Federal Court Rejects Judicial Review of CAF Staffing Policy

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260619 Docket: T-3164-25 Citation: 2026 FC 844 Ottawa, Ontario, June 19, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME_1]: [NAME_3] Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Final Authority ( “[NAME_4]” ), dated September 26, 2024 and communicated to the Applicant on July 23, 2025, concerning her grievance that challenged being screened out of the Reserve Employment Opportunity ( “REO” ) staffing process for the Group Superintendent Clerk ( “GSC” ) at [COMPANY_5] ( “[NAME_5]” ) and subsequent REOs that introduced rank-base restrictions - The Applicant did not hold the required rank of “Sergeant” (the “Decision” ). [ 2 ] The Applicant argues that the rank-based restrictions are discriminatory, arbitrary, and inconsistent with the [NAME_6] ( “[NAME_6]” ) staffing policies, and that it had the effect of foreclosing her advancement opportunities within the [NAME_5]. The Applicant seeks to have [NAME_4]’s decision quashed, and the matter be remitted for reconsideration in accordance with procedural fairness and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 , being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 91(24) (the “ Charter ” ). [ 3 ] The Respondent argues that [NAME_4]’s decision was reasonable and procedurally fair—The Applicant did not hold the rank required for the position and by the time she had applied, other candidates possessing the requisite rank had applied; the applicable staffing practices did not allow for under-ranking since other qualified candidates had applied and as a result, the Applicant was screened out. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, this application is dismissed.

II. Standard of Review [ 5 ] The presumptive standard of review is reasonableness ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 [ Vavilov ] at para 10). Reasonableness review is a deferential standard and requires an evaluation of the administrative decision to determine if the decision is transparent, intelligible, and justified ( Vavilov at paras 12–15, 95). The starting point for a reasonableness review is the reasons for decision ( Vavilov at para 13). Pursuant to the Vavilov framework, a reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Vavilov at para 85). To intervene on an application for judicial review, the Court must find an error in the decision that is central or significant to render the decision unreasonable ( Vavilov at para 100). [ 6 ] The standard of review for procedural fairness issues is correctness, or akin to correctness ( Vavilov at para 53; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at paras 54-56). A reviewing court must consider what level of procedural fairness is necessary in the circumstances and whether the “procedure followed by the administrative decision maker respect[s] the standards of fairness and natural justice” ( [NAME_7] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 733 at para 13). In other words, a court must determine if the process followed by the decision-maker achieved the level of fairness required in the circumstances ( [NAME_8] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2020 FC 120 at para 23, citing with approval [NAME_9] v [NAME_10] , 2014 SCC 24 at para 79, see also [NAME_11] v [NAME_12] , 2024 FC 699 at para 27).

III. Facts [ 7 ] The Applicant is a former member of the [NAME_6] who served in the [NAME_6] from 2006 until her medical release in 2019. During the relevant period, she was posted to the [NAME_5] and held the rank of Master Corporal (described in some records as Master Sailor). [ 8 ] On October 24, 2016, the [NAME_6] posted [NAME_13] for the position of Group Superintendent Clerk within [NAME_5]. The essential rank requirement set out in the posting was “Sergeant” . The posting permitted over-ranking only in “exceptional circumstances” where no qualified candidate of the required rank was available; it did not provide for under-ranking. The competition process was open until November 23, 2015. The essential qualifications for the position were set out as follows: Rank: Sgt OVER RANKING SHALL ONLY BE USED IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTNACES, WHERE NO ESTABLISHED RANK QUALIFIED CANDIDATE IS FOUND SUITABLE BY A BOARD REPORT AND APPROAVED BY DIV HQ. HIGHER RANK WILL RELINQUISH RANK FOR THE DURATION OF THE [EMPLOYMENT PERIOD] [ 9 ] In March 2016, [NAME_5] submitted a request to increase the rank requirement for Position 215756 from “sergeant” to “warrant officer” , prior to posting [NAME_13]. The rationale for the requested change in rank was to better reflect the knowledge and skills required, degree of responsibility and complexity of the position, which included the management of a budget up to $12 million. The requested change in rank was accepted by the [NAME_6] in April 2018. [ 10 ] The Applicant received an email on October 18, 2016, six (6) days prior to the posting for [NAME_13], from the incumbent Group Superintendent Clerk that stated only sergeants and warrant officers would be eligible to apply for the posted position. [ 11 ] The Applicant did not apply for [NAME_13]. [ 12 ] The posting for [NAME_13] was extended to January 24, 2017 due to a lack of suitable candidates. The posting was closed on January 25, 2017, after a candidate meeting the rank requirement was selected. [ 13 ] In July 2017, the same position was reposted, but with a new posting number [NAME_13]. Again, listing “Sergeant” as the essential rank; however, this posting permitted both over-ranking and under-ranking. [ 14 ] The Applicant applied to [NAME_13], but was screened out on the basis that she did not meet the rank requirement; because as an under-ranked candidate other applicants who met the rank requirement had applied. [ 15 ] On September19, 2017, the Applicant filed a grievance pursuant to section 29 of the National Defence Act , RSC 1985, c N-5, challenging her exclusion from [NAME_13] and subsequent competitions that imposed rank restrictions. She sought, among other remedies, promotion to the rank of Sergeant and retroactive pay. [ 16 ] The Applicant’s grievance proceeded through the [NAME_6] grievance process. The Initial Authority ( “[NAME_14]” ) denied the grievance on March 26, 2018, finding that the decision to not permit under-ranking in [NAME_13] was reasonable and that there was no evidence the Applicant would have been selected had she applied. [ 17 ] In April 2018, the Applicant sought review by [NAME_4], and the matter was referred to the [NAME_15] ( “[NAME_15]” ). [ 18 ] On February 7, 2019, [NAME_15] recommended that [NAME_4] deny the grievance. [NAME_15] found, among other things, that [NAME_5] did not intend to allow under-ranking for [NAME_13], the inclusion of under-ranking in [NAME_13] was an error, the applicable policy conferred discretion rather than an obligation to under-rank, and it was speculative that the Applicant would have been selected. [NAME_15] found that the Applicant was properly screened out. [ 19 ] [NAME_4] denied the grievance on September 26, 2024, adopting [NAME_15]’s conclusions. The Decision emphasized that the Applicant had been treated in accordance with applicable policies and staffing practices. [ 20 ] The Applicant received the Decision on July 25, 2025, nearly eight years after the filing of her grievance and ten months after the Decision was rendered.

IV. Applicable Legislative and Policy Framework [ 21 ] The applicable policy framework that governs ranking for competitions is set out in the Canadian Forces Military Personnel Instruction (CF MIL PERS INSTR) 20/04 (the “Policy” ), Administrative Policy of Class “A” , Class “B” and Class “C” Reserve Service. Relevant to this particular matter are the Class “B” employment provisions. The Policy states: 4.5 Notification of CI “B” Reserve Service Opportunities 1. The intent of any notification of CI “B” Reserve Service opportunities is to demonstrate an open, fair, and equitable Reserve Service process accessible to the widest appropriate range of current Res F personnel … 4. All relevant information concerning the CI “B” Reserve Service opportunity shall be included in the notification … 4.7 Under-Ranked in a position A person in an established or temporary position shall only be under-ranked by one rank and under-ranking shall only be used in those exceptional cases where no other qualified candidate is available. In cases where under-ranking of the position could be long term, the employing unit should reconsider the position rank requirements. In cases where a member’s substantive rank is one rank lower than the rank of the established temporary position, the employing unit, with the concurrence of the CI “B” Reserve Service approving authority, may:

1. Authorize that the rank worn remain the member’s substantive rank or 2. If warranted, recommend to the promotion authority that: • If the member is P Res, COATS, or CR, the member be considered for a substantive promotion or an acting/lacking promotion or an A/WSE promotion for the duration of Reserve Service in the same position; or • If the member is Supp Res, the member be considered for an A/WSE promotion for the duration of Reserve Service in the same position.

V. Issues [ 22 ] This application raises the following issues: a) What is the standard of review? b) Was [NAME_4]’s decision reasonable? c) Was the grievance process procedurally fair? [ 23 ] The Respondent requested that the style of cause be amended to reflect that the Attorney General of Canada is the proper Respondent in this matter, pursuant to Rule 303(2) of the Federal Courts Rules SOR/98-106 (the “Rules” ). [ 24 ] I agree, accordingly the style of cause for this application shall be amended with immediate effect.

VI. Analysis A. Reasonableness [ 25 ] The Applicant argued that the Decision is unreasonable because it adopted [NAME_15]’s findings, ignored evidence, and failed to provide justified, transparent, and intelligible reasons, contrary to the framework set out in Vavilov. [ 26 ] The Applicant argues that the Decision does not consider if the discretionary policy concerning under and over ranking had been applied fairly or in good faith. Specifically, the Applicant points to the October 18, 2016 email and the consequences linked to the Applicant’s exclusion from the process. [ 27 ] The Respondent argues that the Decision was reasonable. Further, the Respondent argues that it was reasonable for the [NAME_5] to set out the eligibility requirements for the position and not permit under-raking. The Respondent argues that, even if under-ranking had been permitted, it is speculative whether the Applicant would have been the successful incumbent. Finally, the Respondent argues that the Applicant did not meet the eligibility criteria for [NAME_13]; because other candidates who did meet the eligibility criteria applied, it was reasonable to screen-out the Applicant in this circumstance. (1) [NAME_13] [ 28 ] The Applicant argued that [NAME_15] treated under-ranking as discretionary and exceptional, contrary to the policy. In support of her position, the Applicant notes that the position was posted five times before it was finally filled. The Applicant argued that [NAME_4] does not address if the discretion had been exercised fairly or in good faith. [ 29 ] It is important to note that the Applicant did not apply for [NAME_13], her grievance is premised on the failure of the posting to permit under-ranking. [ 30 ] At the outset of its reasons, [NAME_4] acknowledges that [NAME_15] recommended that [NAME_4] deny the grievance. [NAME_4] notes that it carefully considered all of the evidence and information in the file, including [NAME_15] report. [NAME_4] notes that “[T]he Committee’s [[NAME_15]] analysis of the issue you are grieving is through and comprehensive” , and that it has taken that analysis into account, [NAME_4] nevertheless provides its own analysis. Although the reasons for the Decision are brief, they are transparent, justified, intelligible, and demonstrate consideration of the relevant factual and legal frameworks. [ 31 ] [NAME_15] found that the Applicant had not applied for the position advertised in [NAME_13] because she acknowledged that she did not meet the rank requirements set out in the posting. [NAME_15] also notes that the Applicant highlighted the impacts of an email from the incumbent dated October 18, 2016, wherein the incumbent indicated that the anticipated posting would only be open to persons who held the rank of Sergeant or Warrant Officer. [ 32 ] [NAME_15] found that that pursuant to CG Mil Pers Instr 20/04, the employing unit determines the rank of a particular position. [NAME_15] notes that “a review of the requirements of the position had been conducted in early 2016 when it was determined that greater financial expertise was needed” .

Accordingly, while in exceptional circumstances, pursuant to the policy, the position could have been under-ranked, the employer had the discretion not to; [NAME_15] found the exercise of that discretion was reasonable in the circumstances. [ 33 ] Finally, I note that [NAME_15] found “it was reasonable for the CO not to permit the existing Sgt position to be filled by a [NAME_5], which would be two ranks lower than the requirement.” [ 34 ] As noted above, while the reasons for the Decision are brief, a review of [NAME_4] reasons illustrates that [NAME_4] found that the Applicant had not applied for [NAME_13], as she did not meet the essential rank requirement. [ 35 ] The Decision is reasonable. A review of the record for this application illustrates that the Applicant held the rank of Master Corporal/Master Sailor, a rank that is two levels below the requested upgraded rank for the position, Warrant Officer, and one level below the required rank advertised for the position, Sergeant. [ 36 ] I agree with the Applicant, the policy requires staffing to be “open, fair, and equitable and accessible to the widest appropriate range of members” . However, in this case, the Applicant did not have the necessary rank. A review of the policy illustrates that the under-ranking policy is discretionary and is only applicable where candidates at rank do not apply. In this case, the Applicant did not apply for [NAME_13], accordingly, she could not have even been considered for under-ranking, had it been available, which it was not. Her failure to participate in the process is determinative of the grievance. [ 37 ] The Applicant went on to argue that had she not been denied the opportunity to apply for this competition, she would be the successful incumbent and would have been promoted to the rank of Sergeant (P02) on December 1, 2016. The Applicant points to the October 18, 2016 email that she claims discouraged her application. [ 38 ] The Respondent argued it was reasonable for [NAME_4] to conclude that the Applicant’s argument was improper speculation. [ 39 ] As noted above, while the October 18, 2016 email may have discouraged the Applicant, the fact remains, she did not meet the necessary rank requirements advertised in the competition noted above. The Applicant suggests that the email impacted the fairness of the process, I do not agree. The Applicant has not demonstrated how an email that confirmed that the process would only be open to certain rank levels rendered the process unfair. [ 40 ] In addition, the Applicant argues that the failure to engage with the consequences of her exclusion from the process rendered the process unfair. With respect, I do not agree. The Applicant has acknowledged that she did not have the requisite rank to participate in the competition. While I appreciate that she would have liked to have had an opportunity to compete and she is of the view that she had the necessary skills, the employer was free to set the rank standards—[NAME_15] and [NAME_4] addressed the rationale for the rank in their reasons and found the rationale to be reasonable. I agree. [ 41 ] Finally, I note that [NAME_15] found that it was not clear that other under-ranked candidates would not have applied for the competition had [NAME_13] been open for under-ranking. Further, [NAME_15] noted that paragraph 4.7 of the Policy indicates that promotion to the higher rank is not automatic. [NAME_15] considered the Applicant’s personnel records which illustrated that she was eligible for promotion, “[P]romotion within the [NAME_6] is merit-based” and the evidence did not demonstrate that the Applicant “was high enough on the merit list to warrant a promotion” .

Accordingly, [NAME_15] did not find that the Applicant had been unfairly denied a promotion. [ 42 ] While the Decision from [NAME_4] does not specifically address this issue, nothing turns on this, as the Applicant’s argument is purely speculation and without merit. The Applicant has not identified any specific errors that would warrant this Court’s intervention. As this Court has repeatedly underscored, reasonableness review is a deferential standard, not a treasure hunt for errors. (2) [NAME_13] [ 43 ] [NAME_15] found that while the poster for [NAME_13] stated that both under-ranking and over-ranking were permitted, that the inclusion of under-raking was in error as the intention was for the posting to be identical to [NAME_13]. [ 44 ] The Applicant and two Sergeants applied for the position.

Accordingly, [NAME_15] found that pursuant to paragraph 4.7 of the Policy, under-ranking may only be considered where there are no other qualified candidates at the required rank. [NAME_15] found that the Applicant was properly screened out of the competition. [ 45 ] [NAME_15] noted that while the “unit could have done a better job in explaining the organizational changes to potential candidates at the [NAME_5] rank, as well as the impacts on future staffing processes. This would have helped everyone manage their expectations related to potential career advancement within the unit.” Ultimately, [NAME_15] found that the Applicant was treated fairly and in accordance with applicable policies and therefore, they did not recommend that [NAME_4] provide redress. [ 46 ] [NAME_4] found that while the Applicant applied for this position, she was screened out of the competition because other candidates at the rank of Sergeant applied. [ 47 ] A review of the Decision confirms that the issue of under-raking was considered by [NAME_4] but dismissed. [NAME_4] notes that pursuant to the Policy, at paragraph 3.6, a person “shall only be under-ranked by one rank and under ranking shall only be used in those exceptional cases where no other qualified candidate is available” . [NAME_4] found notwithstanding the Applicant’s training and skill set, she was “excluded from the staffing process as another candidate met the rank criteria” . Therefore, [NAME_4] did not find that she had been aggrieved. [ 48 ] In addition, [NAME_4] notes that the [NAME_5] had applied to increase the rank for the position ahead of the advertised competitions.

Accordingly, [NAME_4] found that the inclusion of under-raking was “ill-considered” . [ 49 ] The Applicant has not pointed to specific errors that would warrant intervention by this Court. The reasons for decision are transparent, justified and intelligible and in accordance with the applicable factual and legal constraints. B. Procedural Fairness [ 50 ] The Applicant raised several arguments alleging breach of procedural fairness. [ 51 ] The Respondent denies any breach of procedural fairness and argues that many of the Applicant’s arguments relate to the reasonableness of the Decision rather than procedural fairness. [ 52 ] The Applicant has raised several issues related to the weight attributed to evidence, the responsiveness and quality of the reasons. These are not procedural fairness issues and are without merit; Vavilov at para 91; [NAME_16] v [NAME_16] ([NAME_17]), 2011 SCC 62 at para 22. (1) Extrinsic Evidence [ 53 ] The Applicant argued that [NAME_4] and [NAME_15] relied on extrinsic evidence that was not available to her for review. [ 54 ] A review of the Decision and the record for this matter illustrates that the document that the Applicant claims was not disclosed, namely the Applicant’s FY 2017-2018 PER, was not part of the record or reviewed by [NAME_4] or [NAME_15]. A review of the record supports the conclusion that [NAME_4] and [NAME_15] are referencing an email provided by the [NAME_18] that set out information concerning the Applicant’s performance in the 206-2017 and 2017-2018 employment periods. [ 55 ] Apart from the Applicant’s bald allegation, there is no evidence that [NAME_4] and [NAME_15] relied on documents that were not disclosed or part of the grievance record. (2) Legitimate Expectations [ 56 ] The Applicant also argues that she had a legitimate expectation that [NAME_6] staffing policies would be fair, transparent and not present arbitrary barriers to inhibit advancement. [ 57 ] While it is not entirely clear, this argument is tied to the staffing practice of permitting under-raking in exceptional circumstances. As set out above, the Decision in this matter is reasonable. Ultimately, persons at the proper rank level applied for the position in [NAME_13] and therefore, the Applicant was screened out as an under-ranked applicant. Further, under-ranking was not permitted for [NAME_13], and she did not apply to this competition in any event. [ 58 ] The Supreme Court of Canada ( “SCC” ) described the doctrine of legitimate expectations in [NAME_19] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),  1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [ [NAME_19] ] at paragraph 26: [The doctrine of legitimate expectations], is based on the principle that the “circumstances” affecting procedural fairness take into account the promises or regular practices of administrative decision-makers, and that it will generally be unfair for them to act in contravention of representations as to procedure, or to backtrack on substantive promises without according significant procedural rights. [ 59 ] The doctrine of legitimate expectations supports a party’s expectation certain procedures will be followed: [NAME_19]  at para 26. The party’s expectations may arise from the conduct of the public authority, including established practices, conduct, guidelines, or representations considered to be “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” : Mount Sinai Hospital [COMPANY_20] v [NAME_21] (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41   at para 29; [COMPANY_22] v Canada (Attorney General) (C.A.),  2000 CanLII 17135 (FCA), [2000] 4 FC 264   at para 122 [ [COMPANY_22], 2000 ]. The test to consider is “ would a reasonable person think that the promise was serious, and should a reasonable person be entitled so to think?” : [COMPANY_22], 2000  at para 128. [ 60 ] In the present application, the poster for [NAME_13] permitted under-ranking; however, paragraph 4.5 of the Policy clearly states that under-ranking is discretionary, exceptional and only “where no other qualified candidate is available” . In this circumstance, the Applicant has not pointed to a clear, unambiguous and unqualified representation that can give rise to a legitimate expectation; [NAME_23] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 1612 at para 58, citing [NAME_24] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at paras 94-95; [NAME_25] v Canada (Advisory Council of the Order), 2015 FCA 5 at para 8. (3) Delay [ 61 ] The Applicant argued that there was an abuse of process because of the delay in the issuance of the Decision. [ 62 ] In [COMPANY_26] v [NAME_27] , 2022 SCC 29 [ [NAME_27] ], the SCC set out the test to determine if a delay amounts to an abuse of process: The test for whether delay amounts to an abuse of process has three steps. First, the delay must be inordinate. This is determined on an assessment of the context overall. Second, the delay must have caused significant prejudice. When those two requirements are met, the court or tribunal is to conduct a final assessment as to whether abuse of process is established. This will be so when the delay is manifestly unfair to the party to the proceedings or in some other way brings the administration of justice intro disrepute: Behn  at paras. 40-41. [ [NAME_27]  at para 72] [ 63 ] The fact that an administrative process took considerable time does not in and of itself amount to an inordinate delay ( [NAME_27] at para 50). Rather, this Court “should consider the following contextual factors: (a) the nature and purpose of the proceedings, (b) the length and causes of delay, and (c) the complexity of the facts and issues in the case” ( [NAME_27] at para 51). These factors are not exhaustive, and additional contextual factors may be considered, including if the applicant contributed to or waived delay ( [NAME_27] at para 61). [ 64 ] Delay in and of itself is not an abuse of process. A party must demonstrate with clear objective evidence that the delay impacted the fairness of the hearing or resulted in significant prejudice to the party; [NAME_28] v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 570 at paras 79–85, citing [NAME_27] at paras 67–68, see also [NAME_29] v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FC 1497 at paras 75-76. [ 65 ] The Applicant has not provided evidence that illustrated how the delay resulted in significant prejudice or impacted the fairness of the process. While the Applicant asserts that the prejudice was “practical and personal” , she asserts that the delay exacerbated psychological distress and reputational harms. The Applicant had no evidence to support these assertions. This is insufficient to meet the threshold to establish the significant prejudice element and accordingly, it is not necessary to determine if the delay in this case is “inordinate” or brought the administration of justice into disrepute. C. Matters Outside the Scope of the Applicant’s Grievance (1) Post-Grievance Reprisals [ 66 ] The Applicant alleged that, following the filing of her grievance, she experienced reprisals within her unit, including adverse treatment in the workplace, denial of medical accommodations, and loss of professional recognition. [ 67 ] The Respondent argued that these allegations were not assessed by [NAME_4], as they fall outside the scope of her original grievance and, therefore, are not properly before the Court in this application. These allegations are not addressed in the Respondent’s account of the facts and remain contested. [ 68 ] While the evidence concerning the alleged reprisals and mistreatment is troubling, I agree with the Respondent that these issues are not properly before Court in this application. The Applicant’s initial grievance related to the hiring processes for [NAME_13] and [NAME_13]. While some of this information was provided in the context of submissions in support of her grievances, this was presented as “background information” for the consideration of [NAME_4]. The Applicant did not seek relief in her grievances related to alleged reprisals and other post-grievance conduct. The Applicant did not amend her grievance to include these allegations nor is there evidence that a grievance was brought forward to address these issues. (2) Charter Issues [ 69 ] A review of the record for this application illustrates that the Applicant did not raise Charter arguments at the [NAME_14], [NAME_15] or [NAME_4] in the consideration of her grievance. It is well established that Charter arguments should not be considered for the first time on an application for judicial review; Forest Ethics Advocacy Association v Canada (National Energy Board) , 2014 FCA 245 at paras 4, 37–46, [NAME_30] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 1287 at para 65; [NAME_31] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 FC 28 at para 24. [ 70 ] In any event, the Applicant has not demonstrated how the Decision to deny her grievance engages section 7 or section 15(1) Charter rights or values, as set out by the SCC in [NAME_32] v [NAME_33] , 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395. [ 71 ] The Applicant has not demonstrated that the Decision has deprived or impacted her right to life, liberty or security of the person, in addition, she failed to provide evidence of widespread systemic issues that impact staffing processes. In addition, the SCC has confirmed that section 7 Charter rights do not extend to economic rights or interests; R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd , [1986] 2 SCR 713 at 786; Reference re Criminal Code, section 193, paragraph 195.1(1)(c), [1990] 1 SCR 1123 at 1179; Siemens v Manitoba (Attorney General) , [2003] 1 SCR 6 at para 46; [NAME_34] v [NAME_21] (Attorney General) , 2005 SCC 35 at paras 201-202; R v [NAME_35] , 2025 SCC 25 at paras 164-166. [ 72 ] The Applicant also did not demonstrate how the decision engages her section 15(1) Charter right - How an alleged distinction based on rank is an analogous ground of discrimination. It is well settled that distinctions based on employment categories are not enumerated or analogous grounds that engage section 15(1) of the Charter ; Power Workers’ Union v Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FCA 182 at para 161, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 41628 (29 May 2025), citing [NAME_36] v [NAME_37] , 2007 SCC 31 at paras 65−66, and Delisle v Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989 at para 44. [ 73 ] I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s argument that rank is a “proxy for service status and hierarchical power, reflecting structural inequities that often disproportionately disadvantage racialized, female, and lower-ranked non-commissioned members” . The Applicant provided no evidence to support her bald allegations and assertions.

VII. Conclusion [ 74 ] [NAME_4] Decision is reasonable. The Applicant did not apply to [NAME_13] because she did not meet the posted rank requirements for this position. In my view, her failure to apply is determinative. [ 75 ] With respect to [NAME_13], the Applicant was screened out of the competition because she was an under-ranked candidate and other candidates at the proper rank level applied. Consistent with the CF Policy, under-ranking is discretionary, exceptional and only available where there are no other qualified applicants. The facts of this application illustrate there were qualified applicants. [ 76 ] Accordingly, the Decision that the Applicant was not grieved is reasonable. [NAME_4] found that [NAME_5] applied to increase the rank for the GSC position months before the competitions were posted. [NAME_4] and [NAME_15] found that this was reasonable given the responsibilities tied to this position. The Applicant has not pointed to any reviewable error that would warrant this Court’s intervention with respect to the reasonableness of the Decision. [ 77 ] Similarly, the Applicant has not illustrated any breach of procedural fairness that would warrant this Court’s intervention. [ 78 ] No questions for certification were posed, and I agree that none arise. [ 79 ] The Respondent, as the successful party on this application is entitled to an award of costs. In oral submissions the Respondent advised that the parties agreed to a lump sum of $2000 for the successful party.

JUDGMENT in T-3164-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The style of cause is hereby amended to name the Attorney General of Canada as the proper Respondent. The application is dismissed. The Respondent is awarded its costs in this application to be fixed at $2000.00, payable forthwith. "[NAME_1]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-3164-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_3] v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa DATE OF HEARING: March 18, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME_1] J. DATED: June 19, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_38] For The Applicant [NAME_39] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME_40] and Solicitors St. Albert, [NAME_37] For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario For The Respondent