Federal Court Upholds Rejection of Retaliation Complaint

Date: 20260707 Docket: A-280-24 Citation: 2026 FCA 126 CORAM: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. [NAME]. BETWEEN: [NAME] Appellant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE Respondents Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on June 22, 2026. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on July 7, 2026.

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT BY: [NAME]. CONCURRED IN BY: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. Date: 20260707 Docket: A-280-24 Citation: 2026 FCA 126 CORAM: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. [NAME]. BETWEEN: [NAME] Appellant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE Respondents

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT [NAME].

I. Overview [ 1 ] This is an appeal of a decision of the Federal Court dated July 16, 2024 ( [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 FC 1115, per Fuhrer J.), which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (Commission) to screen out a retaliation claim filed by the appellant, [NAME], against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ([NAME] or force). In essence, the Federal Court rejected [NAME]’s argument that the screening process was procedurally unfair and that the human rights officer responsible for investigating her claim lacked impartiality. [ADDRESS] also did not accept [NAME]’s claim that the Commission’s decision was unreasonable. [ 2 ] Having carefully considered the arguments, I am not persuaded by [NAME]’s assertions of irregularity in either the Commission’s screening decision or the Federal Court’s determination.

Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal.

II. Background [ 3 ] [NAME] retired from the [NAME] in March 2016 after a career spanning 30 years serving as an officer. In September 2017, she was stopped by an [NAME] officer during a roadside traffic stop, which resulted in tickets for three traffic violations that [NAME] eventually contested in provincial court. During the traffic stop, [NAME] disclosed to the officer that she was a former [NAME] officer herself. However, the officer did not believe her and prepared a Report to Crown counsel (RCC) summarizing the events from the traffic stop in support of a potential charge of personating a peace officer under section 130 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. [ 4 ] Eventually, the officer’s detachment commander decided that the charge would not be pursued, however the events that followed the traffic stop culminated in [NAME] filing a Complaint with the Commission in July 2019 (retaliation complaint), alleging that the [NAME] forwarded the RCC—prepared in October 2017—to Crown counsel in December 2018 with the intention of pursuing criminal charges against her as retaliation for [NAME] having filed a human rights complaint against the [NAME] officer following the traffic stop in September 2018, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and sex (discrimination complaint). Section 14.1 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 ( Act ) provides that it is a discriminatory practice for a person against whom a complaint has been filed to retaliate against the individual who filed the complaint. [ 5 ] The [NAME] informed the human rights officer (HRO) investigating [NAME]’s retaliation complaint that, although it was aware of the discrimination complaint when it forwarded the RCC to Crown counsel in December 2018, it did so at Crown counsel’s request. The [NAME] clarified that the purpose for doing so was not to pursue criminal charges against [NAME], but rather because the RCC contained information relevant to her traffic violations which the Crown was defending at that time—along with various Charter arguments raised by [NAME]—and that it was standard operating practice for the force to disclose all investigative materials associated with the matter to Crown counsel. Specifically, their operational disclosure policy (disclosure policy) requires them to share all relevant information in their possession for prosecution purposes, including details concerning the traffic violations contained in the RCC. Additionally, the [NAME] noted that it initially sent the RCC to Crown counsel in October 2018, prior to becoming aware of [NAME]’s discrimination complaint in November 2018, as part of its obligation to disclose information related to the traffic offenses. [ 6 ] The traffic tickets were eventually withdrawn during the provincial court hearing in February 2019 and no criminal charge for personation was ever laid against [NAME]. [ 7 ] Based on her investigation, the HRO concluded that the [NAME]’s explanation for disclosing the RCC to Crown counsel was reasonable, rational, consistent, credible, and non-discriminatory. She ultimately prepared a report recommending that the Commission dismiss [NAME]’s retaliation complaint. The Commission shared this report with the parties and invited their comments. While the [NAME] agreed with the recommendation to dismiss, [NAME] opposed it. In a ten-page written submission to the Commission, she responded to the HRO’s report, alleged bias on the part of the HRO and asserted that her allegations and relevant evidence had been disregarded. [ 8 ] In August 2022, following its review of the complaint, the HRO’s report and the parties’ responding submissions, and pursuant to subparagraph 44(3)(b)(i) of the Act , the Commission dismissed [NAME]’s retaliation complaint, concluding that, considering all the circumstances, no further inquiry was warranted (the Commission’s decision). The Commission adopted the reasoning of the HRO regarding the [NAME]’s explanation for forwarding the RCC to Crown counsel and found [NAME]’s claim of bias against the HRO to be without merit. [ 9 ] Before the Federal Court, [NAME] challenged the procedural fairness of the Commission’s decision, renewing her claim of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the HRO; she also argued that the Commission’s decision was unreasonable. The Federal Court did not accept [NAME]’s arguments and dismissed her application for judicial review. [NAME] now appeals to this Court, seeking to set aside the Federal Court’s decision and requesting an Order directing the Commission to refer her retaliation complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal (Tribunal).

III. Analysis [ 10 ] As explained to [NAME] at the hearing of this appeal, the role of this Court is not to substitute its own decision for that of the Commission. Rather, it determines whether the Federal Court correctly identified the appropriate standard of review and applied it properly: [NAME] v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) , 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 at paras. 45, 47. [ADDRESS] steps into the shoes of the Federal Court and gives the judgment the Federal Court should have reached on judicial review. Where the Federal Court has thoroughly addressed all the arguments raised, [NAME] carries a significant tactical burden to demonstrate that the Federal Court’s reasoning is flawed: [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2026 FCA 45 at para. 3; [COMPANY] of [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2021 FCA 189 at para. 4, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 39899 (7 April 2022); Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian Civil Liberties Association , 2026 FCA 6 at paras. 154, 161. [ 11 ] Before this Court, [NAME] claims that the Federal Court did not apply the appropriate standard of review, that the process followed by the Commission to reach its decision was unfair, that the Commission’s decision was unreasonable and that the Federal Court lacked impartiality. [ 12 ] First, I cannot agree with [NAME] that the Federal Court applied the wrong standard of review. Referencing this Court’s decision in Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 ( [NAME] ), the Federal Court reviewed the issues of procedural fairness raised by [NAME] on a standard akin to correctness: it determined whether the procedure was fair, having regard to all of the circumstances and whether, ultimately, [NAME] was aware of the case she needed to meet and had a full and fair chance to respond: [NAME] at paras. 54, 56; [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2026 FCA 39 at para 7. Regarding the issue of a reasonable apprehension of bias, the Federal Court applied the reasonable and informed person test set out in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area No 23 v. Yukon Territory (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 ( Yukon Territory ). On the merits, the Federal Court applied the reasonableness standard to the Commission’s decision, consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.  [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 ( [NAME] ) at para. 100; Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364 at para 53.

Accordingly, I would adopt the Federal Court’s reasons with regards to the selection of the standards of review. [ 13 ] On the issue of procedural fairness, citing this Court’s decision in Canada (Minister of Environment Canada) v. [NAME] , 2003 FCA 133 ( [NAME] ), the Federal Court rejected [NAME]’s argument that the Commission’s decision was procedurally unfair because the disclosure policy relied upon by the HRO in preparing her report had not been provided to her beforehand. [ADDRESS] concluded that [NAME] was aware of the case she needed to meet when she received a copy of the HRO’s report from the Commission and was given an opportunity to respond before the Commission dismissed her retaliation complaint: [NAME] at paras 47–50. Additionally, the Federal Court found no procedural unfairness in [NAME] not being provided with the HRO’s exchanges with the [NAME], in which the HRO asked further questions regarding the disclosure of the RCC to [NAME]. The Federal Court reasoned that the right to know the case [NAME] had to meet and respond to arose in relation to the material before the Commission—in this case the HRO’s report and the comments of the parties—and not with respect to investigative material that passed through the HRO’s hands in the course of her investigation: [NAME] at para.

49. For the reasons expressed by the Federal Court, I am satisfied that the Commission’s decision was procedurally fair. [ 14 ] As previously stated, the key issue concerning procedural fairness is whether [NAME] was aware of the case she needed to meet and was provided with a full and fair opportunity to respond. When reviewing a screening decision made by the Commission, this Court will only intervene where it finds fundamental investigative flaws which cannot be remedied through the parties’ additional submissions: [NAME] v. [COMPANY] ., 2015 FCA 173 at para.

79. In this case, I do not find any such flaws in relation to the issues raised by [NAME]. [ 15 ] [NAME] also highlights several issues that she argues suggest a lack of thoroughness in the preparation of the report, which she claims give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the HRO. Specifically, she contends that the HRO (1) did not interview all the witnesses she suggested, (2) conducted her interview in a closed-minded manner that appeared to reflect a predetermined outcome before completing her investigation, (3) misrepresented her complaint to the Commission, and (4) failed to consider whether the disclosure policy itself was justified, beyond merely assessing whether the [NAME]’s explanation for disclosing the RCC was reasonable. [ 16 ] The Federal Court concluded that the HRO was not required to interview all the witnesses suggested by [NAME] because, aside from [NAME] herself, these witnesses did not have direct knowledge of the alleged retaliation. Additionally, the Court found that although [NAME] might have preferred different questions to be asked during the interview, the HRO was afforded broad discretion in how she conducted her investigation. I would agree with the Federal Court’s determination that the way the HRO conducted her investigation did not give rise to procedural unfairness. I am therefore not persuaded by [NAME]’s arguments that these conclusions by the Federal Court constitute reviewable error. Furthermore, I do not accept that the Commission demonstrated bias by preferring the conclusions drawn by the HRO over [NAME]’s submissions responding to the HRO’s report. [NAME] may suspect bias, suspicion alone is insufficient; a genuine likelihood or probability of bias must be demonstrated and the threshold for establishing actual or perceived bias is high: Yukon Territory at paras. 20, 26. I must agree with the Federal Court that [NAME]’s concerns do not meet this high standard. [ 17 ] The Federal Court also determined that the HRO’s alleged mischaracterization of [NAME]’s complaint—that [NAME] claimed she was charged with personating a police officer when she was never so charged—was of no moment when considered in the context of [NAME]’s retaliation complaint and the HRO’s report. However, before this Court, [NAME] claimed the HRO’s mischaracterization related, rather, to the [NAME]’s true intention in disclosing the RCC to Crown counsel—seeking to have [NAME] charged with a criminal offence when in fact, it was to misrepresent her as a criminal in the eyes of the judge hearing the traffic violations case. [ 18 ] In reviewing the retaliation complaint and the HRO’s report, I find there is support for both versions of what may have been the [NAME]’s intention, if any. I appreciate [NAME]’s underscoring of passages in the report which tend to support her version of what the intent of the [NAME] may have been. However, in her retaliation complaint, [NAME] states that the [NAME] “took action to charge her with a criminal code offence” , and that she “was shocked when she learned of the [NAME] officer’s (malicious) attempt to criminally charge [her] in his police report sent to [the] Crown.” I can therefore not agree with [NAME]’s assertion that the HRO mischaracterized the [NAME]’s alleged intent in forwarding the RCC to Crown counsel. In any event, whatever the intent may have been, it was not relevant to the nature of the complaint being investigated by the Commission. The HRO’s enquiry focused on whether the [NAME] retaliated against [NAME] for filing an earlier human rights complaint by forwarding the RCC to Crown counsel. The HRO concluded that the [NAME] provided a reasonable explanation for why the disclosure of the RCC was necessary. [ 19 ] [NAME]’s claim that the HRO failed to consider whether the disclosure policy itself was justified, I find that the HRO did not circumvent the Commission’s procedural guidelines outlined in its Information Sheet on Preparing a Defence in a Human Rights Complaint . I cannot agree with [NAME]’s argument that the HRO improperly characterized the application of the disclosure policy as a reasonable explanation defence rather than as a defence requiring the [NAME] to prove a bona fide justification. The [NAME] offered up the application of its disclosure policy as a reasonable, non-retaliatory explanation for its act of forwarding the RCC to the Crown, not as a justification for conduct that it accepts would otherwise violate her rights under the Act . I agree with the Federal Court that once the Commission was satisfied that the [NAME] had a reasonable explanation for providing the RCC to Crown counsel, it was unnecessary for the HRO to determine whether the disclosure policy itself constituted a bona fide justification, as argues [NAME]. The record is consistent that at no time did the [NAME] argue that it had a bona fide justification for allegedly breaching [NAME]’s human rights by retaliating against her. Rather, the [NAME]’s position remained that no retaliation occurred, and therefore, her human rights were never violated. [ 20 ] The Federal Court concluded that the Commission’s investigation was sufficiently thorough and that [NAME]’s claims of bias against the HRO were speculative and not adequately supported by evidence. [ADDRESS] noted that intervention is warranted only in cases of significant investigative flaws that cannot be remedied through submissions ( [NAME] v. [COMPANY]. , 2015 FCA 173 at para. 79). I have not been convinced of any reviewable error in the Commission’s determination, nor that the Federal Court did not properly apply the standards of review in its findings. [ 21 ] [NAME]’s argument that the Commission failed to provide reasons for adopting the HRO’s report, I agree with the Federal Court that it is inherent in the Commission’s decision to adopt the report that it concurred with the HRO’s recommendations and that it was not persuaded to depart from them by [NAME]’s response. [ 22 ] [NAME] also claims that the Federal Court erred in finding the Commission’s decision reasonable. She contends that the HRO ignored relevant evidence and that the [NAME]’s explanation—that the RCC was sent to Crown counsel to prosecute traffic tickets in provincial court—is illogical as there was no legitimate purpose for the RCC to have been sent to Crown counsel other than to retaliate against her for filing the discrimination complaint in September 2018. [NAME] argues that the RCC was entirely irrelevant and unnecessary for pursuing the traffic violation charges against her as it contained no information relevant to those violations. She adds that the RCC was highly prejudicial because it related to a criminal charge of personating a police officer which unfairly portrayed her as being dishonest. Additionally, adds [NAME], the RCC gave the wrong impression, suggesting that she was charged with personation, and was being used for a purpose other than the original intent for which the RCC was prepared. [ 23 ] In her report, the HRO found that the RCC contained information relevant to the traffic violations. In her response to the report, [NAME] referenced the RCC several times, asserting that the RCC was not relevant to the prosecution of the traffic violations because it pertained to a criminal charge. However, at no time did [NAME] claim that the RCC lacked any information related to the traffic violations. [NAME] did not file the complete RCC in her application record, I find that she has failed to satisfy her burden to show that the HRO unreasonably concluded that it contained information relevant to the traffic violations ( [NAME] at para. 100). [ 24 ] Before the Court, I understand [NAME] to have also argued, although not clearly, that even if the RCC contained some information relevant to the traffic violations, its disclosure to Crown counsel was inappropriate and beyond the pale. She contends that the [NAME] knew at the time that the evidence did not support the criminal charges for which the RCC was prepared and that the RCC itself was false, prejudicial, and defamatory. [NAME] appeared to suggest that the Commission fundamentally misapprehended the evidence before it and therefore could not have reasonably concluded that her complaint should not be referred for further investigation by the Tribunal. [ 25 ] I do not agree with [NAME]. The RCC may have been flawed, as [NAME] contends. However, the HRO nevertheless found that the [NAME] had provided a reasonable, non-retaliatory explanation for forwarding the RCC to Crown counsel based on the evidence before her, including that the RCC contained information relevant to the traffic stop and disputed traffic violation tickets, that it was first forwarded to Crown counsel before the [NAME] knew about the discrimination complaint and that it was ultimately disclosed to her by Crown counsel, not the [NAME]. It was open to the Commission, after considering [NAME]’s detailed rebuttal of the HRO’s account of the evidence, to prefer that account and to adopt the HRO’s conclusion that further inquiry into [NAME]’s complaint was not warranted because the [NAME] had provided a reasonable, rational, consistent, credible and non-retaliatory explanation for its actions. That decision warrants a high degree of deference: [NAME] v. [COMPANY] of Canada , 2023 FCA 208 at paras. 30–31 . [ 26 ] I find that [NAME] is essentially asking this Court to reweigh and reassess the evidence considered by the HRO and before the Commission; this we cannot do: [NAME] at para. 125. In the end, the Commission had before it the recommendations of the HRO in the report, as well as the responses of the parties, on which it based its decision not to refer [NAME]’s complaint to the Tribunal. It is not this Court’s role to decide whether we would have reached the same conclusions as those reached by the HRO and the Commission on this matter. Instead, the Court’s task is to determine whether those conclusions and the reasons that support them, read in light of the record, demonstrate a failure of rationality in their reasoning or produce an outcome that is untenable given the relevant factual and legal constraints: Canada (Attorney General) v. Federal Government Dockyards, Trades and Labour Council , 2026 FCA 105 at para. 36; [NAME] at para. 101. Decisions made by the Commission in screening complaints are accorded considerable deference, as they are heavily fact-dependent and involve a significant degree of discretion grounded in the Commission’s expertise in its gatekeeping role: Canada (Attorney General) v. [NAME] , 2021 FCA 95, [2021] 4 F.C.R. 154 at para.

56. Here, I find nothing unreasonable about the Commission’s decision to dismiss [NAME]’s retaliation complaint considering the material before it and the applicable law. [ 27 ] Finally, [NAME] argues that the Federal Court judge demonstrated unfairness by being closed-minded to her submissions and by failing to adequately consider her arguments concerning the procedural fairness of the Commission’s process and the transparency of the HRO’s handling of the disclosure policy. I would dismiss this claim because [NAME] has provided nothing more than mere speculation to substantiate it. [ 28 ] Overall, based on the material before the Court and the reasons expressed by the Federal Court, I am satisfied that there is no basis to interfere with the Commission’s decision.

Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal, awarding costs in the amount of $1,000 in favour of the Attorney General of Canada. "[NAME]" J.A. “I agree. [NAME] J.A.” “I agree. [NAME] J.A.” FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-280-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, AND ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: June 22, 2026

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT BY: [NAME]. CONCURRED IN BY: [NAME] J.A. [NAME] J.A. DATED: JULY 7, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Appellant ON HER [NAME] SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] of Canada [NAME]