Federal Court Rejects Police Officer’s Judicial Review of Internal Decision

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260618 Docket: T-3391-24 Citation: 2026 FC 833 Ottawa, Ontario, June 18, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE [NAME] [NAME] OF CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT], a member of the [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] [[NAME]], is seeking judicial review of the rejection of his grievance related to the [NAME] process for a job opportunity. I am dismissing his application because he failed to show that the [NAME] [NAME] decision is unreasonable. In my view, [NAME] reasonably addressed [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s allegations concerning the [NAME]’s competencies, the omission of a required competency in the job posting and a reasonable apprehension of bias.

I. Background [ 2 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] has been a member of the [NAME] for more than twenty years. In 2021, he applied for the position of non-commissioned officer in charge of the [NAME] of E Division, at the rank of staff sergeant. The [NAME] was composed of the officer in charge of employee and management relations, E Division [the “[NAME] line officer” ], as well as the officer in charge of the [NAME], E Division [the “delegate” ]. [NAME]. [APPELLANT] was not selected for the position. The [NAME] was already working in the [NAME]. [ 3 ] Pursuant to the applicable policy, [NAME]. [APPELLANT] received a written rationale justifying the [NAME] of the [NAME], written by the [NAME] line officer and approved by the [NAME]’s [NAME]. [ 4 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] filed a grievance pursuant to the [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] Act , RSC 1985, c R-10 [the Act]. Three main themes underlie his grievance: the fact that the [NAME]’s application was deficient, that the [NAME] effectively required a competency that was not listed in the job posting and that its members were biased towards an internal [NAME]. [ 5 ] The [NAME]’s grievance process includes two levels: the [NAME] [NAME] and the [NAME] [NAME]. [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s grievance was dismissed at both levels. The reasons provided by the [NAME] are discussed below in relation to each of the three themes. [ 6 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] brought an application for judicial review of the [NAME] [NAME] decision.

II. Analysis [ 7 ] I am dismissing [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s application because he has not shown that the [NAME] [NAME] decision is unreasonable. A. Standard of Review [ 8 ] There is no dispute that this Court must review the decision of [NAME] on a standard of reasonableness, pursuant to the teachings of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653 [ [NAME] ]. According to this framework, a decision may be unreasonable if its internal logic is defective or if it does not comply with the constraints bearing upon it. However, the reasons given by an administrative decision maker need not be perfect, and judicial review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error.” [ 9 ] What requires some clarification, however, is the respective roles of the [NAME] [NAME] and [NAME] [NAME] [NAME], which can also be described as standards of review. These roles are set out in the Commissioner’s Standing Orders (Grievances and Appeals) , SOR/2014-289 [the Standing Orders], adopted pursuant to the Act. [ 10 ] The role of the [NAME] is set out in subsection 16(2) of the Standing Orders: (2) An [NAME], when rendering the decision, must consider whether the decision, act or omission that is the subject of the grievance is consistent with the relevant law, or the relevant Treasury Board or Force policy and, if it is not, whether it has caused a prejudice to the [NAME]. 2) [NAME] rend la décision, l’arbitre évalue si la décision, l’acte ou l’omission qui fait l’objet du grief est conforme à la législation pertinente ou à la politique pertinente du Conseil du Trésor ou de la Gendarmerie et si, en cas de non-conformité, un préjudice a été causé au plaignant. [ 11 ] Hence, the [NAME] must determine whether the applicable policies were followed, not exercise the discretion bestowed upon management. In this case, the [NAME] described this aspect of her mandate by referring to [NAME] . This is technically incorrect, as [NAME] does not apply to internal administrative appeals. However, as an analogy, it is apt insofar as it captures the basic idea that the [NAME]’s role is not to step into the manager’s shoes. [ 12 ] In turn, the mission of [NAME] is set out in subsection 18(2) of the Standing Orders: (2) An [NAME], when rendering the decision, must consider whether the decision at the [NAME] [NAME] contravenes the principles of procedural fairness, is based on an error of law or is clearly unreasonable.

2) Lorsqu’il rend la décision, l’arbitre évalue si la décision de premier niveau contrevient aux principes d’équité procédurale, est entachée d’une erreur de droit ou est manifestement déraisonnable. [ 13 ] Hence, [NAME] does not consider the matter anew—what is called a de novo review—but rather focuses on the [NAME] [NAME] decision and assesses whether it is affected by one or more of the kinds of errors mentioned in subsection 18(2). [ 14 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in [NAME] requires [NAME] to apply the reasonableness standard of review instead of the “clearly unreasonable” standard set forth in subsection 18(2). I cannot agree. The Federal Court of Appeal considered the meaning of “clearly unreasonable” in [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2021 FCA 73 [ [NAME] ], albeit in relation to a different provision of the Standing Orders. [ADDRESS] found that a [NAME] reasonably interpreted this phrase as equivalent to “patent unreasonableness,” one of the standards of review applied by [NAME] courts before the Supreme Court’s decision in [NAME] v [NAME] , 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190. [ADDRESS] in [NAME] also noted that [NAME] does not dictate the standard of review within the administrative process. [NAME] did not involve subsection 18(2), the same principles were applied to cases governed by that subsection: [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2017 FC 794 at paragraph 37; [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2021 FCA 8; [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2022 FC 1171 at paragraphs 36–37; [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2023 FC 811. [ 15 ] With this framework in mind, I now turn to [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s three grounds for challenging the [NAME] [NAME] decision. B. Defective Example [ 16 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s first submission pertains to what he calls a “defective example” in the [NAME]’s application. [ 17 ] The context for this argument is as follows. When an opportunity for promotion is posted, several competencies are identified as essential. Those competencies are defined in the [NAME]’s competency dictionary. For each competency, several levels are defined. A particular job posting indicates what proficiency [NAME] is required in respect of each compulsory competency. For each one of them, an applicant must provide two written examples of a situation in which they exhibited that competency. Where the competency is required at [NAME] 3 or higher, the examples must be assessed by a [NAME]. Where the competency is required at [NAME] 1 or 2, such an assessment is not mandatory and is conducted only at the discretion of the [NAME]. [ 18 ] At the [NAME] [NAME], [NAME]. [APPELLANT] argued that the [NAME]’s competency examples were defective and that he should not have been short-listed. His criticism focused on the examples pertaining to three competencies, namely, “communication, oral and written,” “knowledge of applicable legislation” and “knowledge of quality assurance process.” In respect of the latter, he argued that the [NAME]’s competency dictionary definition expressly excludes basic supervisory activities, and that the [NAME]’s example pertained only to activities of that nature. He also argued that the [NAME] should have exercised its discretion to require validation of the competencies required at levels 1 or 2. [ 19 ] The [NAME] rejected [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s submissions. She stated that her role was not to substitute her decision for that of the [NAME] line officer, but rather to determine whether the [NAME] process was in accordance with policy. With respect to the precise question of the [NAME]’s competencies, she concluded that the validation of those competencies was outside the scope of the grievance. She added that the validation process complied with the relevant policy and that the policy does not afford an unsuccessful [NAME] an opportunity to challenge the assessment of the [NAME]’s competencies. [ 20 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] made similar points before [NAME]. He argued that [NAME] v Commissioner of [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] , 2013 FC 755 [ [NAME] ], requires the [NAME] to inquire into the substance of the competency examples and that the [NAME] [NAME] in the present case should have reviewed his detailed criticism of the [NAME]’s examples. [ 21 ] [NAME], however, did not agree with [NAME]. [APPELLANT]. He found that the [NAME] [NAME] decision was not “clearly unreasonable” regarding its treatment of this issue. The gist of his reasoning is found in paragraph 40: Here, an independent committee has determined that the example meets the minimum proficiency requirement. It was not open to the [NAME] to substitute their discretion for that of the committee. Importantly, the [NAME] receives no training in the validation of competency examples. Rather, the [NAME]’s role is limited to the application of Force policy. [ 22 ] In my view, this is entirely reasonable in light of the constraint flowing from subsection 16(2) of the Standing Orders. [NAME] reasonably described the [NAME]’s role as limited to ensuring compliance with policy, which does not encompass a reassessment of each competency. [ 23 ] Moreover, [NAME] did not unreasonably distinguish [NAME] from the present case. Contrary to what [NAME]. [APPELLANT] argues, [NAME] does not require the [NAME] to “step into the shoes” of the [NAME] line officer or the [NAME] in every case. [NAME] involved an unusual situation where the [NAME] line officer suspected that the [NAME] had provided misleading information in his competency example but did not pass on this information to the [NAME]. [ 24 ] What I understand from [NAME] is that there are certain irregularities that are sufficiently serious to affect compliance with policy and to take a case outside the ordinary rule that an [NAME] should not reassess a [NAME]’s competencies. [ADDRESS] in [NAME] did not purport to draw a bright line between what amounts to a reassessment of a competency and a case where compliance with the policy is affected. In reality, this is a matter for the [NAME] to decide, provided that they do so reasonably. [ 25 ] Here, I fail to see anything unreasonable in [NAME]’s finding that the [NAME] rule should apply. [NAME]. [APPELLANT] is simply asking for a reassessment of the [NAME]’s competencies. He has not shown any irregularity in the process or non-compliance with policy. Although at the hearing he sought to bring himself under [NAME] by equating “veracity” and “validity,” in my view these are two different concepts. [ 26 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] also suggests that the defect in the [NAME]’s competency example was so obvious that the [NAME] was required to exercise its discretion to submit it to a [NAME]. I have reviewed the example myself and I fail to see an obvious defect. In particular, it does not pertain to basic supervisory activities, which are excluded from the definition of quality assurance. [ 27 ] [NAME]. [APPELLANT] also takes issue with paragraph 41 of [NAME]’s decision, in particular with the following conclusion: “the decision between the [NAME] and the [NAME] cannot be subject to a grievance by someone not involved in that decision.” I agree that if read literally, this sentence is incompatible with [NAME] . Nevertheless, a decision-maker’s reasons must be read generously. Here, it appears that the [NAME] was simply attempting to restate the [NAME] rule he reasonably described in paragraph 40, reproduced above, perhaps not in the most felicitous manner. I agree that the concept of standing is not helpful in this regard and should be avoided, but this does not affect the overall reasonableness of the decision. C. Defective Rationale [ 28 ] When, at the end of the [NAME] process, the [NAME] line officer makes a choice, they must provide a written rationale. [NAME]. [APPELLANT] argues that the rationale provided in the present case is defective, because at least a third of it is devoted to explaining that the selected [NAME] possesses a competency— “networking and relationship building” —that was not listed as essential in the job posting. According to [NAME]. [APPELLANT], this amounts to the imposition of a de facto or disguised essential competency, which deprived him of the opportunity to show that he possessed it too. Condoning this way of proceeding would pave the way to abuse. [ 29 ] The [NAME] did not accept [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s submissions. She found that the [NAME] line officer’s comments in the rationale were related to the description of the position’s duties. Moreover, she noted that candidates are instructed to provide any information that would be relevant for the [NAME] line officer to consider when evaluating which [NAME] is the “right fit,” and that the “networking and relationship building” competency is listed in the “job code” —that is, the generic job description for this type of position—even though it was not listed as essential in the posting. [ 30 ] [NAME] found that the [NAME] [NAME] decision on this point was not clearly unreasonable. He mainly relied on [NAME] v Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2017 FC 4 at paragraph 45 [ [NAME] ], for the proposition that a rationale may consider information that relates to skills or competencies not explicitly required by the job posting. [ 31 ] On judicial review, [NAME]. [APPELLANT] argued that [NAME]’s reliance on [NAME] was misplaced, because that judgment was rendered under a different promotion policy and before the adoption of the current Standing Orders. Moreover, he contends that the decision does not adequately address his submission that the applicable policy required the job posting to include the “networking and relationship building” competency. [ 32 ] In my view, [NAME] reasonably relied on [NAME] . The fundamental premise of the Court’s holding is the [NAME] line officer’s discretion to determine which [NAME] is the “right fit” based on an open list of information sources. [NAME]. [APPELLANT] has not shown how this principle was different at the time [NAME] was decided, even though its formulation might have been slightly different. [ 33 ] Moreover, [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s submissions are based on the premise that the [NAME] line officer effectively imposed an undisclosed requirement. Neither the [NAME] nor [NAME] accepted this premise.

Accordingly, they were not bound to discuss explicitly the consequences of a premise they did not accept. [ 34 ] In any event, upon my own review of the rationale, I find that the [NAME] line officer did not improperly focus on an undisclosed requirement. While it is true that one long paragraph begins and ends with references to building relationships, the examples provided by the [NAME] line officer relate to several other competencies, such as making presentations, supporting conduct authorities, reviewing investigations and dealing with complex Code of Conduct matters. It is reasonable to refer to such factors in a “right fit” analysis. The [NAME] [NAME] decision is not unreasonable for failing to engage in a line-by-line analysis of the rationale. [NAME]. Reasonable Apprehension of Bias [ 35 ] Lastly, [NAME]. [APPELLANT] argues that the way in which the [NAME] process unfolded gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Briefly put, [NAME]. [APPELLANT] alleges that the [NAME] line officer would have favoured a [NAME] who was already working in the [NAME]. [ 36 ] In his submissions to the [NAME], [NAME]. [APPELLANT] stated that he did not rely on a discrete event but rather on a “constellation of errors of fact and policy.” He then engaged in detailed criticism of the [NAME]’s application, the rationale and the scoring notes kept by the [NAME] line officer and the delegate. [NAME]. [APPELLANT] also argued that the delegate should have recused himself for being aware of a harassment complaint he had made, and that he did not formally object to the delegate’s presence because the latter would become his direct supervisor if he were selected. [ 37 ] The [NAME] disagreed with [NAME]. [APPELLANT]. She found that the mere fact that the [NAME] was already working within the [NAME] was not, as such, sufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that [NAME]. [APPELLANT] had not met the high threshold of proving other facts that would give rise to such an apprehension. She also noted that [NAME]. [APPELLANT] failed to object on a timely basis to the participation of the delegate on the [NAME] and remained silent even after the resolution of his harassment complaint. [ 38 ] In his submissions to [NAME], [NAME]. [APPELLANT] launched an all-out attack on the [NAME] [NAME] decision, which he described as reaching “the high-water mark of incoherence, divergence from the issues, utter disregard for the evidence, ignorance of the law, and ‘reverse engineering’ of their desired outcome,” as well as showing “a [NAME] of fundamental disorganization and incoherence that speaks for itself,” to mention only two examples. He also justified his failure to object on a timely basis by the “culture of dysfunction and harassment in the [NAME].” [ 39 ] [NAME] found no error in the [NAME] [NAME] decision with respect to this issue. He noted that [NAME]. [APPELLANT] based his allegation on a “constellation of errors,” but noted that “disagreeing with the decision does not amount to bias.” [NAME] concluded: The [NAME] has not provided any tangible evidence to demonstrate the [[NAME] line officer] was biased or there was bias in the process. Taking excerpts from the Rationale to make allegations of bias falls short of the evidence required to establish this very serious allegation. [ 40 ] On judicial review, [NAME]. [APPELLANT] faults [NAME] for requiring “tangible” evidence of bias and for failing to cite the decision of the Supreme Court in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 SCR 282 [ Yukon Francophone School Board ]. In my view, the [NAME] [NAME] decision is reasonable in this regard. Even if he did not cite Yukon Francophone School Board , [NAME] properly understood the test for proving a reasonable apprehension of bias. I do not understand the use of the adjective “tangible” to amount to a requirement of proof of actual bias, but rather as a requirement that the allegation must not be based on mere speculation. Moreover, [NAME]’s assertion that disagreement with the outcome does not prove bias is perfectly reasonable, especially as [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s challenge to the outcome was rejected. [ 41 ] At the hearing, [NAME]. [APPELLANT] also argued that it was unreasonable to rely on his lack of timely objection to the presence of the delegate on the [NAME]. However, the decision under review is the [NAME] [NAME] decision, not the [NAME] [NAME] decision. Whatever the [NAME] said, [NAME] did not rely on [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s lack of timely objection. Rather, he addressed [NAME]. [APPELLANT]’s allegation of bias on its merits. The lack of objection played no role in the [NAME] [NAME] decision and therefore cannot base a challenge to its reasonableness.

III. Disposition [ 42 ] As [NAME]. [APPELLANT] failed to show that the [NAME] [NAME] decision is unreasonable, his application for judicial review must be dismissed. [ 43 ] I do not see any reason to depart from the usual practice of awarding costs to the [NAME] party. In my view, an amount of $1,000 is just and appropriate in the circumstances.

JUDGMENT in T-3391-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The application for judicial review is dismissed. The applicant is condemned to pay $1,000 in costs to the respondent, inclusive of disbursement and taxes. “[NAME]” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: T-3391-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE [NAME] [NAME] OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, British Columbia DATE OF HEARING: June 4, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [APPELLANT] J. DATED: june 18, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] [NAME] (ON HIS [APPELLANT]) [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] [NAME] of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent