Federal Court Rejects Work Permit Appeal Under Intra-Company Transfer Program

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260522 Docket: IMM-20350-24 Citation: 2026 FC 664 Vancouver, British Columbia, May 22, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice Norris BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicants and MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The applicants, [APPELLANT] and [APPELLANT], are citizens of Iran and a married couple. [ 2 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] has been employed at Roshdeno Nongovernmental Elementary School for Girls and Boys in Karaj, Iran, as Senior School Manager since April 2016. Ms. [APPELLANT]’s parents founded the school in 1991. [ 3 ] In August 2023, Ms. [APPELLANT]’s parents incorporated a [COMPANY], [APPELLANT], with a view to establishing a Farsi-language school in the Greater Vancouver area. In July 2024, Mr. [APPELLANT] applied for a work permit under the [NAME] on the basis that the school in Iran, the [COMPANY], wished to transfer him to its Canadian subsidiary, the company developing the proposed school in Vancouver, to serve as the senior manager there. At the same time, Ms. [APPELLANT] applied for a work permit as an accompanying spouse. [ 4 ] The [NAME] for intra-company transfers was established under paragraph 205(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227. Decision makers assessing applications under the program are guided by publicly-available program instructions. [ 5 ] Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application was supported by, among other things, a detailed business plan for the [COMPANY]. [ 6 ] In a decision dated August 19, 2024, an officer with [NAME] refused Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application because he had not demonstrated that “the [NAME] is a legitimate and continuing establishment of a [NAME],” as required by the program under which he had applied. In a separate decision issued on the same day, the officer also refused Ms. [APPELLANT]’s application for a work permit because Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application had been refused. [ 7 ] The applicants have applied for judicial review of these decisions under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 ( IRPA ). They contend that the decision on Mr. [APPELLANT]’s work permit application is unreasonable and that the process leading to it was unfair. The challenge to the refusal of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s application stands or falls with the challenge to the refusal of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application. [ 8 ] As I will explain, I am not persuaded that there is any basis to interfere with the decision refusing Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application. [ 9 ] The applicable standards of review are not in dispute. The substance of the officer’s decision is to be reviewed on a reasonableness standard. A reasonable decision is one that is “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and that is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 at para 85). On the other hand, when it is alleged that the requirements of procedural fairness were not met, the reviewing court must examine the process followed by the decision maker and determine whether it was fair in all the circumstances ( Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at paras 54-56). Although, strictly speaking, no standard of review is being applied, it has been said that this inquiry is functionally the same as applying a correctness standard ( Canadian Pacific Railway Co , at para 54). [ 10 ] The determinative finding made by the officer was that the information submitted did not establish that “the [NAME] is a legitimate and continuing establishment of a [NAME].” The applicants argue that this finding was made unfairly and unreasonably because the officer applied requirements that only came into effect in October 2024, after they submitted their applications. They also submit that, in any event, the officer’s assessment of the supporting information is unreasonable and depends on adverse credibility determinations. [ 11 ] I do not agree. [ 12 ] To begin with, the applicants have not established that there were material changes in the program requirements in October 2024. Nor, more to the point, have they established that the officer applied the wrong program requirements when deciding the application. The application was submitted in July 2024 and the decision was made in August 2024. I am satisfied that the officer applied the requirements in place at the time. [ 13 ] The focus of the officer’s concerns related to whether the [COMPANY] was “a legitimate and continuing establishment” of a multi-national corporation, as the intra-company transfer program requires. This requirement was publicly known and the applicants had a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that they met it, if they could. To the extent that there may have been changes to the program requirements in October 2024 concerning what it means to be a multi-national company – whether these changes were substantive or merely by way of clarification – they are immaterial to the present application because the character of the [COMPANY] was not the officer’s main concern. [ 14 ] When, as was the case here, the [COMPANY] is a start up, the requirement that it be a legitimate and continuing establishment must be understood accordingly. I am satisfied that the officer did just that. Following the specific guidelines for assessing a start-up company, the officer considered, among other things, whether meaningful steps were being taken to establish the company and whether there were sufficient financial resources to commence business in Canada and to compensate employees. On the information before the officer, the finding that the Canadian subsidiary was not a legitimate and continuing establishment of the Iran-based [COMPANY] was entirely reasonable. The information demonstrated that, at best, the [COMPANY] existed in name only. The applicants have not been able to point to any relevant information the officer overlooked or misconstrued in making this finding. Nor do I agree that the officer made any adverse credibility findings. The decision turned entirely on the officer’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. [ 15 ] In sum, the officer’s reasons, when read as a whole and in light of the record, reveal a line of analysis “that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived” ( Vavilov , at para 102). [ 16 ] For these reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. [ 17 ] The parties did not propose any serious questions of general importance for certification under paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA . I agree that no question arises.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-20350-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is dismissed. No question of general importance is stated. “John Norris” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-20350-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] ET AL v MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Vancouver, british columbia DATE OF HEARING: May 21, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: NORRIS J. DATED: May 22, 2026 APPEARANCES : Dr. [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] [RESPONDENT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [RESPONDENT], [NAME] of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent