Federal Court Dismisses Judicial Review Application as Moot

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260702 Docket: IMM-10919-24 Citation: 2026 FC 889 Ottawa, Ontario, July 2, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF [NAME] Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is the judicial review of a decision of an inland enforcement officer [Officer] refusing the Applicant’s request for a deferral of her removal which was scheduled for July 1, 2024. For the reasons that follow, I am dismissing this application for judicial review. Background [ 2 ] The Applicant is a citizen of China. She entered Canada in August 2021 as a student. On December 22, 2022, her application for an extension of her study permit was refused. She remained in Canada without status. An exclusion order was issued against her on July 20, 2023. On September 19, 2023, the Applicant was informed she could apply for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, however, she did not do so. [ 3 ] The Applicant married [APPELLANT] [NAME] on February 2, 2024. On May 8, 2024, he submitted an application for the Applicant to become a permanent resident of Canada as a member of the Spouse or [NAME]-Law partner in Canada Class [[NAME]]. [ 4 ] Because the [NAME] was submitted on May 8, 2024, which was after the Applicant was deemed removal ready when she was called for a pre-removal interview on April 29, 2024, she was not eligible for an administrative deferral under the Public Policy Under A25(1) of [NAME] . [ 5 ] On June 10, 2024, a Direction to Report for Removal was issued to the Applicant for removal to Guangzhou, China, on July 1, 2024. On June 20, the Applicant submitted a deferral request. The request sought the Applicant’s removal to be deferred pending a decision on her eligibility for permanent residence under the [NAME] or, in the alternative, for eight months from the scheduled removal date, until March 2025. [ 6 ] The Officer refused the deferral request by their decision dated June 21, 2024 [Deferral Decision]. On June 24, 2024, the Applicant submitted an Application for Leave and Judicial Review [ALJR] of the refusal of the Deferral Decision. The Applicant also brought a motion seeking a stay of removal. By order dated June 27, 2024, Justice Ahmed granted her motion and stayed her removal pending the disposition of the underlying ALJR. Justice Ahmed found that the Applicant met the serious issue branch of the tripartite test for a stay, including due to the Officer’s failure to respond to a key risk raised by the Applicant in her deferral request. Specifically, the risk arising from the alleged abuse inflicted on the Applicant by her family in China. [ 7 ] The Respondent submits that it subsequently made an offer to settle the ALJR but that the Applicant declined the offer. [ 8 ] In her Further Memorandum of Argument, the Applicant submits that the treatment by the Officer of some of the factors that were raised in her request for deferral was unreasonable. Specifically, she first submits that the Officer failed to address her submission that while she and her husband could reapply (after her removal) for permanent residence under the [NAME], they would be separated for a considerable amount of time as the Applicant’s husband is a refugee and cannot visit her in China. She submitted that it was also very unlikely that the Applicant would receive a visa to return to Canada during the processing of a new application given that she had remained in Canada without status. Second, the Officer failed to address the practical barriers to her return, being long processing times and the need for her to acquire an Authorization to Return which she claimed would complicate the process and further delay any chance of family unity. Third, the Officer failed to address her submission that her mother and elder brother had beaten her when she was growing up and that she feared she would suffer further physical harm from them if she were to return to China. [ 9 ] In its Further Memorandum of Argument, the Respondent does not respond to the Applicant’s submissions pertaining to the reasonableness of the Decision. Rather, the Respondent submits that the judicial review is moot, the Applicant’s request for “alternative relief” is improper, and that her conduct warrants an award of costs. [ 10 ] When appearing before me, counsel for the Respondent confirmed that the Respondent agrees that the Deferral Decision was unreasonable as a new risk had not been assessed by the Officer and that this would be sufficient to remit the matter back to the Canada Border Services Agency [[NAME]] for redetermination. Issues and Standard of Review [ 11 ] In my view, the issues can be framed as follows: Is the ALJR moot; If not, is the Officer’s decision reasonable; Should the request for “alternative relief” be granted, and; Do the circumstances warrant an award of costs against the Applicant. [ 12 ] The standard of review on the merits of the Officer’s decision is reasonableness. On judicial review the Court “asks whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility — and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 [ [RESPONDENT] ] at para 99). The ALJR is moot Respondent’s Position [ 13 ] The Respondent submits that mootness is a threshold issue. Applying the test for mootness to the circumstances of this matter demonstrates that the ALJR is moot. [ 14 ] The Respondent submits that this Court’s jurisprudence establishes that once the event that underpins a deferral request passes, the judicial review of the deferral decision becomes moot (citing [NAME] v [NAME] ), 2022 FC 13 [ [NAME] ] at paras 21-25). [ 15 ] In this case, the Applicant sought a deferral of eight months, until March 2025, to allow a “step one” determination of her [NAME] to be made. She has now remained in Canada for a period of longer than her deferral request and the ALJR is, therefore, moot. The Respondent argues that the outcome of this judicial review will have no practical effect on the rights of the parties because the decision was based on the request to defer removal until March 2025, which has already happened. The fact that the “step one” determination of the [NAME] is pending does not change the mootness of the application (citing to [NAME] at para 22). [ 16 ] Nor should the Court exercise its discretion to hear the matter even though it is moot. This is for three reasons. First, a decision on the merits of this deferral decision will not change the nature of the parties’ relationship. The underlying adversarial context created by the Applicant’s desire to remain in Canada until her [NAME] is determined and the Respondent’s efforts to remove her to China will continue – regardless of whether this Court decides the merits of the application or not. Second, a decision on the merits of the case will also not result in any judicial economy. Regardless of the outcome of this application, the Applicant will have the opportunity to seek another deferral when a new removal date is set. Third, the Applicant improperly raises new arguments relating to the pending [NAME] which were not raised earlier and therefore cannot be adjudged on an incomplete evidentiary [NAME]. Moreover, the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the new relief sought. [ 17 ] The Respondent submits that this application for judicial review is clearly moot and there is no reason for this Court to consider the merits of the decision. Applicant’s Position [ 18 ] When appearing before me, the Applicant submitted that there remains a live issue between the parties because the “step one” approval has not yet been granted. That is, the event for which the Applicant sought a deferral until, has not yet happened. Further, even if the current stay is exhausted at the determination of this judicial review, the reasons of the Court on the merits will have value for future decision-makers in this matter, in particular, knowing what, if anything, in the Deferral Decision was unreasonable will help to guide the next steps of this matter. In response to the Respondent’s submissions, the Applicant submitted that [APPELLANT] is distinguishable because in that case there was a qualification of the deferral request that does not exist in this matter. Rather, this matter is more closely aligned with [NAME] v [NAME]) , 2023 FC 721 [ [NAME] ] at para 15. Analysis [ 19 ] An assessment of whether an underlying application for judicial review is moot involves a two-step analysis as outlined by the Supreme Court in [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General) , 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC): First it is necessary to determine whether the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared and the issues have become academic. Second, if the response to the first question is affirmative, it is necessary to decide if the court should exercise its discretion to hear the case. [ 20 ] The determination of the first step depends on the proper characterization of the controversy that exists between the parties ( [NAME] v Canada (Minister of [NAME]) , 2009 FCA 81 [ [NAME] ] at para 29; [NAME] at para 21). As the Federal Court of Appeal found in [NAME] , it is not the passing of a removal date that is determinative in finding an application moot, rather it is the passing of events in respect to which the applicant was seeking a deferral of removal for ( [APPELLANT] at para 37; [NAME]. v [NAME]) , 2025 FC 1493 at para 12). Characterization involves looking at what the applicant requested in their deferral request ( [APPELLANT] v [NAME]) , 2010 FC 593 at para 42). [ 21 ] The jurisprudence also establishes that when the events that formed the basis of a deferral request have passed, the underlying application for leave and judicial review of the decision refusing deferral is moot ( [NAME] v [NAME]) , 2026 FC 216 [ [NAME] ] at para 4 and the cases cited within). [ 22 ] In this matter, the letter from the Applicant’s counsel to the Officer states that the Applicant is requesting that: … her removal be deferred, pending a decision on her eligibility for permanent residence as a member of the Spouse or [NAME]-Law Partner in Canada Class. In the alternative, the deferral is requested for eight months from the currently scheduled removal date, until March 2025. [ 23 ] The letter added that: The Application remains in process now. The expected processing time for this type of application is 10 months. This means the Application should receive a decision in or around March, 2025. Furthermore, [NAME] will generally send applicants an “approval in principle” letter, once eligibility has been assessed, but background and medical checks are still in process. Once this is received, applicants benefit from a regulatory stay of removal. Therefore, the Applicant may be exempt from removal even before March 2025. [ 24 ] In her affidavit filed in support of the deferral request, the Applicant states:

9. I am asking that this removal be postponed for 8 months, or until a decision can be made at to whether or not my application for permanent residence is approved in principle.

10. I understand that the current processing time for [NAME] applications like mine is just 10 months. Because mine was submitted in May 2024, it should receive a decision in or about March, 2025, and whether or not it will be approved in principle can be assessed even more quickly. …..

14. I am therefore asking to please have my removal deferred, just long enough for [NAME] to determine if I am eligible to be sponsored by my husband, so that we are not separated. [ 25 ] The Applicant appended as an exhibit to that affidavit a print-out from the [NAME] [[NAME]] webpage indicating a 10-month processing period for “Spouse or [NAME]-law partner living inside Canada: Outside Quebec” . The print-out also references the circumstance in which an application is “approved in principle” (which is often referred to as “Step One” ). This states that an application is approved in principle if “you have received a letter from [NAME] stating that you meet the permanent residence eligibility requirements , but you still have to pass the medical, security and background checks for you and, if needed, your family members” (emphasis added). [ 26 ] In her written submissions, the Applicant states that she had “made a written request that her removal be deferred, either until a step one decision was made on her eligibility for permanent residence in the [NAME], or until March 2025” . [ 27 ] In my view, it is clear from the [NAME] that the Applicant’s deferral request sought her removal from Canada to be deferred either until a step one (approval in principle) determination on her eligibility was made or, alternatively, until March 2025. Therefore, in this particular fact situation and based on the deferral request, the characterization of controversy between the parties is whether the deferral timeframes that the Applicant requested have now passed. [ 28 ] The Respondent submits that this matter is analogous to [NAME]. In that case the applicant sought a deferral until his application for permanent residence as a member of the [NAME] was decided, or for six months to allow him to wind down his business and to accompany his wife to a medical appointment, whichever was sooner. The applicant argued that the application was not moot because, although the removal date had passed, his permanent residence application had not been decided and, therefore, a live issue remained. Justice Favel reviewed the deferral request and found the application to be moot. He acknowledged that [NAME] holds that it is not the passing of the removal date that is determinative in finding an application to be moot, rather, “it is the passing of events in respect to which the applicant is seeking a deferral of his removal” that renders an application moot. He also acknowledged that the applicant’s permanent residence application had not then been determined but noted that a considerable amount of time beyond six months had passed. Further, that the request for deferral included a qualification with the words “whichever is sooner.” With respect to the first event, he found that there was no evidence that the spousal application had been processed or that it would be processed imminently. Further, that the second event, the six-month deferral, had passed. The second event was the sooner of the two requested reasons for deferral.

Accordingly, the applicant had already received the remedy he had been seeking, rendering the application moot. [ 29 ] In this matter, reading the deferral request letter together with the Applicant’s affidavit filed in support of that request, it is apparent that the Applicant anticipated that her application for permanent residence by way of the [NAME] would be determined by March 2025. She pointed out that it was possible that she would receive approval in principle of her eligibility (step one) even before that date. Thus, she requested her removal be deferred pending a decision on her eligibility for permanent residence (that is until she received the step one approval in principle) or, in the alternative, for eight months from the currently scheduled removal date, until March 2025. Because the March 2025 date was the anticipated timeframe for the processing of her final [NAME] (not just step one), it was anticipated to be the longer of her two requested time periods. [ 30 ] [NAME] , this is not a circumstance where there was an explicit qualification as to the occurrence of the sooner of two events. However, in this case, March 2025 was anticipated to be the longer of the two requested deferral timeframes. As March 2025 has passed, the Applicant has obtained the deferral relief that she sought (see for example, [NAME] v [NAME]) , 2013 FC 562 at para 26; [NAME] at para 5). As to [NAME] , there the deferral request was not concerned with deferral to specific times, rather the request was that removal be deferred pending the determination of a further Pre-Removal Risk Assessment application. [ 31 ] I note that, when appearing before me, [NAME] indicated that the purpose of providing the March 2025 date was in recognition of the likelihood that deferral to an undefined date would not be granted. While this may be so, the result was that the Applicant did not seek deferral until the [NAME] was granted, but to March 2025 when she anticipated that it would be. [ 32 ] As to whether this judicial review should be heard on its merits despite my finding that there is no live controversy between the parties and, therefore, that it is moot, the factors for consideration set out in [NAME] are: (1) the existence of an adversarial relationship between the parties; (2) the concern for judicial economy; and, (3) the need for the court not to intrude into the legislative sphere. [ 33 ] The third factor is not in play here. [ 34 ] Beyond the ALJR, which is concerned with the Deferral Decision that is temporal in nature, in the broader context there remains an adversarial relationship between the parties arising from the Applicant’s desire to remain in Canada until the [NAME] is determined which is in conflict with the Respondent’s mandate and efforts to remove her to China as expeditiously as possible. However, even in that broader context, and as the Respondent submits, those efforts will continue regardless of whether this Court determines the application for judicial review of the Deferral Decision on its merits. [ 35 ] This is also the case regardless of how the application may be disposed of if heard on the merits. That is because the existing stay lapses upon determination of the underlying ALJR – whether it is granted or denied – at which point removal efforts can recommence. The Applicant will then have the opportunity to seek another deferral of any new removal date. [ 36 ] In other words, as the removal proceedings will continue in any event, hearing the matter on its merits will not result in a saving of judicial resources. Nor do I agree with the Applicant’s submission that a decision on the merits will assist future decision-makers in this matter. In the event that a new deferral request is made, there will undoubtedly be new evidence and new submissions concerning events that have transpired since the Deferral Decision was made in June 2024. For example, the [NAME] indicates that on May 28, 2024, the [NAME] was given notice that the [NAME] believed that there were reasonable grounds to believe that he is inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 37(1)(a) of the IRPA because of his previous criminal charges and, as a result, a subsection 44(1) report had been prepared. When appearing before me, [NAME] also confirmed that cessation proceedings have been commenced against the [NAME] which are currently unresolved. While both of these matters are ongoing, it is probable that any determination of a new deferral request will include consideration of the status of these matters pertaining to the [NAME] as the determination of the [NAME] may well be dependent on this. [ 37 ] In any event, the Respondent has already conceded that the Deferral Decision was unreasonable. Therefore, nothing is gained by this Court expending judicial resources issuing reasons to confirm this ( [NAME] v [NAME]) , 2026 FC 190 at paras 42-44, 58-61). [ 38 ] In these circumstances, I am declining to exercise my discretion to hear this moot matter on its merits. Request for “alternative relief” Applicant’s position [ 39 ] In addition to seeking that the Deferral Decision be set aside and the deferral request re-assessed, in her Further Memorandum of Argument, the Applicant states that “given the passage of time” , she also seeks an “alternative form” of relief. She submits that the [NAME] is now well beyond normal processing times. And, regardless of the Court’s disposition of the application for judicial review, that the stay of removal will expire when that disposition is made. However, that the underlying dispute between the parties (which she does not identify) will continue. Therefore, she seeks a “continued stay of removal” until a decision is made on the [NAME]. She asserts that this relief would resolve the dispute between the parties, without requiring the re-assessment of the deferral request. [ 40 ] When appearing before me, [NAME] acknowledged that the requested “alternative relief” was highly unusual and that there is no obvious legal pathway by which it can be obtained. However, if granted, the request would avoid the need for a future deferral request. Recognizing that the current stay of removal will no longer be in force once this judicial review has been determined, Applicant’s counsel suggested that the Court could issue a deadline for a decision on the Applicant’s [NAME] and stay removal until such date. Respondent’s position [ 41 ] The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s request for alternative relief is improper. The Applicant did not include this request in her ALJR as required by Rule 5(1)(e) of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules , SOR/93-22 [ IRP Rules ]. Additionally, when an administrative tribunal has made a reviewable error, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to subsections 18.1(3) and (4) of the Federal Courts Act , RSC 1985, c F-7 to set aside the decision and remit it back to the tribunal for redetermination. [ADDRESS] does not have jurisdiction to substitute its own decision for that of the administrative decision-maker. This necessarily means that the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant a deferral until a step one (or approval in principle) decision has been made with respect to the Applicant’s permanent resident application ([NAME]), or to grant a regulatory stay for which she is not eligible. [ 42 ] Nor does the fact that the [NAME] has been pending longer than average processing times mean that the Court has sufficient evidentiary basis to make a finding that this relief is warranted. Average processing times are not a guarantee. Further, this issue arises for the first time in the Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Argument and the Respondent is prejudiced by not having an opportunity to lead any evidence in relation to it. [ 43 ] The Respondent submits that it is open to the Applicant to raise the length of time her [NAME] has been pending as a ground for deferral in a new request, or to challenge the delay as unreasonable in an application to this Court if she so chooses. However, she cannot rely on it in an evidentiary vacuum to seek what is effectively an administrative deferral or regulatory stay, for which she does not qualify, as alternative relief on a moot application. Analysis [ 44 ] As the Respondent submits, Rule 5(1)(e) of the IRP Rules requires that an application for leave shall set out the precise relief to be sought on the ALJR. [ 45 ] The Applicant did not raise her request for “alternative relief” in her ALJR. Rather, in the event leave was granted, she sought the following relief: An Order for a Writ of Certiorari quashing the decision of DSI 19564, dated June 21, 2024, first communicated to the Applicant on June 21, 2024, refusing the Applicant's inland (the Applicant is inside of Canada) request to defer removal; An Order for a Writ of Mandamus directing that the Respondent considers and processes the Applicant's request for deferral in accordance with the law to wit: i) the Applicant's request for deferral be re-assessed including an interview with the Applicant if deemed necessary for the successful processing of said application; ii) in the event the Respondent develops concerns with respect to the Applicant's aforementioned application, the Respondent apprise the Applicant of such concerns in such a way as to afford the Applicant an opportunity to disabuse the Respondent of such concerns; iii) Such other relief as this [ADDRESS] may deem just and equitable in the circumstances. [ 46 ] In her written submissions made at the leave stage she sought “relief as indicated in the Application for Leave and Judicial Review. Specifically, she seeks for the Decision to be set aside and the Deferral Request be sent back to be re-determined by a different decision maker, with instructions from the Court.” [ 47 ] The Applicant raised this new, “alternative relief” for the first time in her Further Memorandum of Argument, submitted on May 19, 2026. I agree with the Respondent that, having failed to raise it in her ALJR, the Applicant cannot now seek this alternative relief ( A.A. v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 366 at paras 45-50). [ 48 ] Further, even if this relief had been raised in the ALJR, I also agree with the Respondent that it is improper. Subsection 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act , sets out the powers of this Court on judicial review. This includes the power to quash, set aside, or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance with any directions that the Court considers to be appropriate, any decision of an administrative tribunal (18.1(3)(b)). However, it is not the role of this Court on judicial review to substitute its decision for that of an administrative decision-maker (see also [NAME] at para 83). In requesting her “alternative relief” , the Applicant is essentially asking this Court to make a determination on the deferral request (to defer her removal until the [NAME] has been determined) instead of sending the matter back for redetermination. That is not the proper function of this Court on judicial review. [ 49 ] Moreover, I fail entirely to see how, and on what legal basis, this Court could issue a “continued stay.” The Applicant points to no jurisprudence and offers no procedural avenue by which this could be accomplished. The ALJR in this case challenges the Officer’s Deferral Decision. The Applicant brought her motion seeking a stay of that decision based on her underlying ALJR of the Officer’s decision. Regardless of how the ALJR is resolved, the current stay order will be exhausted at the time of my decision. Thus, there will no longer be a live underlying application for judicial review as a final determination will have been made. How the current stay order could be converted to a “continued stay” – and in the absence of a live underlying application for leave and judicial review – is a mystery. Further, if the ALJR is denied, then the Deferral Decision will stand and there would be no possible grounds or legal basis for this Court to continue the stay. If the ALJR is granted and the matter is sent back for redetermination, to obtain a new stay the Applicant would have to file a new underlying application for judicial review upon which a new motion for a stay could be grounded. [ 50 ] In effect, the Applicant’s request for new “alternative relief” of a “continued stay” is a veiled attempt to bundle a substituted decision by this Court and a related stay as relief in her challenge of the Deferral Decision. This cannot succeed. [ 51 ] Given all of the above, it is probably unnecessary to add that I also agree that the Respondent would be prejudiced if the request for “alternative relief” were considered by the Court. In its submission on costs, the Respondent argues that the Applicant relies on the fact that the [NAME] has been pending for longer than average to support her request for an indefinite stay of her removal from this Court. However, that this new and alternative relief was requested only after the Respondent’s deadline to submit further evidence had passed. This precluded the Respondent from adducing evidence in response to the request for new relief. The Respondent submits that the Court may take judicial notice that the [NAME] is the subject of ongoing cessation proceedings (citing [NAME] v [NAME]) , 2026 FC 129) and that a determination of her [NAME] cannot be made until his status and eligibility to sponsor her is clarified. Further, while the [NAME] is incomplete, the Applicant may be presumed to be aware of the reason why her [NAME] has not yet received a step one (approval in principle) determination, given that they are represented by the same [NAME]. As such, her attempt to have this Court stay her removal until a step one determination is made is on the basis that her [NAME] has taken longer than average processing times. But, without the Court knowing the full context, is indicative of an attempt to frustrate the removal process and circumvent legitimate legal obstacles which warrants sanction by way of costs. [ 52 ] In my view, what this illustrates in the context of the new request for “alternative relief” , is that it would be prejudicial to the Respondent to entertain the request at this stage in the proceeding given that the new relief was requested after the time had passed within which the Respondent could have filed responding affidavit evidence. This would also mean that the Court would be deprived of a complete evidentiary [NAME], which would be necessary if the request were susceptible to adjudication, which I have found that it is not. [ 53 ] For all of these reasons, I refuse to consider the Applicant’s request for alternative relief. Costs Respondent’s position [ 54 ] The Respondent seeks an award of costs in the amount of $100 against the Applicant. The Respondent provides two reasons for this request. First, as set out above, the Applicant’s reliance on the fact that the [NAME] has been pending for longer than average to obtain an indefinite stay of her removal after the Respondent’s deadline to submit further evidence is improper. Second, that the Applicant unreasonably delayed the resolution of this matter. She unreasonably refused the Respondent’s offer of settlement, pursued a judicial review that is clearly moot and now seeks alternative relief which is not supported by the evidence or the prevailing law. Further, there is no practical benefit to a decision on the merits here, especially considering that she will have the opportunity to request another deferral when new removal arrangements are made and raise any arguments relating to the length of time her [NAME] has been pending at that time. Applicant’s position [ 55 ] The Applicant did not make written submissions on cost. When appearing before me, counsel submitted that under the IRP Rules , costs are only awarded in special circumstances. A deferral case reaching a hearing before the Court is not a special circumstance. Analysis [ 56 ] Rule 22 of the IRP Rules sets out the conditions for awarding costs in immigration matters. The Rule states “[n]o costs shall be awarded to or payable by any party in respect of an application for leave, an application for judicial review or an appeal under these Rules unless the Court, for special reasons, so orders.” [ 57 ] As the Respondent submits, the threshold for establishing “special reasons” is high and must be assessed in the context of the particular circumstances of each case. Special reasons may be found if one party has unnecessarily or unreasonably prolonged proceedings, or where one party has acted in a manner that may be characterized as unfair, oppressive, improper or actuated by bad faith ( [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 1262 at paras 18-22). [ 58 ] In my view, the prudent course of action would likely have been for the Applicant to have accepted the settlement offer, but I am not persuaded that the failure to do so unreasonably prolonged the proceedings. The pursuit of the “alternative relief” was foreseeably doomed to fail. However, in the absence of clear evidence that the Applicant’s intent was to frustrate the removal process and circumvent legitimate legal obstacles, I am not persuaded that bad faith has been established. [ 59 ] I find that the present circumstances do not amount to special reasons requiring an award of costs. Conclusion [ 60 ] For the reasons above, I have found the application for judicial review of the Officer’s Deferral Decision to be moot and I have declined to exercise my discretion to hear the matter on its merits even though it is moot. I have also declined to consider the Applicant’s request for new “alternative relief” and I have declined the Respondent’s request for costs.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-10919-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that This application for judicial review is dismissed; There shall be no order as to costs; and There is no question for certification. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF [NAME]: IMM-10919-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF [NAME] OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: June 23, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: July 2, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For The Applicant [APPELLANT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF [NAME] : [APPELLANT], Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent