4]], a dispute resolution mechanism under an income tax treaty, [NAME_4] the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Canada for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains [1] [Canada-UK Tax Convention or Convention] . He sought to initiate a [NAME_4] to dispute taxation as a resident by both Canada and the UK despite his assertion that he was a resident of the UK. The [NAME_3] refused the Applicant’s request for admissibility to the [NAME_4] on the basis that it was made over three years after the first notification of an action not in accordance with [NAME_4] [Decision]. [ 2 ] The parties agree on the three-year limitation period. The issue in dispute relates to the Minister’s interpretation of when the three-year limitation period is triggered. [ 3 ] The Applicant claims that the Decision is unreasonable because the Minister unreasonably interpreted the relevant provisions of [NAME_4] in an excessively restrictive manner and failed to apply [NAME_4] provisions in a manner most favourable to the taxpayer. He also submits that the Decision is not intelligible and lacks justification. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed. The Applicant’s arguments focused on why his interpretation of the computation of the three-year limitation period was valid and should have been the preferred approach. However, reviewing the Decision with a “reasons first” approach and considering the language of [NAME_4] holistically and based on the record before the decision-maker, the Applicant did not meet his burden to demonstrate that the Decision was unreasonable.

II. Background and Decision Under Review A. Background [ 5 ] Canada is a signatory party to a bilateral Convention with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [UK] which is intended to eliminate double taxation and prevent tax avoidance and fiscal evasion. [ 6 ] [NAME_4] was based on the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital [2] [Model Convention], a model bilateral tax treaty by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. The OECD is a transnational organization comprised of 38 member countries (including Canada), which sets out international standards and solutions for common issues in tax policy and administration. Most of the tax conventions adhered to by Canada in its various bilateral tax agreements with other countries follow the OECD Model Convention. [ 7 ] To facilitate the interpretation and implementation of treaties modelled on the OECD Model Convention, the OECD publishes commentaries to the Model Convention. These commentaries have been consistently relied upon by Canadian courts as a guide in interpreting relevant conventions ( [COMPANY_5] v Canada , 2009 FCA 57 at para 10 citing [COMPANY_6] v Canada , 1995 CanLII 103 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 802). [ 8 ] Both countries have designated “[NAME_7]” to deal with issues arising from [NAME_4]. In Canada, the Competent Authority is the [NAME_3]. In the UK, the Competent Authority is His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [HMRC], the taxation agency in the UK. [ 9 ] The following paragraphs summarize the facts leading to the Applicant’s [NAME_4] request, which were not contested. (1) The Applicant’s [NAME_3] [ 10 ] The Applicant is a Canadian and a UK citizen who had previously filed income tax returns as a resident of Canada for the 2000 to 2015 taxation years, inclusively. On May 24, 2013, the Applicant filed a voluntary disclosure under the [NAME_3] [VDP], reporting previously unreported income earned outside of Canada. [ 11 ] On January 22, 2015, the [NAME_3] issued notices of reassessment to the Applicant for the taxation years 2000 to 2008, and 2010 to 2012. [ 12 ] On June 28, 2016, the [NAME_3] completed an audit of offshore corporations in which the Applicant had interests in. The [NAME_3] concluded that the corporations were residents of Canada for taxation years 1999 to 2014 inclusively and sent the Applicant a Proposal letter [[NAME_3] letter]. The [NAME_3] letter set out proposed adjustments on the taxes owed on the Applicant’s world income as a resident of Canada and certain penalties as a result of the Applicant’s VDP disclosure. The [NAME_3] gave the Applicant the opportunity to make submissions in response to the [NAME_3], which the Applicant provided through his former Canadian counsel. [ 13 ] In a letter from the Applicant’s former counsel dated February 7, 2017 [Applicant’s 2017 Letter], the Applicant submitted, among other things, that he was not a resident in Canada since 2000 but rather, a resident of the UK. The Decision stated that the Applicant also submitted that he was “in the process of preparing non-resident Canadian income tax returns to replace his incorrect Canadian resident T1 income tax returns.” [ 14 ] The [NAME_3] completed its audit on May 29, 2017. In its audit decision, the [NAME_3] summarized the Applicant’s submissions in response to the [NAME_3]. The [NAME_3] also reviewed the Applicant’s objection to being classified as a Canadian resident (and that he should be classified as a UK resident) during the relevant taxation period. The [NAME_3] rejected the Applicant’s assertion that he was not a Canadian resident. It concluded that the Applicant was a resident of Canada as of 2000, on the basis of insufficient supporting documentation to establish UK residency and the existence of ties to Canada during this period, among other things. [ 15 ] Following this audit, the [NAME_3] issued Notices of Reassessment for the 2006 to 2010 and 2014 taxation years, on September 7, 2017 [2017 [NAME_3]]. The Applicant was reassessed by the [NAME_3] regarding additional foreign unreported income. [ 16 ] The Applicant is currently contesting the quantum of the 2017 [NAME_3] before the Tax Court of Canada on the basis of residency. His appeal has been put in abeyance for the benefit of the [NAME_4] request. [ 17 ] The Applicant’s 2017 Letter to the [NAME_3] responding to the [NAME_3] and the [NAME_3] audit decision of May 29, 2017, were not in the Certified Tribunal Record. The Applicant’s 2017 Letter was not in any of the parties’ records filed before the Court, although it was referred to in the Decision. However, and as noted above, the facts in the Decision under review were not contested by either party. (2) HMRC Worldwide Disclosure Facility Disclosure [ 18 ] On December 21, 2018, the Applicant initiated a disclosure on the UK side to HMRC, under the [NAME_8] [Worldwide Disclosure Facility]. In support of this disclosure, he submitted a report dated December 21, 2018 [Applicant’s 2018 HMRC Report] where he submitted that he had been a resident of the UK from the 2002/2003 tax year until the 2016/2017 tax year. [ 19 ] The Applicant also explained in the Applicant’s 2018 HMRC Report that since he had paid Canadian personal income tax returns from 2002 to 2015 as a resident of Canada, he had overpaid tax in Canada not in accordance with the treaty. He advised that he will “make a Mutual Agreement Procedure ([NAME_4]) application for relief of the Canadian tax” for the relevant period, which “is in the process of being prepared and will be submitted shortly.” [ 20 ] On April 25, 2019, the HMRC sent the Applicant a Certificate of Residence, attesting that he was a resident of the UK from April 6, 2002, to April 5, 2017, in accordance with Article 4 of [NAME_4]. The letter accompanying the Certificate acknowledged the Applicant’s intention to seek relief for double taxation under [NAME_4] ([NAME_4]). [ 21 ] On March 8, 2021, the HMRC issued assessments related to the Applicant’s 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 taxation years, based on the Applicant’s disclosure under the [NAME_8], taxing him as a UK resident [March 2021 HMRC Assessments]. (3) The Applicant’s [NAME_4] Request [ 22 ] On January 25, 2022, the Applicant submitted a [NAME_4] request to the Minister under Article 23 of [NAME_4]. [ 23 ] In the [NAME_4] request, the Applicant described reporting income as a resident of Canada from 2000 to 2015. He stated that his “first notification of double tax contrary to the Canada-UK Tax [Convention]” was the March 2021 HMRC Assessments sent to him by the HMRC on March 8, 2021. He explained that based on the March 2021 HMRC Assessments and expected subsequent Notices of Assessment from HMRC, it is “almost certain” that he will be double taxed by the UK for the 2002 to 2017 taxation years. B. Decision Under Review [ 24 ] In a letter dated June 30, 2022, the Minister concluded that the Applicant’s [NAME_4] request was filed outside of the three-year limitation period. The Minister explained that the assertion in the Applicant’s 2017 Letter to the [NAME_3] that he was not a resident of Canada for tax purposes, in combination with the 2017 [NAME_3], resulted in taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4].

Accordingly, the Minister considered the 2017 [NAME_3], on September 7, 2017, as the Applicant’s first notification of “taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]” , and the start of the three-year limitation period. [ 25 ] The Minister relied on the documents submitted by the Applicant in support of his [NAME_4] request, including the January 22, 2015, notices of reassessment issued by the [NAME_3], the 2017 [NAME_3], the Applicant’s Worldwide Disclosure Facility Disclosure (including the Applicant’s 2018 HMRC Report), and the Certificate of Residence issued by the HMRC. [ 26 ] The Decision also identified that in the Applicant’s 2018 HMRC Report, the Applicant’s representatives declared that since the Applicant was actually a UK resident from 2002/2003, yet was taxed in Canada as a resident, he “will make a Mutual Agreement Procedure ([NAME_4]) application for relief of the Canadian tax that appears to have been overpaid between 2002 and 2015.” Considering these facts and applying Paragraph 13 of the [NAME_9] of Article 25 [[NAME_9]] as well as [NAME_4], the Minister stated that [NAME_4] is available not only when double taxation has occurred, but when the taxpayer believes that “either State has taken action resulting in taxation contrary to the provisions of [NAME_4]” . [ 27 ] The [NAME_3] observed that the Applicant’s initial tax returns and self-assessments were filed as a resident of Canada for the taxation years 2000 to 2015. However, as was expressed in the Applicant’s 2017 Letter responding to [NAME_3]’s audit, these assessments were “incorrect” and the Applicant “was not, at all material times, resident in Canada,” rather, the Applicant had been a resident of the UK since 2000.

Accordingly, the [NAME_3] concluded that the 2017 [NAME_3] constituted the first action which in the view of the Applicant and his representatives would lead to taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]. [ 28 ] The Decision further considered the Applicant’s declarations in his 2018 HMRC Report that he had “overpaid tax in Canada not in accordance with the treaty” as indicative of the 2017 [NAME_3] being the trigger date for the three-year period. The Decision then stated that both [NAME_7] concluded that the [NAME_4] request was introduced outside [NAME_4]’s three-year time limit and therefore, access to [NAME_4] should be denied. This concurrence was further confirmed in a letter dated June 29, 2022, from the HMRC to the Minister. [ 29 ] The [NAME_3]’s Decision of June 30, 2022, is the subject of this judicial review.

III. Preliminary Issues [ 30 ] I will first address several preliminary issues and objections. [ 31 ] The Respondent submits that given that the Decision was reached in consultation with the UK Competent Authority, that both [NAME_7] must agree to initiate the [NAME_4], and that the Court cannot compel the UK Competent Authority to change their position on the start of the time limit, this application should not be granted, as it would serve no practical end (citing [COMPANY_10]. v Canada (Attorney General) , 2011 FCA 299 at para 52). [ 32 ] While the Court cannot compel the UK Competent Authority to engage in a [NAME_4] at the second stage of the process, in this application for judicial review, the Applicant asked that the Decision be quashed and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration on its analysis of the applicable limitation period, which is still the first stage of the [NAME_4]. I also note that there was communication between the [NAME_7] that included an exchange on the Minister’s assessment of the limitation period. [ 33 ] The Respondent did not provide any authority or evidence that demonstrated that if the Canadian Competent Authority arrived at a different conclusion upon reconsideration of the limitation period computation, that they could not contact the HMRC to inform them of a revision to their original assessment and canvass whether a [NAME_4] process could be undertaken. As such, I conclude that the Respondent’s objection on jurisdiction based on the absence of available remedies to be speculative. [ 34 ] The next paragraphs deal with the Respondent’s other preliminary objections. The Applicant did not address these contentions or objections at the hearing. A. The Affidavit from the Applicant’s Counsel Does Not Comply with the Rules [ 35 ] The Respondent seeks to strike an affidavit submitted by the Applicant in support of his application, the affidavit of [NAME_11] [[NAME_11]]. [NAME_11] is a lawyer with [COMPANY_13], was part of the Applicant’s legal representation before the [NAME_3] and was also the Applicant’s counsel of record on this application. The Respondent submits that the [NAME_11] runs afoul of the Federal Court Rules , SOR 98-106 [Rules]. Namely, the [NAME_11] does not comply with Rule 81(2), requiring that affidavits be limited to an affiant’s personal knowledge, and Rule 82, requiring solicitors seeking to depose an affidavit on which they will present arguments to first obtain leave of the Court to do so. [ 36 ] The Respondent submits that the [NAME_11] is based on [NAME_11]’ beliefs, relate to contentious matters in the application, and includes legal arguments and opinions. They also note that the affidavit misstates the Decision. The Respondent further submits that the [NAME_11] raises facts or mixed facts and law that were not before the decision-maker. Among them are reasons for the Applicant’s appeal of the 2017 [NAME_3] and descriptions of events which occurred after the Decision was rendered. The Respondent notes that on cross-examination, [NAME_11] was unable to attest to the truth of some of the material issues in his affidavit. The Respondent also submits the [NAME_11] relates to contentious matters in the application and that paragraph 5 confirms that the entire affidavit is based on [NAME_11]’ belief, which is not admissible on judicial review. The Respondent asks that the [NAME_11] should be struck from the record (citing [NAME_14] v Eurocopter , 2013 FCA 261 at para 19). [ 37 ] The purpose of Rule 82 is to prevent, as much as reasonably possible, the difficult situation that can arise when lawyers act as both witnesses and representatives in the same case ( [NAME_15] v Canada , 2012 FCA 18 at para 3). [ 38 ] [ADDRESS] may accept an affidavit from a member of the law firm representing a party where the affidavit relates to uncontested or non-controversial matters. However, where the affidavit goes further and addresses matters in dispute or contains expressions of opinion or descriptions of state of mind, the Court will be reluctant to accept it or to give it weight ( Mobile Telesystems Public Joint Stock Company v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 181 at para 28, citing Ab [NAME_16] v [COMPANY_17]. , 2008 FC 184, at para 46, aff’d, 2008 FCA 416, and Cross-Canada Auto Body Supply (Windsor) Ltd. v Hyundai Auto Canada , 2006 FCA 133 at paras 5 - 7). [ 39 ] The Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME_18] v Canada (Revenue Agency) , 2015 FCA 263 at paragraph 22 instructs that “[c]are must be taken to ensure that the affidavit does not go further and provide [fresh] evidence relevant to the merits of the matter decided by the administrative decision-maker, invading the role of the latter as fact-finder and merits-decider” (citing Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v [NAME_19] ([NAME_20]) , 2012 FCA 22 at paragraph 20 [ [NAME_20] ]; [NAME_21] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FCA 117 at para 46). [ 40 ] In this case, most of the [NAME_11] goes beyond a neutral and objective presentation of the evidence. Upon review of the Respondent’s references, I conclude the following: a) Paragraphs 6 to 13, 16 to 19, 21, 25, 26, 35, and 36 describe the general context in a neutral manner, as well as attach relevant documents (including documents included in the [NAME_4] request). These are not at issue and will not be disregarded or struck. b) Paragraphs 5, 14, 15, 27, 28, and 37 improperly set out legal arguments and opinions. These paragraphs will be disregarded. c) Paragraphs 20, 22, 23, and 24 introduce legal arguments, facts, or material (attached as exhibits to these paragraphs) that were not before the decision-maker and do not meet the exceptions to the general rule as set out in [NAME_20] . These paragraphs and concordant exhibits will be disregarded. d) Paragraphs 29 to 34 describe [NAME_11]’ recollection of personal interactions, communications and calls he had with members of the Canadian Competent Authority on May 18, 2022, and June 28, 2022, as well as the passages of the [NAME_9] that he read after the May 18, 2022, meetings. Paragraph 32 to 34 describe [NAME_11]’ recollection of the [NAME_3]’s rationale behind the Decision that had been communicated to him on June 22, 2022. The Respondent has asserted that this is part of the “contested facts” that make the affidavit improper. However, the Decision also referred to these meetings, and neither party contested what was conveyed verbally during those meetings versus what was in the Decision. If there was, I would agree with the Respondent that these passages of the [NAME_11] would relate to contested facts and would not be permissible in a lawyer’s affidavit pursuant to Rule 82. Thus, I will only consider the fact that meetings took place between the Applicant’s counsel and the members of the Canadian Competent Authority before the Decision was rendered. e) Paragraphs 38 to 41 relate to email communications and a meeting between [NAME_11] and members of the Canadian Competent Authority that occurred after the June 30, 2022, Decision was made. These paragraphs do not meet the exceptions in [NAME_20] and will be disregarded. B. The Balance of the Respondent’s Objections [ 41 ] The Respondent’s other objections relate to the Applicant’s Amended Notice of Application and new arguments presented in the Applicant’s memorandum of fact and law. Namely, the Respondent takes issue with the Applicant’s failure to amend the Notice of Application by clarifying that he was seeking relief for the 2000 to 2002 taxation years, arising from an agreement to settle an appeal of Associate Justice Horne’s decision in 2023 ( [NAME_2] v [NAME_22]) , 2023 FC 248). [ 42 ] The Respondent also objects to the Applicant’s use of affidavits by two [NAME_3] officers [[NAME_3]] to challenge the Decision on review. The Respondent states that the [NAME_3] were initially filed in response to the Applicant’s motion to amend his Notice of Application in May 2024 and granted in part by Associate Justice Horne on July 8, 2024 ( [NAME_2] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1062). The Respondent claims that the Applicant inappropriately relies on these affidavits to advance a new ground of argument in his memorandum of law and argument, that are not found in the Notice of Application or Amended Notice of Application ( [COMPANY_23]. v Canada , 2013 FCA 250 at para 38, citing Rules 301(d) and (e)). At the hearing, the Applicant did not advance the “new arguments” in his oral submissions. [ 43 ] Given my conclusion that the Decision is reasonable, I need not address these objections further. I simply comment that the Applicant ought to have clarified the relevant scope of the applicable taxation years from the outset in these proceedings. [ 44 ] Finally, at the hearing, the Applicant also appropriately withdrew certain remedies sought. The relief sought is now limited to seeking to set aside the Decision, and to remit the matter to a new decision-maker for reconsideration.

IV. Issues and Standard of Review [ 45 ] The issue on judicial review is whether the Minister’s Decision was unreasonable. [ 46 ] The parties submit that the standard of review with respect to the merits of the Decision is reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME_24] , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 10, 25 [ [NAME_24] ]). I agree that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review in this case. [ 47 ] The Respondent submits that the Federal Court ought to give deference to the Minister in the context of foreign affairs ( [NAME_25] v The Minister of National Revenue , 2016 FC 1086 at paragraph 19 [ [NAME_26] ] citing [NAME_27] v Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada) , 2015 FCA 4 [ [NAME_27] ]). The Respondent submits that this deference should extend to the Minister’s interpretation and application of [NAME_4] and the Commentaries in the Applicant’s case. [ 48 ] While Justice McDonald’s analysis and conclusions in [COMPANY_26] at paragraphs 16 to 19 were undertaken before [NAME_24], they are consistent with the deference of a reviewing court with respect to a [NAME_4] request when applying the reasonableness standard of review. [ 49 ] A reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” in which the Court seeks to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision-maker for drawing its conclusion and whether it was “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker” ( [NAME_29] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 SCC 21 at paras 58, 60; [NAME_24] at paras 84 - 85). [ 50 ] On judicial review, the Court must consider whether a decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility ( [NAME_24] at para 99). A reasonable decision will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context of the particular decision under review ( [NAME_24] at para 90). A decision may be unreasonable if the decision-maker misapprehended the evidence before it ( [NAME_24] at paras 125 - 126). [ 51 ] The party challenging the decision bears the onus of demonstrating that the decision is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” to warrant intervention ( [NAME_24] at para 100).

V. Analysis A. Applicable Legal Constraints [ 52 ] The parties do not contest the framework of the Canada-UK Tax Convention, the applicable three-year limitation period or the factual context and chronology of events leading to the Decision under review. Rather, the dispute lies in the Minister’s interpretation of the [NAME_4]’s three-year limitation period and the applicable “[NAME_9] on Article 25 Concerning the Mutual Agreement Procedure” [[NAME_9] on Article 25]. [ 53 ] As such, it is useful to start with the applicable legal constraints that bear upon the decision-maker. [ 54 ] The jurisprudence establishes that tax treaties are to be given a liberal interpretation, and literal interpretations should be avoided where the object of the treaty may be defeated ( [NAME_30] v [NAME_22]) , 2025 FCA 180 at para 36, citing [COMPANY_6]. v Canada , 1995 CanLII 103 (SCC), [1995] 2 SCR 802 at para 43 [ Crown Forest ]; [NAME_32] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2022 FCA 117 at para 24 [ [NAME_32] ]). [ 55 ] The principles of tax treaty interpretation are set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treati es, 23 May 1969, Can TS 1980 No 37 (entered into force 27 January 1980, accession by Canada 14 October 1970) [Vienna Convention] ( Canada v [NAME_33] S.A.R.L. , 2021 SCC 49 at para 37 [ [NAME_33] ]). Article 31 of the Vienna Convention establishes that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” [ 56 ] This approach resembles the modern approach to statutory interpretation ( [COMPANY_34]. (Re) , 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27; World Bank Group v [NAME_36] , 2016 SCC 15 at para 47; [NAME_33] at para 37, citing Crown Forest at para 47, other citations omitted). [ 57 ] The “context” portion of the analysis requires examining the context of the treaty as a whole, including its text, its preamble, and annexes, as well as agreements or other instruments made “in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” ( [NAME_22]) v [COMPANY_37]. , 2025 FC 968 at para 132 [ [NAME_37] ], citing Vienna Convention at Article 31(2)). [ 58 ] In addition to discerning the text, context, and purpose of [NAME_4], the Court must seek to interpret [NAME_4] in a way to implement the “true intention of the parties” ( [NAME_32] at para 24). The parties’ “true intentions” may be ascertained by resorting to extrinsic materials which form part of the legal context, including “accepted model conventions and official commentaries thereon” ( [NAME_32] at para 25, citing Crown Forest at para 44). [ 59 ] In the context of the OECD Model Tax Convention, one of the relevant and persuasive sources of interpreting [NAME_4] are the commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention, published by the OECD ( [NAME_33] at para 38, citing OECD Commentaries “Introduction” at para 29). Indeed, Canadian courts consider commentaries to [NAME_4] to be useful interpretative aids and confirmed the “highly persuasive value” of the OECD Model Convention and its commentaries in interpreting [NAME_4] ( [NAME_33] at para 39). [ 60 ] In the Applicant’s case, the applicable [NAME_9] is the “[NAME_9] on Article 25 Concerning the Mutual Agreement Procedure” [previously referred to in this judgment as [NAME_9]]. The [NAME_9] addresses the interpretation of Article 25 of the Model Convention as well as how to calculate the start of the three-year limitation period for a [NAME_4] request. Article 25 of the Model Convention is identical to Article 23 of the Canada-UK Tax Convention.

Accordingly, the [NAME_9] on Article 25 applies to Article 23 of the Canada-UK Tax Convention. (1) The [NAME_4] [ 61 ] Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 23 of [NAME_4] (corresponding to Article 25 of the Model Convention), contemplate a dispute resolution process, the [NAME_4]. Under the [NAME_4], Canadian tax officials interact and consult with UK tax officials to resolve issues of taxation under [NAME_4] ([NAME_9] on Article 25 at para 10). [ 62 ] The [NAME_4] is a two-fold process. First, the taxpayer must submit a request to the competent authority of either [NAME_38] within three years of the “first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provision of [NAME_4]” (Convention at art 23.1; [NAME_9] on Article 25 at para 16). In this case, the Canadian Competent Authority is the [NAME_3], and the UK Competent Authority is HMRC. [ 63 ] Second, if the Competent Authority finds that the Applicant has submitted their request in due form, they will seek to reach a mutual agreement with the other [NAME_38]’s competent authority, with the purpose of avoiding taxation that is not in accordance with [NAME_4]. The taxpayer is no longer involved in these negotiations, once the application to initiate the [NAME_4] has been accepted. [ 64 ] In the Applicant’s case, the [NAME_3] refused to initiate his [NAME_4] request and communicated this decision to him on June 30, 2022. Thus, the second step in the [NAME_4] process was not undertaken. [ 65 ] The period of time in which an applicant can submit a request to be admissible to the [NAME_4] is set out in [NAME_4] at paragraph 1 of Article 23: Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or will result for that person in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention , that person may, irrespective of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, address to the competent authority of the [NAME_38] of which that person is a resident an application in writing stating the grounds for claiming the revision of such taxation. To be admissible, the application must be submitted within three years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. (emphasis added) [ 66 ] Both parties agree on the applicable limitation period to initiate a request for admissibility to the [NAME_4]. The issue before the Court is the Minister’s interpretation of the start of the limitation period. As such, the language of [NAME_4] and the terms and intention of the treaty at issue in light of the [NAME_9] are all relevant legal constraints that bear upon the decision-maker (see also [NAME_37] at paras 115 - 117). B. Applicable Factual Constraints [ 67 ] In support of his [NAME_4] request, the Applicant submitted: (1) a signed authorization allowing his Canadian counsel, [NAME_39], to act on his behalf; (2) notices of reassessment from the [NAME_3] for the tax years 2000 to 2008 and 2010 to 2012, inclusively, dated January 22, 2015; (3) notices of reassessment from the [NAME_3] following the May 29, 2017, Audit for the tax years 2006 to 2010, and 2014, dated September 7, 2017; (4) a letter from the Applicant’s representatives asking the Tax Court to hold his notice of appeal in abeyance for the duration of the [NAME_4] process; (5) the Applicant’s report for HMRC prepared in the context of his Worldwide Disclosure Facility Disclosure, dated December 21, 2018; (6) the Applicant’s certificate of residence for the UK, dated April 25, 2019; (7) the Notices of assessment from HMRC for the 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 tax years, dated March 8, 2021. [ 68 ] In his [NAME_4] request to the Canadian Competent Authority, the Applicant stated that he filed income tax returns as a resident of Canada for the 2000 to 2015 taxation years. On May 24, 2013, he filed an amended tax return to report his income earned outside Canada under the Voluntary Disclosure Program, which was confirmed by the [NAME_3] as being accurate. The [NAME_3] issued notices of reassessment in confirmation of this on January 22, 2015. [ 69 ] The Applicant’s tax returns were reassessed by the [NAME_3] on September 7, 2017. The Applicant claims these reassessments were wrong: his tax accountants and lawyers discovered that he was a UK resident for tax purposes in 2018, leading him to obtain a UK Certificate of Residence and to file a disclosure and UK tax returns using the [NAME_8], in 2019. As a result of his newly acknowledged UK residence, the Applicant states he was double taxed on the 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 tax years by the HMRC on March 8, 2021, when he received Notices of assessment from the HMRC. [ 70 ] With respect to the limitation period, the Applicant made the following submission in his [NAME_4] request under the section “Time Limit” : Time Limit 18. HMRC first notified [NAME_1] that his UK disclosure led to double tax contrary to [NAME_4] on or about March 8, 2021, i.e., after HMRC sent [NAME_1] the first UK NoAs 19. [NAME_1] has filed this request for assistance within 3 years from the HMRC’s notification and his realization that the first UK NoA resulted in double taxation contrary to [NAME_4]. 20. [NAME_1] believes when he receives the expected UK NoRs the result will be the same, i.e., double tax contrary to [NAME_4] related to the 2002 to 2017 taxation years. C. The Decision is not Unreasonable [ 71 ] The Applicant submits that the March 8, 2021, date should be considered the “first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4].” The [NAME_3] applied the 2017 [NAME_3] date of September 7, 2017, as the triggering date. [ 72 ] At the hearing, the Applicant proposed a view of the [NAME_9], explaining that pursuant to Article 25 of [NAME_4], actual double taxation is required for the limitation period to begin. Although taxpayers may initiate the [NAME_4] if they believe that double-taxation may occur, he submits that the three-year limitation period only starts running once double-taxation actually occurs. The Applicant explained that there is no way of knowing with certainty whether any taxation is not in accordance with [NAME_4] other than when actual double-taxation occurs. [ 73 ] Applying this reasoning to his particular facts, the Applicant submits that the 2017 [NAME_3] could not have been “taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]” because he did not know and could not know whether the HMRC would accept his Worldwide Disclosure Facility Disclosure and find him to be a UK resident for tax purposes during the relevant period. This only occurred in 2021, when HMRC issued him notices of assessment. [ 74 ] The Applicant submits that the Decision referenced only certain parts of the [NAME_9], while omitting those which supported an outcome that would be more favourable to him. Using that phrase, the Applicant states that his interpretation of the triggering event being when the UK actually taxed him in 2021 was the “most favourable” interpretation of [NAME_4]. Therefore, the [NAME_3] should have used 2021 as the starting point for computing the limitation period. [ 75 ] Moreover, the Applicant submits that [NAME_4] and [NAME_9] seek to make the [NAME_4] procedure as accessible as possible. As such, the Applicant submits that in using the September 7, 2017, date, the Minister adopted an overly restrictive interpretation, unreasonably denying the Applicant access to the [NAME_4]. Such an interpretation is contrary to the purpose of [NAME_4], which is to eliminate circumstances of double taxation. [ 76 ] The Respondent submits that the [NAME_9] does not say what the Applicant says it does and that he is proposing a selective reading to justify his late submission. The Respondent submits that the Applicant has isolated the phrase “most favourable to the taxpayer” without consideration of the entirety of the [NAME_9] that guides the computation of the limitation period. This includes the term “first notification” as set out in [NAME_4] and expanded on in the [NAME_9]. [ 77 ] The Respondent submits that one cannot divorce the language in [NAME_4] from the factual context. This includes when the Applicant was first notified – not when he was last or later notified - as well as what (and when) the Applicant knew about the action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] from being considered as the starting point of the calculation. The Respondent underlines that the language in [NAME_4] also considers knowledge or notice from the taxpayer’s perspective (citing paragraph 14 of the [NAME_9]). [ 78 ] The Respondent submits that paragraph 23 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 clarifies that the limitation period starts from the time the taxpayer receives the “first notification” of an action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]. This paragraph distinguishes a taxpayer’s act of self-assessment from the notification effecting that assessment from the calculation, which is the interpretation most favourable to the taxpayer. Furthermore, paragraph 23 of the [NAME_9] also provides other circumstances where notification of the fact of taxation to the taxpayer is to be assessed in a manner most favourable to the taxpayer (e.g., in cases where there is no notice of liability or the like, the time of “notification” begins when a reasonably prudent person in the taxpayer’s position would have been able to conclude that the taxation to the taxpayer is enough). [ 79 ] I agree with the Respondent’s submissions. [ 80 ] [ADDRESS] must start with the reasons in the Decision and then assess whether the [NAME_3]’s interpretation of the limitation period is reasonable given the legal and factual constraints that bear upon the decision-maker ( [NAME_24] at para 84). On review, the Court must assess whether it can “connect the dots on the page where the lines and the direction they are headed, may be readily drawn” ( [NAME_24] at para 97). With respect to the Applicant’s submissions, judicial review cannot start with the Applicant’s contention that his interpretation of the three-year limitation period ought to have been preferred. [ 81 ] In the reasons in the Decision, the [NAME_3] concluded that the 2017 [NAME_3], constituted the “first notification of an action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]” to start calculating the three-year limitation period. [ 82 ] The Applicant has put significant focus in his arguments in the language found at paragraph 21 of the [NAME_9], underlining that the Competent Authority must apply “the interpretation most favourable to the taxpayer” . However, the Applicant’s arguments do not take into consideration the reasons set out in the Decision, and especially the specific language of [NAME_4] with respect to the [NAME_4] and the guidance in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the [NAME_9] on the computation of the limitation period. [ 83 ] Since many of the provisions of the [NAME_9] were paraphrased or terminology was used interchangeably during the hearing, it is relevant to set out the exact language in each relevant passage. [ 84 ] The Preliminary Remarks of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 specify that the object of Article 25 of the Model Convention is to “promote, through consultation and mutual agreement between the [NAME_7], the consistent treatment of individual cases” and to promote a consistent interpretation and application of [NAME_4]. Paragraph 9 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 presents examples of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]— “the most common is where the measure in question leads to double taxation which is the specific purpose of [NAME_4] to avoid” . [ 85 ] Paragraph 13 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 describes the scope of the [NAME_4] to include taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4], not only double taxation:

13. The mutual agreement procedure is also applicable in the absence of any double taxation contrary to [NAME_4], once the taxation in dispute is in direct contravention of a rule in [NAME_4]. Such is the case when one State taxes a particular class of income in respect of which [NAME_4] gives an exclusive right to tax to the other State even though the latter is unable to exercise it owing to a gap in its domestic laws. Another category of cases concerns persons who, being nationals of one [NAME_38] but residents of the other State, are subjected in that other State to taxation treatment which is discriminatory under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 24. (emphasis added) [ 86 ] A taxpayer can set in motion the [NAME_4] “ without waiting until the taxation considered by him to “not in accordance with [NAME_4]” has been charged against or notified to him ” (emphasis added) ([NAME_9] at para 14). Paragraph 14 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 further defines the term “actions” including: Such actions mean all acts or decisions , whether of a legislative or a regulatory nature, and whether of general or individual application, having as their direct and necessary consequence the charging of tax against the complainant contrary to the provisions of [NAME_4] . (emphasis added) [ 87 ] One of the examples articulated in paragraph 14 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 with respect to the term “actions” provides that: Other examples include filing a return in a self assessment system or the active examination of a specific taxpayer reporting position in the course of an audit, to the extent that either event creates the probability of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] (e.g. where the self assessment reporting position the taxpayer is required to take under a [NAME_38]’s domestic law would, if proposed by that State as an assessment in a non-self assessment regime, give rise to the probability of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] , or where circumstances such as a [NAME_38]’s published positions or its audit practice create a significant likelihood that the active examination of a specific reporting position such as the taxpayer’s will lead to proposed assessments that would give rise to the probability of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]) . (emphasis added) [ 88 ] Paragraph 16 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 elaborates the criteria established by paragraph 1 of Article 25. To be admissible, objections must first be presented to a competent authority of either [NAME_38]. There is no specific form required for the objections, and the competent authority is given leeway to prescribe the form deemed appropriate. Second, objections must be presented within three years of “the first notification of the action which gives rise to taxation which is not in accordance with [NAME_4]” (at para 16). [ 89 ] The intention of the three-year time limit is intended to “protect administrations against late objections” ([NAME_9] on Article 25 at para 20). [ 90 ] Paragraphs 21 to 23 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 are at the heart of the dispute. For ease of reference, I have duplicated the full text below:

21. The provision fixing the starting point of the three year time limit as the date of the “first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of [NAME_4]” should be interpreted in the way most favourable to the taxpayer. Thus, even if such taxation should be directly charged in pursuance of an administrative decision or action of general application, the time limit begins to run only from the date of the notification of the individual action giving rise to such taxation, that is to say, under the most favourable interpretation, from the act of taxation itself, as evidenced by a notice of assessment or an official demand or other instrument for the collection or levy of tax. Since a taxpayer has the right to present a case as soon as the taxpayer considers that taxation will result in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of [NAME_4], whilst the three year limit only begins when that result has materialised , there will be cases where the taxpayer will have the right to initiate the mutual agreement procedure before the three year time limit begins (see the examples of such a situation given in paragraph 14 above).

22. In most cases it will be clear what constitutes the relevant notice of assessment, official demand or other instrument for the collection or levy of tax , and there will usually be domestic law rules governing when that notice is regarded as “given”. Such domestic law will usually look to the time when the notice is sent (time of sending), a specific number of days after it is sent, the time when it would be expected to arrive at the address it is sent to (both of which are times of presumptive physical receipt), or the time when it is in fact physically received (time of actual physical receipt). Where there are no such rules, either the time of actual physical receipt or, where this is not sufficiently evidenced, the time when the notice would normally be expected to have arrived at the relevant address should usually be treated as the time of notification, bearing in mind that this provision should be interpreted in the way most favourable to the taxpayer.

23. In self assessment cases, there will usually be some notification effecting that assessment (such as a notice of a liability or of denial or adjustment of a claim for refund), and generally the time of notification, rather than the time when the taxpayer lodges the self-assessed return, would be a starting point for the three year period to run. Where a taxpayer pays additional tax in connection with the filing of an amended return reflecting a bona fide taxpayer-initiated adjustment (as described in paragraph 14 above), the starting point of the three year time limit would generally be the notice of assessment or liability resulting from the amended return, rather than the time when the additional tax was paid. There may, however, be cases where there is no notice of a liability or the like. In such cases, the relevant time of “notification” would be the time when the taxpayer would, in the normal course of events, be regarded as having been made aware of the taxation that is in fact not in accordance with [NAME_4]. This could, for example, be when information recording the transfer of funds is first made available to a taxpayer, such as in a bank balance or statement. The time begins to run whether or not the taxpayer actually regards the taxation, at that stage, as contrary to [NAME_4], provided that a reasonably prudent person in the taxpayer’s position would have been able to conclude at that stage that the taxation was not in accordance with [NAME_4]. In such cases, notification of the fact of taxation to the taxpayer is enough. Where, however, it is only the combination of the self assessment with some other circumstance that would cause a reasonably prudent person in the taxpayer’s position to conclude that the taxation was contrary to [NAME_4] (such as a judicial decision determining the imposition of tax in a case similar to the taxpayer’s to be contrary to the provisions of [NAME_4]), the time begins to run only when the latter circumstance materialises. (emphasis added) [ 91 ] The Decision acknowledged the Applicant’s central argument that he views the first notification as being the March 2021 HMRC Assessments. The Applicant had stated that this was when double taxation had crystallized. As the Respondent correctly identified, the [NAME_3] engaged with the Applicant’s “Time Limit” submission in the [NAME_4] request. The Decision cited paragraph 13 of the [NAME_9] and described that [NAME_4] is applicable in the absence of any double taxation. If the Decision had stopped there, I would have been inclined to agree with the Applicant that the Minister combined the “anticipatory” right to request a [NAME_4] and collapsed it with the computation of the limitation period. However, the Decision did not stop there and sufficiently detailed why it did not accept the Applicant’s argument that March 2021 should be the starting point for calculation. [ 92 ] The Decision explained why the [NAME_3] found that the “first notification” occurred in 2017, after the 2017 [NAME_3] and that the “action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]” was tied to the 2017 [NAME_3] issued after it did not accept the Applicant’s contention that he was a UK resident. The Decision specifically stated that “in view of the above, it is therefore evident the Taxpayer and his representative were of the opinion that the notice of reassessment (ultimately issued on September 7, 2017) would result in taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4].” [ 93 ] This conclusion is transparent, justified and intelligible given the factual and legal constraints that bear upon the [NAME_3]. From the outset of his interactions with the [NAME_3], the Applicant had asserted that he was a UK resident for Canadian taxation purposes, meaning that the UK could rightfully tax him and prevail over Canada. Once Canada sent him Notices of Reassessment imposing taxation on him as a resident in 2017, it meant, practically speaking, Canada was now taking the action of imposing taxation that he had asserted they were not entitled to. [ 94 ] The [NAME_3]’s conclusion that the 2017 [NAME_3] was an action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] is consistent with the [NAME_9], at paragraph 21, which reads that “considering the interpretation most favourable to the taxpayer, the time limit begins to run only from the date of the notification of the individual action giving rise to such taxation, that is to say, under the most favourable interpretation, from the act of taxation itself, as evidenced by a notice of assessment or an official demand or other instrument for the collection or levy of tax” (emphasis added). [ 95 ] The [NAME_3]’s determination on the 2017 [NAME_3] concords with paragraph 23 of the [NAME_9], that describes the time of notification “in self assessment cases, there will usually be some notification effecting that assessment (such as a notice of a liability or of denial or adjustment of a claim for refund), and generally the time of notification , rather than the time when the taxpayer lodges the self-assessed return, would be a starting point for the three-year period to run” and “ the starting point of the three-year time limit would generally be the notice of assessment or liability resulting from the amended return , rather than the time when the additional tax was paid” (emphasis added). [ 96 ] The Applicant takes umbrage with the [NAME_3]’s references to his previous submissions in 2017 to the [NAME_3] and in 2018 to the HMRC, and contests that he stated that the Canadian assessments were not in accordance with [NAME_4]. The Applicant’s argument on judicial review is at odds with the record before the Court. [ 97 ] In the materials that he submitted to the HMRC in his 2018 Report, the Applicant challenged [NAME_3]’s position that his residency for tax purposes was Canada, on the grounds that taxation on this basis would be not in accordance with [NAME_4]. It was therefore open to the [NAME_3], as decision-maker, to consider the Applicant’s following acknowledgement in the 2018 Report to the HMRC:

7. Double taxation relief 7.1 Notwithstanding his UK tax liabilities, HMRC is advised that [NAME_40] has already paid tax due in Canada in respect of the same income and gains. Indeed, [NAME_40] has filed and paid tax between 2002 and 2015 as a Canadian resident (rather than a non-Canadian resident), and therefore has overpaid tax in Canada not in accordance with the treaty. An application under the Mutual Agreement Procedure to correct [NAME_40]'s historical Canadian tax position is discussed in Section 14 . 7.2 Accordingly, this report submits that [NAME_40] is entitled to relief under the 1978 Canada-UK Double Taxation Convention ([NAME_4]). The relief has been calculated on the basis that [NAME_40] is liable to Canadian tax as a non-Canadian resident. (emphasis added) [ 98 ] The Applicant’s argument on judicial review overlooks that he specifically placed this assertion before the [NAME_7]. As such, I cannot fault the Minister for considering this admission when assessing the computation of the limitation period. [ 99 ] It is also circular and somewhat contrary for the Applicant to advance before the HMRC, that the [NAME_3]’s actions in 2017 were not in accordance with [NAME_4], but conversely, that it was not appropriate for the [NAME_3] to arrive at that same conclusion for the purpose of calculating the limitation period. [ 100 ] One cannot ignore the specific language at paragraph 1 of Article 23 of [NAME_4], which I repeat for ease of reference: “Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or will result for that person in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention ” […] [ 101 ] Breaking this down, paragraph 1 of Article 23 speaks to “where a person considers” , which reasonable is associated to the knowledge or belief from the taxpayer’s perspective. Next, “the actions of one or both of the Contracting States” , in this case, means the action of either Canada or the UK, or both Canada and the UK. Further, such actions “result or will result in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention” which, on a plain reading, means that these actions produce or will produce the outcome of taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. [ 102 ] In the Applicant’s case, he had clearly expressed to the Canadian tax authority that he should be considered a UK resident for taxation purposes. The result of the 2017 [NAME_3] was the [NAME_3] charging tax to the Applicant. He then asserted, that when Canada imposed tax on him, this was taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] by Canada because of his UK residency claim. It was therefore reasonable for the [NAME_3] to conclude that the 2017 [NAME_3] was an “action” , with the direct and necessary consequence of the charging of tax against the complainant contrary to the provisions of [NAME_4] (at para 14 of the [NAME_9]), and when the “result materialized” for the purpose of paragraphs 21 and 23 of the [NAME_9], meaning when the taxpayer was notified of the individual action giving rise to taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]. The facts support the [NAME_3]’s interpretation. [ 103 ] Based on this, I cannot agree with the Applicant’s argument that when he knew about the actions resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of [NAME_4] is not a relevant factor in the computation of the limitation period. [ 104 ] I am able to “connect the dots” between the [NAME_3]’s reasons and paragraph 1 of Article 23 of [NAME_4], as well as the [NAME_9] to understand how the [NAME_3] concluded, based on the record before it, that when the Applicant considered that the action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] materialized after the 2017 [NAME_3] was issued. The Applicant has not persuaded me that the [NAME_3] erred in concluding that the 2017 [NAME_3] constituted a “first notification” to the Applicant that would trigger the limitation period pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 23 of [NAME_4] and paragraph 23 of the [NAME_9]. [ 105 ] The Applicant also submitted that the Decision is unreasonable as the Minister did not grapple with why the 2021 actual double taxation was not a first action, which was the gist of his submissions to the decision-maker. However, the [NAME_3] addressed the Applicant’s arguments in the [NAME_4] request and explained why they were rejected. It was incumbent on the Applicant to show on judicial review that the Decision was unreasonable in its analysis of the “first notification” —in other words, why the finding that 2017 was the first notification of an action resulting in taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] was unreasonable. The Applicant failed to do so. [ 106 ] Finally, the Applicant argues that the Minister did not explain how the chosen interpretation was the “most favourable” to the Applicant as set out in paragraph 21 of the [NAME_9], particularly when another, more beneficial, interpretation was available. He claims this renders the Decision unreasonable (citing [NAME_41] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1247 at para 48). [ 107 ] On this issue, I also agree with the Respondent’s submissions that adopting the “most favourable” interpretation does not mean that the decision-maker can ignore the facts before it. In the Applicant’s case, the events of 2017 and 2018, the Applicant’s past submissions that the 2017 [NAME_3] were taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4] were relevant factual constraints. He asserted as of February 7, 2017, that he was a resident of the UK and not of Canada. He repeated this assertion in the Applicant’s 2018 HMRC Report. These were referred to in the Minister’s assessment of the limitation period. [ 108 ] Furthermore, the Applicant’s argument on the limitation period as it was framed in his [NAME_4] request was simply that March 2021 was the first notification of an action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]. He did not address the 2017 [NAME_3], nor did he make a cogent argument to the [NAME_3] that his interpretation of the limitation period was the “most favourable” under paragraph 21 of the [NAME_9] and why, only presenting these arguments to the Court on judicial review. [ 109 ] Having reviewed the Applicant’s submissions in the [NAME_4] request and specifically, his submissions in the “Time Limit” section, I cannot fault the [NAME_3] for not rebutting an argument that was not made. The [NAME_3] grappled with the central submissions, disagreed with his contention that March 2021 was the “first notification” , and explained why, referring to its interpretation of [NAME_4] and [NAME_9]. It also explained and justified why 2017 was the applicable starting point. [ 110 ] I also cannot find that the [NAME_3] erred by not using the later date - 2021 - as proposed by the Applicant. I understand the Applicant’s submissions that his March 2021 date was a reasonable conclusion. However, the fact that there are other possible outcomes does not mean that the Decision is unreasonable ( [NAME_24] at paras 83, 86). [ 111 ] While I appreciate that the purpose of [NAME_4] is to avoid double-taxation, this purpose cannot be read in a vacuum, nor can I ignore that [NAME_4] specifically set out a three-year limitation period in which to initiate a request to be admissible to the [NAME_4]. The [NAME_9] then provides guidance on how to determine when the limitation period can be triggered. [ 112 ] Indeed, the “most favourable interpretation” language in paragraph 21 of the [NAME_9] on Article 25 should not be read in isolation. Rather, it should be considered in conjunction with the rest of the relevant [NAME_9] which supports the Minister’s conclusion that the three-year time limit began from the moment that the [NAME_3] took an action which resulted in taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]. The Applicant’s argument also does not account for the specific language in the [NAME_9] that the purpose of the three-year time limit as “protect[ing] administrations against late objections” ([NAME_9] on Article 25 at para 21). [ 113 ] The Decision, [NAME_4] and the [NAME_9] must be read holistically based on the record before the decision-maker. The [NAME_3] was required to engage in the analysis of the [NAME_9] to assess what constitutes the “first notification” and the “action of taxation not in accordance with [NAME_4]” . It did so and explained why. [ 114 ] With respect, the Applicant’s submissions amount to a disagreement with the decision-maker’s reasoning ( [NAME_24] at para 125). The Decision is transparent, intelligible, and justified based upon the legal and factual constraints that bear upon the decision-maker. As such, the Court’s intervention is not warranted.

VI. Conclusion [ 115 ] The application for judicial review is dismissed. The Decision meets the hallmarks of reasonableness, being coherent and rational in its analysis of the evidence and arguments provided. [ 116 ] The parties have agreed on a quantum of costs fixed at $24,593.23, pursuant to Rule 400(4). I agree that this is appropriate in the circumstances.

JUDGMENT in T-1567-22 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that :

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. The Applicant shall pay the Respondent $24,593.23 total, in costs. "[NAME_42]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-1567-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_1] v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO (ONTARIO) DATE OF HEARING: january 14, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: NGO J. DATED: JUNE 23, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_43] [NAME_44] [NAME_45] For The Applicant [NAME_46] For The RESPONDENT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [COMPANY_13] and Solicitors Toronto (Ontario) For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto (Ontario) For The RESPONDENT [1] Signed on September 8, 1978, enacted in Canada by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 44, Part X, in force December 18, 1980, as Amended by the Protocols signed on April 15, 1980 (enacted in Canada by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 44, Part XI, in force December 18, 1980), October 16, 1985 (enacted in Canada by SI/86-47, in force December 23, 1985), May 7, 2003 (enacted in Canada by P.C. 2003-1374, in force May 4, 2004) and July 21, 2014 (enacted in Canada by SI/2015-82, in force December 18, 2014). [2] OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (Paris: OECD, 2017).