Tax Court Grants Relief from Implied Undertaking Rule

Docket: 2025-1546(IT)G BETWEEN: [NAME_1] and all persons listed in schedule A attached hereto, Appellant, and HIS [NAME_2] THE [NAME_2], Respondent , and HIS [NAME_2] THE [NAME_2] in his capacity as the respondent in the matter of [NAME_3] and His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2], Court file 2023-2276 [NAME_2]), [NAME_4]. Motion submitted on January 21, 2026 at Ottawa, Ontario Before: The [NAME_5] U. [NAME_5] submissions by : Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted] Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] Counsel for the [NAME_4]: [NAME_8]

ORDER For the purposes of the appellant’s motion set for hearing on February 10, 2026 to designate the appeal of [NAME_3] v His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2], 2023-2276 as a lead case for the [NAME_2] herein , the Respondent is relieved from compliance with the implied undertaking rule that attaches to documentary and oral discovery evidence obtained by it in the [NAME_3] proceeding; Signed at this 30 th day of January 2026. “[NAME_5]” [NAME_5] J. Citation: 2026 [NAME_9] 21 Date:20260130 Docket: 2025-1546(IT)G BETWEEN: [NAME_1] and all persons listed in schedule A attached hereto, Appellant, and HIS [NAME_2] THE [NAME_2], Respondent, and HIS [NAME_2] THE [NAME_2] in his capacity as the respondent in the matter of [NAME_3] and His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2], Court file 2023-2276 [NAME_2]), [NAME_4]. AMENDED

REASONS FOR

ORDER [NAME_5] J. [ 1 ] The reasons below are issued following my Order of January 28, 2026 as amended on January 29, 2026. That Order dismissed the [NAME_4]’s request to be a party to the [NAME_2]’ motion set for hearing on February 10, 2026 to designate the appeal of [NAME_3] v His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2], 2023-2276 as a lead case for the [NAME_2] herein which, Order indicated that reasons were to follow. That Order also extended time for the [NAME_2] to respond to the [NAME_4]’s request for alternate relief that it be relieved from compliance with the implied undertaking rule in respect of the [NAME_3] proceeding. [ 2 ] The [NAME_2] herein (the [NAME_2] and the [NAME_10] as the context requires) are all subject to a Case Management Order issued by St-Hilaire CJ on November 16 th , 2025 (the CM Order). [ 3 ] Counsel for the [NAME_2] has filed a motion on their behalf (the “Motion” ) which would designate the case of [NAME_3] v His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2], 2023-2276 as a lead case in respect of the [NAME_2]. Counsel for [NAME_3] is the same counsel as counsel for the [NAME_2]. [ 4 ] The [NAME_3] appeal is not one of the [NAME_10] because it is not subject to the CM Order. [NAME_3] is an appeal that was filed some two years before any of the [NAME_10] were filed. It was set down for [NAME_11] commencing in April 2026. [ 5 ] The respondent in the [NAME_10] opposes the Motion. [ 6 ] The [NAME_3], by letter dated December 19, 2025, asked to participate in the Motion and to have the right to make submissions. [ 7 ] The respondent in [NAME_2] asked that [NAME_3] be added to the style of cause in the [NAME_2] motion. The [NAME_2] opposed this request. The Timetable Order and Responses Received [ 8 ] I issued an Order on January 7, 2026, setting out deadlines for the filing of the [NAME_2] and specifying that [NAME_3] would be added to the style of cause for the [NAME_2] as the “[NAME_4]” . At that point in time, the [NAME_2] had not yet been filed so the January 7, 2026 Order invited [NAME_3] to file and serve brief further submissions on the law that it says governs their request to participate in the [NAME_2]. [NAME_2] was granted until January 26, 2026, to respond to that supplemental submission. [ 9 ] The January 7 Order included a provision requiring that it be provided by this Court to counsel of record for both the appellant and respondent in the [NAME_3] appeal. [ 10 ] On January 15, 2026, the [NAME_2] was filed, but without all the supporting material. An amended motion including all material was filed on January 20, 2026. [ 11 ] On January 21, 2026, [NAME_3] filed a formal motion in writing to participate in the [NAME_2] as a party (the “Motion to Participate” ). As alternative relief, [NAME_3] asked to be relieved from the implied undertaking rule that otherwise limits its ability to adduce discovery documents and related evidence from the [NAME_3] discoveries. [NAME_3] was named as a responding party. [ 12 ] Counsel for [NAME_2] responded on January 26, 2026, expressing concerns about the timelines for motions in writing and describing the Motion to Participate as abusive writing suggesting that: “[ADDRESS] should not countenance such abusive tactics which clearly serve no purpose other than to frustrate the ends of justice and add unnecessary complexity and expense to this matter.” [ 13 ] [ADDRESS]’s process is adversarial, and it is understandable that from time-to-time counsel faced with unexpected motions or filings from an adverse party will be frustrated and will reflect those frustrations in their correspondence with this Court. However, it is important to remember that submissions to this Court are not intended to be cathartic. They are supposed to assist the Court by helping the Court to understand the facts, the law and the positions of the parties. The [NAME_2] submission does none of that. It does not address issues of prejudice, problems with evidence or any other matters that either militate in favour of summarily rejecting the Motion to Participate or otherwise relieving against problems created by the Motion to Participate. It was also entirely silent on the request in the Motion to Participate for relief from the implied undertaking rule. [ 14 ] The Motion to Participate from [NAME_3] does go beyond the supplemental formal submissions invited in the January 7 Order. It changes the request from mere participation to party status and includes the aforementioned alternate request to be relieved from compliance with the implied undertaking rule in the [NAME_3] appeal. However, it does not include any evidence which would require time to address. I am therefore satisfied that the Motion to Participate should be accepted and considered in adjudicating the status of the [NAME_3] in the upcoming [NAME_2]. [ 15 ] With respect to the time frame for further responses, the January 7, Order provided until January 26 for [NAME_2]’s response to the [NAME_4]’s submissions. I have had to therefore consider whether the appellant should be granted more time to respond to the issues raised in Motion to Participate. In my Order of January 28, 2026 as amended on January 29 th , I granted the [NAME_12] until noon on January 30 th to briefly reply only to the implied undertaking issue. Here is why: The relatively short timelines in my January 7 Order were based on my view of the time that the parties might reasonably need to address various issues having regard to the overall time frames of the [NAME_2] and the upcoming [NAME_3] [NAME_11].The [NAME_2] response of January 26 simply assumed that they had the full 20 days set out in Rule 69 to respond.That is not the case.My January 7 Order set out the time to respond.If [NAME_2] wanted more time to respond they needed to ask for it in the January 26, 2026 letter; The request for party status by the [NAME_4] was being denied in the January 28 th Order so there was no need to receive further detailed submissions on that point from [NAME_2]; and However, I did have a concern that it might be unfair to the [NAME_2] for me to decide the implied undertaking issue if they had been under the impression that they had the full 20 days in Rule 69 to provide a response to that issue.In my opinion I needed to grant at least some additional time for the [NAME_2] to provide a response.There was no evidence adduced by the [NAME_4] and the issue was relatively straightforward.That is why I provided a short additional window of time for the [NAME_12] to make a brief submission on the issue. The Decision [ 16 ] For the reasons that follow, I decline to permit the [NAME_4] to participate in the [NAME_2] as a “party” . More specifically, the [NAME_13] should appear in the [NAME_2] in its capacity as counsel for the [NAME_13] and not in any other capacity. [ 17 ] For the purposes of the [NAME_2] only, the Respondent is relieved from compliance with the implied undertaking rule that attaches to documentary and oral discovery evidence obtained from the appellant in the [NAME_3] proceeding. The Nature of the request by [NAME_3] [ 18 ] The [NAME_3] and [NAME_2] Respondents are one and the same person, His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2]. The Department of Justice is counsel for His [NAME_2] the [NAME_2] in both cases. Further, there is no reason in principle why the lawyers acting as respondent’s counsel in [NAME_3] cannot act also appear as counsel to the [NAME_13] on the Motion. So, what exactly is it that the [NAME_4] wants to do? [ 19 ] I think that the real issue raised by the [NAME_4] is this: Can Crown counsel on the [NAME_2] motion, whoever those individuals may be, obtain leave to make submissions as counsel for the [NAME_3] and not just as counsel for the [NAME_13]? [ 20 ] The reference to [NAME_3] as a Party is also invoked in respect of a possible appeal the decision in the [NAME_2], but again I’m not sure that is really what is at stake. If the [NAME_13], who, again, is also [NAME_3], is not satisfied with the outcome of the [NAME_2], they will have the right to appeal. The question is whether they will appeal only in their capacity as the [NAME_13] or also as to [NAME_3]. [ 21 ] The [NAME_4]’s submissions appear to track this formulation of the problem. The submissions state in part: [16] Though the Respondent has the right to participate in the motion in his capacity as the Respondent in the other appeals, his participation is restricted as described below, and he has no right to appeal the order the Court will issue in his capacity as Respondent in the [NAME_3] Appeal. To challenge the Court’s Order as it relates to the [NAME_3] Appeal the Respondent must file an appeal with the Federal Court of Appeal in his capacity as the Respondent in that appeal, rather than in his capacity as the Respondent in the twenty-one other appeals… [ 22 ] The basic reasons given by the [NAME_4] for seeking standing as a party are these: [NAME_3] has an interest in whether that appeal is designated as a lead case.If it is so designated, additional pre-[NAME_11] steps will be required in [NAME_3], the cost of the case may rise, the [NAME_11] may be longer, and the cost consequences of losing may be greater.A party who may be affected by an order is entitled to as a matter of procedural fairness to participate in the hearing of the proceeding that may lead to that order; and [NAME_3] is in the best position to provide information and evidence needed to determine whether the [NAME_3] case should be a lead case.The participation by [NAME_3] is also consistent with the collaborative nature of the lead case process; The Rules [ 23 ] There is no exact provision in the Tax Court of Canada Rules [1] (the Rules) that govern this request. However, subrule 4(2) provides that where a matter is not provided for in the Rules, the practice is to be determined by the Court. [NAME_3] also reminds me that this Court has the inherent jurisdiction to control its process. [ 24 ] I have also considered Rule 28 which governs interventions, as relevant to the matter in issue. It is also convenient to consider intervention rule in the Federal Court Rules, [2] again as a guide. The text of the two rules is set out below: TAX COURT RULE FEDERAL COURTS RULES 28 (1) Where it is claimed by a person who is not a party to a proceeding (a) that such person has an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding, (b) that such person may be adversely affected by a judgment in the proceeding, or (c) that there exists between such person and any one or more parties to the proceeding a question of law or fact or mixed law and fact in common with one or more of the questions in issue in the proceeding, such person may move for leave to intervene. 28(2) On the motion, the Court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the determination of the rights of the parties to the proceeding, and the Court may, (a) allow the person to intervene as a friend of the Court and without being a party to the proceeding, for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Court by way of evidence or argument, and (b) give such direction for pleadings, discovery or costs as is just. 109 (1) [ADDRESS] may, on motion, grant leave to any person to intervene in a proceeding. (2) Notice of a motion under subsection (1) shall (a) set out the full name and address of the [NAME_4] intervener and of any solicitor acting for the [NAME_4] intervener; and (b) describe how the [NAME_4] intervener wishes to participate in the proceeding and how that participation will assist the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding. (3) In granting a motion under subsection (1), the Court shall give directions regarding (a) the service of documents; and (b) the role of the intervener, including costs, rights of appeal and any other matters relating to the procedure to be followed by the intervener. Procedural Considerations and the Right to be Heard [ 25 ] The right to be heard and to receive notice is a cornerstone of any fair process. In this case, the [NAME_4] invokes those rights because it asserts that it will be affected by a decision to make [NAME_3] a lead case. The notice requirement is invoked by the [NAME_4] in respect of [NAME_3] but as my January 7, Order was to be provided to him and he did not request to participate, I see no notice issue here and certainly not one that the [NAME_4] can invoke in the name of [NAME_3]. [ 26 ] The [NAME_4] relies on two Supreme Court cases regarding the right to be heard, [NAME_14]) . [ 27 ] I don’t think that the TWU [3] decision assists the [NAME_4]. The [NAME_14] in that case complained that it was not given notice of certain CRTC proceedings that led to a decision being issued. The Supreme Court held that the union’s interest was only indirect such that principles of natural justice and procedural fairness did not require that the union be provided with an opportunity to be heard. The case seems to suggest that not every conceivable interest entails a right to be heard. Further, and as I discuss below, the [NAME_2] will entail consideration of the extent to which the Respondent’s interests in [NAME_3] are engaged by the [NAME_2] and so I don’t propose to assume the truth of assertions about the extent of those interests at this time. [ 28 ] The [NAME_14]) case was procedurally complex. Two health care facilities had been subpoenaed to provide the complainant’s counselling records to the defendant in an indecent assault prosecution. The facilities were also named in a motion requiring early production of the same. The motion for early production was granted. [4] [ADDRESS] of Appeal quashed the appeal of the facility on the basis that neither parties nor third parties could appeal interlocutory evidentiary decisions prior to the end of [NAME_11]. The Supreme Court held that the proper appeal route for the complainant and third parties was directly to the Supreme Court, with leave. It also held that while the Crown, though precluded from an interlocutory appeal of its own, as well as the complainant, had the right to participate in the appeal based on the natural justice and procedural fairness because they would be affected by the decision. [ 29 ] I don’t find [NAME_14]) helpful for two reasons. The Supreme Court held that the Crown would be affected by the decision.However, in the [NAME_2], the question of whether [NAME_3] will be affected is one of the key issues that need to be determined.As I have already indicated, I am not prepared to assume the truth of the very issue that I may have to decide as part of the [NAME_2], in order to adjudicate the question of who gets to participate.I might feel differently if the participation of [NAME_3] was the only way to canvass the impact of granting the [NAME_2] on [NAME_3].This leads to my second point of departure from [NAME_14]) ; Even if the [NAME_13] does not advocate as [NAME_3], there is obviously a convergence of interests between the Respondent in its capacity as [NAME_3] and as the [NAME_13].This distinguishes [NAME_3]’s position from that of the [NAME_14]) .The [NAME_14]) would have had no voice in an appeal that was to determine the admissibility of evidence in the very case that the Crown would then have to litigate.Likewise, the complainant in that case would have no voice in the potential use of her most personal treatment records.Granting standing to the Crown and the complainant in that case was the only way to ensure that their interests would be protected in the appeal. [ 30 ] The question of whether the interests of [NAME_3] are sufficiently protected by the [NAME_13] invites a consideration of the question from the point of view of an intervention and in particular the factors that have guided requests for intervention. Participation as akin to an intervention [ 31 ] [ADDRESS] has on occasion considered the scope of Rule 28. In [NAME_15] , leave to intervene was granted to an industry association whose members might be impacted by a decision on the GST status of collection agency services. The intervenor had a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal that is members might be adversely affected by the decision of the Tax Court. [ADDRESS] distinguished cases like Tioxide Canada [5] where the application to intervene, made to the Federal Court of Appeal, was animated by the intervenor’s own tax assessments which would be affected by the final outcome of the litigation. This “jurisprudential” interest in the case was held insufficient to ground an application to intervene. [ 32 ] In applying Rule 28(2), this Court in [NAME_15] found that the [NAME_4] intervention would not unduly delay or prejudice the hearing of the appeal and that hearing the intervenor’s point of view could be helpful to the Court. [ 33 ] I also find it useful to also consider the case law of the Federal Court applying its rule on interventions. Federal Court [ 34 ] The Federal Courts Rule is broader than that of this Court in that the intervener is not limited to being a “friend of the Court” . [ADDRESS] in granting an intervention motion can set out the role of the intervener. The intervener must explain how they propose to intervene and how that intervention will “assist” the Federal Courts. [ 35 ] In applying its Rule 109, the Federal Court of Appeal set out in [NAME_16] , [6] factors that can be considered, namely: A. Whether the [NAME_4] intervener directly affected by the outcome; B. Is there a justiciable issue and a veritable public interest; C. Is there an absence of any other reasonable or efficient means to submit the question to the Court; D. Is the position of the intervener adequately defended by one of the parties to the case; E. Are the interests of justice better served by the intervention of the [NAME_4] third party; and F. Can the court decide the case on its merits without the [NAME_4] intervener [ 36 ] In [NAME_18] ([NAME_18]), the [NAME_19] Co. had appealed to the Federal Court contesting a decision of the [NAME_20] to strike [NAME_19]’s trade-[NAME_21]. [NAME_19] had named [NAME_22], a [NAME_18] competitor as an additional respondent but had chosen not to also name [NAME_18] as a respondent even though [NAME_19] had by that point filed separate trade-[NAME_21] infringement claims against both [NAME_22] and [NAME_18]. [NAME_19] then settled with [NAME_22] leaving it with a free hand to continue its appeal against the Registrar. [NAME_18], did not want the application against the Registrar to be unopposed in this way and sought to intervene. Their application was rejected by a Federal Court Prothonotary, who was concerned that [NAME_18] wanted to effectively substitute itself for [NAME_22]. The Prothonotary also considered other factors such as public interest along with certain factual allegations [7] in the [NAME_18] [NAME_19] litigation that might operate against [NAME_18] in that case. The Federal Court judge while not wholly in agreement with the Prothonotary’s reasoning upheld the decision, noting that the appellant had its own litigation with [NAME_19] where it could advance many of its arguments. [ 37 ] The Federal Court of Appeal in upholding that decision wrote that the [NAME_17] factors are not intended to be exhaustive and it is up to the court in a given case to ascribe the weight that it wishes to the individual factors. [ADDRESS] held that: “in the end, we must decide if, in a given case, the interests of justice require that we grant or refuse intervention”/ [8] [ 38 ] The FCA in applying the factors agreed that the appellant was effectively substituting itself as a respondent in the case. [9] It then went on to consider other factors, especially the public interest factors in trade-[NAME_21] litigation, and the existence of other litigation, in upholding the decisions below. [ 39 ] In Alliance for Equality of [NAME_23] , [10] the Federal Court of Appeal held that no [NAME_17] factor is in and of itself determinative of the question. The factors may in some cases need to be supplemented or in some instances they may be of no relevance. The intervention must, however, assist the determination of a legal or factual issue and it must further the interests of justice. Application of the law to this [NAME_4]’s Motion [ 40 ] I start by considering whether the [NAME_4] is acting based on a “jurisprudential interest” in the [NAME_10]. This was a concern raised in [NAME_15] . I think that it was also a concern in [NAME_18] . The reality is that the [NAME_4]’s Motion effectively acknowledges that its interest in [NAME_2] stems from its jurisprudential interest in [NAME_3]. This [NAME_4] is, however, distinguishable from [NAME_18] . In [NAME_18] , [NAME_18] was trying to enhance its position as a defendant in the [NAME_19] trademark infringement case by essentially having the central question of trademark validity decided in the appeal of the Registrar’s decision. The [NAME_4] here does not seek participation in the hopes of gaining an advantage in the [NAME_3] case but, rather is trying to preserve what they see as the status quo as it existed before the [NAME_2] [NAME_4] designating [NAME_3] as their lead case. [ 41 ] However, I also think that the [NAME_4] has difficulty in satisfying the other criteria of the [NAME_17] test. The following criteria from that test are, I think relevant to the issue before me and present real challenges for the [NAME_4]: A. Is there an absence of any other reasonable or efficient means to submit the question to the Court? B. Is the position of the intervener adequately defended by one of the parties to the case? C. Are the interests of justice better served by the intervention of the [NAME_4] third party? [ 42 ] Are there other reasonable or efficient means to raise issues that may be of interest to the [NAME_4]? Presumably some of the issues raised by the Motion are of a general nature and could apply whenever an appellant seeks to unilaterally bind the Crown to a lead case. However, I see no reason why only the [NAME_4] can canvas those issues. Those objections can just as easily be argued by the [NAME_13]. [ 43 ] It is also quite difficult for the [NAME_4] to convincingly argue that the [NAME_13] cannot adequately defend the [NAME_4]’s position. They are, after all one and the same person, the Crown. [ 44 ] We then consider whether the [NAME_4] may have arguments to make that rely on specific evidence arising in the [NAME_3] appeal. If that is the case, such evidence should generally be adduced in the usual way via affidavit or other documentary evidence rather than in the form of submissions from counsel table. Once such evidence is appropriately presented, the arguments that flow therefrom can as easily be made by [NAME_2]’s responding counsel as by the [NAME_4]. [ 45 ] The [NAME_17] factors also ask if the interests of justice are best served by the intervention of the third party. I am not satisfied that the interests of justice are best served by the [NAME_4]. If the [NAME_4] were added to the [NAME_2], I would also have to permit counsel for the [NAME_3] appellant to appear as well. Practically speaking, both [NAME_3] and the [NAME_2] have the same counsel, but I am troubled by the spectre of having before me appellant’s counsel who acts both for [NAME_3] and for the [NAME_2] as well as Respondent’s counsel who acts both for the [NAME_13] and [NAME_3]. That form of presentation would in my view unacceptably blur the line between the [NAME_2] cases and the [NAME_3] appeal before I even get a chance to decide if that line should be blurred by allowing [NAME_3] to serve as a [NAME_2] lead case. [ 46 ] I much prefer that all counsel in the [NAME_2] wear only one hat, i.e., the hat of counsel for the [NAME_2] and Respondent. Any submission that they may make relating to [NAME_3], even if the submissions allege prejudice in the [NAME_3] appeal that may arise by granting or not granting the [NAME_2], ought to be made and considered in the context of helping to decide whether [NAME_3] should be a [NAME_2] lead case. [ 47 ] Further, it is and must remain solely within the discretion of a judge deciding how the [NAME_3] appeal should proceed to also decide how, if at all, any decision that I might make in the [NAME_2] should be taken into account, in regards to the further conduct of [NAME_3]. [ 48 ] I am also of the view that the above is a full answer to concerns about a future costs order in [NAME_3]. The [NAME_3] will have a full opportunity to make submissions on costs in that case and the [NAME_11] judge will be able to take into account that the [NAME_3] appeal, if it becomes a lead, case, was so designated despite the opposition of the Respondent. The [NAME_3] [NAME_11] judge will be in the best position to decide how if at all the status of [NAME_3] as a lead case should affect any issue regarding costs in that appeal. [ 49 ] I conclude that the [NAME_4]’s request to be made a party to the [NAME_2] should be denied. The Respondent on the [NAME_2] is free to adduce evidence and make argument on the impact to the [NAME_3] litigation of designating [NAME_3] as a [NAME_2] lead case. That evidence and those submissions will, if relevant, be considered only in the context of deciding the Motion. Relief From Implied Undertaking [ 50 ] My finding that the [NAME_13] can represent the interests of the [NAME_4] is grounded on the idea that any supporting evidence can be adduced by the [NAME_13] in the usual way. However, the [NAME_4] notes that the implied undertaking rule could impede the use of such evidence at the Motion. [ 51 ] The implied undertaking rule provides that both documentary and oral information obtained on discovery is not to be used by the other party except for the purposes of that litigation unless or until the scope of that undertaking is varied by a court order or a situation of immediate and serious danger occurs. [11] The purpose of the undertaking is to protect privacy and the efficient conduct of civil litigation. [12] [ 52 ] Relief from the implied undertaking rule is available where the interests of justice outweigh any prejudice to the party who disclosed the evidence. [13] The prejudice to the party examined is virtually non-existent and leave will generally be granted where it is [NAME_4] to use of discovery materials from one action in another action with the same or similar parties/issues. [14] [ 53 ] The [NAME_2] in their January 30, 2026 submissions assert that evidence from the [NAME_3] discoveries would be irrelevant because the only issue to be determined under Rule 146.1 is whether the appeals gives rise to one or more common or related issues and that determination should be made based upon the pleadings. [ 54 ] It is premature to accept the appellant’s view of what constitutes relevance for the purpose of the Motion. In 4092325 Investments , this Court held that a decision under Rule 146.1, “must consider the broader interests of justice” . [15] I am not prepared to pre-judge the issue of relevance before hearing the respondent’s argument, on the “interests of justice” question. Further, the [NAME_2] point to no prejudice that may arise from waiving the rule particularly given what they assert are the similarities between [NAME_3] and the [NAME_10]. The [NAME_13] is relieved from the implied undertaking rule and is free to use documentary and oral discovery evidence obtained by the [NAME_3] in support of such arguments that it may wish to advance in response to the [NAME_2]. These Amended Reasons for Order are issued in substitution of the Reasons for Order dated January 30, 2026. Signed this 5 th day of February 2026. “[NAME_5]” [NAME_5] J. SCHEDULE “A” - “[NAME_2]” 1. 2025-1547(IT)G [NAME_25] 2. 2025-1548(IT)G [NAME_27] 3. 2025-1549(IT)G [NAME_31] 4. 2025-1550(IT)G [NAME_32] 5. 2025-1551(IT)G [NAME_35] 6. 2025-1552(IT)G [NAME_37] 7. 2025-1553(IT)G [NAME_39] 8. 2025-1554(IT)G [NAME_41] 9. 2025-1555(IT)G [NAME_44] 10. 2025-1557(IT)G [NAME_45] 11. 2025-1558(IT)G [NAME_48] 12. 2025-1559(IT)G [NAME_50] 13. 2025-1560(IT)G [NAME_51] 14. 2025-1561(IT)G [NAME_28] 15. 2025-1562(IT)G [NAME_54] 16. 2025-1826(IT)G [NAME_56] 17. 2025-1827(IT)G [NAME_58] 18. 2025-2028(IT)G [NAME_59] 19. 2025-2472(IT)G [NAME_61] 20. 2025-2655(IT)G [NAME_62]: 2026 [NAME_9] 21 COURT FILE NO.: 2025-1546(IT)G STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_1] PERSONS LISTED IN SCHEDULE A AND HIS [NAME_2] THE [NAME_2] OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: N/A

REASONS FOR

ORDER BY: The [NAME_5] U. [NAME_5] DATE OF

ORDER: January 30, 2026 WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY: Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted] Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] Counsel for the Intervenor: N/A COUNSEL OF RECORD: For the Appellant: [redacted] [NAME_6], [NAME_6]: [COMPANY_63] For the Respondent: [redacted] [1] Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) , SOR 90/688, as amended. [2] Federal Courts Rules , SOR 98-106, as amended. [3] Telecommunication Workers Union v Canada (CRTC) , [1995] 2 SCR 781, paras 29 to 31. [4] To simplify the presentation, I omit discussion of a Crown motion to quash the subpoenas that was also dismissed. [5] Tioxide Canada Inc. v R , [1994] Carswell Nat 1136 (FCA). [6] [NAME_17], Benson & Hedges Inc v Canada (AG) (1989), [1990] 1 FC 90. [7] Namely that [NAME_18]’s predecessors had signed agreements withdrawing opposition to [NAME_19]’s [NAME_4] trade-marks. [8] Ibid , Para 42. [9] Ibid , Para 46. [10] Alliance for Equality of [NAME_23] v Canada (AG) , 2022 FCA 131, paras 11-12. [11] [NAME_68] v [NAME_69] 2008 SCC 8, para 4. [12] Ibid para. 32. [13] Ibid . para 34. [14] Ibid . para 35. [15] [COMPANY_70] v R , 2018 [NAME_9] 228, para 25, Aff’d but without endorsement of the R. 146.1 reasons, 2019 FCA 225.