Tax Court Rejects Disability Tax Credit Appeal Due to Insufficient Evidence

Docket: 2025-3153(IT)I BETWEEN: [NAME], Appellant, and HIS [NAME], Respondent . Appeal heard on July 2, 2026, at Toronto, Ontario Before: The [NAME] : For the Appellant: [redacted] Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT In accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment; The appeal of the determination made under the Income Tax Act with respect to the Appellant’s eligibility for the Disability Tax Credit for the 2024 taxation year, is dismissed, without costs. Signed this 13 th day of July, 2026. “[NAME]” [NAME]. Citation: 2026 TCC 133 Date: 20260713 Docket: 2025-3153(IT)I BETWEEN: [NAME], Appellant, and HIS [NAME], Respondent.

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT [NAME]. [ 1 ] The issue in this case is the denial by the Minister of a credit for mental or physical impairment, also known as the disability tax credit and referred to in this judgment as the “DTC” , under section 118.3 of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Act” ) for the 2024 taxation year. [ 2 ] The Respondent accepts that the Appellant has a “severe and prolonged impairment” as contemplated by paragraph 118.3(1)(a) of the Act but denies the credit on two bases. First, the Minister takes the position that the impairment did not significantly restrict the individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living or more than one basic activity of daily living (where the cumulative effect of those restrictions is equivalent to having a marked restriction in the ability to perform a basic activity of daily living), as contemplated by paragraph 118.3(1)(a.1). The Minister takes the view that the Appellant did not receive any life-sustaining therapy and that therefore the assistance obtained and measures taken by the Appellant should not be taken into account in determining whether the Appellant would have satisfied this test had the assistance not been obtained and the measures not taken. [ 3 ] Second, the Minister takes the position that the certificate of a medical practitioner attesting to such restrictions, as required by paragraph 118.3(a.2) or (a.3) (as applicable), was not obtained nor filed with the Minister. [ 4 ] The sole witness at trial was the Appellant, whom I found to be credible and reliable.

I. Factual Background and Previous Judgment [ 5 ] This Appeal is very similar to an appeal brought by the Appellant for her 2022 taxation year, decided by this Court at 2024 TCC 106 (the “Previous Judgment” ). As noted by the trial judge in that case, the Appellant, a high [COMPANY] history teacher, was diagnosed with Multiple Chemical Sensitivity ( “MCS” ) a number of years ago, and as a result has a high degree of sensitivity to many triggers, including hand sanitizers, perfumes and colognes, deodorant, cosmetics, chemicals relating to dry cleaning, laundry products, sunscreen and many other commonly used products. Should the Appellant be exposed to a product or chemical that triggers her MCS, she may experience a range of reactions, depending on factors such as the nature of the chemical and its intensity, as well as the accumulation of chemicals over the day and the nature of the air on a particular day (e.g., whether there is smog). However, a potential reaction is one that is anaphylactic, which prevents her from breathing, speaking or walking until she can reach a space that is clear of any triggers. One example provided by the Appellant was exposure to spray-on deodorant used by a student in her classroom; the Appellant would have to run to the football field to escape the trigger, perhaps using an EpiPen to allow her to breathe just enough to reach the field. (I note that the Appellant testified that she did not use her EpiPen in 2024.) The Previous Judgment set out the Appellant’s condition and its effects upon her in detail, and indeed the trial proceeded on the basis that those findings of fact continued to be applicable in the 2024 taxation year. [ 6 ] In 2024 the Appellant did not teach in person. She taught an on-line course in the summer of 2024, did some marking for an adult education course and also did some tutoring on-line. She describes [NAME] as being “housebound” , as indoor public spaces such as stores, public transit and hospitals are dangerous to her. She is in the process of moving to a more rural area to enable her to spend more time outside. [ 7 ] She testified that there are no treatments or therapies that materially mitigate her MCS, and that the only effective means to address the risk of anaphylaxis is the avoidance of triggers. She testified that she runs multiple air purifiers in her house 85% of the time, but emphasized that their use does not prevent the onset of anaphylaxis and therefore does not mean that she is able to enter indoor public spaces freely. Rather, they allow her to live more comfortably in her home, particularly as other members of her family do enter indoor public spaces and can, effectively, carry chemicals into the home. She testified that sometimes just opening up a window can be more effective than an air purifier, depending on whether there are chemicals in the air on that day. She also used a [NAME] multiple times per week, which she finds physically beneficial and uses as a good general health practice, but again it does not mitigate her reactions to chemical triggers. There was no evidence as to the total amount of time per week that the Appellant used the [NAME]. [ 8 ] The Appellant testified that her MCS had taken a toll on her from a mental health perspective, but preferred not to provide testimony on this point as she felt, as a matter of principle that the physical aspects of her condition should “stand on their own” . [ 9 ] In the Previous Judgment, this Court held that the Appellant was not entitled to the DTC because she had not obtained the required medical certification. In that case, the Appellant had provided a Form T2201 - the Disability Tax Credit Certificate - for 2022 (the “2022 Certificate” ), but had only provided pages 1, 2, 15 and 16, along with letters from various medical practitioners. [ADDRESS] at paragraphs 24 to 28 stated that neither the 2022 Certificate nor the letters described or certified how the effects of the Appellant’s impairment were such that the Appellant’s ability to perform basic activities of daily living were markedly restricted. Whether the Appellant’s impairment resulted in marked restrictions in basic activities of daily living as contemplated by paragraph 118.3(1)(a.1) was not addressed. [ 10 ] In this case, the Appellant submitted a Form T2201 for 2024 (the “2024 Certificate” ) to the Minister. The first two pages, contained biographical information to be filled out by the applicant, were completed. Pages 3 to 14 were left blank, but were submitted. The final two pages, addressing life-sustaining therapy, were completed by the Appellant’s physician. These pages indicated that the Appellant’s MCS was a severe life-threatening condition, and that the Appellant used a [NAME] and air purifiers as life-sustaining therapy. The Appellant’s physician also provided a letter (the “2024 Letter” ), as part of the 2024 Certificate. I reproduce the relevant parts of the Letter here: [NAME]’s multiple chemical sensitivity as a life-threatening allergy leading to reactive airway disease and lastly anaphylaxis. Multiple chemical sensitivities syndrome is a recognized disability by the Canadian Human Rights Commission. Her condition affects her quality of life and mental health – she is unable to complete tasks that an average person can perform such as going to doctors appointments, going to a grocery store, going to a shopping mall, attending her family’s events to celebrate birthdays/milestones etc. This is very isolating and restrictive. She has significant limitations and/or restrictions: (as described by Womens College Hospital Environmental Health Clinic – Toronto Ontario).

1. An environment free from triggers such as away from machinery (printer/copier, ventilation that may carry scents from other areas of the building).

2. Patient should be in an environment with good ventilation, good air quality and free from triggers. An air purifier can help but for a smaller room setting – not appropriate for a larger room shared with many other people.

3. Recommending an air purifier with HEPA and charcoal filter, metal casing to reduce off gassing, size to fit square footage in need of coverage. Some companies include [NAME].

4. Recommending a scent free policy at her workplace. She has an active treatment plan and safety aids: She is prescribed inhalers for reactive airway disease. She taking [sic] a daily antihistamine allergy medication. [NAME] has constant access to her epipen due to risk of allergy/anaphylaxis which can be life threatening. She is at high risk of mortality when exposed to chemicals due to low oxygen saturation, pulmonary collapse and cardiac arrest. [ 11 ] This 2024 Letter is very similar to a letter submitted with the 2022 Certificate, with the most material change being the addition of the paragraph above beginning with “Her condition affects her qualify of life and mental health…” II. Marked Restriction [ 12 ] As stated above, the Minister takes the view that the requirement in subsection 118.3(1) regarding marked restrictions on basic activities of daily living has not been satisfied.

III. Legal Framework [ 13 ] Paragraph 118.3(1)(a.1) requires as follows: the effects of the impairment or impairments are such that the individual’s ability to perform more than one basic activity of daily living is significantly restricted where the cumulative effect of those restrictions is equivalent to having a marked restriction in the ability to perform a basic activity of daily living or are such that the individual’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted or would be markedly restricted but for therapy that (i) is essential to sustain a vital function of the individual, (ii) is required to be administered at least two times each week for a total duration averaging not less than 14 hours a week, and (iii) cannot reasonably be expected to be of significant benefit to persons who are not so impaired. [ 14 ] Basic activity of daily living is defined in 118.4(1)(c), with supporting rules in paragraphs (c.1) to (f), as follows: (c) a basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual means (i) mental functions necessary for everyday life, (ii) feeding oneself or dressing oneself, (iii) speaking so as to be understood, in a quiet setting, by another person familiar with the individual, (iv) hearing so as to understand, in a quiet setting, another person familiar with the individual, (v) eliminating (bowel or bladder functions), or (vi) walking; (c.1) mental functions necessary for everyday life include (i) attention, (ii) concentration, (iii) memory, (iv) judgement, (v) perception of reality, (vi) problem solving, (vii) goal setting, (viii) regulation of behaviour and emotions, (ix) verbal and non-verbal comprehension, and (x) adaptive functioning; (d) for greater certainty, no other activity, including working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a basic activity of daily living; and (e) feeding oneself does not include (i) any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring food, or (ii) the activity of preparing food to the extent that the time associated with the activity would not have been necessary in the absence of a dietary restriction or regime; and (f) dressing oneself does not include any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring clothing. [ 15 ] “Marked restriction” is described in 118.4(b) as occurring only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or is unable (or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living. Paragraph 118.4(b.1) provides a similar description for the case where the cumulative effect of restrictions on multiple activities is the equivalent of a market restriction in a single basic activity. [ 16 ] I note that previous decisions of this Court, such as Radage v. Canada , [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2510 (T.C.C.), have held that these provisions should be construed liberally, humanely and compassionately, and that if there is doubt then the doubt should be resolved in favour of the claimant.

IV. Application to the Facts [ 17 ] In this case the Appellant testified that basic activities of daily living such as speaking so as to be understood and walking could be severely restricted if her MCS were triggered sufficiently. However, if the Appellant’s MCS were not triggered sufficiently, she did not have difficulty speaking or walking. Paragraph 118.4(1)(d) specifically excludes from “basic activities of daily living” any activity that is not referenced in paragraphs 118.4(1)(c) and (c.1), including working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, and therefore the Appellant’s inability to go grocery shopping, to work in a [COMPANY], to attend family events or even to go to a hospital or doctor’s office are not considered to be basic activities of daily living for this purpose. [ 18 ] The Appellant makes enormous efforts to avoid triggering her MCS, and is sufficiently successful that she is largely able to perform basic activities of daily living.

Accordingly, the evidence here does not demonstrate that the Appellant’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living (or multiple basic activities of daily living, taken on a cumulative basis) were markedly restricted “all or substantially all of the time” . [ 19 ] I also note, as did the Court in the Previous Judgment, the decision of [NAME] v The Queen , 2018 TCC 212. In that case the appellant also was not able to leave the house. However, in that case the diagnosis was severe depression and anxiety, and the Court found that the appellant’s inability to leave the house was “indicative of a marked restriction in mental functions necessary for everyday life, being a basic activity of daily living” . In other words, that appellant’s inability to leave the house, in the case, was evidence of the impairment of her mental functions necessary for everyday life. However in this case, as noted above, the Appellant did not wish the Court to consider the impact of her MCS on her mental functions, and therefore did not provide much evidence on this topic. [ 20 ] Paragraph 118.3(1)(a.1) does contemplate that, where the taxpayer receives the therapy described in subparagraphs 118.3(1)(a.1)(i) through (iii) ( “life-sustaining therapy ” ), the existence of marked restrictions on basic activities of daily living should be evaluated in the absence of that life-sustaining therapy.

Accordingly, those who receive life-sustaining therapy are not barred from receiving the DTC just because the life-sustaining therapy allows those taxpayers to overcome their restrictions on basic activities of daily living. [ 21 ] I considered whether the air purifiers, the [NAME] or the fact that the Appellant generally stayed in her house to avoid MCS triggers, could be considered to be life-sustaining therapy the absence of which would leave the Appellant in a position where she would satisfy the marked restriction requirement. (I note that there was no testimony regarding the daily antihistamine allergy medication referenced in the 2024 Letter.

Accordingly, I do not consider this point further.) [ 22 ] Beginning with the air purifiers and the [NAME], the Appellant made it clear in her testimony that air purifiers do not prevent her MCS from being triggered. They are helpful in improving her quality of life after a more mild exposure that triggers her MCS, but there is no evidence that any of, or a combination of, her basic activities of daily living, would be markedly restricted but for the use of air purifiers. The Appellant was very clear in her testimony that avoidance of triggers is the only effective means to address the risk of anaphylaxis. The same analysis is applicable to the [NAME]. [ 23 ] In addition, subparagraphs (i) through (iii) of paragraph 118.3(1)(a.1) set out the following requirements for life-sustaining therapy: (i) is essential to sustain a vital function of the individual, (ii) is required to be administered at least two times each week for a total duration averaging not less than 14 hours a week, and (iii) cannot reasonably be expected to be of significant benefit to persons who are not so impaired, [ 24 ] [ADDRESS] in [NAME] v The Queen , 2008 TCC 189 stated that, in order to show that a therapy is essential to sustain a vital function of an individual, an appellant must show that his or her life would have been in immediate or proximate danger if the therapy had not been used. In this case the Appellant’s testimony regarding the efficacy of opening a window versus using air purifiers demonstrates that air purifiers are not always essential to sustaining a vital function of the Appellant. There was no testimony as to the number of days during the year when opening a window would not be effective. There was also no testimony as to the severity of the consequences to the Appellant of not using an air purifier.

Accordingly, the evidence was not sufficient to allow me to conclude that air purifiers are essential to sustaining a vital function of the Appellant. [ 25 ] There was no direct evidence regarding the consequences of not using the [NAME]. Further, the evidence that was adduced – namely that it is “beneficial” and was used by the Appellant as a general good health practice – does not suggest that usage of the [NAME] was essential to sustaining a vital function of the Appellant. [ 26 ] The Respondent also suggested that air purifiers can reasonably be expected to be of significant benefit to persons who do not have MCS. Although the Appellant [NAME] admitted that air purifiers are beneficial to her children, who do not have MCS, there was no evidence, and certainly no scientific evidence, regarding the degree of benefit that air purifiers might have for persons who do not have MCS. Therefore I am not able to come to any findings regarding the possibility of significant benefits of air purifiers to persons who do not have MCS. Similar analysis is applicable to the [NAME]. [ 27 ] In addition, paragraph 118.3(1.1) provides supporting rules in determining whether therapy is required to be administered at least two times each week for a total duration averaging not less than an average of 14 hours per week. One of the requirements, found in paragraph 118.3(1.1)(a), is that the therapy time includes only time spent on activities that require the individual to take time away from normal everyday activities in order to receive the therapy. [NAME] v [NAME] , 2025 TCC 124 consider this requirement. In [NAME] , the Court at paragraph 93 finds that “normal everyday activities” are regular, usual, typical or ordinary daily activities and are “routine activities that individuals can be expected to engage in daily” . In this case the Appellant was able to work, eat, sleep and spend time with her family while being in her house with the air purifiers running.

Accordingly, I find that the usage of the air purifiers did not take the Appellant away from her normal everyday activities. [ 28 ] In respect of the [NAME], it does take the Appellant away from her daily activities. However, there was no evidence as to the total amount of time spent in the [NAME] per week. [ 29 ] I considered whether the time spent by the Appellant in her house avoiding chemicals that could trigger her MCS could be considered to be life-sustaining therapy, particularly given the Appellant’s evidence that she needs to remain in a chemical-free environment in order to be assured that she can breathe properly. However, the use of the term “administered” in subparagraph 118.3(1)(ii) suggests that the therapy in question must be something more than simply being in a particular environment, passively, without any person or object taking some action such as providing radiation or laser treatment. But perhaps more importantly, being in a chemical-free environment does not require the Appellant to take time away from normal everyday activities; as stated above, the Appellant is able to work, eat, sleep and spend time with her family while being in her house.

Accordingly, I find that merely being in a chemical-free environment does not constitute life-sustaining therapy. [ 30 ] Some analogy can be made to [NAME] v The Queen , 2014 TCC 82. In that case the Court considered the availability of the DTC for an appellant suffering from severe eczema who often stayed indoors during periods of change in weather in order to reduce his exposure to allergens or to prevent or clear up the eczema. [ADDRESS] in that case stated at paragraph 6: I have no doubt that the Appellant’s medical condition is severe and often prevents him from leading a normal life. I also understand why the Appellant is frustrated that his disability, which has been recognized for the purposes of the [NAME] , does not automatically entitle him to claim a DTC. Unfortunately, [NAME] chose a different route with respect to the DTC by defining the types of impairment that will be recognized for the purposes of that credit. In the instant case, the Appellant's physician concluded that the Appellant did not suffer from the type of impairment described in paragraph 3 above. It is well established that a positive medical condition is a condition precedent to the Minister granting a DTC. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. [citations omitted] [ 31 ] Although the finding in [NAME] focusses on the lack of a medical certificate, which was the basis of the Previous Judgment and will also be found here, as discussed below, I cite this paragraph from [NAME] because of its emphasis on the contours of the DTC as decided by [NAME]. In this case the Appellant’s MCS is life-threatening and has imposed extremely significant restrictions on her life. I was very impressed by the Appellant’s articulate and organized presentation of her evidence and arguments in court, particularly in light of the havoc that her MCS has caused to her life and her family. However, the statutory scheme governing the DTC does not recognize the type of impairment – meaning the need to stay within chemical-free spaces in order to avoid life-threatening risks – notwithstanding the profoundly limiting effects that this impairment has in our current context. Whether the scope of the DTC is appropriate from a policy perspective is not a matter for this Court. [ 32 ] Based on the evidence before me, I find that the Appellant’s ability to perform a basic activity of daily living was not markedly restricted in 2024, the Appellant’s ability to perform multiple basic activities of daily living was not markedly restricted in 2024 having regard to the cumulative effect of the relevant restrictions, and the Appellant did not obtain life-sustaining therapy the absence of which would have changed these conclusions.

V. Certification [ 33 ] A third requirement, in paragraphs 118.3(1)(a.2) or (a.3) (as the case may be) is that a medical practitioner has provided a certification in prescribed form, currently Form T2201, in respect of the requirements in paragraphs 118.3(1)(a) and (a.1). The fulfillment of this requirement is mandatory for those seeking the DTC. (See, for example, [NAME] v. The Queen , 2002 FCA 231.) Additional information provided in response to a request from the Minister can be deemed to be included in the certificate in some cases under subsection 118.3(4). In this case the Respondent accepted that the 2024 Letter should be considered to be part of the 2024 Certificate. [ 34 ] In this case the 2024 Certificate, including the 2024 Letter, did not certify that the impairments suffered by the Appellant as a result of her MCS, whether individually or on a cumulative basis, resulted in marked restrictions of any basic activities of daily living as defined. The 2024 Letter states that the Appellant’s MCS affects her quality of life and mental health, specifying that she is unable to complete tasks that an average person can perform such as going to doctor’s appointments, going to a grocery store, going to a shopping mall and attending her family’s events. As stated above, these do not constitute basic activities of daily living, as defined.

Accordingly, the requirements of paragraph 118.3(1)(a.2) or (a.3) (as applicable) have not been satisfied. [ 35 ] For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the appeal, without costs. Signed this 13 th day of July, 2026. “[NAME]” [NAME]. CITATION: 2026 TCC 133 COURT FILE NO.: 2025-3153(IT)I STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME] AND HIS [NAME] OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: July 2, 2026

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT BY: The [NAME] OF

JUDGMENT: July 13 th , 2026 APPEARANCES: For the Appellant: [redacted] Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] COUNSEL OF RECORD: For the Appellant: [redacted] N/A Firm: N/A For the Respondent: [redacted] Ottawa, Canada