Employment Tribunal Upholds Claim of Sex Equality Breach in Equal Pay Case

OUTCOME: Allowed

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

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EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ashford (by video)

On: 24-28 November & 1 December 2025 & 2 & 11 December 2025 (In Chambers)

Before: Employment Judge [NAME_4]

[NAME_6] For the claimant: [redacted] For the respondent: [redacted]

Reserved Judgment

1. The tribunal finds the respondent has breached a sex equality clause.

Reasons

1. The claims and list of issues had been set down in Case Management Orders on 18 June 2024 but were amended by the parties’ representatives at the outset to reflect the preliminary decision not to allow an amendment to the claim in respect of concealment. They also reflect our decision, made at the outset, after hearing from the parties, that the claimant does not need to amend the claim to raise issues in respect of a material factor sex-taint.

2. The claimant’s representative confirmed at the outset that this remains a like work equal pay case only.

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2 3. The claimant’s named comparators are referred to here by initial only as this document will be publicly available online and neither has participated in this case. Other personal information is referred to as needed and their privacy should be respected in respect of online publication.

4. The issues are therefore now agreed to be:

1 Equal pay

1.1 The Claimant was employed as a Planning Enforcement Officer (or Planning Contraventions Officer) at [NAME_13] from September 2014 (or 1 April 2015) until 31 December 2017, and at [NAME_15] from 1 January 2018 thereafter (her pay increase to [NAME_15] having been backdated to that date).

Mr G – 2009 to 31 March 2010

1.2 It is common ground that Mr G was employed at [NAME_15] from 2009 to 31 March 2010.

1.3 Between 20 December 2017 and 31 December 2017, was the Claimant performing like work to that performed by Mr G during the comparison period?

1.4 It is common ground that Mr G was paid more during the comparison period than the Claimant was paid during the claimed period.

1.5 Can the Respondent show that the difference between the pay of Mr G and the Claimant was because of a material factor which did not involve treating the Claimant less favourably because of the Claimant’s sex? The material factors relied upon by the Respondent are:

(a) the differences in the role done by Mr G compared to the Claimant, due to the change in the nature of the work and the lowering of the demands placed upon the role holder; (b) that Mr G entered his role with a greater degree of experience than the Claimant; (c) that Mr G was fulfilling the requirements of his role, requirements which the Claimant’s role did not have, or had only on a lesser basis.

1.7 In determining whether each of the factors relied on above was a material factor for the purposes of s69 EqA2010, the Tribunal must consider:

(a) Whether it is a real reason for the difference in pay, or rather, a sham or pretence; (b) Whether it is the cause of the disparity; (c) Whether it is itself discriminatory on the grounds of sex; (d) Whether it is significant and relevant in terms of the circumstances of the Claimant and Mr G.

1.8 In respect of factor 1.5(b) (Mr G’s experience):

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1.8.1 Was the experience referred to, the fact that Mr G is a former police officer? 1.8.2 If so, does this put women doing work equal to the Claimant at a particular disadvantage when compared to men doing work equal the that of the Claimant (s69(1)(2) EqA2010)?

1.8.3 If so, is the factor nevertheless a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (s69(1)(b) EqA2010)?

Mr G – 1 April 2010 to August 2014

1.9 It is common ground that Mr G was employed at band [NAME_17] from 1 April 2010 to August 2014.

1.10 Between 1 April 2018 and the date that the claim was presented, was the Claimant performing like work to that performed by Mr G during the comparison period? That is the date on which the Claimant completed the “[NAME_18]” course.

1.11 It is common ground that Mr G was paid more during the comparison period than the Claimant was paid during the claimed period.

1.12 Can the Respondent show that the difference between the pay of Mr G and the Claimant was because of a material factor which did not involve treating the Claimant less favourably because of the Claimant’s sex? The material factors relied upon by the Respondent are:

a) the differences in the role done by Mr G compared to the Claimant, due to the change in the nature of the work and the lowering of the demands placed upon the role holder; b) Mr G entered his role with a greater degree of experience than the Claimant; c) that Mr G was fulfilling the requirements of his role, requirements which the Claimant’s role did not have, or had only on a lesser basis.

1.13 In determining whether each of the factors relied on at 1.9 above was a material factor for the purposes of s69 EqA2010, the Tribunal must consider:

(a) Whether it is a real reason for the difference in pay, or rather, a sham or pretence; (b) Whether it is the cause of the disparity; (c) Whether it is itself discriminatory on the grounds of sex: (d) Whether it is significant and relevant in terms of the circumstances of the claimant and Mr G.

1.14 In respect of factor 1.12(b) (Mr G’s experience):

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1.14.1 Was the experience referred to, the fact that Mr G is a former

police officer?

1.14.2 If so, does this put women doing work equal to the Claimant at a

particular disadvantage when compared to men doing work equal the

that of the Claimant (s69(1)(2) EqA2010)?

1.14.3 If so, is the factor nevertheless a proportionate means of

achieving a legitimate aim (s69(1)(b) EqA2010)?

Mr W – June 2022 to the date of claim

1.15 It is common ground that in June 2022 Mr W commenced employment

with [NAME_21] and that the Respondent and [NAME_21] are

associated employers (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010).

1.16 Between June 2022 and the date of the claim, was the Claimant performing like

work to that performed by Mr W during the comparison period?

1.17 It is common ground that Mr W was paid more during the comparison

period than the Claimant was paid during the claimed period.

1.18 Can the Respondent show that the difference between the pay of Mr W

and the Claimant was because of a material factor which did not involve treating

the Claimant less favourably because of the Claimant’s sex? The material

factors relied upon by the Respondent are:

a) the differences between the work done by Mr W compared to that done by the Claimant. b) that Mr W was fulfilling the requirements of his role, requirements which the Claimant’s role did not have, or had only on a lesser basis. c) that Mr W was and is an agency worker for specific periods, which results in different benefits and pay compared to an employee.

1.19 In determining whether each of the factors relied on at 1.5 above was a material

factor for the purposes of s69 EqA2010, the Tribunal must consider:

a) Whether it is a real reason for the difference in pay, or rather, a sham or

pretence;

b) Whether it is the cause of the disparity;

c) Whether it is itself discriminatory on the grounds of sex;

d) Whether it is significant and relevant in terms of the circumstances of the

Claimant and Mr W.

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

5 1.20 In respect of factor 1.18(a) (the difference between the work done by the Claimant and Mr W):

1.21 Is this because, or partly because, of the similarity between the content of Mr W’s role, and his former work as a police officer?

1.22 If so, does this put women doing work equal to the Claimant at a particular disadvantage when compared to men doing work equal the that of the Claimant (s69(1)(2) EqA2010)?

1.23 If so, is the factor nevertheless a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (s69(1)(b) EqA2010)?

2 Remedy

2.1 Should the Tribunal make a declaration as to the rights of the parties?

2.2 Should the Tribunal order an award by way of arrears of pay or damages?

2.3 Should interest be awarded? If so, how much?

Hearing

5. The tribunal heard evidence from the Claimant on her own behalf and from [NAME_61] (Principal Planning Officer, the Claimant’s Line Manager) on behalf of the claimant. On behalf of the respondent the tribunal heard evidence from [NAME_25] (Head of Planning Applications); [NAME_60] (Director for Growth and Communities, former Interim Director of Environment, Planning and Enforcement) and Mr [NAME_31] (Head of Innovation & Business Intelligence). We also had regard to a partially agreed statement from the respondent’s HR & Analytics Commissioning Manager. The claimant identified those parts which are disputed. As she did not attend to give evidence I have not identified her by name.

6. There was a 1311 page bundle used by the tribunal. Initially the bundle was a little longer and was not in chronological order. It appeared to be the claimant’s disclosure followed by the respondent’s disclosure, with potential duplication. We requested a bundle in the format that the parties had been ordered to comply with. We were then supplied with a revised bundle of 1311 pages, with more (but by no means all) of the documents in chronological order. The parties preferred to use the original bundle and so we worked with two bundles with different pagination. The pagination referred to here is to the tribunal’s bundle. We remain of the view that the way the evidence was presented did not assist the tribunal in gaining an understanding of the case rapidly but we have had to work with the bundle as presented.

7. There was a supplementary bundle prepared on behalf of the claimant. We were only taken to one page of that bundle. The respondent objected to this, but by the time of the objection we had already read the contents and agreed that he could deal with it in submissions.

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8. The respondent produced a further supplementary bundle but then withdrew it.

9. In addition the respondent provided an additional document (an organization chart) during the course of the hearing with the consent of the claimant and the tribunal.

10. We also had the benefit of a cast list and chronology and a document cross referencing page numbers between the two versions of the bundle.

11. Both parties provided written opening statements. The parties made oral closing submissions and the claimant provided a written submission.

12. Based on the evidence heard and the documents before us we found the following facts.

Facts

13. [NAME_35] has run the planning enforcement team within the Planning Applications Group for 30 plus years. It has always been a two-person team. [NAME_35] is the manager of the team as the team lead and over the relevant period reported to [NAME_36], the Head of the Planning Applications Group. He has responsibility for the actions of the team and in that capacity does a lot of the reporting to Committees. He says he has never missed a meeting. He is also seconded to [NAME_37] work for the equivalent of 2 days a week meaning the other postholder in his team takes responsibility for the team’s work for the equivalent amount of time, although [NAME_35] spreads the [NAME_37] time out across the working week as needed. He has been involved in the claimant’s case both as her Line Manager and as her union representative.

14. We accept that, as [NAME_35] says, it has generally been difficult to recruit and retain staff in planning enforcement (supported by the comment by [NAME_36] in similar terms on page 920 as part of Mr G’s regrade). He has over his working life worked with the talent available to ensure the continuity of a successful enforcement team. His evidence, which we accept, is that ideally the other member of his team is working at experienced professional capacity (the more senior KS9-10 role/[NAME_38]-10 role) (see below)), but that in the case of Mr G, and later the claimant, they did not initially perform at that level as they needed to be trained and gain the relevant experience. [NAME_35] wrote a career progression scheme, mirroring one already in place for other planning officers, to recognise this need to recruit staff into a lower level role and develop them into the senior role (see references to this at p920 when applied to the claimant’s comparator). The comments from [NAME_36] on p920 (see paragraph 17 below) support this finding, and we reject her evidence that following the claimant joining the team there has been no business need for a role above [NAME_39].

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7 15. Before the claimant’s employment, the second member of the team with [NAME_35] was her first comparator, Mr G. He had begun working as the planning contraventions officer from 2003. He then became Senior Planning Enforcement Officer from 1 April 2010 to 31 August 2014. He was recruited with a police and army intelligence background. [NAME_35] said he had no experience of planning enforcement prior to his recruitment. We accept this, but note that he began the role in 2003 much earlier than the 2009 date asserted by the claimant. 2003 is the date the respondent gave as his start date. We note the email at page 913 which says he began contraventions work in 2004 and then did his training. He was awarded the Certificate of Continuing education in Planning Enforcement on 20 February 2007 (1196). He obtained his technical membership of [NAME_40] (which requires a minimum 4 years’ experience) on 23 January 2009 (1198).

16. His initial job description is at page 1058. Unlike the claimant’s his was not separated into different grades. After the regrade application he progressed to the senior planning enforcement officer (p1246). The career progression envisaged by [NAME_35] was applied in the case of Mr G. He began at [NAME_39]. When he moved from [NAME_39] to [NAME_42] he did nevertheless need to apply for a regrade but both managers approved this and it was agreed. He did not appear to have had to progress through KS9 (reflected in the senior job description). [NAME_36] herself refers to applying the career grade scheme to his development at that point, and that there was a career grade scheme in place to help the respondent acquire the skills required of a seasoned/senior planning enforcement officer (p920).

17. Broadly both of the roles performed by Mr G were to pursue breaches of planning control and unauthorised activities as part of the Council’s Monitoring and Enforcement team. His caseload and that of [NAME_35] focused on unauthorised sites as breaches on sites with permitted use was carried out by planning officers in the wider team. Together, he and [NAME_35], responded to complaints and alleged breaches through site inspections and enforcement action or negotiated alternatives; built working relationships with key players to deliver an effective enforcement service; and reported on their activities to the relevant Committees. They decided together who would deal with which case although Mr G was given increasing autonomy by [NAME_35] as he gained experience. However we accept [NAME_35]’s evidence that they remained a team working closely together as that is necessary in enforcement work. Enforcement cases broadly fall into three categories of priority rating. High and medium which cause the most risk of harm and can involve organised crime. The lower level involve more minor breaches at permitted sites. The work of the enforcement team focuses on the high and medium priorities but enforcement notices and court attendance (more traditional police-style work) is the more straightforward side of the work of the service.

18. The more senior job description differs in that the post-holder is to be a professional member of the group (reflecting the requirement for Technical Membership of the [NAME_40]) who in addition to the above duties is able to handle and determine lawful use applications and major enforcement/more complex cases and deal with all enforcement

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8 matters within the relevant regulatory framework. It had additional duties, such as staff development and assisting the Group Head with her regional and national duties, that he did not necessarily do much of, if any, in practice.

19. Mr G’s previous experience had made him well-suited to the more traditional enforcement methods which the council used at that time. At that time the team handled fewer cases than they have done since the claimant joined the team. Over his period of time working for the respondent he conducted site visits and inspections, prepared enforcement notices and from time to time attended the Magistrate’s Court. He gave evidence at 2-3 [NAME_43] and he also attended and presented at [NAME_44]. Once Mr G progressed to the senior post he was, according to both [NAME_35] and [NAME_36], increasingly working from his own initiative and creative problem- solving. He was a Technical Member of the [NAME_40], had given evidence of opinion and fact at a public inquiry and had developed into a case officer for lawful use applications (p919). [NAME_35] in support of the re-grade application said “he [had] risen beyond his base duties to include: professional evidence giving at Inquiry; case officer status within the lawful use field; instrumental direct actions and pivotal inputs to legal /enforcement cases”. [NAME_36] referred to his development of the role and significantly developing the enforcement service to meet members requirements and operate at a senior and advanced level. She said then (at page 920) “The skills required of a seasoned/senior planning enforcement officer are wide and difficult to come by and replace. The career grade scheme …was specifically devised to help address difficulties and retention issues created by the shortage of such experience…one of the criteria for progression is the availability of work at the higher level. Tri-annual reporting to the [NAME_44] attests to an expansive workload, with increasing challenge and expectation. ..with only two officers to cover the [NAME_3] in this demanding and specialist field [Mr G’s ability and capacity] is crucial to the future success of the planning enforcement service. That in turn underpins the integrity of the Planning Applications Group itself.” At that time the fact that he was consistently working at a senior level was reason to progress him through the career grade.

20. [NAME_35] did want the service to develop and adopt more modern ways of working and was trying to move in that direction even during Mr G’s time due to the developing needs of the service but this had not yet been achieved. [NAME_36] is doubtful that this ever would have been achieved if Mr G had remained in post.

21. The claimant began working for the council as a Planning Technical Support Officer. She brought with her experience of enforcement in other fields. In particular she had worked for the [NAME_46] for many years (p915). She began assisting on a large project for the enforcement team which enabled [NAME_35] to have formed the view that she had potential to progress in his team when Mr G suddenly retired in August 2014 for personal reasons. He identified her as a potential replacement for Mr G. She shadowed Mr G before he left and all three shared the understanding she was replacing him. She was given a warrant card from the outset which enabled

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9 her to attend and inspect sites and gather evidence. [NAME_35]’s aspiration at least was that the claimant be fast-tracked through the career-grade scheme to replace Mr G. That aspiration was not however shared with [NAME_36].

22. [NAME_35] asked that the claimant be transferred on a temporary basis for 6 months. She therefore transferred on her existing grade but with an additional allowance to reflect her work on casework. Page 109 shows that by September 2014 she had been working closely with [NAME_35] for over 2.5 months and he described her as both under training but also “acting up” in Mr G’s absence (he took leave before he retired) and that they were successfully running the planning enforcement service together. [NAME_35] asked that she be flexibly deployed for at least 6 months.

23. The email said she was already taking on higher and demanding planning enforcement work, and the new team was credible and working but needed to be formalised. His concern was that she remained on the pay of a technical administrative grade. Around this time [NAME_35] must have modified his career grade scheme to that at pp935-940. Now the career progression envisaged a number of stages with different grades at both Planning Contraventions Officer level and Senior Planning Enforcement Officer level, starting just above the claimant’s Technical Officer level. We find this was done to provide a pathway of progression between the level of the claimant’s former post to the [NAME_39] level, within the role of Planning Contraventions Officer. These job descriptions at pp935-940 do differ from those in place when Mr G held the posts. Although the traditional enforcement elements are still there, as is reporting to [NAME_45], there is much greater emphasis on negotiating other outcomes, preventing breaches, avoiding court enforcement and [NAME_43], and multi-agency working. This reflected the direction [NAME_35] wanted to take the service (in order to respond to demand and have a successful enforcement team working on the higher priority more complex cases) and what he perceived were the claimant’s strengths in these areas even then. Under the new job descriptions the difference with the Senior role was that the postholder was to be an accredited member of the team doing the same duties as the Contraventions Officer but with more complex cases and presenting to a wider audience.

24. In [NAME_35]’s business case (attached to page 109) the post referred to was “Planning Contraventions Officer/Senior Planning Enforcement Officer”. There he focused on the team’s need for the Claimant’s specialist knowledge and transferrable enforcement skills and a creative problem solving mindset. He said the level of police style work was being reviewed. He proposed the role be ring-fenced to the claimant because she was giving pivotal specialist advice and conducting casework with him spanning the full range of the job. He said they were currently running the service together and developing new approaches to the work (p111). The police style work review was dependent on whether Mr G could continue in any form and the outcome of a review by the [NAME_44] on the required level of that style of planning enforcement. He further said of the claimant at page 112 she “holds very specific (and directly applicable skills) in [NAME_47] and related fields which

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10 have already been successfully transferred into an existing and major case…In addition…[she had] authentic case-working and court reporting experience and has issued warrants for arrest…and has further displayed remarkable and creative problem solving skills supported by financial astuteness and related accounts experience”.

25. From 1 September 2014 the claimant was given 7 months with an additional responsibility allowance to cover specialist advice and case support. This decision was reported to the [NAME_45] under staffing updates as “[NAME_48]’s post is being filled by the claimant/[NAME_35] and this will be reviewed after 6 months” (p116).

26. [NAME_35] then in March 2015 requested the claimant become permanent based on the same reasons plus further successful and innovative work and a positive appraisal. He said she has undoubted talent, particularly exceptional people and networking skills which were pulling in additional capacity including from other regulatory bodies (p122).

27. The request was granted for a further month pending a further review of the enforcement service (p123). The incremental month by month extensions continued until September- again “pending further review”. An email from [NAME_35] to [NAME_36] (P126) shows by June 2015 the extent of the claimant’s influence in the team’s development towards combatting more sophisticated organised crime on a multi-agency level.

28. By the end of July 2015 [NAME_35] was frustrated at the lack of response to his request and sought the help of [NAME_50] who was just in her first Director level role (pp134-135). This communication makes clear that his vision was that the claimant be appointed to his updated job descriptions and career structure in parity with the wider planning group. He said there she has specialist skills and abilities and had been doing the role successfully for over a year. He said there was no-one else with the intellect and range of personal, enforcement and emotional intelligence skills. He wanted pay adjustment back to 1 April 2015. His frustration was in part due to concern that the claimant might miss the start of her training course in October that year.

29. [NAME_36] then decided to appoint the claimant to the role of planning contravention officer (p136). She said she had updated the job description to reflect the outcome of the review by the [NAME_45] being the need for the enforcement team to be more cross-party working with other regulators, organised around an intelligence led approach. This was [NAME_35]’s desired move away from the more traditional “police-style” legal enforcement approach to more modern multi-agency responses. As already said above, he said this matched the claimant’s strengths.

30. At some point the grades changed from KS to [NAME_51]. The claimant was put on [NAME_14] pay point £20,168 from 1 October 2015. This was against [NAME_35]’s advice to put her straight onto [NAME_52] in his career grade scheme. There is

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11 reference that there was already discussion of her being regraded with the intention that her 2016 appraisal would form part of her case for upgrading.

31. [NAME_35] raised an issue at the end of the year that they were still awaiting the relevant paperwork for their appraisals. In that he references the claimant now having 2 years’ successful experience in planning enforcement and also records a significant achievement in respect of one of the larger cases.

32. The re-grade had not been considered by July 2017 when [NAME_35] made points in support of a re-grade. He argued the claimant was at that point a minimum of [NAME_16] with the claimant having important transferred skills and now 3 years in planning enforcement. She also had an Accounting Technician qualification. Again he mentioned a key success. He mentioned a number of comparators but not Mr G. He made further submissions in August 2017. He said over the two years since October 2015 the claimant had further developed in the role and she had completed ¾ of her training. The role and the service itself had been developed and smart links made to other parts of the [NAME_53]. He said the claimant had provided a great deal of the creative thought and energy behind this, way beyond a [NAME_14]. He referred again to intelligence led work being one of many initiatives the claimant had developed within the planning enforcement field and referred to work contributing to an Environment Agency prosecution. He described their team as dealing with an extremely difficult brief under extremely difficult circumstances.

33. These requests evolved into a job evaluation request on the basis he believed the claimant was performing at either [NAME_16] or even [NAME_38] (158). His notes of a meeting at this time say of the claimant: [redacted] – brilliant creative thought new approach endorsed by Members and HMRC – successful, groundbreaking. Significant saving on a project directly credited to her” (see 161). He said there she was under-graded at a [NAME_14] and he submitted a case for [NAME_16] in early July.

34. In April 2018 the claimant obtained her [NAME_18] in planning enforcement (p174). The lack of progress on the re-grading eventually was raised by a [NAME_37] directly with the Head of HR (13 November 2018) leading to an HR Manager being appointed to do the job evaluation.

35. As of December 2018 [NAME_35] said “the team is constantly seeking new and better outcomes in a realistic and resource-efficient way…. fighting organised crime…”This was being done by integration of council services in inventive ways and a new style of collegiate action across the regulatory authorities with the respondent taking the public sector lead on selective cases to ensure a co-ordinated action. He credited the claimant with this development (p177).

36. There were meetings between the HR Manager and the claimant, [NAME_35] and [NAME_36] in January 2019 followed by a resolution meeting which commenced in May 2019 and completed in September 2019. Despite the delays it was agreed that the regrading exercise needed to be completed with

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12 the utmost urgency and that [NAME_14] was too low. [NAME_35]’s notes of the May meeting, which were not disputed, show his understanding was that the career framework leading to the Senior Planning Enforcement Officer Level was still in place and there was no need to change either job description. It was agreed the claimant met [NAME_51] 8 and had the required qualification and training elements of [NAME_38]. There was further discussion about how she met [NAME_38] and even [NAME_17] requirements. A grading of [NAME_38] and to a degree [NAME_16] were resisted by [NAME_36] who considered she needed more information about the claimant’s independence and how the team worked together.

37. Ultimately, in around August 2019 the claimant was re-graded to a [NAME_51] 8, backdated to 1 January 2018. There was no rationale relating to the claimant’s role and progression for choosing this date, the re-grade having been requested much earlier. We presume it was chosen as the start of the calendar year.

38. The claimant’s application (p402) had proposed a grade of [NAME_16], linking to [NAME_38]-10 on qualification/accreditation. When signing it, [NAME_36] crossed out the reference to [NAME_38]-10. The explanation for why she crossed that out is in her accompanying email to the HR Manager (p433-434) which was not copied to the Claimant and [NAME_35]. They only became aware of the crossing out in these proceedings. That email is misleading in that it says [NAME_22]’s evaluation had been done on only the lower job description of his career grade scheme. She said the business need is limited to that job description and not the Senior description. She had not considered the regrading against the Senior description and said she therefore expressed no view on the claimant’s potential to fulfil it. She said that due to the lack of business need she was unable to agree to the linking. She said she had advised the claimant and [NAME_35]. We accept she did tell the claimant there was no business need for 9+ as the claimant says this is what she was told on page 713 in her later grievance. At the time they were not aware of the crossing out itself.

39. At the time the claimant and [NAME_35] accepted the decision to re-grade to [NAME_16] on a pragmatic basis. They did not agree with [NAME_36]’s view on business need. The rationale for her decision appears to be limited to the fact that, in her view, the role is successfully being done by the Claimant at [NAME_16] and [NAME_35] at [NAME_54] (as later expressed in the grievance) and if the claimant is performing above that grade then that’s by choice and not a requirement and not evidence that work at that level is needed. She has not explained why, with the workload increasing and becoming more demanding, her comments at p920 do not still stand. We find that the reality is that they do- the team is still a team of 2 dealing with enforcement for the [NAME_3] doing demanding and specialist work requiring both members of the team to have capacity at the experienced professional level.

40. The claimant’s evidence to us, which we accept, was that initially when she was new there was a period of time learning the role and [NAME_35] made key decisions, but eventually – right from almost the outset –she did the full duties of a planning contravention officer. She was visiting sites, writing

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13 reports (initially with input from [NAME_35]) and dealing with the initial complaint to final resolution. She has determined 3 lawful use applications. She would be able to give factual evidence if required in a public inquiry or court. She and [NAME_35] increasingly worked together as an equal partnership (save for [NAME_35]’s team leader duties) jointly problem-solving in a two-person team with constant capacity pressures and urgent live cases. The claimant was doing case development work under her own steam. She made her own decisions to investigate a case or to determine strategy and direction. They do go to sites together for health and safety reasons and as a team of two are in regular communication.

41. . In the period since the claimant’s employment with the team the work has been fast moving, there is a lot of field and document work and high pressure. [NAME_35] says the workload has over the period of her employment become greater, more demanding and more scrutinised. It is more intense and pressured.

42. [NAME_43] are an expensive form of enforcement. We accept [NAME_35]’s evidence that the claimant successfully seeks alternative cheaper resolutions. With the claimant as part of the team they tend to work more with other authorities in a multi-agency way. On occasion they still need to prepare for court, for example an attempt to get an injunction in a major case when they both went on site and took evidence and both would have given evidence had that been needed.

43. [NAME_35]’s evidence is that since her obtaining her certificate and gaining increasing breadth of experience the claimant has for some time been working at the more advanced level, [NAME_42] at least, judged by the way she works, how she takes on tasks, how she works under her own steam and the level of her grasp of a case. She is achieving the same results as Mr G without the need for court.

44. We accept this. In terms of identifying when she made this transition we find it likely that she had done so by April 2021, when she had equivalent years of experience as Mr G when he was re-graded, and when she became eligible for Associate level membership of the [NAME_40]. We do not accept it was upon qualification in April 2018 as she and [NAME_35] accepted the re-grade to [NAME_16] in September 2019 (though we acknowledge she was already working above that grade in some respects).

45. [NAME_35]’s evidence is that he is not a supervisory person. He sees his role as being to free up his team member as much as possible to use their abilities and they jointly discuss how to play things. He says the claimant sees what needs to be done on a case, like her predecessor, and works on it and brings it to his attention when she has analysed it to a degree. Their conversations then are very interactive. They have to get on and share the load and at times this means he follows the claimant’s lead if she is more expert. He said he has been doing this work a long time, but the claimant’s ideas have the capacity to stun him. He is reliant on her. In particular she has an incredible ability to take a complex matter and reduce it to 5 or 6 bullet

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14 points to be able to communicate the situation (a requirement of the [NAME_42] person specification). She is more than a support, but a vital work colleague. It is correct though that although she has done some of the traditional enforcement work she has not had to give evidence at an Inquiry (as she has successfully avoided the need for one) and she has not served an enforcement notice.

46. Historically the planning enforcement of permitted sites was done by the Planning Officers. However Members were concerned that there was insufficient capacity for this work. From late 2020 until September 2021 a very experienced planning enforcement officer who had managed another council’s planning enforcement functions for 20 years was employed as a consultant. From September 2021 until April 2022 he continued to do the work on a part-time basis through the respondent’s agency. When he resigned the respondent sought to create a permanent full-time position to do the work. A job evaluation was conducted around March 2022 (p 548-566) That document sets out the job evaluation key descriptors against each grade.

47. In May 2022 the respondent unsuccessfully advertised for a [NAME_17] Senior Planning Enforcement Officer for permitted sites. This was led by Member concerns to have a designated enforcement officer dealing with enforcement of breaches at permitted sites, work previously done by planning officers. It was placed at the same level as [NAME_35] in the structure reporting directly to [NAME_36]. The purpose of that role is to take a specific lead in monitoring and enforcement of permitted development breaches. The tasks involved are very similar to the claimant’s job role, though with less emphasis on alternatives to enforcement and greater emphasis on traditional enforcement methods, and with the addition of supervision and training of staff and assisting the group head. The qualification required was to hold or be eligible for Membership of the [NAME_40].

48. The claimant was not encouraged to apply and found out after the deadline. From August 2022 Mr W has been filling that role through the respondent’s agency. At that time he was a Planning Enforcement Manager at another council leading and training a larger enforcement team, having a number of years’ experience as a Senior Enforcement Officer before that. He also has a police background.

49. On 22 November 2022 the post was re-advertised at [NAME_55]. HR advised [NAME_36] to invite the claimant to apply despite the fact she evidently had misgivings about the claimant’s ability in the role (589). HR suggested flexible ways to appoint the claimant if need be. Her misgivings particularly for [NAME_55] are evident in her reply though she did acknowledge the claimant would meet most of the [NAME_17] criteria (594). That recruitment was also unsuccessful and the temporary agency postholder remains on the [NAME_17] grade. The person specification requires a relevant degree or equivalent and to hold or be eligible for Membership of the [NAME_40]. The temporary postholder is not a member.

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15

50. [NAME_35] raised the pay disparity with that role and the claimant submitted a grievance for pay equality on 13 December 2022 (610-11). The grievance investigation report (17 April 2023) is at 710-724. It shows that the Claimant and [NAME_35] still referred to the career structure. She compared her grade to her current comparators in this case. [NAME_35] referred to their difficult work being paid less than the easier work of permitted site breaches. He says that both the claimant’s role and the permitted sites role are planning enforcement but the permitted sites work is the easier end of the spectrum dealing with single sites. The claimant deals with multiple sites and organised crime operating across a number of sites. She works with external bodies and regulators.

51. In that grievance process [NAME_36] said that if the claimant was performing above a [NAME_51] 8 and they had a need she would be open to considering a regrade but at the moment they do not have need for a [NAME_17] in the team because the function is shared between [NAME_35] at [NAME_54] and the claimant at [NAME_16]. She had not received any further application for a re- grade. It was found during the grievance that “roles within the Planning Applications Group have been traditionally filled by ex-police officers, which is an industry dominated by male employees”. The grievance was not upheld, but it was acknowledged that the claimant was working beyond her job description and it suggested a review of the job requirements and career progression. It otherwise did not find that she was being underpaid as there were differences in the roles.

52. On 13 June 2023 there was a reconvened resolution meeting at which it was recommended that there was a review of the claimant’s work and the requirements of the unit and a more open dialogue about career development.

53. The claimant appealed the grievance. At the appeal she presented a comparison of her own job description and the two other relevant job descriptions. In the outcome, dated 8 September 2023, [NAME_50] acknowledged that there were many similarities but a key difference was the claimant’s job description at [NAME_39] indicated more of a support role. She acknowledged that the claimant might in fact be working above that level. She acknowledged she does not look at the work being done in practice. Again it was recommended that the claimant’s role be re-evaluated and she was offered free career coaching.

54. The claimant went to ACAS on 17 October and obtained a certificate on 28 November 2023. The claimant submitted this claim on 20 December 2023.

55. The respondent still undertook what they refer to as a further job evaluation. [NAME_35] made some points as set out in the email 22 November 2023. These included that the three previous planning enforcement officers had been awarded [NAME_42] at the appropriate time. He said the claimant was now eligible for the 7 year threshold for Associate Membership of the [NAME_40] and [NAME_56] on the 10 year rule.

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16 56. The job evaluation was undertaken in August 2024 by [NAME_57]. The specific request this time was that the claimant was regraded to the Senior Planning Contraventions Officer role ([NAME_38]-[NAME_17]). He accepted that the Group has the career structure of the two roles. He decided he was to assess whether she met the relevant person specification and not whether there was a requirement for the relevant level post. He looked at evidence provided by the claimant and [NAME_35] and has made some assumptions adverse to the claimant where the evidence is inconclusive. For example, he assumed that because the team of two are in contact every day there is a question as to whether the claimant was working independently, and because [NAME_35] was the last to save a document meant there was a question over how much of it was the claimant’s work. We note this was not a job evaluation akin to that done in preparation for the permitted sites role (starting at p548).

57. He did acknowledge that there was strong evidence of the claimant working in a multi-disciplinary environment and leading collective thinking; and has the required excellent people skills. He also found that she was deputising for [NAME_35] at times. He took account that the claimant had not obtained the Membership of the [NAME_40] and that [NAME_36] had reduced [NAME_35]’s assessment in her appraisal from “excellent” to “successful”.

Relevant law

58. S65(1)(a) Equality Act 2010 states the work of a claimant (A) is equal to the work of B if it is like B’s work. S65(2) and (3) further define A’s work as like B’s work if (a) A’s work and B’s work are the same or broadly similar and (b) such differences as there are between their work are not of practical importance in relation to the terms of their work. It is necessary to have regard to (a) the frequency with which differences between their work occur in practice, and (b) the nature and extent of the differences.

59. From the cases referred to by the parties the following apply. The comparison is a broad and pragmatic assessment. A pedantic approach should be avoided. The focus is on the work done in practice and the kinds of skill and knowledge required to do it. A purposive approach entails that if it is A’s work that is more onerous it may still be like work.

60. It is for the claimant to show the work is the same or broadly similar but it is for the respondent to show that any differences are sufficiently significant that the work is not like work.

61. The effect of ss64 and 66 are that if A’s work is equal to B’s work, and if a term of A’s work is less favourable than a term of B’s work, her term is modified so as not to be less favourable. However under s 69 Equality Act 2010 this is not the case if the respondent shows that the difference in terms is because of a material factor reliance on which (a) does not involve treating A less favourably because of her sex than B is treated; and (b) if the factor is

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17 indirectly discriminatory because of sex, that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

62. The respondent must show the factor is material in the following senses: it is not a sham or pretence; it is the cause of the disparity; it is significant and relevant in terms of the circumstances of A and B. It must be transparent and the respondent must be able to explain what the factors mean; how they were assessed and how they apply to the circumstances of the case. The factors relied on must be the full explanation for the differential.

63. A factor is indirectly discriminatory if A shows that as a result of that factor both A and persons of the same sex as A doing work equal to A’s are put at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons of the opposite sex doing work equal to A’s.

Conclusions

Mr G – 2009 to 31 March 2010

Between 20 December 2017 and 31 December 2017, was the Claimant performing like work to that performed by Mr G during the comparison period?

64. This 11 day period is the period between the backdated date the claimant’s role was evaluated to [NAME_16] (and paid accordingly) and the earliest date that she can claim equal pay from due to the tribunal deadlines. It is therefore a somewhat artificial question especially as we have no evidence of work done by the claimant during that period, which we note spans Christmas. Her case as we understand it is really that she should have been paid at [NAME_16] level, like her predecessor, dating back atleast to July/August 2017 when [NAME_35] was requesting an already belated re-grade. If that is the case then this applies in the relevant 11 day period prior to 1 January 2018. We have had no evidence to distinguish the work the claimant did in late 2017 with the work from 1 January 2018.

65. The claimant has conceded the work was not the same as her comparator’s work and relies on it being broadly similar.

66. We do find the two roles broadly similar, both being the role of planning contraventions officer in a 2-person team of officers, with [NAME_35], providing the specialist planning enforcement function covering the [NAME_3], as per the requirements of the [NAME_44] Members. We accept she was recruited to replace her predecessor and fulfil his role in that team, on a similar career path to the one he had followed.

67. They both essentially investigated complaints, gathered evidence and conducted enforcement casework in respect of planning breaches on unauthorised sites.

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18 68. We then considered whether such differences as there were between their work were or were not of practical importance in relation to the terms of their work. We took account that it is necessary to have regard to (a) the frequency with which differences between their work occur in practice, and (b) the nature and extent of the differences.

69. The main difference is that the [NAME_45] Members had endorsed a change in focus from traditional-style enforcement to multi-agency work seeking alternative cost-saving enforcement solutions. This meant the predecessor gave evidence at [NAME_43], drafted and served enforcement notices and took cases to court, for example the Magistrates Court. He gave evidence at 1 inquiry during the earlier part of his employment (though that was considered evidence that he was working at a higher level). We do not know how often he attended the Magistrates’ Court at this time. However, overall what [NAME_36] said is that although she remembers him attending regularly, what she remembers about it is him returning and complaining that the case had not in fact gone ahead.

70. On the other hand the emphasis of the claimant’s role was prevention and she negotiated alternative outcomes in increasingly complex cases with an organised crime element. This did not mean she was not still required to give factual evidence at inquiries or court and take cases to court if needed. It was not needed in practice as she successfully achieved alternative outcomes.

71. We note that [NAME_35] had wanted to take the team in this new direction even when Mr G was still in post.

72. We do not consider this difference of practical importance in relation to the terms of the work. There are career grade schemes with commensurate grades for each time period. So this difference in emphasis did not necessarily mean a difference in pay grade. The knowledge and skill requirements for each role were broadly similar but reflected this change in emphasis. There was an essential requirement for the holder of Mr G’s role to have previous experience in preparation of evidence at [NAME_43], Court Hearings or other statutory tribunals; whereas the claimant’s role required good research and analytical skills in the reactive and preventative spheres of planning enforcement and ability to participate in multi-disciplinary projects.

73. There is a difference in the grades in that it is only the later career scheme that began on KS6. This reflects that the entry skills and knowledge requirements were lowered to A-levels and equivalent and a willingness to undertake the training course of study leading to a professional planning qualification and eligibility for [NAME_58]. This was to facilitate the claimant’s transfer and was the reason why the claimant was initially paid at the KS6 level. However by December 2017 we find it likely she was meeting the requirements of [NAME_39], as she was from 1 January 2018. She had by then 3 years’ relevant experience and the [NAME_47] experience before that. Therefore we do not consider this difference between the career grade scheme was a difference of practical importance in the terms of their work by December 2017.

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19

74. The difference in career grade and the difference in the role’s emphasis is not the reason the claimant was paid differently by this 11 day period but rather the choice to backdate the re-grade to 1 January 2018 rather than to the date of the request for the re-grade. This was presumably due to the convenience of the start of the calendar year. There is no evidence it was chosen because of any difference in the claimant’s work by that stage.

75. On one occasion in this period Mr G gave expert evidence which he was able to do by virtue of his technical membership. This was not a requirement of his role at that time and did not happen sufficiently frequently to be of practical importance in respect of the terms of work.

76. We accept the claimant contributed to [NAME_45] reports rather than presenting them. However it is not clear if this is a difference in respect of the period before Mr G was promoted. His job description did not require it when he was Planning Contraventions Officer. In any event Committees are not frequent, and he shared the presentation of reports with [NAME_35] (who has never missed a meeting) such that we find this difference insufficiently significant to justify a difference in pay, or terms of work, when she was otherwise at that time successfully doing the enforcement work and the change of direction required by the Members and she was performing at “a solid [NAME_16]”.

77. We note that the giving of expert and factual evidence at inquiry were in any event reasons used to justify Mr G’s promotion to [NAME_51] 10 so it is not the reason for the difference in pay in respect of his employment prior to that.

78. The tribunal is not required and has not taken any view as to whether at any earlier point in her employment the claimant was doing broadly similar work to Mr G when he started his employment on [NAME_39].

Can the Respondent show that the difference between the pay of Mr G and the Claimant was because of a material factor which did not involve treating the Claimant less favourably because of the Claimant’s sex?

79. The claimant’s role had been classed as a strong [NAME_16] from 1 January 2018 and there is no evidence to suggest she was working at a lower level for the 11 days prior to that, especially as her regrading request predated that period. We find the difference in pay between Mr G and the Claimant was because of the respondent’s choice to backdate the claimant’s pay to 1 January 2018 rather than the date the re-grade was first raised. This date was not picked due to one of the material factors relied on below. We have been given no reason related to the claimant’s role or performance that it was not backdated earlier to 20 December 2017 or earlier. We will nevertheless address each of the material factors relied on by the respondent below.

The material factors relied upon by the Respondent are:

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20 the differences in the role done by Mr G compared to the Claimant, due to the change in the nature of the work and the lowering of the demands placed upon the role holder;

80. We agree that the role was changed at the time the claimant was transferred. This was to make the function of the service more modern and less traditional and make the most of the skills brought by the claimant. This was a direction [NAME_35] already wanted to take when Mr G was still in post but which had not been successful. Specifically this involved less emphasis on traditional enforcement work and planning and a greater emphasis on preventative and negotiated solutions that avoided costly inquiries and enforcement, that brought in multi-agency working and tackled the increasing problem of organised crime. We accept the evidence of [NAME_35] that this was not a lowering of demands at all. We accept that the traditional enforcement notice/court work (at least at the Magistrates Court level) is more routine and that the particularly complex work of the service is that involving multi-agency alternative solutions to the higher stakes cases. In any event this, as set out above, was not the reason the claimant’s pay increase to [NAME_16] was not back-dated to 20 December 2017.

81. It is right that Mr G had attended a public inquiry and given evidence prior to the period when he was made a Senior Enforcement Officer at [NAME_17] and that over his employment as a whole he also presented to [NAME_45] more often than the claimant. We have no evidence that if there had been a public inquiry that the claimant would not have given factual evidence if relevant, but instead she successfully worked to avoid expensive solutions of that nature. In any event these were reasons to justify his promotion to [NAME_42] and are not genuinely the reasons that the claimant’s pay was kept at [NAME_14] from 20-31 December 2017.

that Mr G entered his role with a greater degree of experience than the Claimant.

82. We accept that by 2009 Mr G had a greater degree of experience than the claimant had when she started in the team. Neither had planning enforcement experience when they started working for the council and both had to do the planning enforcement course whilst working for the council. It is true he had transferable skills from the police force and army intelligence, but the claimant had transferable skills from other enforcement experience including with the [NAME_46]. However by 2009 he had completed his course and had achieved technical membership of the [NAME_40]. These were reasons he was promoted but we infer that he therefore did have more relevant experience in 2009 than the claimant had when she started working in planning enforcement.

83. We find that the claimant joining the team with no experience in initially a support role was the reason that the job description and person specification were amended to include lower grades and adapted to remove some essential experience that was no longer considered essential. This could have been a material factor in initially paying the claimant less, at [NAME_14] level (though we have not been asked to make a comparison with Mr G when he first started). However that factor was no longer operative by December 2017. The claimant

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21 had 3.5 years’ experience and was nearing completion of her course by that time. [NAME_35] had supported a re-grade since atleast July 2017 based on her experience.

that Mr G was fulfilling the requirements of his role, requirements which the Claimant’s role did not have, or had only on a lesser basis.

84. It is right that Mr G had attended a public inquiry and given both expert and factual evidence prior to the period when he was made a Senior Enforcement Officer at [NAME_17]. We have no evidence that if there had been a public inquiry that the claimant would not have given factual evidence if relevant, but instead she successfully worked to avoid expensive solutions of that nature. In any event these were reasons to justify his promotion to [NAME_59] and are not genuinely the reasons that the claimant’s pay was kept at [NAME_14] from 20-31 December 2017. Over his employment as a whole he also presented to [NAME_45] more often than the claimant, though it was not a requirement prior to his promotion and she did contribute to the reports to [NAME_45]. We do not consider this difference of practical importance in respect of the terms of their work nor the reason that her pay remained at [NAME_14] level in December 2017.

85. Having made the findings above we do not need to consider whether reliance on the previous work experience referred to above as a material factor is indirectly discriminatory. The respondent has not satisfied the burden that there is a material factor explaining the difference in pay in the relevant period that did not involve treating the claimant less favourably because of her sex.

Mr G – 1 April 2010 to August 2014

Between 1 April 2018 and the date that the claim was presented, was the Claimant performing like work to that performed by Mr G during the comparison period? That is the date on which the Claimant completed the “[NAME_18]” course.

86. We do find the two roles broadly similar, both being responsible in a 2-person team of officers with [NAME_35] for the [NAME_3]’s enforcement of high priority and complex cases. As before she was recruited to replace him in that team, on a similar career path to the one he had followed up to his leaving.

87. They both essentially investigated complaints, gathered evidence and conducted enforcement casework in respect of planning breaches on unauthorised sites.

88. We then considered whether such differences as there were between their work were or were not of practical importance in relation to the terms of their work. We took account that it is necessary to have regard to (a) the frequency with which differences between their work occur in practice, and (b) the nature and extent of the differences.

89. There are differences between the roles. In terms of the day to day work the difference is, as before, that the emphasis has changed from lawful use

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22 applications and traditional enforcement to finding cost effective alternatives with other agencies. The workload has become more demanding and increasingly involves organised crime.

90. This difference is not in itself of practical importance because again there is a senior role in the new career scheme which reflects the change of focus for work at the advanced/professional level. We do not accept [NAME_36]’s evidence that there has been no business case for someone working above KS 8 since the claimant was appointed, even if the claimant is practically doing so. [NAME_36] has not really provided any justification for a change in position from the view she expressed in Mr G’s re-grade that with just two officers providing the enforcement function for the [NAME_3] the more capacity and skill they have the better. Especially as the work is now even more complex and demanding.

91. In the comparison period Mr G had been promoted to a Senior Planning Enforcement Officer. This involved being a professional member of the Planning Group. Additional duties included the handling and determination of lawful use applications. It involved working on major enforcement cases and specifically the more complex cases and presenting at [NAME_44] and public meetings. He had to conduct all enforcement matters within line with legislation and other requirements.

92. There are also aspects in the job description that he did not really do such as development of other staff and assisting the Group Head.

93. He was required to, and did by then, have Technical Membership of the [NAME_40] and needed to be conversant with the requirements of PACE and RIPA and needed to have self confidence acting as an expert witness on behalf of the Council.

94. By 1 April 2018 the claimant had passed the [NAME_18] but did not have Technical membership. Around 2017 the rules for membership were changed and Associate membership after 7 years’ experience replaced technical membership. Therefore the claimant could not apply at that time but otherwise had 4 years’ experience and had passed the [NAME_18].

95. Over the period of time the claimant has worked for the respondent she has increasingly been involved in the major enforcement cases and the complex cases with a criminal element. She was increasingly working in partnership with [NAME_35] to cover the [NAME_3] in the enforcement field. He said they are a two-person team up against a lot increasingly “punching above their weight”. She has been involved in partnership with him on an equal level in investigating and seeking solutions in the complex cases on multiple sites and organized crime. She does work independently and sometimes she will take the lead.

96. She has determined 3 lawful use applications, but these do not come up frequently, as reflected by their omission from the Senior job description. She makes her own decisions to investigate a case or to determine strategy and direction. They do go to sites together for health and safety reasons and as a

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23 team of two are in regular communication but this is not evidence of a hierarchical relationship. In the period since the claimant’s employment with the team the work is fast moving, there is a lot of field and document work and high pressure. [NAME_35] says the workload is greater, more demanding and more scrutinised than in the comparison period. It is more intense and pressured.

97. If required she would give factual evidence at tribunal. As before, the emphasis of the team has changed to avoiding court and [NAME_43] as they are an expensive form of enforcement. The claimant has been instrumental in successfully taking the service in the direction [NAME_35] wanted (and which the planning [NAME_45] supported), and successfully seeks alternative cheaper resolutions. With the claimant as part of the team they tend to work more with other authorities in a multi-agency way. The claimant’s work has for some time been at the advanced level equivalent to that of Mr G. She is achieving the same results as Mr G without the need for court.

98. The relationship is not a level 8 and level 12 team but a partnership that relies on the claimant’s high level skill and [NAME_35] is frank in saying he would not be able to do some of this, or have moved the team in this direction, without her input, in particular her ability to take a complex matter and reduce it to 5 or 6 bullet points to be able to communicate the situation (an attribute needed for the [NAME_42] role).

99. We find at some point she began fulfilling the job role of the [NAME_42] senior role (without the formal accreditation required) though not as early as April 2018. It was accepted by [NAME_35] as late as September 2019 that her role was then a strong 8 with some elements above that level.

100. We note that not only is the focus on the work done in practice but also the kinds of skill and knowledge required to do it. By April 2021 we note that the Claimant had the same number of years’ experience as Mr G had by 2010, and was eligible for the Associate Membership of the [NAME_40]. We note that in a number of the respondent’s person specifications eligibility is considered sufficient. [NAME_35]’s evidence was that membership of the [NAME_41] is expensive to acquire and he did not consider it unreasonable of the claimant to wait to be on a higher pay grade to get it. In his view it is the eligibility to join which is important.

101. We find therefore that by April 2021 the differences in the level of the work done and the experience of each was no longer of practical importance with respect to the terms of work. We find that the technical absence of accreditation is not of practical importance in relation to the terms of work and she was by then of commensurate experience and doing the job at the advanced level.

102. As above we find the difference in respect of inquiries and court is not of practical importance. She would still need to do this in respect of factual evidence if it arose but has been successful in avoiding it. The giving of expert

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24 evidence does not happen sufficiently frequently to be of practical importance and indeed has been removed from the current [NAME_59] role.

103. We find that presenting to the public or to [NAME_45] did not happen often enough to be of practical importance. The same applies to the “working with head of service”.

104. As is evident from the conclusions above we find the respondent’s grading of each role was of practical importance to the terms of work for a period from April 2018. However by April 2021 the claimant was doing the work of [NAME_17] with the same number of years’ experience as her predecessor had when he was promoted. The difference in grading was no longer of practical importance, other than as an excuse to keep the claimant’s pay down.

105. We are invited to take account of the respondent’s evaluation in August 2024 (p1251). However we do not consider that of practical importance in terms of the terms of work as it is not an evaluation of the work the claimant was doing with reference to the key descriptors in the respondent’s job evaluation scheme. There was also no evaluation of her predecessor’s role.

The material factors relied upon by the Respondent are:

the differences in the role done by Mr G compared to the Claimant, due to the change in the nature of the work and the lowering of the demands placed upon the role holder;

106. Again we do not find the change in the nature of the work was a material factor explaining the disparity in pay as there were comparable career grade schemes for the work done by the team during each era. We do not accept there was a lowering of demands on the team. We accept [NAME_35]’s evidence that the demands on the team and the complexity have increased. We also accept that finding alternative enforcement solutions with other agencies is more advanced work than more routine serving of enforcement notices and attending court.

107. By the start of the relevant comparison period Mr G had 7 years’ experience, had completed the course and had technical membership of the [NAME_40]. This is one of the reasons why he was promoted

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25 to the Senior Enforcement Officer position in 2010. As [NAME_35] said he had become an independent professional and was paid accordingly. The claimant in April 2018 had 4 years’ experience, had passed the course but had not obtained membership. She was re-graded to [NAME_51] 8 (and not [NAME_17]) in September 2019 because of the perception of her performance rather than the experience and lack of membership, but membership is a key marker and [NAME_35] did compare her experience to Mr G’s. That Mr G had more experience by 2010 is a factor explaining the disparity at that time.

108. By April 2021 the Claimant was eligible for Associate Membership and had comparable length of experience as Mr G so we are not satisfied that the difference in experience continued to be an operating factor from that date. We find this was no longer a significant and relevant factor by April 2021.

109. We note that the absence of Membership of the [NAME_40] is one of the reasons [NAME_57] did not re-grade the claimant to the higher grade but do not find this a sufficient explanation. We note that other job descriptions support [NAME_35]’s evidence that eligibility is more important than actually having the membership.

110. We are not convinced that Mr G’s previous police experience has been a cause of the difference in pay but if it was we are not persuaded that it is sufficient explanation or untainted by sex given the claimant had years of comparable relevant experience in the [NAME_46] and it is not clear why the police experience would be a reason for higher pay other than a valuing of police-style skills over the claimant’s skills. See paragraphs 114-115 below. We do not consider it necessary to consider indirect sex discrimination here as we are not satisfied that, if this was a reason for the disparity in pay, that there is no direct discrimination.

111. As of April 2018 the claimant was not performing a role fully at the [NAME_17] level, though she did in part. This is reflected by the acceptance of the [NAME_16] outcome in the re-grade in August 2019. For a period this is a genuine and sufficient reason for the difference in pay. We accept that as at April 2018 the claimant was still performing the role at the [NAME_16] level, with some [NAME_38] and [NAME_17], whereas in the comparison period Mr G had progressed to performing at the [NAME_17] level as an independent professional. We accept that this was a material factor for a period of time after April 2018. However, by April 2021, if not before, the claimant was doing the more challenging advanced work at the [NAME_17] level, working with sufficient experience to be eligible for Associate Membership of the [NAME_40] and at that professional level.

112. From that date onwards we are not satisfied that there was a material factor causing the difference in pay which did not involve treating the claimant less favourably because of her sex.

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26 113. As the claimant’s experience has increased we accept she has at some point begun performing the job at the senior [NAME_17] level. We find that by 21 April 2021 she was working with [NAME_35] and independently as required as an equal professional at the advanced level and fulfilling the requirements of the role at that level.

114. The respondent has sought to say that if the claimant is working at that level she is not required to and is exceeding the requirements of her role. We have rejected [NAME_36]’s evidence that there is now no requirement for work above [NAME_16]. We have seen nothing to support this supposed business case. We find the reality is that there has been no change since [NAME_36] declared (at page 920) that “with only two officers to cover the [NAME_3] in this demanding and specialist field [the ability and capacity to work at the higher [NAME_17] level] is crucial to the future success of the planning enforcement service.” We note that in Mr G’s case the fact that he was performing the role at the [NAME_17] level was justification for his promotion up the career grade scheme. We have not had an explanation for the difference in the way the claimant and her comparator Mr G have been treated in relation to working beyond the grade 8 requirements.

115. We find the requirements of the role or the supposed business case is not the cause of the disparity from April 2021 and consider there was something else contributing to the respondent’s valuation of the claimant and her work that is left unexplained and may be to do with her sex. We are not satisfied that there is no sex taint to the way the respondent regards the claimant’s contribution to the team’s more modern way of working and the strengths she has in the less “visible” skills like emotional intelligence, people skills and team building, in comparison to the traditional “police-style” skills of her comparator. We cite as an example [NAME_36]’s persistent questioning of the claimant’s contribution as being at the higher level as it is not visible separate to [NAME_35]’s contribution, from which she chooses to infer a lack of independence, despite [NAME_35]’s strong support and endorsement of the level of the claimant’s work and his reliance on her work at an advanced level for the success of the team. We contrast with this the example she gave in evidence of Mr G’s contribution at the [NAME_42] level being regular but ultimately futile court trips that were adjourned or similar without being effective.

116. We do not consider that specific tasks such as the handling of lawful use applications; giving evidence at Inquiry/court and presenting to [NAME_45] and the public, were the reason for the difference in pay as the claimant’s role was part of a parallel career grade scheme but with different priorities.

117. We note [NAME_57] did not make any findings on the actual requirements of the role.

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

27 Mr W – June 2022 to the date of claim

Between June 2022 and the date of the claim, was the Claimant performing like work to that performed by Mr W during the comparison period?

118. We again consider the work is broadly similar. Both are investigating complaints and conducting planning enforcement casework at an advanced level.

119. The claimant works on unauthorised sites and Mr W works with permitted sites. The claimant works on the more complex cases whereas Mr W’s role deals with more straightforward cases. This difference is not of practical importance in respect of the terms of their work.

120. There are some notable differences however that we do find are of practical importance in respect of the terms of work and mean that they do not do like work. Firstly Mr W works through an agency and this is of practical importance in respect of the aspects of his renumeration (eg an agency rate) that are done for that reason.

121. The role is also tasked with taking the specific lead on the enforcement of breaches on permitted sites and as such is placed on a level with [NAME_35]’s role in the group structure, reporting directly to [NAME_36] the Head of Service (but without a team to lead). The role is expected to work independently. Although to date it may not have occurred much if at all, the job description does require the postholder to assist in the direction, supervision, training and development of the other staff within the Planning Applications group and develop enhanced procedures, processes and systems for the team’s activities.

122. Mr W himself works as an Enforcement Manager in another council and is therefore working at [NAME_35]’s level, but with a larger team to manage. He has a number of years as a Senior Enforcement Manager before that. He is not a Member of the [NAME_40].

123. We find the above are of practical importance in respect of the terms of work. The postholder is in their own independent team reporting direct to head of service and therefore is placed in a different level in the structure. They are expected to take the lead in respect of their work, albeit the work is at a less complex level than the claimant’s and they also have the potential to take some responsibility for others in the wider group. Therefore although the claimant’s enforcement work may be more complex the postholder is required to take the lead for their work and as such share some similarities with [NAME_35]’s role. The roles are therefore not like work.

Can the Respondent show that the difference between the pay of Mr W and the Claimant was because of a material factor which did not

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

28 involve treating the Claimant less favourably because of the Claimant’s sex? The material factors relied upon by the Respondent are: the differences between the work done by Mr W compared to that done by the Claimant?

that Mr W was fulfilling the requirements of his role, requirements which the Claimant’s role did not have, or had only on a lesser basis.

that Mr W was and is an agency worker for specific periods, which results in different benefits and pay compared to an employee.

124. We did not need to consider the material factor defence in respect of Mr W.

125. In short we find that the claimant’s work was like the work of her predecessor in the December 2017 period, and again from April 2021. We do not find she did like work to that of Mr W. She did not claim that her work was of equal value to Mr W and relied only on like work.

126. There will now be a remedy hearing to address the remedy aspects of the list of issues above, unless the parties are able to reach an agreement as to the award.

Approved by Employment Judge Corrigan

27 February 2026

Sent to the parties on: 3 March 2026

For the Tribunal Office

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

29

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Recording and Transcription

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CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

1

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant:

[redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ashford (by video)

On: 29 April 2026

Before: Employment Judge [NAME_4]

Remedy Judgment

1. Following the liability judgment dated 27 February 2026, sent to the parties on 3 March 2026, that the respondent had breached a sex equality clause, the tribunal makes the following declarations as to the rights of the parties:

1.1 The claimant’s contract for the period 21-31 December 2017 is modified so that her grade was increased to [NAME_16] and her pay to the bottom of the [NAME_16] pay range at that date/2.5% above her existing pay rate/her pay rate from 1 January 2018 (whichever was the higher).

1.2 The claimant’s contract for the period from 21 April 2021 is modified so that her grade became [NAME_17] and her pay the bottom of the [NAME_17] salary range at that date/a 2.5% increase on her existing pay rate (whichever was the higher).

1.3 The claimant’s contract provided for her pay to be reviewed annually and the annual percentage increases that were applied to the claimant since 21 April 2021 would have still applied to the modified salary in the same way.

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

2

2. The respondent is ordered to pay an award to the claimant of arrears of pay as follows (subject to tax and National Insurance):

2.1 £207.95 for the period 21-31 December 2017; and

2.2 £25,732.25 for the period 21 April 2021 – 29 April 2026.

Our understanding is that the tax is calculated according to the dates of

entitlement and not the dates payment is made.

3. The total for the first period (21-31 December 2017) was agreed. The total for the second period was agreed and was calculated as follows: Period Proportion of year Actual salary Modified grade Modified salary Annual increase Loss for the period 21.4.21- 31.3.22 0.944444444 £29,588.16 [NAME_17] £34,351.00 £4,498.24 1.4.22- 31.3.23 1 £30,333.00 [NAME_17] £35,215.74 2.5173580% £4,882.74 1.4.23- 31.03.24 1 £32,333.00 [NAME_17] £37,537.68 6.5934790% £5,204.68 1.4.24- 31.3.25 1 £32,769.00 [NAME_17] £38,043.86 1.3484680% £5,274.86 1.4.25- 31.3.26 1 £33,752.00 KSH £39,185.10 2.9997860% £5,433.10 1.4.26- 29.4.26 0.[PHONE] £35,035.00 KSH £40,674.62 3.8012560% £438.64

Total £25732.25

4. The respondent is also ordered to pay interest on the above sums calculated as follows (subject to tax and national insurance only if appropriate):

4.1 £139.08 for the 2017 period (8% of £207.95 over the entire 8.36 years

since the loss accrued);

4.2 £5,169.32 for the second period (8% of £25,732.25 over the 2.51 years

since 25 October 2023 – the midpoint of the period of loss (as calculated

by the respondent and agreed by the claimant).

5. The respondent is ordered to pay damages of £5,849.78 for the loss of pension that would have been accrued in accordance with her contract up to 13 January

CASE NUMBER: 2307642/2023

3 2025 if the claimant had been paid the above sums at the relevant time (subject to tax and national insurance but only if appropriate). The claimant opted out of the pension after 13 January 2025.

6. The pension sum was calculated by the respondent and agreed by the claimant. It is 2.04 % of the loss of pay up to 13 January 2025 (£18,717.64) x an adjusted multiplier of 15.32.

7. The total to be paid by the respondent to the claimant is £37,098.38.

Approved by Employment Judge Corrigan

29th April 2026 Sent to the parties on 1st May 2026 For the Tribunal Office

Recording and Transcription