Employment Tribunal Rejects Claims of Unfair Dismissal and Discrimination

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Case Number: 6004630/2024

1

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent:

[redacted]

Manchester On: 9 to 13 March 2026 Before: Employment Judge [NAME_4] [NAME_6]:

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT having been issued separately and written reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, the following written summary reasons are provided:

WRITTEN SUMMARY REASONS

1. The claimant made a request for written reasons by email after the conclusion of the final hearing, on 13 March 2026. That was before the relevant judgment had been promulgated. I have today prepared these written summary reasons which are intended to be sent to the parties in addition to the written judgment.

2. As these are summary reasons, I will not set out all of the detailed findings of fact which we have made and which underpin our decision. Nor will I set out the written summary of the relevant and applicable law. Those would form part of any full written reasons provided to the parties. These summary reasons address the issues in dispute which were set out in the list of issues at page 55 of the final hearing bundle. What follows is a summary of our reasons in relation to the issues in dispute and our conclusions drawn from the evidence presented to us in writing and orally.

Case Number: 6004630/2024

2 3. Much of [NAME_10]’s evidence was particularly focused on how she felt and how her health and wellbeing was impacted by the respondent during the time that she was employed by the respondent. It was, of course, legitimate for [NAME_10] to give that evidence about the impact of the events upon her. However, the task for this Tribunal is to make findings of fact based on the evidence that we have heard and then to apply the appropriate legal principles to those findings to see if the claims of unfair dismissal, discrimination and victimisation succeed. With that in mind, I shall go through the list of issues using the same numbering system as is used in the hearing bundle. Paragraph 1.1.1.1.1 4. This is the allegation that [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] were supposed to train the claimant as an Inspector from July 2023 and that they did not do so.

5. Our conclusions are, firstly, that there was no specific “Inspector” role or job description within the respondent’s business structure. Instead, there were Inspector or supervisory type duties/tasks which formed part of the wider job role at some levels within business. Thus, in the respondent’s business the ‘Dealer’ role existed at different levels within the organisational structure, including Trainee Dealer, Dealer 1, Dealer 2 and Dealer 3. Inspector tasks and responsibilities are a type of supervisory task which formed part of the Dealer 2 and Dealer 3 job roles. ‘Inspecting’ involved checking the integrity of a game and checking that the game did not become too big. That means that, at the start of a game, a dealer of a particular level will be assigned to that game. The decision as to the appropriate level of dealer is based on a number of factors, including the nature of the game, the number of players in the game and how demanding it would be to manage that particular game. Effectively, the busier, or more difficult a game was to manage, the higher the level of dealer that it would merit. It was possible for a game to grow and develop over time as new players joined the game, for example. So, a game that was manageable for a lower level of dealer at the start (Dealer 1, for example) may need to be reassigned to a higher level dealer later on in the game because of changes to the game and the players. Part of the supervisory skill set is to know when to assign or reassign a game to a particular dealer of a particular level. Whether that inspection or supervisory task is done by a level 3 Dealer or a Gaming Supervisor or the [NAME_15] Manager, the task is to identify any changes to the management of the game that are needed, whether for the benefit of the employees or for the benefit of the customers. The inspector-type tasks are to manage the game and the experience.

6. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was normal for a Dealer to be coached to develop new or additional skills during quieter times within the business. It was important that anybody carrying out supervisory/inspector duties was able to keep the game in question within the competence levels of the Dealer who was dealing that game. Further, someone carrying out inspection tasks could also decide to open up new tables and additional gaming tables in order to manage and meet demand.

7. Inspector tasks/duties were only assigned to Dealers at levels 2 or 3. Dealers at lower levels (e.g. a Level 1 Dealer) could be asked to observe other gaming

Case Number: 6004630/2024

3 tables and other dealers at work. This was not so that the Level 1 Dealer could inspect the Level 2 or 3 Dealers. Rather, it was part of the Level 1 Dealer’s career development and coaching. It was one way to help the Dealer develop their skills so that they could progress upwards through the levels of Dealer in the respondent’s business. 8. [NAME_10] was promoted to ‘Dealer 1’ level in May 2023. The claimant asserts that the respondent should have trained her up to a supervisory role or to an inspector-type role from July 2023. The Tribunal concludes that this is unlikely. Any legitimate or reasonable expectation that the claimant would start further training with a view to further promotion is only likely to have arisen once the claimant had been in post as a Level 1 Dealer for a number of months.

9. In her evidence, the claimant accepted that, in fact, she did receive some coaching and training on inspector level tasks. During the course of the Tribunal case her complaint altered from being an assertion that no training was provided to an assertion that there was some training but that it was not of an appropriate quality or standard and was not provided by [NAME_11] and [NAME_13]. She accepted that she did get some guidance and assistance in developing from other managers including [NAME_16], [NAME_17] and [NAME_18]. However, she maintained that it was not of the standard that she expected. It was unclear to the Tribunal what the difficulty or criticism of the standard of training actually was in specific terms. The business had no specific or pre-existing training course to train employees to progress to inspector-type roles or tasks. There was no document by which the Tribunal could assess whether the training provided to the claimant was up to the required level or the expected standard. The claimant could only really give evidence of her impressions or her personal views on the subject. Whilst she says that the training was below her personal expectations, the Tribunal was not sure in what way (or ways) the training fell short of what was required. Nor do we have the evidence on which to assess whether the claimant’s expectations were realistic or reasonable. We have come to the conclusion that [NAME_10]’s perception of what career development would look like within this business did not match the respondent’s actual general practices and procedures. Nor could we see that the identity of the people providing the training made any particular difference in this case. Whether coaching or training was provided by [NAME_13], [NAME_11] or another manager should not make any difference.

10. The claimant was never actually told that she would be trained as an inspector. Nor was she given any reasonable expectation that she would receive training, that it would be of a particular type or standard, or that she would get it at a particular time. In light of the above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant was supposed to be trained as alleged or that this was supposed to happen in July 2023. Further, we are not satisfied that the training had to be provided by the two managers that the claimant names. In short, there was no agreement between the parties (and no obligation on the respondent) that the claimant would be trained in the manner that she asserts or over the time period that she asserts.

Case Number: 6004630/2024

4 11. Our finding is that the factual allegation at paragraph 1.1.1.1.1 is not proved or established in this case. In those circumstances, it cannot form part of the basis for the claim of unfair dismissal or that of discrimination. The respondent was not in breach of any obligations, and the claimant had not been ‘let down’ or disappointed in the way that she alleges. We do not find that the respondent acted without reasonable or proper cause or that it acted in a way which was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the mutual trust and confidence between the parties.

12. Furthermore, there is also nothing about these events to establish a link between the respondent’s actions and the claimant’s sex. We have no evidence on which to base a conclusion that the claimant was treated in this way because of her sex or that the treatment was ‘related to’ her sex. The furthest the claimant was able to take this (even in her own evidence) was to say that she saw others get training that she herself did not receive. However, she did not say what that missing training was or who received the training that she did not receive. Whilst the claimant had every opportunity to clarify her allegation and evidence on this issue, she was unable to give us something more concrete on which to base a finding of discrimination. In the absence of the necessary evidence, the Tribunal was unable to conclude that other employees were treated more favourably or that a hypothetical male comparator would have been treated more favourably than the claimant. We had no material on which to base a conclusion that the claimant’s sex has anything to do with the way that she was treated in relation to training. There was nothing to shift the burden of proof from the claimant to the respondent in this part of the discrimination claim. Paragraph 1.1.1.1.2 13. The claimant alleges that, in November/December 2023 [NAME_11] shouted at the claimant whilst the claimant was working on a roulette table. When the customer won and the claimant paid out the money to the customer, she alleges that he shouted out, “you have to spin as I say.” 14. On balance of probabilities, the Tribunal preferred the respondent’s evidence in relation to this allegation. Given the layout of the gaming area and the number of people and managers likely to have been present, we are satisfied that the alleged behaviour or event would have been noticed at the time if it had happened. We also noted that the claimant made no complaint or report about this incident at the time that it is said to have happened. None of the managers noticed any shouting by [NAME_11]. On balance, we conclude that someone would have heard it and noticed this sort of behaviour if it had happened. This is particularly so given that it was alleged to have happened near to Christmas when the [NAME_15] was busier. In such circumstances there would be more witnesses in the area who would be able to see and hear what was going on. The claimant was unable to name or indicate any witness who did overhear or witness this alleged event. In the course of answering questions during the hearing, the claimant had the opportunity to explain the context of this incident and to explain the meaning of the comments that [NAME_11] allegedly made. Unfortunately, the claimant was unable to do that. The comments that [NAME_11] is said to have made, about spinning in a particular way, are something that the

Case Number: 6004630/2024

5 Tribunal has been unable to understand. We were unable to understand what such a comment would have meant if it had been said. What could [NAME_11] have meant by shouting at the claimant, “you have to spin as I say.” The claimant could not explain that clearly to us. [NAME_11] denied making the comment and the witness [NAME_19] was also unable to explain what it could have meant (and she is someone who knows the business well and could reasonably be expected to understand the meaning of such a comment.) Furthermore, the respondent’s gaming manual existed to set out how games should be run by the Dealers.

15. The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove her factual allegation before we can conclude that this part of the claim succeeds. She has not managed to prove the allegation. In those circumstances we are unable to conclude that there was a repudiatory breach of contract, as alleged. Further, we are unable to conclude that this formed part of a course of conduct which, cumulatively, which amounted to a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. In addition, there was nothing to indicate a link between this and the fact that the claimant is female. Nor did we have evidence to suggest that a male comparator would have been treated more favourably. The burden of proof pursuant to section 136 did not shift from the claimant to the respondent in relation to this part of the case. Paragraph 1.1.1.1.3 16. The claimant alleged that at the end of January 2024, during a day shift, whilst the claimant was working on [NAME_22] (“[NAME_23]”), [NAME_13] told the claimant to be an Inspector. She alleges that she did so and whilst she was concentrating on checking two tables and watching an experienced dealer on roulette, [NAME_13] said, “I didn’t put you here as Inspector, you are here to learn from an experienced dealer.” The claimant said that she felt ready to be an Inspector. At which point, [NAME_13] started shouting at her and said, “you know what, go back to [NAME_23].” 17. The claimant was taken through this allegation and the evidence on this in detail during cross examination. She was taken to the contemporaneous reports, investigations and observations of the managers [NAME_24] and [NAME_26]. Those investigations were completed close in time to the alleged incident. [NAME_24] and [NAME_26] found no evidence of problematic behaviour by [NAME_13]. They had no reason to lie about that, and the claimant could not suggest why they would not tell the truth about this.

18. There were other sources of evidence which did not support the claimant’s case. These included: CCTV footage, [NAME_13]’s account when [NAME_26] and [NAME_24] spoke to him, and the absence of any other witnesses who said they heard or saw something which matched the claimant’s version of events. The Tribunal concluded that [NAME_13]’s evidence was consistent. In summary, he saw an opportunity to let the claimant observe a roulette game which had lots of ‘action,’ and which would be useful for her development in the job. When this was offered to the claimant, she did not react as he would expect. She was rude about it. In those circumstances, he concluded that there was no point in [NAME_10] going onto the roulette game in question as no purpose would be

Case Number: 6004630/2024

6 served by this. Consequently, the claimant could go back to the table where she had originally been situated ([NAME_22].) This is what he communicated to the claimant. The Tribunal is satisfied there was nothing wrong with this or [NAME_13]’s overall actions and behaviour in the circumstances. The claimant had rejected a development/coaching opportunity (whether through a misunderstanding or otherwise) and had been quite rude and so [NAME_13] had stepped back and told her to return to what she was doing beforehand. This was a legitimate managerial intervention and there was no evidence that it was done in an inappropriate or aggressive way.

19. In those circumstances, this event could form no part of a breach of mutual trust and confidence, whether in isolation or when considered as part of a course of conduct. There is also nothing to suggest that it had anything to do with the fact that the claimant is female. In fact, the claimant herself provided another reason for the alleged behaviour which was nothing to do with the fact that she is a woman. In part of her evidence to the Tribunal, [NAME_10] said that when another employee called [NAME_28] left his employment in September 2023, her relationship with [NAME_13] or [NAME_11] deteriorated. She said that this was because they blamed her for the fact that [NAME_28] had left the job. In short, there was no evidential basis for us to conclude that [NAME_10] was treated less favourably than a male comparator or that the treatment was related to her sex. Paragraph 1.1.1.2.1 20. The next group of allegations relate to the period after the claimant went off on sick leave until her resignation. The first of these allegations is that the claimant was required by HR on 23 March 2024 during a meeting by video call to set out the detail of her complaint against [NAME_13] and [NAME_11] as they wanted more information from the claimant.

21. This meeting took place on [NAME_29] with [NAME_30] on 23 April 2024. By this stage, the claimant had raised a grievance but it was not very clear what the specific allegations were or what the claimant’s desired outcome from the grievance was. The respondent needed to understand what the claimant’s complaint actually was. Having looked at the relevant documents, the respondent was not clear what allegations it was supposed to be investigating. In many organisations and businesses it is perfectly standard procedure to have a meeting as a way of getting clarification and information. The claimant may not have realised what a written grievance needed to contain in order for the respondent to be able to address it and investigate it. It is possible that she did not understand the level of detail that was required. If [NAME_10] perceived this request or this meeting as being in some way unreasonable, that may well have been her personal perception, but it was not a legitimate or objectively justifiable characterisation of the meeting itself.

22. In addition, the claimant did not suggest at the time that she was not fit enough or well enough to attend an online meeting. She did not resist having the meeting. Indeed, the respondent had attempted to get the required information and details from the claimant in various other ways (for example, by email correspondence or requesting a screenshot of information.) They were not prescriptive about how the claimant could or should provide the relevant

Case Number: 6004630/2024

7 information. The respondent just wanted to make sure that they had everything necessary in order to be able to investigate the grievance appropriately.

23. The Tribunal was unable to find any basis on which to conclude that the way that this meeting was conducted was capable of being a repudiatory or fundamental breach of contract. Nor did it form part of a course of conduct which cumulatively amounted to a fundamental breach of contract. Paragraph 1.1.1.2.2 24. The next allegation is that HR did not arrange a face-to-face in person meeting between the claimant and HR to discuss her complaint against [NAME_13] and [NAME_11]. The claimant says that such a meeting was necessary because her English was poor.

25. The evidence shows that there was a face-to-face, in person meeting but it was attended by [NAME_19] rather than someone from HR. The claimant did not complain at the time that the meeting was not with HR rather than with Ms [NAME_21]. In any case, the claimant had already had an online meeting with HR and had also been offered a further meeting with the Group HR Director (which she did not accept). So, the only missing combination of attendees and formats is an ‘in person’ meeting between the claimant and someone from HR. However, there is nothing particularly remarkable or unusual about this. There is nothing in the contemporaneous documentation to suggest that the claimant needed the meeting to be in person and with someone from HR because of her language barrier. The language issue does not seem to have been raised by the claimant at the time but has become an issue during the course of the Tribunal claim.

26. Viewed objectively, there was nothing objectionable about the way that the respondent proceeded in all the circumstances. It was a neutral event. The absence of an in-person meeting with someone from HR did not make any real difference. The claimant did not say that she needed to have a meeting with HR and that it needed to be ‘in person.’ The only issue she raised in correspondence at the time was about being accompanied by a solicitor at the meeting. Even so she did not suggest that the solicitor was required because of any language barrier. In any event, she was offered the right to be accompanied and then decided to attend alone if she could not have her solicitor with her. The Tribunal noted that the respondent was flexible and adapted to get the information from the claimant by whatever method she felt able to give it. This was a reasonable way to handle a grievance issue in the circumstances. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it could have contributed in any way to a breach of mutual trust and confidence (either in isolation or as part of a course of conduct.) Paragraph 1.1.1.2.3 27. The claimant asserted that a manager, [NAME_17], repeatedly contacted the claimant during her first week of illness. The claimant says that he should not have done so. This refers to the amount of contact between employee and

Case Number: 6004630/2024

8 manager during the first few days of sickness absence in circumstances where the claimant had been taken away from the workplace by ambulance.

28. The text messages were reproduced within the hearing bundle. Their content is as follows: 20 Feb 2024 (at 22.23): “Hi [NAME_31], how are you? Are you home?” 21 Feb 2024 (at 10.07) “you ok [NAME_31]?” 24 Feb 2024 (at 0930) “Hi [NAME_31], we didn’t have any contact from you yesterday. Are you ok?” 27 Feb 2024 (at 14.00) “Hi [NAME_31], can you please contact us. If you are going to be off sick, that’s fine. Don’t worry about it. You’ll get paid if you make contact.”

29. The content of the messages is, on the face of it, entirely unobjectionable. The first messages are merely asking the claimant if she is ok and enquiring after her welfare. The claimant did not reply or respond to the messages in any way. The respondent had no reason to know that further texts would be unwelcome. The respondent’s manager was making enquiries about things that they needed to know in line with the sickness policy. In addition, the claimant had been scheduled to work during the period in question but did not attend work as planned. This gave the respondent an additional reason to contact the claimant to see what the situation was.

30. These messages were sent over a short period of time, a number of days. The respondent’s manager had good reasons for doing what he did. [NAME_32] did not want to be too intrusive. The respondent’s managers did not know the claimant’s situation at that time. They did not know whether she was still in hospital or not.

31. The Tribunal does not criticise the respondent for taking the less intrusive option of communicating with the claimant by text. The respondent’s manager did not want to send formal letters or deploy a more formal approach. In the circumstances, the respondent could not be expected to refrain from contacting the claimant altogether. The messages that were sent were the least intrusive or formal way of doing what was necessary from management’s perspective. Indeed, the respondent’s management is likely to have been criticised if it did not at least attempt to make some contact with the claimant. This is particularly so when the managers last saw her being taken away by ambulance.

Case Number: 6004630/2024

9 32. The Tribunal is satisfied that this batch of text communication does not amount to a breach of mutual trust and confidence and cannot be said to contribute to a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. Paragraph 1.1.1.2.4 33. The claimant alleges that whilst she was absent, she was informed by [NAME_17] that if she did not contact the respondent she would not be paid. This is a reference to the text message sent on 27 February 2024 as set out at paragraph 28, above. To some extent, the content of the message itself speaks for itself. It is not a threat or a negative message in any way. All the message does, in effect, is to state (or restate) the contractual requirements that needed to be complied with for the employee to keep in touch with the employer in order to receive sick pay. The message does that in a positive, non-threatening and non-critical way. It provides the incentive for the claimant to make contact with her employer during her absence. The text message was a minimal intervention by the respondent. The consequence of the respondent sending the message was that the claimant actually received the pay that she was entitled to because she subsequently complied with the requirements to receive sick pay. The claimant sent a doctor’s note later on 27 February and, as a result, she received sick pay. If the respondent had not sent this message, there is a possibility that the claimant would not have sent the necessary information and she may not have received the sick pay.

34. There is nothing in the text which should have been offensive to the claimant. The message did not amount to a fundamental breach of contract. It did not contribute to a fundamental breach of contract when taken together with the rest of the conduct relied upon by the claimant. Paragraph 1.1.1.2.5 35. The claimant relies on the fact that after she was admitted to hospital on 20 February, managers did not visit her.

36. In the circumstances of this case the claimant can have had no legitimate expectation that her employer would visit her in hospital. There was no reasonable basis for expecting that the respondent’s managers would visit any of their employees in hospital. The contract documents and other documents associated with the employment do not suggest that the respondent’s managers would visit employees in hospital. There was no custom or practice that the respondent’s managers would do this either.

37. Furthermore, in circumstances where the claimant had not really responded to the respondent’s texts (except the request for a doctor’s note) the respondent was clearly trying not to be intrusive with the claimant or to invade her privacy. In such circumstances it would be odd for them to visit her whilst she was in hospital. Importantly, the respondent’s managers did not know (and had no reason to know) that she had been admitted to hospital and had stayed there for three days. The Tribunal notes that the claimant’s stated desire for a hospital visit from managers is somewhat inconsistent with her reaction to the text messages sent by [NAME_32]. If she objected to the respondent contacting

Case Number: 6004630/2024

10 her via text message, surely she would also object to them coming to see her in person whilst she was in hospital.

38. The Tribunal is satisfied that the failure of respondent managers to visit the claimant in hospital did not constitute a fundamental breach of contract and did not contribute to a fundamental breach of contract when viewed alongside the other matters relied upon by the claimant. Paragraph 1.1.1.2.6 39. The claimant relies on the fact that, whilst she was absent from work due to sickness, the claimant did not receive her full salary.

40. The payments that the respondent made to the claimant during her sick leave were made in accordance with her contractual entitlement. The Tribunal has concluded that the claimant’s interpretation of the relevant clauses of the contract is mistaken or incorrect. The claimant was not suspended from work. Rather, she was absent from work on sick leave. Consequently, the applicable rules are the rules for sick leave rather than suspension.

41. In addition, there was no evidence that the respondent had a residual discretion to pay extra or additional company sick pay. The claimant had no reasonable expectation of receiving anything in excess of statutory sick pay during this period of absence. By this time, the claimant had already exhausted her entitlement to two weeks of full sick pay (when she was off work in September and December 2023.) Her remaining entitlement (from February 2024 onwards) was to statutory sick pay only. The Tribunal also notes that the claimant did not make a complaint about the absence of full sick pay prior to submitting her resignation.

42. The Tribunal was satisfied that the decision to pay statutory sick pay only (rather than a higher rate of company sick pay) did not amount to a fundamental breach of contract. Furthermore, when viewed alongside the whole course of conduct, it did not contribute to a fundamental breach of contract based on the cumulative conduct. Conclusions 43. The Tribunal has taken its conclusions (as set out above) and has used them to decide each of the claimant’s legal claims in these proceedings. Unfair dismissal 44. In order to be successful in her claim, the claimant must show that she was constructively dismissed. The first element of a constructive dismissal is a fundamental (or repudiatory) breach of contract by the respondent. The Tribunal can examine the respondent’s conduct to see if any one element of the matters relied upon amounts to a fundamental breach of contract. Alternatively, the respondent’s actions can be considered cumulatively to see whether, when viewed altogether, they add up to a fundamental breach of contract.

Case Number: 6004630/2024

11 45. The Tribunal has considered the events relied upon both individually and cumulatively. Either way, we have been unable to find that the respondent committed a fundamental breach of contract. We have considered whether the respondent breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence (which would be a fundamental breach of contract) and have concluded that it did not.

46. As the claimant has failed to establish the first element of a constructive dismissal, the Tribunal was not, strictly speaking, required to consider the remaining elements of the test for constructive dismissal. However, for completeness, we state that the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the claimant actually resigned in response to the way she personally perceived she had been treated by the respondent. Further, if the Tribunal had found in favour of the claimant in relation to the first parts of the test for constructive dismissal, we would not have concluded that the claimant delayed too long before resigning. She did not affirm the contract or waive what she considered to be a breach of contract by the respondent. The respondent points to the claimant’s correspondence from about a month before the resignation and says that she should not have waited until the 24 May to resign. However, viewed in its proper context, this was not an unreasonable delay. The claimant was not required to resign immediately in order to preserve her claim of unfair dismissal. Nor was she required to resign without having obtained alternative employment. (We are satisfied that she was looking for a job before she resigned but that is not the same as concluding that she did not resign in response to the respondent’s actions, which she considered to be a breach of contract. Rather, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there was a breach of contract by the respondent.)

47. In this context, the one-month delay is not too long. The fundamental problem for the claimant in this case is not the timing of the resignation but the absence of a fundamental breach of contract by the respondent. In light of all of this, the unfair dismissal claim fails and is dismissed. Harassment 48. The claimant relied upon the allegations of bullying by [NAME_11] and [NAME_13] at paragraph 1.1.1.1.1 to 1.1.1.1.3. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the respondent’s conduct was ‘related to’ sex. In addition, section 26 of the Equality Act requires the conduct to have either the purpose or the effect of violating the claimant’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the conduct had either this purpose or this effect. If the claimant subjectively experienced the acts as having that effect, the Tribunal also has to consider the other circumstances of the case, including whether it was reasonable for them to have that effect (section 26(4).) We were satisfied that it was not reasonable for the conduct to have that effect on the claimant. Consequently, the test for harassment in section 26 of the Equality Act is not satisfied in this case. The claims of harassment must fail and be dismissed. Direct sex discrimination 49. In light of our other conclusions, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the claimant was treated less favourably than a hypothetical male comparator would have

Case Number: 6004630/2024

12 been. Nor were we satisfied that any less favourable treatment was ‘because of’ sex. Thus, the claim of direct discrimination fails and is dismissed. Discriminatory dismissal 50. Any assertion of discriminatory constructive dismissal must also fail given our findings in this case. There was no constructive dismissal and the respondent’s actions were not tainted by sex discrimination.

Victimisation 51. The final complaint for us to consider is that of victimisation. The protected act relied on by the claimant in this case is the current claim that she presented to the Employment Tribunal. The respondent has conceded that this was a protected act within the meaning of section 27 of the Equality Act.

52. The question for us is whether the respondent subjected the claimant to a detriment because she did the protected act. The detrimental treatment relied on here are the visits to the claimant’s new place of work by her former colleagues.

53. The claimant has been working in a [NAME_34] since she left the respondent’s employment. The claimant’s former colleagues [NAME_35] and [NAME_11] both visited that [NAME_15]. However, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the claimant was subjected to detrimental treatment as a result of these individuals going to the [NAME_15]. There is no evidence that there was any interaction between the claimant’s former colleagues and the claimant when they visited her workplace. Nor is there evidence of any sort of intimidation. 54. [NAME_35] did not even know about the claimant’s Tribunal claim at the time that she visited the [NAME_15]. Logically, her visit to [NAME_34] cannot have been caused by the claimant’s protected act. Legal causation is not established. [NAME_11] did know about the Tribunal claim but did not actually see the claimant when he visited the [NAME_34]. It is hard to see how he was subjecting her to detrimental treatment in those circumstances. There was no real interaction between the parties during the visits which could be described as detrimental to the claimant.

55. Both of the claimant’s former colleagues were entitled to visit this [NAME_15] for gaming purposes. Indeed, [NAME_35] gave evidence that she had been visiting that [NAME_15] for a number of years before the claimant started to work there. Her behaviour did not change because the claimant brought a Tribunal claim. Nor should [NAME_35]’s behaviour have to change because of the claimant’s claim. She had the right to carry on as before using the [NAME_15] as she had previously. There is no evidence to suggest that these two individuals visited the [NAME_15] for any purpose other than to play games at the [NAME_15]. The Tribunal also notes that, because both of these individuals were employed at the [NAME_37], they were not permitted to play at the [NAME_37]. If they wanted to go to a [NAME_15] they could not go to the [NAME_15] that they worked

Case Number: 6004630/2024

13 at. This further explains why they turned up at the claimant’s new place of work. It undermines any suggestion that they had gone to that [NAME_15] because the claimant worked there or because they wanted to intimidate or upset the claimant. The fact that the claimant had started work there was, we are satisfied, no more than an unfortunate coincidence (when all the surrounding circumstances are considered.)

56. In summary, the victimisation claim must also fail. Causation is not established and the Tribunal does not accept that the claimant was subjected to a detriment as a result of the respondent’s employees visiting the premises.

Approved by: Employment Judge Eeley Date: 23 April 2026 Summary written reasons sent to the parties on: 8 May 2026 …………………………………… For the Tribunal:

…………………………………… Notes All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written full reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal- decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. Written summary reasons will not be placed online. If written full reasons are provided, they will be placed online. Written full reasons will not be provided unless requested by any party with a written request received by the Tribunal within 14 days of the sending of the written summary reasons. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation- practice-directions/

Case Number: 6004630/2024

1

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent:

[redacted]

Claimant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted]

JUDGMENT

1. The complaint of unfair dismissal is not well-founded. The claimant was not unfairly dismissed. 2. The complaints of direct sex discrimination are not well-founded and are dismissed.

3. The complaints of harassment related to sex are not well-founded and are dismissed.

4. The complaints of victimisation are not well-founded and are dismissed.

Approved by: Employment Judge Eeley 13 March 2026

Case Number: 6004630/2024

2

Judgment sent to the parties on: 8 May 2026 For the Tribunal:

…………………………………

Notes Summary Reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written summary reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. Written summary reasons will not be placed online. If written full reasons are provided, they will be placed online. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any written full reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found at www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment- rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/