Federal Court Upholds Danger Opinion for Removal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260619 Docket: IMM-3796-24 Citation: 2026 FC 845 Ottawa, Ontario, June 19, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] This application for judicial review concerns a danger opinion issued pursuant to section 115(2)(a) of the Immigration and [NAME] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 ( “ IRPA ” ), wherein the Minister’s Delegate (the “[NAME]” ) determined that the Applicant, a citizen of South Sudan and [NAME] [NAME], constitutes a danger to the [NAME] in Canada and may therefore be removed notwithstanding the principle of non-refoulement. [ 2 ] The Applicant argues that [NAME] unreasonably assessed the risk he would face upon removal to South Sudan by improperly importing the “personalized risk” framework applicable under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA into the broader section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11 [ “ Charter ” ] analysis. The Applicant does not challenge [NAME]’s finding regarding dangerousness, which was based on an extensive and violent criminal history spanning more than a decade; including convictions for assault, firearms offences, and repeated breaches of court orders. [ 3 ] The Respondent submits that [NAME] applied the correct legal framework, reasonably considered the country-condition evidence and the Applicant’s personal circumstances, and appropriately concluded that the Applicant had failed to establish a substantial personal risk sufficient to outweigh the significant [NAME]-safety concerns arising from his continued presence in Canada. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, this application is dismissed.

II. Request for Adjournment [ 5 ] [ADDRESS] notes that the Applicant is self-represented. Self-represented litigants are not excused from an application of the rules of the Court and the Court’s procedures and they have a duty to self-educate; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FC 204 at para 23 , citing [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2017 FC 2 at paras 29, 33), see also and [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 FC 1913 at para 6. [ 6 ] [ADDRESS] recognises the difficult position that self-represented litigants find themselves in with respect to navigating the Court’s procedural requirements, which can be challenging, even for counsel. In recognition of this, the Court has developed tools that are available to assist self-represented litigants to understand a broad range of procedural issues. The information is available on the Federal Court’s website, is prominently displayed, and is free. [ 7 ] The Applicant arrived at Court and presented approximately 15 minutes after the commencement of the hearing; counsel for the Respondent had already begun oral submissions. Upon arrival, the Applicant requested an adjournment and he indicated that counsel was not available. [ 8 ] It is important to set out the history of this application and the attempts to schedule a hearing for this application, as set out in the Court’s recorded entries for this file. [ 9 ] On February 28, 2024, counsel on behalf of the Applicant filed an application for leave and judicial review. On April 11, 2025, counsel filed the Applicant’s Record. [ 10 ] On May 14, 2025, the Court granted leave for the application and ordered that the hearing for the application was scheduled to take place on Tuesday, August 12, 2025, in person, in Calgary, Alberta. [ 11 ] On July 8, 2025, Applicant’s counsel filed a further Memorandum of Argument on behalf of the Applicant. [ 12 ] On August 7, 2025, the Applicant’s counsel requested to withdraw from the record and the Applicant requested an adjournment to retain [NAME] and on August 8, 2025, the Court granted the requests; the August 12, 2025 hearing was vacated. [ 13 ] On January 28, 2026, the Respondent sent a letter to the Court and the Applicant seeking an update and the rescheduling of the hearing for the application. [ 14 ] In March 2026, [NAME] for the Applicant provided two email addresses to the Court registry, and attempts were made to schedule the hearing of the application for April 7, 2026. The Applicant responded to an email sent to [EMAIL] , but did not advise of his availability for a hearing. On March 23, 2026, the Applicant advised via email from [EMAIL] that they were available for a hearing anytime after April 22, 2026. [ 15 ] On March 30, 2026, the Court ordered that the hearing of the application was scheduled to take place on Wednesday, June 3, 2026 in person at the Federal Court in Calgary, Alberta. [ 16 ] On May 26, 2026, the Registry sent an email to the Applicant seeking confirmation of their attendance at the scheduled hearing. No response was received. [ 17 ] On May 27, 2026, the Registry sent a further email to the Applicant seeking confirmation of their attendance at the scheduled hearing. No response was received. [ 18 ] There is no record that the Applicant attempted to contact the Court to re-schedule the hearing of the application or to advise that he would be late for the hearing on June 3, 2026. [ 19 ] The Applicant did not bring a formal or informal motion to adjourn the hearing pursuant to Rule 36(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, (the “ Rules ” ). As further explained in the Amended Consolidated General Practice Guidelines, the Federal Court operates on a guaranteed, fixed-date system. When the Court has fixed a date for a hearing, parties are expected to proceed. Last-minute requests for adjournments result in significant inefficient use of Court resources. [ADDRESS] recognises that for exceptional and unforeseen reasons an adjournment may be necessary. Where an adjournment is needed, a request must be made in advance, in a timely manner, by way of motion or an informal request by letter, five days in advance of the hearing. [ 20 ] Pursuant to Rule 38, where a party fails to appear at a hearing, the Court may proceed in absence of the party if the Court is satisfied that notice of the hearing was provided in accordance with the Rules. [ 21 ] As noted above, the Applicant was late for the scheduled hearing of this matter and the Court commenced the hearing in the absence of the Applicant, as the Court was satisfied that the Applicant had received notice of the hearing. [ 22 ] The Applicant requested an adjournment at the outset of his arrival in Court to give counsel time to appear. Later in the hearing, the Applicant indicated that he had not yet retained counsel and he needed more time to do so. The Applicant’s request was denied. As noted above, while the Court may grant an adjournment of a scheduled hearing, this discretion is exceptional and reserved for unforeseen reasons. The hearing of this application was adjourned in August 2025, to permit the Applicant time to retain [NAME]. In addition, the Court notes that the Applicant advised he was available for a hearing anytime after April 22, 2026.

Accordingly, it was not appropriate to grant a further adjournment for the purpose of retaining counsel. [ 23 ] The Applicant then requested a further adjournment, advising the Court that he had recently undergone a medical procedure, was taking a variety of medications and therefore unable to proceed with oral submissions. No evidence was provided in support of this assertion;

accordingly, the Court denied the request. [ 24 ] [ADDRESS] explained to the Applicant that given the history of this application it could not accommodate the Applicant’s last-minute request for an adjournment. [ADDRESS] also explained that the Applicant’s failure to retain [NAME] in a timely way and recent medical procedures, for which there was no evidence before the Court, were not acceptable reasons for a further adjournment. The Applicant appeared to accept the Court’s reasons for denying his request. [ 25 ] However, the Applicant further requested that the hearing be adjourned and resumed later the same day or the following day to permit him an opportunity to prepare oral submissions. This request was also denied. As noted above, the Federal Court operates on a fixed-hearing date system and the Applicant’s request could not be accommodated. Further, the Applicant was advised that the Court was scheduled to hear another matter following the conclusion of the present proceeding and that there were also scheduled matters for the following day. [ 26 ] The Applicant indicated that he intended to appeal the Court’s decision to not grant an adjournment. [ADDRESS] advised the Applicant that there was no right to further appeal this decision. [ 27 ] [ADDRESS] provided the Applicant with an opportunity to make oral submissions. Apart from the noted request for an adjournment, the Applicant declined to make oral submissions. [ADDRESS] advised the Applicant that it had before it the written submissions previously filed by [NAME] and advised the Applicant that it would consider those submissions in determining the application. [ 28 ] In addition, both the Court and the Respondent explained to the Applicant that regardless of the outcome of this application, it did not mean that the Applicant would be removed from Canada; rather, this application was a step in that process, and there would be other opportunities for the Applicant to participate in those processes.

III. Background [ 29 ] The Applicant is a national of South Sudan. He entered Canada on June 9, 2005, at age 17, as a permanent resident in the [NAME] with his immediate family. The family had fled conflict in Sudan and lived in Egypt before resettling in Canada. The Applicant was included as a dependent on his sister’s successful [NAME] claim. [ 30 ] The Applicant is the father of an eight-year-old boy. The record before [NAME] contained limited information regarding custody arrangements, the nature and extent of the Applicant’s relationship with the child, and the degree of financial or emotional support provided. [ 31 ] The Applicant has an extensive criminal history in Canada spanning from September 2006 to 2019, including over 50 convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, domestic assault, possession of firearms, drug trafficking and possession, and failure to comply with recognizance and other court orders. This has led to significant incarceration time and time in immigration detention. [ 32 ] On May 13, 2009, the Canada Border Services Agency ( “CBSA” ) prepared an inadmissibility report for serious criminality pursuant to section 36(1)(a) of the IRPA . A deportation order was subsequently issued on April 22, 2010, resulting in the loss of the Applicant’s permanent resident status. [ 33 ] In December 2015, CBSA initiated the process for seeking a ministerial danger opinion pursuant to section 115(2)(a) of the IRPA . [NAME] for the Applicant provided submissions in response. [ 34 ] The Applicant continued to incur criminal charges and convictions after the section 36(1)(a) IRPA report and the initiation of the danger opinion process, including convictions for domestic violence, a home invasion, and weapons offenses. The Applicant completed his sentence in March 2022, after being denied parole in August 2021, and was transferred to immigration detention in March 2022. He was released in May 2022 on payment of a Bond and with terms and conditions. [ 35 ] On April 29, 2020, CBSA submitted a formal request that [NAME] form an opinion that the Applicant constitutes a danger to the [NAME] pursuant to section 115(2)(a) of the IRPA . [ 36 ] On February 2, 2024, [NAME] issued a Danger Opinion finding that the Applicant represents a present and future danger to the [NAME], whose presence in Canada posed an unacceptable risk to the [NAME]. [ 37 ] [NAME] further found that the Applicant’s personal circumstances, including his establishment in Canada and the best interests of his child, did not outweigh the statutory objective of protecting the [NAME], and ultimately determined that the Applicant could be removed to South Sudan pursuant to section 115(2)(a) of the IRPA and that his removal would not violate section 7 of the Charter . [NAME] considered whether the Applicant would face a personalized risk to life, liberty, or security if removed to South Sudan, and reviewed documentary evidence concerning country conditions in South Sudan, including evidence relating to armed conflict, humanitarian conditions, displacement, security concerns, language, ethnicity, and the Applicant’s personal circumstances. [ 38 ] On February 28, 2024, the Applicant filed an application for leave and judicial review.

IV. Issues and Standard of Review [ 39 ] The parties agree, and I accept, the question of whether [NAME] applied the correct legal test is a question of law that attracts correctness review: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2013 FC 247 [ [NAME] [NAME] ] at para 31; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [[NAME]] at paras 17, 143. [ 40 ] By contrast, [NAME]’s assessment of the Applicant's risk upon return, including the evaluation of the evidentiary record and the application of the governing legal framework to the facts, attracts review on a reasonableness standard: [NAME] [NAME] at para 31, [NAME] at paras 10, 15–17, 99–100. Such determinations are factual or mixed fact and law in nature and fall within the decision maker's delegated sphere of responsibility. [ 41 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly emphasized that reviewing courts must accord significant deference to administrative decision makers in matters involving risk assessment and the weighing of relevant evidence. In [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2002 SCC 1 [ [NAME] ], the Court explained that it is for the decision maker, not the reviewing court, to assign weight to the relevant considerations. A reviewing court's role is limited to determining whether the decision maker acted within the constraints imposed by the governing legislation and the Constitution; it is not to undertake a fresh weighing of the evidence or substitute its own assessment of the relevant factors: [NAME] at paras 37–38. [ 42 ] [ADDRESS] in [NAME] further held that the determination of whether an individual faces a substantial risk of torture upon removal is a threshold inquiry that is largely fact driven. It requires consideration of matters such as country conditions, the claimant's personal circumstances, the reliability of any diplomatic assurances, and other contextual factors. Since such issues are generally outside the expertise of reviewing courts and involve a limited legal component, the resulting findings attract deference on judicial review.

Accordingly, a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence but may intervene where the decision is unsupported by the evidence, fails to consider the appropriate factors, or is otherwise unreasonable: [NAME] at para 39. [ 43 ] Notably, the court’s observations in [NAME] concerning judicial restraint in reviewing factual risk assessments remain consistent with the principles articulated in [NAME] . As the Supreme Court confirmed in [NAME] , absent exceptional circumstances, reviewing courts must refrain from "reweighing and reassessing the evidence considered by the decision maker" and should not interfere with factual findings merely because they might have reached a different conclusion on the same record: [APPELLANT] at para 125.

V. Analysis [ 44 ] The Applicant argues that the Decision is unreasonable. The Applicant argues that [NAME] applied the wrong test in assessing his risks of return to South Sudan; in particular, [NAME] failed to conduct a proper assessment of the country condition information. [ 45 ] The Respondent argues that the decision is reasonable and that [NAME] applied the proper test. The Respondent argues that the Applicant’s submissions amount to a request for the Court to reweigh the country condition evidence to reach a different conclusion, which is not the proper scope of an application for judicial review. A. Danger Opinion Framework [ 46 ] The applicable legislative framework for Danger opinions is set out at sections 115(1) and (2)(a) of the IRPA . A protected person or a [NAME] shall not be removed from Canada to a country where they would face a risk of persecution or risk of torture or cruel and unusual punishment, except where the individual is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality, who in the opinion of the Minister, represents a danger to the [NAME]. A valid danger opinion must be completed by the Minister to remove a [NAME] from Canada. [ 47 ] Section 36 of the IRPA describes serious criminality; a conviction of an offence in Canada punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years; s. 36(1)(a). [ 48 ] As noted above, in [NAME] [NAME] at paragraph 31, the Court stated that, “[T]he question of the correct test to be applied must be evaluated on a correctness standard, whereas questions related to the delegates assessment of danger are subject to a reasonableness standard.” [ 49 ] In [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2006 FCA 151 [ [NAME] ], the Federal Court of Appeal set out the sequencing for the analysis in respect of a section 115(2)(a) danger opinion: Step 1 – [NAME] must confirm that the protected is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality, ( [NAME] at para 16); Step 2 – [NAME] must determine that the protected person is a danger to the [NAME]. This determination is informed by the persons criminal history of the individual and requires a finding of “present and future danger” that the individual poses to the [NAME] ( [NAME] at para 17 ) ; Step 3 – if [NAME] finds that the protected person is not danger to the [NAME] that is end of the inquiry and the individual may not be removed; ( [NAME] at para 18); and Step 4 – if [NAME] determines the protected person is a danger to the [NAME], [NAME] must engage in a balancing exercises to weigh: the risk of persecution, torture or other inhuman punishment or treatment if the protected person were removed against the danger to the [NAME] if the protected person is not removed. This analysis is informed by section 7 of the Charter , will the person likely face a risk to life, liberty and security of the person on removal? [NAME] may also consider humanitarian and compassionate factors, such as the Best Interests of a Child (“BIOC”) ( [NAME] at para 18 and 19). [ 50 ] In [NAME] , the Supreme Court of Canada ( “SCC” ) held that a finding that an individual poses a danger to the [NAME] is a discretionary decision entitled to considerable deference. On judicial review, the court must assess if [NAME] considered the appropriate factors within the constraints established by Parliament through legislation and the Constitution. Where [NAME] has done so, a reviewing court cannot set aside the decision, even if it would have weighed the factors differently and reached a different conclusion. This approach reflects the distinct roles of Parliament, the Minister (or [NAME]), and reviewing courts. It gives effect to legislative intention and respects the expertise and experience of the decision maker; [NAME] at para 38, see also para 45. B. Findings on Serious Criminality and Humanitarian and Compassionate Factors [ 51 ] The Applicant has not challenged the finding of inadmissibility due to serious criminality. [ 52 ] A review of the Decision illustrates that [NAME] conducted a review of the Applicant’s criminal convictions. Further, the Officer notes that a requirement of a section 115 danger opinion is that the person be found inadmissible for serious criminality, as set out at paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA. [NAME] was satisfied that the Applicant was inadmissible for serious criminality based on convictions for aggravated assault, possession and trafficking of a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm, which are offences punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years. [ 53 ] The Applicant also did not challenge [NAME]’s findings in respect of humanitarian and compassionate factors, including the best interests of the child ( “BIOC” ). [ 54 ] A review of the Decision indicates that [NAME] found that much of the Applicant’s submissions concerning humanitarian and compassionate factors focused on his Canadian child. [NAME] found that the evidence was lacking to establish that it was in the best interests of the child for the Applicant to remain in Canada. [ 55 ] [NAME] goes on to find that the Applicant did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate a degree of establishment in Canada, either social or economic, that would cause him disproportionate hardship to be removed. [ 56 ] [NAME]’s findings in respect of these issues are reasonable; the reasons provided are transparent, intelligible and justified and properly consider the applicable legal framework and factual matrix. C. Danger to the [NAME] [ 57 ] The Applicant does not appear to challenge [NAME]’s conclusion on danger to the [NAME]. [ 58 ] The Respondent submits that, in concluding that the Applicant is inadmissible because of serious criminality and he poses a danger to the [NAME], [NAME] considered: the Applicant’s extensive criminal history; the violent nature of the offences the Applicant committed, including use of weapons; and the Applicant’s behavior while incarcerated. [ 59 ] The Respondent also notes that [NAME] considered reports prepared by the [NAME] ( “[NAME]” ) concerning the suitability of the Applicant for early release. The Respondent highlights that the [NAME] reports underscore the Applicant’s lack of accountability, lack of evidence of efforts to lead a pro-social lifestyle, and assaults while in custody. Ultimately, the [NAME] determined that the Applicant was likely to re-offend. [ 60 ] A review of [NAME]’s Decision illustrates that [NAME] considered the Applicant’s complete history of criminality in determining that he posed a danger to the [NAME]: … I accept that Mr. [APPELLANT] has experienced trauma throughout his life, but with respect, this is not an excuse to commit crimes as a means of dealing with his trauma. Mr. [APPELLANT] has seriously injured [NAME], his ex-partner and his own brother. In my opinion, he has shown little remorse or acceptance for his criminal behavior. … The evidence before me clearly establishes the seriousness of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s criminal activities. Given the lack of sufficient evidence of rehabilitation, the fact that he has a lengthy criminal history, numerous and recent incidences of non-compliance with his reporting conditions, and the violent nature of his offences, it is my opinion that he is likely to re-offend. For the reasons previously identified, I find there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. [APPELLANT] poses a present and future danger to the [NAME], whose presence in Canada represents a risk. [ 61 ] [NAME] correctly applied the legal test set out by this Court in [APPELLANT] when assessing whether the Applicant poses a danger to the [NAME]. A review of the Decision illustrates that [NAME]’s conclusion was grounded in the Applicant’s criminal history and reflects a finding that the Applicant is a present and future danger to the [NAME]. The [APPELLANT] expressly notes that he is required to determine if there is “sufficient evidence on which to formulate the opinion that he is a potential reoffender, whose presence in Canada poses an unacceptable risk to the [NAME].” In concluding that the Applicant posed a present and future danger to the [NAME], the [APPELLANT] relied on several factors, including the Applicant’s history of “failure to comply” offences, a history of violent offences, a lack of accountability for his actions, and his tendency to “blame others” for getting him in trouble. [NAME] also notes an absence of evidence that the Applicant has received treatment for childhood trauma or has taken steps towards more pro-social behaviors. [ 62 ] The reasons for the Decision are tangible, intelligible and justified. [NAME]’s conclusion concerning the Applicant’s danger to the [NAME] is reasonable and in line with the applicable legal framework and the evidence. The Applicant has not pointed to a specific legal error that would warrant this Court’s intervention on judicial review. [APPELLANT]. Risks of removal [ 63 ] The Applicant argued that [NAME] conflated the risk assessment from sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA with the section 7 Charter risks – risk to life, liberty and security of the person. The Applicant argued that [NAME] failed to explain how the findings in respect of general “significant harsh conditions” did not personally impact the Applicant. [ 64 ] The Respondent submits that [NAME] considered the prospective risks to the Applicant on refoulement. The Respondent submits that the Decision grapples with the Applicant’s submissions in respect of the impacts of removal to South Sudan, including the Applicant’s lack of familiarity with the region, language and culture. [ 65 ] The Respondent argues that [NAME] considered open-source country condition evidence in determining that the Applicant would be able to settle in the region, noting that English is the primary language spoken and that the Applicant is a member of the [NAME], the largest ethnic group in the region. [NAME] also considered the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. However, despite the challenges for the Applicant facing removal to a country very different from Canada, [NAME] concluded that the evidence advanced by the Applicant spoke to general conditions experienced by all citizens and he did not provide evidence that established a personal risk to his life, liberty or security if returned. [ 66 ] The Respondent submitted that [NAME] engaged with the Applicant’s submissions related to humanitarian and compassionate factors, including the BIOC. The Respondent highlights that [NAME] noted there were significant gaps in the evidence provided concerning the Applicant’s child. In particular, there was no evidence concerning the child’s custody, current location, the Applicant’s relationship with the child, or how the Applicant has contributed to the child’s well-being, financial or emotional support. [NAME] also determined that the Applicant had not established a degree of establishment, social or economic, in Canada that would cause hardship were he to be removed. [ 67 ] The Respondent notes that [NAME] conducted the required balancing exercise in determining that the removal of the Applicant would not, on balance, violate his rights under section 7 of the Charter. [ 68 ] The Applicant suggests that [NAME]’s application of the test was flawed because [NAME] failed to mention certain country condition documents in the Decision. It is trite law that an administrative decision maker need not reference every single piece of evidence in its reasons. Administrative decision makers are assumed to have weighed and considered all evidence submitted, unless the contrary is shown; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration ), [1993] FCJ No 598 at para 1 (FCA); [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 551 at paras 27 and 42. [ 69 ] In [NAME] [NAME], the Court found that the relevant inquiry for the purposes of a danger opinion, in the determination of whether removal would contravene section 7 of the Charter, is will the Applicant “personally face a risk to life liberty or security” . This inquiry is necessary to determine if the risks of removal are properly balanced against the danger to the [NAME] (at para 73). [ 70 ] [ADDRESS] in [NAME] [NAME] goes on to note that the onus is on applicants to provide evidence of personal risk: … for the purposes of the analysis pursuant to section 7 of the Charter , there can be no requirement to demonstrate that one will be at greater risk than the general population. That being said , an applicant must still show that he or she would personally be at risk for his or her life, liberty or security if removed to his or her country of origin . The Supreme Court of Canada held in [NAME] , above, that the assessment of whether a person faces a substantial risk of torture is a fact-driven and individualized inquiry . Generally country conditions are relevant to the inquiry, but ultimately the person must show that he or she faces a substantial personal risk to life, liberty or security on a balance of probabilities . … It is that substantial personal risk that needs to be balanced against the danger to the [NAME] in order to determine whether removal would offend the principles of fundamental justice and whether deporting a [NAME] to that risk would shock the conscience of Canadians. [emphasis mine] (at para 68 and 69) [ 71 ] The Decision clearly sets out the test and framework applied by [NAME] in respect of the risk assessment portion of the danger opinion: The starting point for my analysis of risk begins with paragraph 115(2) of IRPA which provision creates and exception to the general protection provided to [NAME] since I have found that Mr. [APPELLANT] is inadmissible for serious criminality and constitutes, in my opinion a danger to the [NAME] in Canada. As a result, I now proceed to an assessment of whether Mr. [APPELLANT], if removed to South Sudan, will personally face a risk of persecution, risk to life or risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. In undertaking this assessment, I am informed by the risks set out in s.115(1) of IRPA and s. 7 of the Charter. [ 72 ] A review of the Decision supports the conclusion that [NAME] properly found that the Applicant failed to provide evidence that established personal risk to his life, liberty or security if removed. [NAME] noted the Applicant’s submissions that removal to South Sudan would impact him because he is an English speaker and not fluent in Sudanese, that the wages and standard of living would be “detrimental” , and that he would be required to establish himself in a completely different labour market. Subsequent submissions filed by the Applicant’s [NAME] focused on the current armed conflict in Sudan, rather than South Sudan, where removal would take place. [NAME] also argued that the Applicant does not have family ties, does not know the language or culture, and would have difficulty adjusting. Further, [NAME] relied on open-source country condition evidence of conditions in South Sudan, including information regarding ongoing armed conflict and the humanitarian situation. [NAME] also considered letters from the Applicant’s family members, including a letter from his mother, in which she indicates that she nearly lost her life during a recent visit. However, [NAME] notes that specific details are missing, including the region where she visited. [ 73 ] [NAME] concludes that: … I appreciate that Mr. [APPELLANT] may have a difficult time adjusting to a place different from Canada, and one that may not afford the same lifestyle he has been accustomed to in Canada. I accept that Mr. [APPELLANT] would be exposed to significantly harsh conditions in South Sudan, however, those same conditions continue to be experienced by the general population and would not be unique to Mr. [APPELLANT]. As such I find there is insufficient evidence before me that demonstrates Mr. [APPELLANT] faces a personalized risk to life, liberty or security, if removed to South Sudan at this time. Based on my review of current country conditions and the information before, I have considered risk to life liberty and security of the person, being informed by the risks set out in s. 115(1) of IPRA and s. 7 of the Charter . I find, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. [APPELLANT] will not personally face a risk to life, liberty or security upon return to South Sudan. [ 74 ] In addition, [NAME] notes that the applicable balancing exercise must be undertaken in the context of a danger opinion. Ultimately, [NAME] finds that “[A]fter fully considering all facts of this case, including personal circumstances, and an assessment of the possible risks that Mr. [APPELLANT] might personally face if returned to South Sudan and the need to protect [COMPANY], I find the later outweighs the [NAME].” [ 75 ] I am persuaded by the Respondent that [NAME] applied the correct test to assess the risks to the Applicant on removal to South Sudan. [ 76 ] The Applicant’s submission that [NAME] did not consider country condition evidence and that [NAME]’s conclusions do not explain the findings in respect of general country conditions do not personally impact the Applicant are without merit. The reasons for Decision clearly set out that [NAME] carefully considered the evidence of general country conditions in South Sudan that were submitted. However, the Applicant failed to provide evidence of personalized risk, as required. The Decision illustrates that [NAME] agreed that conditions in South Sudan were not ideal, and that this will be a difficult transition for the Applicant. It is not for [NAME] to explain how general country conditions do not personally impact the Applicant. Rather, the onus was on the Applicant to demonstrate with evidence a prospective personal risk. [ 77 ] The Decision is reasonable; the reasons are transparent, intelligible and justified and are consistent with the evidence and applicable legal framework. A review of the record for this application indicates that the Applicant did not set out specific personalized risks he would face if removed. Rather, he relied on general country condition evidence and set out general risks that are inherent for any removal. The Applicant’s failure to provide evidence of personal prospective risks of removal are determinative. I agree with the Respondent that ultimately, the Applicant’s disagreement is with the result. The Applicant has not persuaded the Court that there are any legal errors that merit this Court’s intervention.

VI. Conclusion [ 78 ] The Applicant did not demonstrate that [NAME] applied the wrong legal test and framework in the assessment of the Applicant’s factors as a danger to the [NAME] or the risks of refoulment. [ 79 ] The decision bears all the hallmarks of reasonableness. Ultimately, weighing of evidence is within the purview of [NAME] and the Applicant has not pointed to specific legal errors that would warrant this Court’s intervention on judicial review. [ 80 ] I appreciate that the Applicant disagrees with the conclusions set out in [NAME]’s Danger Opinion. I understand that this is one more step in the process to have the Applicant removed, which the Applicant does not want to happen. I note that while the situation that the Applicant is in is unfortunate, it is a consequence of his long history of choosing to disregard Canadian law. The Applicant’s disagreement with the Decision does not mean that [NAME] applied the wrong legal test or that the Decision was otherwise unreasonable. [ 81 ] The parties did not pose questions for certification, and I agree that there are none.

JUDGMENT in IMM-3796-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The Applicant’s requests to adjourn the hearing of this application are denied. The application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-3796-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Calgary, Alberta DATE OF HEARING: June 3, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [APPELLANT] J. DATED: June 19, 2026 APPEARANCES : [APPELLANT] For The Applicant (ON HIS [APPELLANT]) [APPELLANT] [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : Attorney General of Canada Calgary, Alberta For The Respondent