Federal Court Rejects Judicial Review of Refugee Appeal Decision

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260612 Docket: IMM-17871-24 Citation: 2026 FC 788 Ottawa, Ontario, June 12, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is the judicial review of a redetermination of appeal decision of the [NAME] [[NAME]], dated September 18, 2024. This is the third decision of the [NAME] related to the Applicant’s [NAME] claim. [ 2 ] For the reasons that follow, I am dismissing this application for judicial review. Background [ 3 ] It is necessary to first provide some procedural background to provide context for the [NAME]’s decision that is now under review. [ 4 ] By decision of May 27, 2021, the [NAME] Protection Division [[NAME]] found that the Applicant was neither a [NAME] nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to section 98 of the Immigration and [NAME] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ]. The sole focus of the [NAME] [APPELLANT] was exclusion from [NAME] protection under Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] to the Status of Refugees [ [NAME] ]. The [NAME] found that there were serious reasons for considering that the Applicant committed a serious, non-political crime in the United Kingdom [UK] – the handling of stolen goods – prior to his entry into Canada. Therefore, the [NAME] found that he was excluded from [NAME] protection under Article 1F(b) of the [NAME] . This was the determinative issue. [ 5 ] The Applicant appealed the [NAME]’s decision to the [NAME] [[NAME]]. The [NAME] confirmed the [NAME]’s determination by decision dated December 7, 2021 [[NAME]]. The Applicant sought judicial review of the [NAME]. By judgment dated February 24, 2023, Justice Go of this Court granted the judicial review and returned the matter to the [NAME] for redetermination ( [APPELLANT] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 FC 265). [ 6 ] On September 7, 2023, the [NAME] [[NAME]] issued its redetermination of appeal decision [[NAME]]. The [NAME] found that the Applicant was not excluded from [NAME] protection under Article 1F(b). However, the [NAME] went on to conduct an inclusion analysis. Based on its negative credibility findings pertaining to the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims, the [NAME] dismissed the appeal. [ 7 ] The Applicant sought judicial review of the [NAME] that the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims were not credible and, therefore, that the Applicant was neither a [NAME] nor a person in need of protection. The Respondent did not seek judicial review of the finding that the Applicant was not excluded under Article 1F(b). In her decision dated January 4, 2024, Justice Turley of this Court granted judicial review and remitted the matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination by a different [NAME] member ( [APPELLANT] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , IMM-11862-23 [Justice Turley’s Decision]). She noted that the parties agreed that the [NAME] had made a reviewable error in making a credibility determination on the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims without the benefit of a full evidentiary record and that the matter should be sent back for redetermination. However, that the parties disagreed about the scope of the remittal for redetermination. [ 8 ] Justice Turley found that the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding had not been raised in the judicial review that was before her. She was also not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that on redetermination the [NAME] must be given the opportunity to consider the Article 1F(b) issue afresh. She set aside the [NAME] insofar as it determined that the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims lacked credibility and remitted the matter on that issue to a differently constituted panel for redetermination. [ 9 ] On September 18, 2024, the [NAME] [[NAME]] issued its redetermination decision [[NAME]]. [NAME] allowed the appeal and sent the matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination. [NAME] is the subject of this judicial review. Relevant Legislation Immigration and [NAME] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ] Definitions 2 (1) The definitions in this subsection apply in this Act. … [NAME]  means the [NAME] to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva on July 28, 1951, and the Protocol to that Convention, signed at New York on January 31, 1967. Sections E and F of Article 1 of the [NAME] are set out in the schedule. ( Convention sur les réfugiés ) [NAME] 98 A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the [NAME] is not a [NAME] or a person in need of protection. Decision 111 (1) After considering the appeal, the [NAME] shall make one of the following decisions: (a) confirm the determination of the [NAME] Protection Division; (b) set aside the determination and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made; or (c) refer the matter to the [NAME] Protection Division for re-determination, giving the directions to the [NAME] Protection Division that it considers appropriate. Referrals (2) The [NAME] may make the referral described in paragraph (1)(c) only if it is of the opinion that (a) the decision of the [NAME] Protection Division is wrong in law, in fact or in mixed law and fact; and (b) it cannot make a decision under paragraph (1)(a) or (b) without [APPELLANT] evidence that was presented to the [NAME] Protection Division. [NAME] to the Status of Refugees , Can TS 1969 No 6 Article 1 – Definition of the term “[NAME]” … E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country. F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: … (b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a [NAME]; Decision Under Review [ 10 ] [NAME] reviewed the procedural history of the matter and admitted new evidence submitted by each the Minister and the Applicant. However, [NAME] found that it did not have jurisdiction to hold an oral [APPELLANT] as the new evidence admitted did not meet the criteria of subsection 110(6) of the IRPA . [NAME] found that it must refer the matter back to the [NAME] for redetermination and, in that regard, the criteria set out in subsection 111(2) of the IRPA had been met. [ 11 ] [NAME] then addressed the scope of the [NAME] redetermination. [NAME] did not accept the Applicant’s arguments that the scope of the redetermination should be limited to the issue of credibility as it pertains to sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA and that the [NAME] should be directed not to consider the issue of Article 1E. Nor did [NAME] agree with the Applicant that the [NAME] did not have the power to refer the issue of exclusion under Article 1E to the [NAME]; that doing so could lead to an absurd outcome; that issue estoppel precludes re-litigation of the [NAME] finding on exclusion under section 98; and that it would be an abuse of process to allow the Minister to pursue exclusion under Article 1E. [ 12 ] [NAME] concluded that: [42] Owing to the fact that the [NAME] [APPELLANT] was limited to canvassing the issue of exclusion under Article 1F(b), I am unable to bring finality to this matter. I find that the requirements of subsection 111(2) of the IRPA, that the [NAME] erred in law or in fact or in mixed law and fact, and I am unable to make a decision under paragraph 111(1)(a) or (b) without [APPELLANT] evidence that was presented to the [NAME], have been satisfied. [43] The appeal is allowed. Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(c) of the IRPA, I refer this claim to the [NAME] for redetermination by a differently constituted panel with directions. DIRECTIONS TO THE [NAME] [44] Upon the redetermination of the claim by a differently constituted [NAME] panel, the [NAME] is instructed as follows: • The [NAME] is to consider all the evidence in the record and all the issues, with the following exceptions. • The [NAME] is not to revisit the issue of identity unless new information that was not previously before the [NAME] or the [NAME] comes to light. • The [NAME] is not to revisit the issue of exclusion by virtue of Article 1F(b) unless new information that was not previously before the [NAME] or the [NAME] comes to light and that information is in relation to a crime that was not previously alleged by the Minister as having been committed by the Appellant. Issues and Standard of Review [ 13 ] The sole issue arising in this matter is whether [NAME] is reasonable. [ 14 ] While the Applicant in his written submissions indicated that there was also an issue of procedural fairness, when appearing before me, his counsel advised that any arguments concerning procedural fairness were not being pursued.

Accordingly, I will not address them in these reasons. [ 15 ] The parties submit, and I agree, that the standard of review of the merits of the [NAME]’s decision is reasonableness. On judicial review, the Court “asks whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [APPELLANT] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [APPELLANT] ] at para 99). [ 16 ] The Applicant submits, however, that [NAME]’s interpretation of Justice Turley’s Decision is subject to the correctness standard of review (citing [COMPANY] v [COMPANY] , 2023 FC 11 [ [NAME] ] and [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2020 ONCA 688 [ [NAME] ]) . The Respondent disagrees and refers to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in [NAME] in support of its view that the reasonableness standard applies to the interpretation of Justice Turley’s Decision. [ 17 ] I agree with the Respondent. In [RESPONDENT] , the Supreme Court of Canada held that the analysis for determining the standard of review where a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision begins with a presumption that the reasonableness standard applies in all cases. Reviewing courts should derogate from this presumption only where required by a clear indication of legislative intent or by the rule of law ( [NAME] at paras 17, 23, 25). Respect for the rule of law requires courts to apply the standard of correctness for certain types of legal questions: constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the [NAME] as a whole and questions regarding the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies ( [NAME] at paras 17, 53). The Supreme Court held that the general rule of reasonableness review, when coupled with these limited exceptions, offers a comprehensive approach to determining the applicable standard of review ( [NAME] at para 17). The Supreme Court restated and further explained these principles in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 SCC 21 at paras 35-41. [ 18 ] None of the exceptions that rebut the presumption of reasonableness have application with respect to this judicial review of [NAME]. And while the interpretation of Justice Turley’s Decision may have significant importance to the Applicant, it does not have implications beyond the decision at hand. I do not agree with the Applicant that the rule of law requires that the correctness standard apply in this circumstance. [ 19 ] Further, in my view, the jurisprudence relied upon by the Applicant does not assist him. Those cases are not concerned with judicial review of decisions of administrative decision-makers. [ 20 ] [NAME] concerned an appeal under Rule 51 of the Federal Courts Rules,  SOR/98-106, of a decision of an Associate Judge allowing [NAME] to amend its statement of claim. The defendant argued that all of [NAME]’s infringement claims were barred by an earlier summary judgment decision within the same file. [ADDRESS] held that the standard of review applicable when a Judge of this Court is considering an appeal of a decision of an Associate Judge is the appellate standards outlined in [NAME] v [NAME] , 2002 SCC 33 ( [COMPANY] v Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology , 2016 FCA 215 at para 28; see also [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 1088 at para 11; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 1781 at para 15; [NAME] v Canada , 2025 CanLII 100347 (FC) at para 17). [ 21 ] That is, for questions of law and mixed fact and law where there is an extricable question of law, the standard is correctness. Otherwise, for questions of fact or mixed fact and law, the standard of appeal will be overriding and palpable error ( [NAME] at para 16). In that context, this Court in [NAME] held that the interpretation of a Court order is a question of law (citing [NAME] at para 20).

Accordingly, the standard of review for the Associate Judge’s interpretation of the summary judgment order was correctness ( [NAME] at para 17). [ 22 ] This is a judicial review. Therefore, the appellate standard of review is not applicable. [ 23 ] The Applicant also argues that deferential review is inapplicable because this is not a circumstance where the [NAME] has chosen to leave certain matters with decision-makers, rather than the courts ( [NAME] at para 33). Here the decision-maker is required to “give effect to a Court order” and court orders must be followed unless and until they are varied or rescinded (citing to [NAME] ). Again, [NAME] is not a concerned with a judicial review. Nor has the [NAME] singled out decisions of the [NAME] as attracting the correctness standard (appellate standards) where those decisions, in the course of the [NAME]’s administrative decision-making role, interpret and apply a related court order. [ 24 ] This matter does, to an extent, raise an issue of interpretation – being [NAME]’s interpretation of Justice Turley’s Decision in crafting its directions to the [NAME]. However, in my view, the fact that what is being interpreted is a judgment does not, in these circumstances, serve to attract the correctness standard. It is true, as the Applicant argues, that this is not a circumstance of statutory interpretation. However, nor is it a circumstance of a clear failure or refusal to follow a court order. Rather, in my view, the issue here is whether [NAME]’s understanding of Justice Turley’s Decision, as reflected in its redetermination directions to the [NAME], was reasonable. The Applicant submits that this Court must assess whether the [NAME]’s decision “exceeds the scope” of Justice Turley’s Decision. To my mind, that is a question of the reasonableness of [NAME]’s decision. [ 25 ] Before leaving the standard of review I note that, when appearing before me, the Applicant submitted that [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 [ [NAME] ] left the door open for the development of further types of legal questions where the standard of correctness may apply. This was raised for the first time at the [APPELLANT]. The Applicant also proposed, without prior notice, a question for certification concerning this point. That will be addressed below. Was the Decision Reasonable? Applicant’s position [ 26 ] The Applicant does not challenge [NAME]’s determination that the Applicant’s appeal should be allowed. Rather, the Applicant challenges the [NAME]’s direction to the [NAME] on reconsideration to consider issues beyond the [NAME] that the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims lack credibility. The Applicant submits that [NAME]’s remedy exceeds the scope of Justice Turley’s Decision. [NAME] lacked jurisdiction to revisit section 98 and, by extension, lacked jurisdiction to direct the [NAME] to revisit section 98. Further, that the doctrines of estoppel and abuse of process operate to prevent the re-litigation of the section 98 exclusion. Respondent’s position [ 27 ] The Respondent acknowledges that while the [NAME] made no explicit reference to Article 1E in its instructions to the [NAME], the [NAME] did instruct the [NAME] to consider all the evidence in the record and all the issues with some exceptions. As Article 1E was not listed as one of the exceptions, a reasonable interpretation of the [NAME]’s directions is that the [NAME] should consider exclusion under Article 1E. This is not inconsistent with Justice Turley’s Decision. Further, [NAME] followed Justice Turley’s Decision as it did not consider Article 1F(b) and it directed the [NAME] not to reconsider the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) determination. The [NAME] limited the [NAME]’s reconsideration of the Article 1F(b) issue to new information only and, therefore, complied with Justice Turley’s Decision by leaving the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) determination intact. The Respondent also submits that the [NAME]’s direction to the [NAME] does not amount to re-litigating Article 1E or 1F(b) or lead to an absurd result. Analysis [ 28 ] This judicial review centres around the directions of [NAME] to the [NAME]. This, in turn, is centred on Justice Turley’s Decision. More specifically, if the [NAME] properly interpreted and applied Justice Turley’s Decision in crafting its directions to the [NAME]. [ 29 ] The scope of the redetermination by [NAME] was addressed before Justice Turley. She noted that the parties agreed that the [NAME] made a reviewable error in making a credibility determination on the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims without the benefit of a full evidentiary record and that the matter should be sent back for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. However, that (emphasis in original): [8] The parties disagree about the appropriate scope of the Court’s remittal for redetermination: (a) The Applicant’s position is that “the Court should only return the Tribunal below’s decision on [NAME] inclusion (i.e., IPRA [sic] ss. 96 and 97)” and that “the Court should not disturb the [NAME]’s decision on the preliminary issue of [NAME] exclusion pursuant to IRPA s. 98 and Article 1F(b) of the Convention”: Applicant’s Written Representations at para 1 [emphasis in original]; (b) In contrast, the Respondent takes the position that the [NAME]’s decision must be set aside and the matter referred back for a “full re-determination”: Respondent’s Reply Submissions at para 9; [9] The proper scope of the [NAME]’s redetermination is necessarily circumscribed by the issue raised in the underlying application for leave and for judicial review [application]. The only issue before this Court is whether the [NAME] erred in finding that the Applicant is not a [NAME] or a person in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA . The [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding was not raised before this Court and is therefore not in contention; [10] While the Applicant requests that the application be allowed “in part”, that is not the appropriate disposition in this case. The application is allowed on the sole issue raised before this Court. Indeed, allowing the application “in part” would be a misnomer and would imply that the Court is dismissing the application on other grounds, which is not the case here; [11] At the same time, stipulating that the [NAME]’s decision is set aside insofar as the [NAME] determined that the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims were not credible does not amount to a directed verdict as asserted by the Respondent. Rather, it conforms to what was raised before this Court on the application and simply provides clarity for the [NAME] as to what is being sent back for redetermination. [ADDRESS] is not directing the [NAME] how to decide the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims on redetermination; [12] Setting aside the [NAME]’s decision and remitting the matter back writ large, as requested by the Respondent, would be unfair. It would effectively allow the Respondent another opportunity to re-litigate the issue of exclusion under Article 1(F)(b) without having properly challenged it by way of a judicial review. Having failed to seek judicial review on that issue, the [NAME]’s finding on Article 1(F)(b) remains intact and is not disturbed by this Court; [ 30 ] Justice Turley stated that she was not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the [NAME] must be given the opportunity to consider the Article 1F(b) issue afresh, together with the sections 96 and 97 credibility determinations, as the matters were intertwined. Rather, she noted that the [NAME] had approached these issues discretely. [ 31 ] [NAME] acknowledges Justice Turley’s judgment, including stating that “[t]he Court ordered that the matter be remitted to a different [NAME] member for redetermination but that the finding on Article 1F(b) remain intact” . [ADDRESS] held that it would be unfair to allow the Minister to relitigate the Article 1F(b) issue without having challenged it by way of judicial review. Further, [NAME] noted: [25] The history of this matter presents me with an unusual situation. My role is to look at all the evidence and decide whether the [NAME] made the correct decision. However, the Federal Court said that the [NAME] is not to revisit the issue of exclusion under Article 1F(b). This was the only issue on which the [NAME] decided the claim. [ADDRESS] ordered that the 2023 [NAME] finding on this issue, that the Appellant is not excluded under Article 1F(b), is to remain intact. I am bound by the Court’s decision. In accordance with the Court’s ruling, the [NAME]’s previous finding stands. The [NAME] erred, and the Appellant is not excluded under Article 1F(b). [ 32 ] [NAME] found that Justice Turley’s Decision was that the [NAME] erred in making a credibility determination on the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims without the benefit of a full evidentiary record. On reviewing the record, [NAME] found that it would be unable to make such a determination. This was because the [NAME] limited the scope of the [APPELLANT] to the issue of exclusion under Article 1F(b), indicating that other issues (specifically Article 1E and credibility) would be canvassed at a resumption, if necessary. The [NAME] had not found it necessary (as Article 1F(b) was determinative) and, therefore, the Applicant did not have the opportunity to present all the evidence in support of his claim. a. Article 1E [ 33 ] With respect to Article 1E, [NAME] noted that the [NAME] stated that inclusion and Article 1E would not be canvassed at that stage of the [APPELLANT]. As a result, the Applicant’s counsel limited questioning in accordance with the [NAME]’s instructions. Further, that when the [NAME] testified, the [NAME] reiterated that her testimony was to focus only on Article 1F(b) and intervened to limit questioning by the Applicant’s counsel. Nor did counsel for the Minister question the [NAME], saying that he had no questions with respect to Article 1F(b) but might have questions if the [APPELLANT] were reconvened on inclusion. [ 34 ] In other words, the [NAME] had made its determination exclusively on the basis of the Article 1F(b) finding. And, because it found that the Applicant was excluded under that provision, the [NAME] did not consider Article 1E or sections 96 and 97. [ 35 ] With respect to the directions to be given to the [NAME] in respect of redetermination, [NAME] acknowledged the Applicant’s submission that a redetermination at the [NAME] should be limited to inclusion, but did not agree, finding: [34] I do not agree that the [NAME] should direct the [NAME] not to consider the issue of Article 1E. The Minister intervened and presented documentary evidence at the [NAME] on the issue of Article 1E. The Minister had the same expectation as the Appellant: [redacted] [35] It is true that the Minister did not ask the [NAME] to consider Article 1E exclusion until after the 2024 Federal Court judgment. I do not accept the Appellant’s argument that this makes it an abuse of process for the Minister to pursue this issue on a redetermination at the [NAME]. This is for two reasons. Firstly, there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for the [NAME] to make a finding on exclusion under Article 1E, so the [NAME] could not have decided and cannot decide the issue. Secondly, for the [NAME] to hold a [APPELLANT] on the issue, the Minister would have needed to present new evidence relevant to Article 1E. The Minister has not indicated that they have any new evidence pertaining to Article 1E exclusion. The Minister presented documentary evidence on that issue to the [NAME]. What the Minister wants is to question the Appellant on the issue. This is appropriate, since they had no previous opportunity to do so. [36] The Appellant argues that, by disposing of the matter on inclusion grounds, the 2023 [NAME] decision implicitly accepted that the Appellant was not excluded under section 98 of the IRPA for any reason. I disagree. The 2023 [NAME] decision does not address or decide the issue of exclusion by virtue of Article 1E. I do not find the doctrine of issue estoppel applicable. This is because I do not accept the argument that the 2023 [NAME] decision was a final decision on the issue of Article 1E and that the 2024 Federal Court Judgment orders that the issue not be addressed. On the contrary, there was no decision on Article 1E, whether by the [NAME], the [NAME] or the Federal Court. Moreover, the 2023 [NAME] was not in a position to make a decision on Article 1E. Doing so would have breached the procedural fairness rights of the Appellant or the Minister, depending on which way the panel had decided. This is for the same reason the panel was not in a position to decide on the Appellant’s credibility. The evidentiary record is insufficient. [37] The only aspect of the 2023 [NAME] decision that the Federal Court identified as remaining “intact” was the finding on Article 1F(b). [ADDRESS] accepted the Appellant’s argument on that point, which was set out in paragraph 8(a) of the Federal Court Judgment as follows: [8] The parties disagree about the appropriate scope of the Court’s remittal for redetermination: (a)The Applicant’s position is that “the Court should only return the Tribunal below’s decision on [NAME] inclusion (i.e., IPRA [sic] ss. 96 and 97)” and that “the Court should not disturb the [NAME]’s decision on the preliminary issue of [NAME] exclusion pursuant to IRPA s. 98 and Article 1F(b) of the Convention [my emphasis]”: Applicant’s Written Representations at para 1 [emphasis in original]; [38] The Federal Court found that it would be unfair to allow the Minister to relitigate the issue of Article 1F(b) exclusion at the [NAME] on the redetermination of the appeal. This was because the Minister had not sought judicial review on that issue. For the same reason, I find that it would be unfair to the Appellant for the [NAME] to revisit that issue, unless new information that was not previously before the [NAME] or the [NAME] comes to light and that information is in relation to a crime that was not previously alleged by the Minister as having been committed by the Appellant. This leaves the 2023 [NAME] finding on Article 1F(b) exclusion intact, as required by the Federal Court, since the panel’s finding was based on the evidence pertaining to crimes that the Minister alleged at the [NAME]. [39] The same reasoning does not apply to the issue of exclusion under Article 1E. [APPELLANT] [NAME] nor the [NAME] ever considered or made findings on that issue. In limiting the scope of the [NAME] redetermination, the Federal Court was saying that the [NAME] should not revisit the issue of exclusion under Article 1F(b). This is what the Appellant asked the Federal Court to order. I agree with the Minister that the Federal Court directed the [NAME] not to consider exclusion under Article 1F(b) but gave no direction in respect of Article 1E. [ADDRESS] was not asked to decide whether the issue of Article 1E remained open, nor, in my view, did the Court make any such decision. [40] The Appellant argues that the Federal Court ordered the [NAME] to conduct a section 96/97 analysis and, therefore, it would be an error not to do so. He argues that referring the matter back to the [NAME] for consideration of Article 1E could lead to a finding of exclusion, thereby preventing the [NAME] from complying with the Federal Court order. I do not accept this argument. The reason this matter has come before the [NAME] again is that the 2023 [NAME] decision that the Appellant’s claims lacked credibility was found by the Court to have been made without a sufficient evidentiary basis. [ADDRESS] explicitly did not direct the [NAME] on how to decide the Appellant’s section 96 and 97 claims on redetermination. Given that the evidentiary record is the same as the record before the 2023 [NAME], the only disposition of this appeal that I can make is to send it back to the [NAME] for redetermination. In sending it back to the [NAME], I am acting in compliance with the Judgment of the Federal Court. Indeed, I see no other way to comply with the Court’s Judgment. And for the reasons I have given, I do not agree with the Appellant that the [NAME] should be precluded from considering Article 1E exclusion. [ 36 ] I note that the transcript of the [NAME] [APPELLANT] confirms that the [NAME] limited the issue before it to the consideration of Article 1F(b): So, with regards to the issues in this claim generally, we have exclusion under article IE and IF(b). In terms of inclusion, the issues before us are credibility and nexus. For today’s [APPELLANT] because of course we must look at exclusion before we proceed to anything on inclusion, I would like [the] [APPELLANT] today to focus on exclusion under Article IF(b). I will leave open the possibility to reconvene to explore exclusion under Article 1E and potentially as needed, inclusion issues of credibility and nexus. Counsel, either Counsel, do you have any concerns with this approach? [ 37 ] To which counsel responded: [COUNSEL] : If I may have, it’s just to clarify, this [APPELLANT] will be focused on 1F(b). If it is not described under 1F(b), then we will reconvene for a further [APPELLANT] for 1E in inclusion. MEMBER : Correct. [NAME] : Okay. MEMBER : [NAME], anything from you with regards to this approach today? COUNSEL : [redacted] [ 38 ] And, as noted by [NAME], because the [NAME] did not reconvene, neither party had the opportunity to present evidence on issues other than Article 1F(b). In a May 15, 2024, letter to [NAME], the Respondent requested an oral [APPELLANT] and provided notice of its intent to question the Applicant and make submissions on the issue of Article 1E during the [APPELLANT]. Additionally, that if [NAME] did not convene an oral [APPELLANT], then “the claim ought to be sent back to the [NAME] so Article 1E Exclusion can be canvassed” . [NAME] declined to hold an oral [APPELLANT], for the reasons set out above. [ 39 ] [NAME] disagreed with the Applicant’s submission that by disposing of the matter on inclusion grounds, the [NAME] implicitly accepted that the Applicant was not excluded under section 98 of the IRPA for any reason. [NAME] noted that the [NAME] did not address or decide the issue of Article 1E. Furthermore, there had been no decision on Article 1E by the [NAME], the [NAME] or the Federal Court. The [NAME] also could not have made such a decision because the evidentiary record was insufficient to do so. I see no error in the [NAME]’s findings in this regard. [ 40 ] Before me, the Applicant again submits that the [NAME] explicitly determined that the Applicant was captured by section 98 per Article 1F(b) and implicitly determined that section 98 was not triggered on any other ground. Furthermore, that a [NAME] adjudicator is not at liberty to proceed to an inclusionary analysis under sections 96 and 97 unless it is satisfied that section 98 exclusion is not in play (citing [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2004 FCA 250 [ [NAME] ] at para 38). Therefore, [NAME] erred in directing the [NAME] to revisit section 98 exclusion. [ 41 ] I disagree with the Applicant. The [NAME]’s sections 96 and 97 analysis was agreed to be unreasonable by the parties and this Court. Therefore, that issue has not been finally determined. Further, the Applicant’s point that section 98 exclusions must be determined first appears to support allowing the [NAME] to consider Article 1E on redetermination. Article 1E was raised by the Respondent before the [NAME] but the [NAME] decided it would only deal with Article 1F(b). The [NAME] noted that it “must look at exclusion before we proceed to anything on inclusion” . The [NAME] member went on to state “I will leave open the possibility to reconvene to explore exclusion under Article 1E and potentially as needed, inclusion issues of credibility and nexus” . Therefore, if necessary, the [NAME] intended to address Article 1E before credibility. The [NAME] dealt the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) analysis and found that it was not correct. The [NAME] then went on to address sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA . It is silent with respect to Article 1E. [ 42 ] The only issue that was before Justice Turley on judicial review of the [NAME] was whether the [NAME] erred in its credibility finding on the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims without the benefit of a full evidentiary record. Justice Turley made no mention of Article 1E in her judgment. She quoted the Applicant’s position that the Court should only return the [NAME] on [NAME] inclusion (i.e., sections 96 and 97) and should not disturb the [NAME] “on the preliminary issue of [NAME] exclusion pursuant to IRPA s. 98 and Article 1F(b) of the Convention” . Moreover, that the [NAME] was set aside “insofar as the [NAME] determined that the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims lacked credibility and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of redetermination on that issue” . [ 43 ] That is, Justice Turley dealt with the challenge before her on judicial review – the unreasonableness of [NAME]’s sections 96 and 97 credibility findings. She also found that because the Respondent had not raised, in the judicial review before her, the [NAME]’s finding that the Applicant was not excluded pursuant to Article 1F(b), that finding remained intact. The [NAME] made no Article 1E finding and that issue was not raised and challenged before Justice Turley. She made no finding with respect to Article 1E. [ 44 ] I also do not agree with the Applicant that the [NAME] implicitly determined that section 98 was not triggered on any other ground. The [NAME] stemmed from the [NAME] decision – which set aside the issue of Article 1E and sections 96 and 97 until a future time. As Justice Turley found, the [NAME] erred in considering sections 96 and 97 without the benefit of a full evidentiary record. In my view, it would similarly have erred if it had considered Article 1E. I am not persuaded that because the [NAME] considered sections 96 and 97 it was impliedly accepting that Article 1E no longer had application. [ 45 ] Nor did Justice Turley make that finding. Indeed, in addressing the Applicant’s submission that the application should be allowed “in part” , she found that would not be the appropriate disposition “and would be a misnomer and would imply that the Court is dismissing the application on other grounds, [other than the [NAME]’s error with respect to sections 96 and 97] which is not the case here.” [ 46 ] In my view, in these circumstances, [NAME] did not err in its direction that the [NAME] is to consider all of the issues other than the specific exceptions set out by Justice Turley. [NAME]’s direction does not contravene Justice Turley’s Decision. [ 47 ] If the [NAME] were to make a finding that the Applicant is not a [NAME] pursuant to Article 1E, then this would mean that the [NAME] was not required to proceed to consider credibility in the context of sections 96 and 97. This is the structure of the statutory regime ( [NAME] at para 38; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 1353 at para 57). I do not understand Justice Turley’s Decision to preclude that analysis by either [NAME] or the [NAME]. Nor would the [NAME] considering Article 1E lead to an absurd result. [ 48 ] The Applicant also argues that, in failing to seek judicial review of the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding, the Respondent acquiesced to that decision’s finding that the Applicant was not captured by section 98 and, accordingly, the decision to proceed to assess sections 96 and 97 inclusion. Put otherwise, that Article 1E is off the table because the Respondent did not raise that issue before the First or [NAME]. [ 49 ] However, as set out above, the [NAME] acknowledged that the Article 1F(b), Article 1E and the credibility issues had been raised but it decided to first deal only with the Article 1F(b) issue. The [NAME]’s decision that was appealed to the [NAME] and later reconsidered by the [NAME] dealt only with the submissions related to Article 1F(b). The determination based on section 98 therefore related only to Article 1F(b) and did not consider potential Article 1E arguments. [ 50 ] In any event, as the Respondent argues, the [NAME] has a statutory duty to apply the IRPA . As an inquisitorial body, it is required to determine whether section 98 of the IRPA applies to the applicant before it. This obligation exists whether or not the Minister elects to intervene in a given case ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 FC 214 at para 18 citing Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2015 FC 1288 at para 11; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 59 at para 42). In other words, in the absence of an order by Justice Turley precluding the [NAME] and [NAME] from considering Article 1E, the [NAME] is required to consider whether section 98 applies to exclude a claimant under Article 1E, regardless of the Minister’s position. [ 51 ] Nothing in Justice Turley’s Decision suggests that she intended that the [NAME] or the [NAME] be precluded from considering Article 1E. b. Article 1F(b) [ 52 ] The Applicant submits that it was not open to the [NAME] to direct the [NAME] to revisit Article 1F(b) if the Minister were to disclose new evidence in relation to a crime that was not previously alleged by the Minister as having been committed by the Applicant. [ 53 ] According to the Applicant, revisiting Article 1F(b), for any reason, was precluded under the terms of Justice Turley’s Decision. The Applicant submits that “[t]he [NAME] panel’s express determination that the Applicant is not captured by s. 98 exclusion (per 1F(b) stands and is functus ” . The Applicant refers to [APPELLANT] v Manitoba , 2021 SCC 33 which held that “ functus officio indicates that a final decision of a court that is susceptible of appeal cannot, as a general rule, be reconsidered by the court that rendered that decision” (at para 33). Further, that the “rule serves goals of finality and, by stabilizing judgments subject to review, of an orderly appellate procedure” (at para 34). [ 54 ] The Applicant further submits that the [NAME]’s own rules recognize that the [NAME]’s limited jurisdiction to entertain reopening an application definitively ends the moment the Federal Court makes a final determination in respect of an appeal that has been decided. While the Applicant does not provide a citation, it appears he is referencing section 62 of the [NAME] Protection Division Rules , SOR/2012-256 [[NAME]] which states: Application to reopen claim 62 (1) At any time before the [NAME] or the Federal Court has made a final determination in respect of a claim for [NAME] protection that has been decided or declared abandoned, the claimant or the Minister may make an application to the Division to reopen the claim. [ 55 ] I agree with the Applicant that Justice Turley’s finding on Article 1F(b) cannot be revisited. That is, the [NAME]’s finding that the Applicant is not excluded on the basis of Article 1(F)(b) remains intact. However, the [NAME] was based on the crime and evidence presented – the offence being possession of property obtained by crime – and, in that regard, the [NAME] found that the presumption of seriousness of handling stolen goods had been rebutted. [ 56 ] Justice Turley did not address the possibility of new evidence of a new crime by the Applicant not previously alleged by the Minister. [ 57 ] The Respondent submits that the direction of [NAME] limited the [NAME]’s consideration of the Article 1F(b) issue to new information only. In that way, [NAME]’s direction was in accordance with Justice Turley’s finding that the [NAME]’s determination on Article 1F(b) remains intact. [ 58 ] It seems to me that the possibility of a new Article 1F(b) issue is speculative. I say this because the [NAME], in its reasons, noted that the Minister’s evidence and submissions on exclusion were with respect to the Applicant’s arrest in relation to eleven high value stolen motorcycles and charges filed against the Applicant in the UK for handling stolen goods. The [NAME] noted that the Applicant was also charged with possession with intent to supply cannabis and possession of a stun gun. The Minister had addressed the cannabis charges against the Applicant. However, because the [NAME] had found that the Applicant was excluded on the basis of the stolen goods charges, it did not consider the evidence and submissions with respect to the cannabis charges. [ 59 ] Given that this information and evidence was before the [NAME], it would appear to be captured by [NAME]’s direction that the [NAME] may not revisit the issue of exclusion under Article 1F(b) “unless new information that was not previously before the [NAME] or the [NAME] comes to light and that information is in relation to a crime that was not previously alleged by the Minister as having been committed by the Appellant.” Thus, it cannot be raised before the [NAME]. And, presumably, the Minister would have addressed all known charges that could have led to a finding of exclusion under Article 1F(b). [ 60 ] That said, I am not persuaded that if new information about a new, previously unknown crime is raised by the Minister when the matter is remitted to the [NAME], then the consideration by the [NAME] of whether to admit and to address such new evidence would be in violation of Justice Turley’s Decision. Her concerns with unfairness and re-litigation arose because the Respondent did not challenge the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding (regarding the offence being possession of property obtained by crime) on judicial review. If new evidence on a new and different crime were to come to light, there would be no issue of re-litigation. [ 61 ] As to subsection 62(1) of the [NAME], in my view, this provision does not assist the Applicant. [NAME]’s direction does not allow for a reopening of a claim. Rather, it narrowly allows for Article 1F(b) to be considered if new evidence of a new crime not previously alleged is presented. That is, a new issue under Article 1F(b) is raised. c. Issue estoppel and abuse of process [ 62 ] The Applicant argues that the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process operate to prevent re-litigating the section 98 exclusion, including the section 98 exclusion per Article 1E. [ 63 ] Many of the arguments that the Applicant submits on this point in this judicial review were also presented to, and rejected by, [NAME]. This is demonstrated, for example, by the Applicant’s reproduction of extensive extracts from his submissions to the [NAME] in his written submissions to this Court. I find the [NAME]’s consideration and determination of these arguments, as set out above, to be reasonable. [ 64 ] In that regard, the Applicant’s submissions largely rely on the argument that the Respondent failed to raise the Article 1E issue earlier and that the [NAME] made an implicit finding on Article 1E. I disagree with these submissions for the reasons outlined above. Therefore, I also disagree with the Applicant’s submissions on these doctrines and do not find that [NAME]’s directions to the [NAME] gives rise to an abuse of process or re-litigation. [ 65 ] For the sake of completeness, and although these points are addressed above, I reiterate that I do not agree with the Applicant’s submission that [NAME] unreasonably found that the [NAME] did not make an implicit finding with respect to section 98 and Article 1E and that [NAME] unreasonably failed to properly address the Applicant’s absurdity argument. I also do not agree that [NAME] (in para 40 of its reasons) engaged in an unreasonable chain of analysis. Conclusion [ 66 ] Justice Turley dealt with the only issue that was before her, the [NAME]’s assessment of sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA , and found its decision on that point to be unreasonable. She set aside the [NAME] in so far as the [NAME] determined that the Applicant’s sections 96 and 97 claims lacked credibility. And, because the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding was not challenged on judicial review, Justice Turley held that it is to remain intact. Her judgment does not extend beyond these essential two points. [NAME] does not interfere with the [NAME]’s Article 1F(b) finding. It precludes the [NAME] from revisiting Article 1F(b) with a narrow exception in the event that new information that was not previously before the [NAME] or the [NAME] comes to light and is in relation to a crime by the Applicant not previously alleged by the Minister. In my view, this narrow exception is neither precluded by Justice Turley’s Decision nor does it contravene her judgment. [ 67 ] As to Article 1E, Justice Turley’s Decision does not touch on this in any way. For the reasons above, I am not persuaded that [NAME] erred in failing to prohibit the [NAME] from addressing that section 98 exclusion, which has not previously been addressed by the [NAME] or the [NAME]. [ 68 ] In sum, the Applicant has failed to demonstrate [NAME]’s directions to the [NAME] on reconsideration exceeded the scope of Justice Turley’s Decision and were, therefore, unreasonable.

Accordingly, I am dismissing this application for judicial review. Certified Question [ 69 ] At the [APPELLANT], the Applicant raised, for the first time, a certified question proposed pursuant to paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA . Contrary to the Court’s Consolidated Practice Guidelines for Citizenship, Immigration and [NAME] Protection Proceedings [ Guidelines ], the Applicant did not give opposing counsel five days notice of its intent to do so in an effort to reach consensus regarding the language of the proposed question. Given this, I permitted the parties to make brief post-[APPELLANT] written submissions concerning the proposed certified question. [ 70 ] The question put forward by the Applicant at the [APPELLANT] was: Does the correctness standard apply when an administrative tribunal must construe and apply the scope of a Court order that circumscribes the tribunal’s mandate, or is deference owed? [ 71 ] In the Applicant’s post-[APPELLANT] submissions, he asserts that [APPELLANT] recognizes that categories of correctness review are not closed and that rule of law concerns may warrant the recognition of additional categories. Further, that in [COMPANY], [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2022 SCC 30 [ [COMPANY] ], the Supreme Court recognized an additional category where rule of law concerns displace the [NAME] presumption that reasonable review applies – being when [NAME] have concurrent first instance jurisdiction over a legal issue in a statute. The Applicant submits that in [COMPANY], the Supreme Court observed that when the [NAME] has granted exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative decision-maker, courts presume that the [NAME] wanted that decision-maker to operate without undue judicial interference. However, the Court further observed that when the [NAME] expressly involves the court in the administrative scheme, this presumption no longer applies. According to the Applicant, the present case gives rise to an analogous correctness review category, whereby rule-of-law considerations relating to the Court’s institutional role – including its ability to determine whether its own orders are followed – entails that deferential review is inappropriate. [ 72 ] The Applicant further submits that the proposed question meets the test for certification as it is dispositive of the appeal and transcends the interests of the parties. [ 73 ] The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s argument that this matter gives rise to a new rule of law category is without merit. Further, that the test for certification has not been met as it is not dispositive of the appeal and does not relate to an issue of broad or general significance. Analysis [ 74 ] Paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA provides that an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal can only be brought if this Court certifies a question of general importance: 74 Judicial review is subject to the following provisions: …. (d) subject to section 87.01, an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal may be made only if, in rendering judgment, the judge certifies that a serious question of general importance is involved and states the question. [ 75 ] The law underlying the test to be met with respect to certifying a question was summarized by Justice Gascon in [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2024 FC 2040 : [ 76 ] According to paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA, a question can be certified by the Court if “a serious question of general importance is involved.” To be certified, a question must be a serious one that: (i) is dispositive of the appeal; (ii) transcends the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation; and (iii) contemplate an issue of broad significance or general importance ( [NAME] at para 37 ; [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2018 FCA 22 at para 46; [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ), 2017 FCA 130 at para 36 ; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FCA 178 at paras 15–16 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2013 FCA 168 at para 9 [ [NAME] ]). The question must also have been dealt with by the Court, and it must arise from the case rather than from the Court’s reasons ( [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2023 FCA 151 at para 28 [ [NAME] ]; [NAME] at para 16 ; [NAME] at para 9 ; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2009 FCA 145 at para 29 ). Finally, and as a corollary of the requirement that it be of general importance, it must not have been previously settled in an earlier appeal ( [NAME]  at   para 28 ; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2016 FCA 292 at para 6 ; [NAME] at para 36 ; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2018 FC 1203 at para 98 ; [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2017 FC 1062 at para 37 ). (See also Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v [NAME] , 2022 FCA 113 [ [NAME] ] at paras 5-7.) [ 76 ] In my view, the question proposed for certification does not meet the requirements of the test. [ 77 ] First, the interpretation of Justice Turley’s Decision does not transcend the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation. [NAME]’s interpretation or understanding of Justice Turley’s Decision, and its resultant directions to the [NAME] on redetermination, are specific only to the circumstances of that matter and that judgment. [ 78 ] Nor does [NAME]’s interpretation of the judgment engage an issue of broad significance or general importance. As discussed in the context of the standard of review, in [NAME] the Supreme Court held that the analysis for determining the standard of review where a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision begins with a presumption that the reasonableness standard applies. This presumption is rebutted only where required by a clear indication of legislative intent or by the rule of law ( [NAME] at paras 17, 23, 25). Respect for the rule of law requires courts to apply the standard of correctness for certain types of legal questions: constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the [NAME] as a whole and questions regarding the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies ( [APPELLANT] at paras 17, 53, 62). [ 79 ] The Applicant submits that [NAME]’s interpretation and application of Justice Turley’s Decision, which restricted the scope of redetermination by [NAME], is a question of law. But even if that is so, and I am not persuaded that it is in these circumstances, it is not a general question of law of central importance to the [NAME] as a whole. [ 80 ] It is true, as held in [NAME] , that [NAME] did not preclude the possibility of new categories of correctness: [ 43 ] At the same time, [NAME] did not definitively foreclose the possibility of recognizing new categories of correctness “[i]n rare and exceptional circumstances . . . when applying reasonableness would undermine legislative intent or the rule of law in a manner analogous to the five correctness categories” already identified ( [COMPANY] , at para. 27; [NAME] , at para. 70). [ADDRESS] recently recognized a sixth category of correctness review in [COMPANY] , a case involving copyright royalties for works accessed online: (6) “when [NAME] have concurrent first instance jurisdiction over a legal issue in a statute” (para. 28). [ADDRESS] noted that both the Copyright Board and the courts have concurrent first instance jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of the Copyright Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, which signals “a legislative intent for judicial involvement” (para. 31) and highlights the need for consistent and definitive interpretation of the Copyright Act to maintain the rule of law (paras. 33‑35). [ 44 ] The presumption of reasonableness review and the limited circumstances in which it is rebutted provide a comprehensive framework for determining the standard of review. …… [ 81 ] In [NAME] , the Supreme Court held that in the context of statutory interpretation, none of the established exceptions to the presumption applied in that case: [ 47 ] Second, the standard of correctness is not required based on the rule of law. The proper interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA is not a “general question of law of central importance to the [NAME] as a whole” under [NAME]  (paras. 58‑62). Such “general questions of law” require uniform and consistent answers because of their impact on the administration of justice as a whole or for other institutions of government (para. 59). Examples of general questions of law include questions with legal implications for many other statutes or for the proper functioning of the justice system as a whole (paras. 59‑61). It is not enough for the question to “touc[h] on an important issue” or to raise an issue of “wider public concern” (para. 61). Although the proper interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) is important for the [NAME] and the proper administration of the IRPA , it does not affect the [NAME] or the administration of justice as a whole, have legal implications for many other statutes, or affect other institutions of government. Rather, the issues raised are particular to the interpretation of the conditions for inadmissibility under s. 34(1)(e). Moreover, the proper interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) is not a constitutional question or a question related to the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies, nor does it engage the correctness category recognized in [COMPANY] . Thus, the rule of law does not require the Federal Court to review an administrative interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) for correctness. [ 82 ] Similarly, in this matter the interpretation and application of Justice Turley’s Decision as manifested in [NAME]’s directions to the [NAME] does not give rise to a general question of law of central importance to the [NAME] as a whole, or, in the paragraph 74(d) context, “ a serious question of general importance.” Part of the [NAME]’s role is to interpret and apply jurisprudence as well as statutes. In this case, it was interpreting and applying a determination of this Court that was specific to the matter before it. In my view, that falls within the Vavilov reasonableness standard. [ 83 ] Even if the proposed question is considered more broadly as the interpretation of court orders generally, rather than the specific order in this matter, the question does not meet the test. This is because construing and applying the scope of a court order that “circumscribes a mandate” of an administrative decision-maker will in most instances – like this one – be highly fact specific. Therefore, it will not engage an issue of broad significance or general importance. The question does not concern the proper functioning of the justice system as a whole ( [NAME] at para 47). [ 84 ] As to [COMPANY] , as the Respondent points out, the sixth category of correctness review recognized in [COMPANY] was “when [NAME] have concurrent first instance jurisdiction over a legal issue in a statute” (at para 28). Therefore, applying correctness accorded with legislative intent and promoted the rule of law. [ 85 ] Further, in that case the Supreme Court held: [ 31 ] When the [NAME] enacts a statute that gives concurrent first instance jurisdiction to [NAME], the [NAME] expressly involves the courts. Like legislated standards of review and statutory appeal mechanisms, concurrent first instance jurisdiction signals a legislative intent for judicial involvement. By conferring such jurisdiction, it should be inferred that the [NAME] wanted to subject those decisions to appellate standards of review. [ 86 ] The Supreme Court held that the Copyright Board and the courts had concurrent first instance jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of the Copyright Act , which signalled “a legislative intent for judicial involvement” and highlighted the need for consistent and definitive interpretation of the Copyright Act to maintain the rule of law. Unlike that case, the [NAME] and the courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction in immigration matters.

Accordingly, I agree with the Respondent that it is not clear how that exception is analogous to the proposed question in this matter. [ 87 ] For these reasons, I find that the test for certification has not been met.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-17871-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is dismissed; There shall be no order as to costs; and The question proposed for certification by the Applicant is not certified. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-17871-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF [APPELLANT]: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF [APPELLANT]: May 19, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [APPELLANT] J. DATED: june 12, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] For The Applicant [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent