Federal Court Dismisses Judicial Review of Citizenship Revocation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260623 Docket: T-3087-24 Citation: 2026 [NAME] 853 Ottawa, Ontario, June 23, 2026 PRESENT: Mr. Justice McHaffie BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] Files related to [APPELLANT] and her family were found as part of an investigation into a fraud scheme involving a citizenship consultant, [NAME] [NAME], and his firm, [COMPANY]. Those files included documents suggesting that Ms. [APPELLANT] had materially understated her absences from Canada when she applied for Canadian citizenship in 2008. Based on this information, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration first initiated revocation proceedings in 2011. Thirteen years later, during which the process was twice restarted following legislative amendments, a delegate of the Minister issued a decision revoking Ms. [APPELLANT]’s citizenship in October 2024. [ 2 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] seeks judicial review of that revocation. She claims the process was unfair because she received inadequate disclosure of the [COMPANY] files, and that the overall delay in her revocation proceedings amounts to an abuse of process. She also contends the Minister’s decision includes a number of logical and factual errors that render it unreasonable. [ 3 ] For the reasons detailed below, I conclude the process leading to the Minister’s decision was procedurally fair and the decision itself was reasonable. The Federal Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that the revocation process set out in the Citizenship Act , RSC 1985, c C‑29, is procedurally fair and constitutionally compliant: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 [NAME] 36 [ [NAME] ([NAME]) ] at paras 69–102. The Minister complied with that statutory process, including by providing the disclosure required by paragraph 10(3)(c) of the Citizenship Act . Ms. [APPELLANT] was not entitled to disclosure going beyond that paragraph, which displaces any disclosure requirements that might have been imposed by the common law duty of procedural fairness. While Ms. [APPELLANT] could have obtained greater disclosure by requiring the Minister to bring a revocation action to this Court, she chose not to pursue this procedural avenue. [ 4 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] has also not demonstrated that any delay in the revocation process caused her significant prejudice in her ability to respond to the Minister’s allegations, such that the delay cannot have amounted to an abuse of process, regardless of whether it was unreasonable or inordinate. As for the merits of the decision itself, Ms. [APPELLANT]’s arguments pertain mostly to factual conclusions related to the issues of procedural fairness and delay. None of those arguments convince me that the decision was unreasonable. [ 5 ] The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. I thank counsel for their submissions, including helpful post-hearing submissions addressing this Court’s decision in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2025 [NAME] 2010, and the Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME] ([NAME]) , each of which was decided after the hearing in this matter.

II. Issues [ 6 ] Ms. [APPELLANT]’s application for judicial review raises the following three issues: Was the process leading to the revocation of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s citizenship unfair owing to a lack of disclosure? Did the delay in the revocation proceedings amount to an abuse of process? Was the Minister’s decision unreasonable on its merits? III. Analysis A. The Minister’s decision was not unfair due to insufficient disclosure [ 7 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] argues that it was unfair for the Minister to revoke her citizenship without first disclosing the entirety of the client file seized from [COMPANY] relating to her and her family. While the Minister referred to the documents that were relied on, and had previously disclosed a number of them, Ms. [APPELLANT] asserts that the common law duty of procedural fairness required the production of all documents in the file. [ 8 ] As the parties agree, this argument speaks to an issue of procedural fairness and therefore attracts what is effectively a correctness or “fairness” standard of review. On this standard, the Court asks whether the process was fair having regard to all the circumstances: [COMPANY] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2018 [NAME] 69 at paras 51–55; [COMPANY] v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) , 2020 [NAME] 196 at para 35. [ 9 ] In the present case, the Minister’s decision itself addresses the issue of disclosure. The Federal Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that this does not change the overall standard of review applicable to the issue, which remains one of procedural fairness, and thus one subject to correctness review: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v [NAME] , 2026 [NAME] 115 at paras 33–46. Nonetheless, even on matters of procedural fairness, the Minister’s factual findings or determinations regarding the evidence continue to warrant deference: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2021 [NAME] 642 at para 10; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2022 [NAME] 1797 at para 27. [ 10 ] Applying this standard, I conclude that Ms. [APPELLANT]’s disclosure argument cannot succeed. In setting out my reasons for this conclusion, I will address (1) the statutory scheme for revocation set out in the Citizenship Act ; (2) the notice provided by the Minister and the records at issue; (3) the relevant principles regarding common law and statutory procedural requirements; (4) the relevant jurisprudence, notably the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [APPELLANT] ([NAME]) ; and (5) Ms. [APPELLANT]’s election to have her case decided by the Minister. (1) The statutory scheme [ 11 ] Subsection 10(1) of the Citizenship Act provides for the revocation of [NAME]’s citizenship if they obtained it by false representation, fraud or knowing concealment of material circumstances: Revocation by Minister — fraud, false representation, etc. Révocation par le ministre — fraude, fausse déclaration, etc. 10 (1) Subject to subsection 10.1(1) , the Minister may revoke [NAME]’s citizenship or renunciation of citizenship if the Minister is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the person has obtained , retained, renounced or resumed his or her citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances . 10 (3) Sous réserve du paragraphe 10.1(1) , le ministre peut révoquer la citoyenneté d’une personne ou sa répudiation lorsqu’il est convaincu, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que l’acquisition , la conservation ou la répudiation de la citoyenneté de la personne ou sa réintégration dans celle-ci est intervenue par fraude ou au moyen d’une fausse déclaration ou de la dissimulation intentionnelle de faits essentiels . [Emphasis added.] [Je souligne.] [ 12 ] The process for revocation is set out in subsequent sections of the Citizenship Act , and begins with a written notice pursuant to subsection 10(3): Notice Avis 10 (3) [NAME]’s citizenship or renunciation of citizenship may be revoked, the Minister shall provide the person with a written notice that 10 (3) Avant que la citoyenneté d’une personne ou sa répudiation ne puisse être révoquée, le ministre lui envoie un avis écrit dans lequel : (a) advises the person of his or her right to make written representations; a) il l’informe qu’elle peut présenter des observations écrites; (b) specifies the form and manner in which the representations must be made; b) il précise les modalités de présentation des observations; (c) sets out the specific grounds and reasons, including reference to materials, on which the Minister is relying to make his or her decision ; and c) il expose les motifs et les justifications, notamment les éléments de preuve, sur lesquels il fonde sa décision ; (d) advises the person that the case will be referred to the Court unless the person requests that the case be decided by the Minister. d) il l’informe que, sauf si elle lui demande de trancher l’affaire, celle-ci sera renvoyée à la [NAME]. [Emphasis added.] [Je souligne.] [ 13 ] After this notice, the person [NAME] may file written representations with respect to the matters set out in the notice, including any considerations regarding their personal circumstances that warrant special relief and/or whether the revocation of their citizenship will render them stateless: Citizenship Act , s 10(3.1)(a). [ 14 ] The Citizenship Act then includes an important procedural fork in the road, allowing the [NAME] person to choose between two decision-making avenues: an action before this Court for declaratory relief or a decision by the Minister. [ 15 ] The default is that the Minister must refer the case to the Federal Court (unless they are satisfied that the matter should be decided in the person’s favour): Citizenship Act , s 10(4.1); [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 55, 66–67. This referral comes in the form of an action commenced by the Minister, seeking a declaration that the person obtained their citizenship by false representation, fraud, or knowing concealment of material circumstances: Citizenship Act , s 10.1(1). Such a declaration has the effect of revoking the person’s citizenship, so the Court acts as the decision maker on the revocation: Citizenship Act , s 10.1(3); [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 59. In an action under this process, the usual pre-trial procedures are engaged, including those pertaining to disclosure and discovery: Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106, Rules 222–248; [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 94. [ 16 ] Alternatively, [NAME] who receives a notice pursuant to subsection 10(3) may request that their case be decided by the Minister: Citizenship Act , s 10(3.1)(b). If they do, then the Minister is the decision maker, and must consider the person’s representations before making their decision: Citizenship Act , ss 10(3.2), (5). The Minister may hold a hearing if they believe one is required, based on prescribed factors related to credibility and the person’s inability to provide written submissions: Citizenship Act , s 10(4); Citizenship Regulations , SOR/93‑246, s 7.2. [ 17 ] In either case—whether the Court or the Minister is to be the decision maker on the issue of misrepresentation or fraud—the person [NAME] may file submissions with the Minister on the question of whether their personal circumstances warrant special relief, and the Minister must assess those decisions and determine whether special relief is warranted: Citizenship Act , ss 10(3.1)(a), (3.2), 4.1(a)(ii); [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 60–68. [ 18 ] As discussed further below, the foregoing process came into force in January 2018, after this Court found that former provisions that came into force in May 2015—which left the decision entirely in the hands of the Minister except in respect of “complex” cases—were constitutionally inoperable: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 [NAME] 473 at paras 2, 17–19. [ADDRESS] held that the prior process contravened paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights , SC 1960, c 44, since it deprived those [NAME] by a revocation decision of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice: [NAME] at paras 70, 126, 195; [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 10. (2) The Minister’s 2024 notice and the records at issue [ 19 ] As noted at the outset, revocation proceedings involving Ms. [APPELLANT] originally began in 2011, pursuant to the process that was then in force. Various steps arose in the years that followed, [NAME] by the statutory amendments referred to above. This procedural history is discussed further below in addressing Ms. [APPELLANT]’s arguments about delay. For the purpose of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s arguments regarding inadequate disclosure, it is sufficient to focus on the process undertaken in 2024, which led to the revocation decision at issue on this application. [ 20 ] On May 8, 2024, the Minister sent Ms. [APPELLANT] a “Request for Information Letter.” That letter identified concerns about Ms. [APPELLANT] having misrepresented her absences from Canada during the four years preceding her 2008 citizenship application. It invited Ms. [APPELLANT] to submit documents and evidence for consideration, based on which the Minister would decide whether to formally commence revocation proceedings. Ms. [APPELLANT]’s counsel responded to the Request for Information Letter with submissions regarding delay in the process, the substantive allegations in the letter, and the personal circumstances that warranted special relief from the revocation process. [ 21 ] On July 17, 2024, having reviewed Ms. [APPELLANT]’s response, the Minister sent a “Notification Letter Concerning Your Canadian Citizenship” [2024 Notice] pursuant to subsection 10(3) of the Citizenship Act . The 2024 Notice set out the grounds the Minister relied on in respect of revocation, including information regarding the [COMPANY] investigation and documents obtained during that investigation that related to Ms. [APPELLANT] and her family. The Minister cited a number of documents obtained from the [COMPANY] files, including numerous email exchanges and a copy of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s 2005 Lebanese passport, bearing the handwritten annotation “ à ne pas déclarer ” ( “not to be declared” ), which showed passport stamps in 2005, 2006, and 2007 that were not declared in her citizenship application. The 2024 Notice indicated the Minister’s conclusion that Ms. [APPELLANT] appeared to have worked with [APPELLANT] to develop a strategy to simulate residence in Canada, and that she may have obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. It also indicated that the Minister was not satisfied that Ms. [APPELLANT]’s personal circumstances warranted special relief. [ 22 ] In compliance with paragraphs 10(3)(a) and (b) of the Citizenship Act , the 2024 Notice advised Ms. [APPELLANT] of her right to make written representations and specified the form and manner in which to make those representations. In compliance with paragraph 10(3)(d), the 2024 Notice advised her that the case would be referred to the Federal Court unless she requested that her case be decided by the Minister. The 2024 Notice attached a “Request to Have Your Case Decided by the Minister of [NAME]” form, which included (a) a page of information about the Federal Court and the Minister; and (b) a place for Ms. [APPELLANT] to put her name and signature if she requested to have her case decided by the Minister rather than the Federal Court. [ 23 ] On September 15, 2024, Ms. [APPELLANT]’s counsel provided submissions in response to the 2024 Notice. The majority of those submissions focused on Ms. [APPELLANT]’s argument that the delay in the revocation process amounted to an abuse of process and a breach of procedural fairness. She also asked for full disclosure of the materials seized from [COMPANY] that related to her and her family, and asked for additional time to respond substantively to the allegations of misrepresentation after receiving that disclosure. Enclosed with Ms. [APPELLANT]’s submission was her signed request to have the Minister decide her case, in the form attached to the 2024 Notice. [ 24 ] On October 11, 2024, a Senior Analyst, [NAME], rendered the decision at issue on this application on behalf of the Minister, revoking Ms. [APPELLANT]’s citizenship. [ 25 ] I will address other aspects of the decision further below, but on the issue of disclosure, the Minister noted that subsection 10(3) of the Citizenship Act prescribed what had to be provided in the written notice. The Minister concluded that these requirements had been fulfilled in the 2024 Notice, including the requirement in paragraph 10(3)(c) to set out the specific grounds and reasons, including reference to materials, that the Minister relied on. The Minister was satisfied that Ms. [APPELLANT] had been provided with the relevant information contained in the documents on which the decision was based, and that there was no obligation to provide the entire contents of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police file pertaining to the [NAME] from the [COMPANY] seizure. (3) The statutory disclosure requirement ousts the common law duty of fairness [ 26 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] does not argue that the 2024 Notice fails to set out “the specific grounds and reasons, including reference to materials, on which the Minister is relying,” as required by paragraph 10(3)(c) of the Citizenship Act . However, she contends that the common law duty of fairness superimposes on section 10 a duty to provide additional disclosure of relevant documents in the possession of the Minister. I disagree, and conclude that the Minister correctly interpreted the disclosure obligations under section 10. [ 27 ] Where a statutory regime established by [NAME] sets out the procedural requirements that must be followed in making a decision, those requirements will prevail over the common law duty of procedural fairness : [COMPANY] v [NAME] ([NAME] Manager, [NAME]) , 2001 SCC 52 at paras 19–22 . The Federal Court of Appeal recently reaffirmed that this principle applies to all aspects of procedural fairness: [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2024 [NAME] 142 at para 71 ; [NAME] at para 22. Absent a constitutional challenge, the Court cannot override statutory procedural provisions on the basis of a common law duty. At the same time, [NAME] is presumed to have intended a fair process, and the [NAME] rule is that the duty of fairness will yield only to clear statutory language or necessary implication to the contrary: Canada ([NAME]) v [NAME] , 2011 SCC 30 at para 39. [ 28 ] As set out above, the revocation process set out in the Citizenship Act begins with a written notice, the contents of which are prescribed by subsection 10(3). In particular, paragraph 10(3)(c) provides that the notice must set out the specific grounds and reasons on which the Minister is relying, including “reference to materials.” Where the recipient of the notice asks that the Minister decide their case, the Citizenship Act then provides for only four subsequent procedural steps: (i) written representations by the person [paragraph 10(3.1)(a)]; (ii) the consideration of those representations by the Minister [subsection 10(3.2)]; (iii) a hearing if required [subsection 10(4)]; and (iv) the Minister’s written decision [subsection 10(5)]. [ 29 ] This is not therefore a case where the legislation is silent or ambiguous, such that the Court might infer an intention that the process comport with the principles of natural justice: [NAME] at para 21; [NAME] at para 39. Rather, paragraph 10(3)(c) clearly sets out what the Minister must disclose before receiving submissions and making a decision: [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 93–94. Significantly, it does not include a requirement that the Minister set out or disclose everything in their possession that relates to the [NAME] person, or even everything that is relevant. It requires only that the Minister set out the grounds, reasons, and materials the Minister is relying on. The procedure set out in section 10 of the Citizenship Act provides for no further steps unless the Minister concludes that a hearing is required: Citizenship Act , ss 10(3)‑(5). [ 30 ] This procedure is in clear statutory juxtaposition to the procedure where [NAME] does not request that the Minister decide their case. In such cases, the Minister cannot revoke the person’s citizenship. Rather, the case must be referred to this Court through an action commenced by the Minister, and it is a declaration of the Court that has the effect of revoking the person’s citizenship. The requirement that the matter be referred by way of action means that the full panoply of procedural rights afforded to litigants in an action by the Federal Courts Rules , including disclosure and discovery rights, are available to the person facing revocation (and to the Minister). [ 31 ] In this regard, Ms. [APPELLANT]’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2021 [NAME] 536 is misplaced. In [NAME] , the Court found that the principles set out in [NAME] applied in the context of a revocation action based on accusations that the defendant had misrepresented or knowingly concealed his involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity: [NAME] at paras 16–18, citing R v [NAME] , 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC). [ADDRESS] found that the seriousness and consequences of the war crimes and crimes against humanity allegations were such that the [NAME] principles must apply: [NAME] at paras 17–18, citing [NAME] v Canada ([NAME]) , 2006 [NAME] 139 at paras 29–33. [ 32 ] Leaving aside the question of whether the seriousness of the allegations against Ms. [APPELLANT] triggers the same concerns as those arising in [APPELLANT] , which I need not decide, it is clear that [NAME] pertains to the disclosure obligations in a revocation action brought pursuant to subsection 10.1(1) of the Citizenship Act , effected through an affidavit of documents, and not to the process leading to a decision by the Minister: [NAME] at paras 1–3, 14, 21 (Reasons) and para 6 (Order). Nothing in [NAME] imposes any disclosure obligations, whether under [NAME] or otherwise, where [NAME] has requested that the Minister make a decision in their case. (4) Recent jurisprudence on the revocation provisions [ 33 ] The foregoing conclusion is confirmed by recent jurisprudence on the revocation provisions of the Citizenship Act , and in particular the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME] ([NAME]) , upholding this Court’s decision in [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2024 [NAME] 600 [ [NAME] ([NAME]) ]. Consideration of [NAME] ([NAME]) and the parties’ arguments with respect to it requires a brief review of [NAME] ([NAME]) and the intervening decision of this Court in [NAME] , as they relate to the issue of disclosure. [ 34 ] In both [APPELLANT] and [APPELLANT] , the applicant had, like Ms. [APPELLANT], requested that their case be decided by the Minister. [NAME] and [NAME] included arguments regarding insufficient disclosure, but the arguments presented were different. [ 35 ] Ms. [NAME] recognized that the revocation process in the Citizenship Act did not provide for a right to documentary disclosure when the Minister was the decision maker, but argued that this meant that the process contravened paragraph 2(e) the Canadian Bill of Rights : [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 78, 84. [ADDRESS] rejected this argument on the basis that (a) the Citizenship Act provides for disclosure and discovery through the default option of adjudication before the Federal Court; and (b) further, [NAME] had not demonstrated that the disclosure she received prevented her from knowing the case to meet: [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 86–88. [ 36 ] Ms. [NAME], on the other hand, did not raise a constitutional challenge. Rather, she argued that the common law duty of fairness still applied to require disclosure, even though she had asked the Minister to decide her case. In a decision issued after the hearing of this matter, this Court agreed with Ms. [NAME], finding that a request to have the Minister decide the matter did not lower the applicable duty of fairness and that the Minister was required to provide adequate disclosure: [NAME] at paras 54–57, 64–68, 71–74. [ADDRESS] found that the Citizenship Act did not suggest that someone who asks the Minister to decide their case would receive a lesser degree of procedural fairness, and raised a concern regarding the potential for a “two-tier” citizenship revocation system: [NAME] at paras 56–57. [ADDRESS] in [NAME] considered [NAME] ([NAME]) , but held that it did not mean that [NAME] who asked the Minister to decide their case was not entitled to adequate disclosure, noting that the Court in [NAME] ([NAME]) had found that the applicant had not shown that the disclosure she received curtailed her ability to know the case she had to meet: [NAME] at para 72. [ 37 ] In post-hearing submissions filed at the Court’s invitation, Ms. [APPELLANT] relied on [NAME] for the proposition that the common law duty of fairness continued to apply in the context of a ministerial decision on revocation despite the provisions of the Citizenship Act . She argued that, like Ms. [NAME], she had shown how the lack of full disclosure resulted in her inability to fully know the case to be met and defend herself against the allegations raised by the Minister. The Minister argued that [NAME] did not alter the statutory disclosure requirement in paragraph 10(3)(c), and that the Court in [NAME] did not appear to have considered the effect of [NAME] and [NAME] . The Minister therefore argued that the finding in [NAME] that the common law duty of procedural fairness requires disclosure beyond that required by the statutory scheme should not be followed. The Minister further argued that, in any event, unlike in [NAME] , Ms. [APPELLANT] had not pointed to any evidence that would have helped her know and meet the Minister’s case. [ 38 ] The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in [NAME] ([NAME]) was issued, coincidentally, the business day after the Court received the parties’ post-hearing submissions on [NAME] . Given the importance of the decision to the issues and the parties’ prior submissions, the Court invited further post-hearing submissions. [ 39 ] In [NAME] ([NAME]) , the Court of Appeal upheld [NAME] ([NAME]) . In doing so, the Court of Appeal confirmed that section 10 of the Citizenship Act does not offend paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights since the revocation process as a whole provides for a procedurally fair process: [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 82–102. In addressing each of Ms. [NAME] arguments with respect to the right to an independent and impartial decision maker, the right to disclosure, and the availability of an oral hearing, Justice Walker referred to the availability of a revocation hearing before the Federal Court, noting that the Minister only made a decision where [NAME] asked them to: [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 84–85, 90, 94, 97. Justice Walker was explicit on the effect of this election: In my view, [NAME] who elects to have their case decided by the Minister pursuant to paragraph 10(3.1)(b) cannot subsequently claim they have not been afforded procedural fairness when the Federal Court process by way of action before an independent and impartial court with its attendant rights to full disclosure and an oral hearing was available to them for the revocation decision […]. [Emphasis added; citations omitted; [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 90.] [ 40 ] Similarly, in addressing disclosure in particular, Justice Walker noted that [NAME] who proceeds through the Federal Court process by way of action is entitled to full discovery and disclosure, and that “[i]f the person elects to proceed via the ministerial process, they do so on their own initiative with notice of the extent of the Minister’s disclosure obligations pursuant to paragraph 10(3)(c) ” [emphasis added]: [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 94. She concluded that the current legislative regime, which included the availability of a Federal Court action, “meets the requirement for fair disclosure” and did not deprive the person of their right to a fair hearing, including the right to know the case against them: [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 95. [ 41 ] Since the Federal Court of Appeal was addressing a constitutional challenge to the provisions, the [NAME] principle discussed above was not relevant to its decision. However, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the statutory provisions are constitutionally valid reinforces the conclusion that those valid provisions oust any common law duty of fairness. [ 42 ] It is important to underscore that the Court of Appeal’s assessment was of the statutory scheme as a whole, rather than just one aspect of the scheme. In other words, the fairness and constitutional validity of the revocation process was not undertaken with respect to the ministerial decision-making process and the Federal Court process independently. Rather, the scheme as a whole was reviewed to assess whether it was fair to the individual facing revocation. This is particularly important as it is the [NAME] that holds the power to choose which of two available procedural options to follow. [ 43 ] The Federal Court of Appeal’s analysis and conclusions are binding on me. I conclude that they must be considered to overtake the analysis set out in [NAME] . In particular, the conclusions in [NAME] that [NAME]’s choice to have the Minister decide their case does not affect their procedural rights; that the duty of fairness ought to be assessed separately in respect of a ministerial decision; and that the common law duty of fairness requires the Minister to provide greater disclosure than that set out in paragraph 10(3)(c), each seem to be in conflict with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in [NAME] ([NAME]) . I conclude that the rationale of the earlier decision has been undermined by a subsequent appellate decision, and that I should therefore not follow [NAME] : R v [APPELLANT] , 2022 SCC 19 at paras 75(1), 76. [ 44 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] argues that [NAME] can co-exist with [APPELLANT] ([NAME]) , and that the Court of Appeal even tacitly endorsed the holding in [NAME] by confirming that what the duty of procedural fairness requires depends on the context of the case. In support of this submission, she cites paragraph 88 of [NAME] ([NAME]) , where Justice Walker made the following statement: In my view, regard must be had in each case to the particular decision maker and the decision in question to properly assess whether the procedures followed by the Minister or a delegate respect the duty of procedural fairness and whether the [NAME] person had a meaningful opportunity to present their case fully and fairly […]. [Citations omitted.] [ 45 ] I cannot accept Ms. [APPELLANT]’s submission. As is clear from the context in which the foregoing passage appears, it pertains to the question of whether the revocation process contravenes paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights , and not whether the common law duty of fairness imposes disclosure obligations going beyond those set out in the Citizenship Act . The contents of paragraph 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights are established by reference to common law principles of fundamental justice ( i.e. , the duty of fairness), and Justice Walker was clearly addressing the question of whether the fact that the Minister has a lower degree of institutional independence than a court raised a constitutional concern: [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 87–88; [NAME] v [NAME] Association , 2003 SCC 36 at para 28. [ 46 ] In any event, Justice Walker’s entire analysis and conclusion was that the revocation process as set out in the Citizenship Act was procedurally fair. At no time did she suggest that in certain circumstances, the Minister might have to provide additional disclosure in addition to that provided for in paragraph 10(3)(c) in order to meet the common law duty of fairness. To the contrary, she repeatedly underscored that where [NAME] wished greater procedural protections than those set out in section 10, they could avail themselves of the Court process, and that the choice to have the Minister decide a case meant that [NAME] could not “subsequently claim they have not been afforded procedural fairness” : [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 90. [ 47 ] Ms. [APPELLANT]’s argument that the Minister’s disclosure obligations exceed those set out in paragraph 10(3)(c) is also in direct conflict with Justice Walker’s express observation that [NAME] who chooses to have the Minister decide their case does so with notice of “the extent of the Minister’s disclosure obligations pursuant to paragraph 10(3)(c) ” : [NAME] ([NAME]) at para 94 [emphasis added]. This observation confirms the conclusion above, namely that the Citizenship Act is not silent or ambiguous as to the Minister’s disclosure obligations in a manner that could leave room for the common law duty of fairness, but rather sets out clearly the extent of those obligations. [ 48 ] I note that Ms. [APPELLANT]’s submissions on [APPELLANT] ([NAME]) also contend that the lack of disclosure prejudiced her in respect of the Minister’s decision not to grant special relief based on her personal circumstances, which the Court of Appeal confirmed must be considered by the Minister in every case: [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 60–68. I cannot accept this submission, for two reasons. First, Ms. [APPELLANT] did not challenge the Minister’s decision on special relief in this application for judicial review, and she cannot now raise a challenge to that aspect of the Minister’s decision in post-hearing submissions. Second, and in any event, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Minister’s disclosure obligations are limited to those in paragraph 10(3)(c), even though this means—as the Court of Appeal clearly recognized—that an [NAME] person will have to make their submissions on special relief pursuant to paragraph 10(3.1)(a) based on the combination of their own knowledge of their circumstances and the disclosure provided under paragraph 10(3)(c): [NAME] ([NAME]) at paras 56–59, 66–68, 75, 79–80, 93–95, 102. [ 49 ] It is worth underscoring that the foregoing conclusions, as with those of the Federal Court of Appeal, in no way prevent the Minister from disclosing additional information or documents. The question is only the extent of the Minister’s obligations and thus the [NAME] person’s entitlement to receive a greater level of disclosure. Nor do the foregoing conclusions preclude [NAME] from arguing in a given case that a notice provided under subsection 10(3) does not comply with that subsection because it does not, for example, set out “the specific grounds and reasons, including reference to materials, on which the Minister is relying to make his or her decision.” As noted above, Ms. [APPELLANT] did not make such an argument, either before the Minister or this Court. (5) Ms. [APPELLANT] elected not to be entitled to further disclosure [ 50 ] In the present case, Ms. [APPELLANT] expressly asked the Minister to make a decision in her case and not the Court. The Minister’s 2024 Notice explained both procedural routes and attached a form to request that the Minister decide her case rather than the Federal Court. She completed this form on September 13, 2024, requesting that her case be “decided by the Minister of [NAME] rather than the Federal Court.” [NAME] ([NAME]) , I conclude that having done so, she cannot complain that the procedure that she requested is unfair because it does not afford her the same degree of disclosure as the other procedure available to her. Rather, she elected a procedure in which the Minister’s disclosure obligation was limited to that set out in paragraph 10(3)(c). [ 51 ] Having complied with the statutory notice and disclosure obligation set out in subsection 10(3), I conclude that the Minister cannot be found to have breached the common law duty of fairness. [ 52 ] As a final observation on this issue, I note that the Minister reached the same conclusion that I have reached above, namely that subsection 10(3) prescribes what the Minister must disclose, and that the 2024 Notice complied with the requirements of that subsection. While the Minister did not directly address whether the common law duty of fairness could impose additional disclosure requirements over and above those in paragraph 10(3)(c), this is likely because Ms. [APPELLANT] did not directly present such arguments. It follows that in addition to concluding that there has been no breach of the duty of fairness, I conclude that the Minister’s decision was correct. B. There was no abuse of process owing to delay [ 53 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] contends that the Minister’s delay in pursuing revocation of her citizenship amounts to an abuse of process that invalidates the decision and effectively requires a permanent stay of any revocation proceedings against her. She asserts that the undue delay from the onset of the process impaired her ability to answer the Minister’s allegations of misrepresentation. [ 54 ] The parties agree that in administrative proceedings, the existence of an abuse of process is a matter of procedural fairness, which therefore attracts the correctness standard: [COMPANY] v [NAME] , 2022 SCC 29 at para 38; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2023 [NAME] 689 at para 32. As with the issue of disclosure, the Minister’s decision addressed the question of abuse of process due to delay, but this does not change the applicable standard of review: [NAME] at para 40. Arguably, factual findings within the Minister’s analysis, such as those related to the existence of prejudice, would attract the usual deference applicable to factual findings: [NAME] at para 27; [NAME] at para 10. In the present case, the standard of review on such issues is not determinative, as the Minister’s relevant factual findings were both correct and reasonable. [ 55 ] For the reasons below, I am not satisfied that Ms. [APPELLANT] has demonstrated a prejudice that would justify a finding of abuse of process, regardless of whether the delay is considered inordinate. I will explain this conclusion with reference to (1) the [NAME] principles regarding abuse of process by administrative delay; (2) the history of the matter and the asserted delay in the present case; and (3) the alleged prejudice to Ms. [APPELLANT]’s ability to respond to the allegations of misrepresentation. (1) Abuse of process by administrative delay [ 56 ] The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that delay in the making of an administrative decision may potentially amount to a denial of natural justice that justifies an administrative law remedy, such as a stay of proceedings, based on the doctrine of abuse of process: [NAME] v [NAME] (Human Rights Commission) , [NAME] at paras 101–117, 120; [NAME] at paras 38–44, 83, 89–90. [ 57 ] In order to constitute an abuse of process, there must first be an administrative delay that is “unreasonable or inordinate” : [NAME] at para 121. In determining whether an administrative delay is inordinate, the Court considers all relevant circumstances and factors, including (a) the nature and purpose of the proceedings; (b) the length and causes of the delay; and (c) the complexity of the facts and issues: [NAME] at para 122; [NAME] at para 51. [ 58 ] However, even if a delay is unreasonable or inordinate, this alone will not amount to an abuse of process. The Supreme Court has confirmed that “there is no abuse of process by delay per se ” : [NAME] at para 121; [NAME] at paras 50, 59. In order to constitute an abuse of process, the inordinate delay must have given rise to a significant prejudice: [NAME] at paras 101, 115; [NAME] at paras 42–43, 67. [ 59 ] The requisite significant prejudice may come in the form of prejudice to the fairness of the administrative process itself, where an inordinate delay impairs a party’s ability to answer the complaint against them. This may arise where the delay has resulted in faded memories, unavailable witnesses, or lost evidence: [NAME] at para 102; [NAME] at para 41. [ 60 ] The Supreme Court has also recognized that other forms of significant prejudice may also ground an abuse of process finding: [APPELLANT] at para 115; [APPELLANT] at para 42. However, Ms. [APPELLANT] does not allege a personal prejudice of the nature described in the jurisprudence, relying solely on the prejudice to her ability to respond to the Minister’s allegations. [ 61 ] In this regard, I cannot accept Ms. [APPELLANT]’s argument that evidence of significant prejudice is only required where the fairness of the proceedings has not been compromised. In [NAME] , under the heading “Prejudice to the Fairness of the Hearing,” the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that “[i]n the administrative law context, there must be proof of significant prejudice which results from an unacceptable delay” : [NAME] at para 101 [emphasis added]; Canada (Transport) v [COMPANY] , 2019 [NAME] 286 at paras 147–148; [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 [NAME] 187 at para 26. This prejudice may come in the form of an impairment of the fairness of the hearing, but this does not mean that any impact on a party’s ability to respond, no matter how insignificant, will amount to prejudice sufficient to establish an abuse of process. [ 62 ] Where an abuse of process by administrative delay is established, it does not necessarily result in a stay of proceedings. Other administrative remedies, such as an order of mandamus , a reduction in sanction, or costs, may be appropriate: [NAME] at paras 78–99. The Supreme Court of Canada has underscored that a stay should be granted only in the clearest of cases, where the abuse falls at the high end of the spectrum of seriousness, where proceeding with a matter would “shock the community’s sense of fairness and decency” : [NAME] at paras 76, 83, citing R v [NAME] , 2002 SCC 12 at paras 53, 107 and [NAME] at para 120. The question for the Court to ask itself is whether going ahead with the proceeding would result in more harm to the public interest than if the proceedings were permanently halted: [NAME] at para 85; [NAME] at para 120. (2) The procedural history and the asserted delay [ 63 ] As described at the outset, the Minister first undertook revocation proceedings against Ms. [APPELLANT] in 2011, following an [NAME] investigation of Mr. [APPELLANT] and [COMPANY]. The [NAME] contacted [NAME] [[NAME]] in respect of its investigation in April 2008. In January 2009, cases from the investigation were referred to [NAME]’s [NAME] for possible citizenship revocation. As Ms. [APPELLANT] points out, this was even prior to her obtaining citizenship in July 2009. [ 64 ] In September 2011, a “Notice in Respect of Revocation of Citizenship” was issued to Ms. [APPELLANT] [2011 Notice]. The 2011 Notice is not in the record before the Court, but it was apparently sent to the [NAME], Lebanon, to be delivered to Ms. [APPELLANT]. The [NAME] advised in February 2014 that it was unable to locate Ms. [APPELLANT]. [ 65 ] As referenced above, significant amendments to the revocation provisions of the Citizenship Act came into force in May 2015. As these amendments created a new revocation process, the Minister cancelled the 2011 Notice and, on September 15, 2016, sent Ms. [APPELLANT] a new “Notice of Intent to Revoke Citizenship” [2016 Notice] under subsection 10(3) of the Citizenship Act as it then read. Similar notices were sent to Ms. [APPELLANT]’s husband, [APPELLANT], and their two eldest daughters. [ 66 ] The 2016 Notice attached a report which set out the Minister’s concerns and attached a number of documents from the [COMPANY] files, including a copy of her former passport bearing the “ à ne pas déclarer ” notation and copies of five emails between Ms. [APPELLANT]’s husband, [APPELLANT], and [COMPANY]. Ms. [APPELLANT] responded to the 2016 Notice through counsel, requesting a number of extensions to allow her time to gather information and respond to the allegations, and asking the Minister for disclosure of the complete [COMPANY] file. These extensions were granted, the final one of which provided a deadline for submissions in March 2017. The Minister, however, refused to provide full disclosure of the [COMPANY] file, advising the [NAME] that “all the information considered” regarding the revocation of citizenship had been released, and that if they wished a complete copy of the file or further details regarding the [NAME] investigation, they could make a request under the [NAME] , RSC 1985, c A‑1. [ 67 ] In May 2017, this Court issued its decision in [NAME] , finding the 2015 amendments to the Citizenship Act unconstitutional. As a result, [NAME] advised Ms. [APPELLANT] in July 2017 that the 2016 Notice was cancelled and that she was no longer subject to revocation proceedings. [ 68 ] The current revocation provisions came into force in January 2018. As described above, the Minister sent Ms. [APPELLANT] a Request for Information Letter in May 2024, starting the process that led to the revocation of her citizenship in October 2024. [ 69 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] asserts that the relevant time period for assessing procedural delay ought to being either in April 2008, when the [NAME] first contacted [NAME], or at the latest in January 2009, when cases were referred to [NAME]’s [NAME]. She claims that the delay between then and the ultimate revocation proceedings in 2024 is inordinate, and that [NAME] has not explained why the revocation process should have taken so long. In particular, she points to (a) [NAME]’s decision to send the 2011 Notice to the [NAME] rather than to her addresses on file; (b) the two-and-a-half-year period before the [NAME] advised in February 2014 that it could not locate her; (c) the lack of movement between July 2014, when [NAME] apparently found another address for her, and May 2015, when the first round of amendments to the Citizenship Act came into force; (d) the 15 months between the coming into force of the amendments and the issuance of the 2016 Notice; (e) the delay caused by [NAME]’s incomplete disclosure in 2016 and early 2017; and (f) the over six-year period between the coming into force of the current revocation provisions in January 2018 and the Request for Information Letter sent in May 2024. [ 70 ] The Minister argues that there has been no inordinate delay, arguing that the relevant period for consideration should begin with the coming into force of the current revocation provisions in January 2018. The Minister also argues that (a) there were significant periods of time when Ms. [APPELLANT] was outside Canada and/or not living at the address provided to authorities; (b) the revocation proceedings flow from Ms. [APPELLANT]’s misrepresentations on her citizenship application, and she must therefore bear some responsibility for the length of time that she has been subject to those proceedings; (c) much of the delay was caused by the two rounds of amendments to the Citizenship Act and the intervening [NAME] decision, which cannot be placed at the feet of the Minister; and (d) the complexity of the matter, including both the large-scale nature of the [COMPANY] fraud investigation, which resulted in numerous revocation proceedings arising from what a 2011 news report described as “the biggest citizenship fraud sweep in Canadian history.” [ 71 ] There is no question that the revocation proceedings against Ms. [APPELLANT] have taken a long time, although she was apparently only aware of them between September 2016 and October 2024, since the 2011 Notice never reached her. Certain periods during the overall time can certainly be attributed to the need to investigate Ms. [APPELLANT]’s file and prepare the various notices. At least part of the early period (2011 to 2014) can be attributed to difficulties in locating Ms. [APPELLANT], while still other periods are attributable to the two significant legislative amendments that came into force in 2015 and 2018. However, there are certainly lengthy periods, notably between the coming into force of the new provisions in January 2018 and the issuance of the 2024 Notice, that are not explained on the record. [ 72 ] I conclude that I do not need to determine whether the periods of time attributable to [NAME] as part of the revocation process are unreasonable or inordinate, as I find that Ms. [APPELLANT] has not demonstrated that any delay caused a significant prejudice, either in her ability to respond to the Minister’s case or in other forms of prejudice. (3) Prejudice to the ability to respond [ 73 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] argues that the delay in the revocation process has prejudiced her ability to respond to the allegation that she misrepresented her physical presence in Canada between July 2004 and July 2008, the four years prior to her citizenship application. She presents two primary forms of prejudice: fading memories and unavailable documents. [ 74 ] With respect to fading memories, Ms. [APPELLANT] has not presented any direct evidence that she, Mr. [APPELLANT], or anyone else has been unable to recall central information related to their residence in Canada in 2004 to 2008, or to their dealings with [APPELLANT]. At its highest, Ms. [APPELLANT] relies on a statement made in her counsel’s submission letters filed in June and September 2024 (echoing a nearly identical statement made in March 2017) that “the [NAME] advise that they are simply unable to recall the circumstances surrounding many of the specific events, information and conversations related to the misrepresentation allegations.” Ms. [APPELLANT]’s affidavit filed on this application refers to and attaches counsel’s letter and says that in the letter, she “attempted to demonstrate that the delay seriously prejudiced [her] ability to provide evidence due to the very significant passage of time.” However, she makes no other statements regarding her recollection of events. [ 75 ] The qualified statement presented in counsel’s letter, which refers to “ many of the specific events, information and conversations” [emphasis added], is simply insufficient to establish serious prejudice in Ms. [APPELLANT]’s ability to respond to the Minister’s allegations. [ 76 ] The Minister’s central allegation is that the [NAME] were actively involved in a conscious scheme to misrepresent their Canadian residence during the relevant period. This included the acquisition and suppression of a second passport in 2005 that contained a State of Kuwait residency permit (valid from September 2005 to September 2007) and 23 visa stamps between 2005 and 2007 showing travel in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon. These stamps, itemized in the 2024 Notice, were inconsistent with Ms. [APPELLANT]’s declaration in her citizenship application that she had only been absent from Canada twice during the 2004 to 2008 period, for a total of 28 days: a six-day trip to Kuwait over the 2004–2005 New Year; and a 22-day trip to Lebanon in June–July 2007. [ 77 ] Further, emails with [APPELLANT] indicated that (a) Ms. [APPELLANT] was advised in February 2007 (when she claimed to be in Canada) that she had to come to Ontario to deliver her baby; (b) she travelled to Canada in early August 2007 for that purpose, and (c) she returned to Lebanon or Kuwait in the fall of 2007, having arranged her travel in a manner so that her travel to Canada did not show her return travel plans. [ 78 ] As the Minister points out, most of the allegations in the 2024 Notice, including central allegations regarding the passport and many of the email communications with [COMPANY], were also referenced in the 2016 Notice, which raised serious allegations of deliberate and significant misrepresentations. [ 79 ] Notably, nothing in Ms. [APPELLANT]’s evidence either denies or indicates that she does not recall (a) travelling extensively and/or residing in Kuwait, the UAE, and Lebanon in the period from 2005 to 2007; (b) having a Lebanese passport that was sent to [COMPANY] but not disclosed to [NAME]; or (c) obtaining this passport deliberately to conceal her travels, as alleged by the Minister. Nor does Ms. [APPELLANT] give evidence that she is simply unable to recall where she lived or where her children went to [COMPANY] in the 2004 to 2008 time frame, or whether she travelled to Canada shortly before the birth of her child in August 2007 and left again after the birth, rather than living in Canada throughout 2007, as she had declared. In other words, Ms. [APPELLANT] has not provided any evidence that her memory with respect to the central elements of the Minister’s allegation of misrepresentation has faded to such a degree that she was prejudiced in her ability to respond to the 2024 Notice. [ 80 ] Ms. [APPELLANT]’s evidence with respect to the unavailability of documents is equally unpersuasive. In this regard, she presents evidence of unsuccessful efforts in 2024 to obtain medical records from the doctor who assisted with her daughter’s birth in 2007; bank records; [COMPANY] records from an [COMPANY]; information regarding a rental apartment in Gatineau in 2007; and records from a hotel in Lebanon. She also presented a letter from Mr. [APPELLANT]’s [NAME] indicating that the [NAME]’s aunt and uncle were owners of the Ottawa home that was declared as Ms. [APPELLANT]’s residence throughout the 2004 to 2008 period, and that they had died in, respectively 2021 and 2017. [ 81 ] As expressed by the Minister in the revocation decision under review, there are some peculiarities about some of the foregoing evidence. It is unclear, for example, why Mr. [APPELLANT] was allegedly renting an apartment in Gatineau when Ms. [APPELLANT] had declared the same single residence address in Ottawa for the entire 2004 to 2008 period. It is similarly unclear why the aunt and uncle would be the only potential source of information or documents showing that Ms. [APPELLANT] had resided at the Ottawa address. [ 82 ] It is also worth noting that the [COMPANY] did not say that they did not have records, or that they had been lost due to the passage of time. Rather, the [COMPANY] responded on August 30, 2024, to an inquiry Mr. [APPELLANT] sent them on August 22, 2024—well after the Request for Information Letter sent in May and the 2024 Notice sent in mid-July—saying that they were busy preparing for back to [COMPANY], but that they would “look into the archive and will do it as soon as possible.” At no time prior to Ms. [APPELLANT]’s submission letter of September 15, 2024, or the Minister’s decision of October 11, 2024, did Ms. [APPELLANT] provide any follow-up response from the [COMPANY]. Any inability to obtain records from the [COMPANY] appears therefore not to be due to any delay on the part of the Minister, but because of the late and limited nature of the inquiries made to the [COMPANY]. In any case, Ms. [APPELLANT] has provided no explanation as to why no other documents with respect to the children’s alleged presence at the [COMPANY]—photographs, enrolment or tuition documents, communications with the [COMPANY], [COMPANY] reports, or anything else—could not be put forward. [ 83 ] Ultimately, it does appear that in 2024, Ms. [APPELLANT] was unable to obtain some documentary information that might have been previously available. However, I am unable to conclude that this amounts to significant prejudice, for two reasons. [ 84 ] First , as the Minister noted in the decision, Ms. [APPELLANT] was first notified of the Minister’s concerns about misrepresentation in the 2016 Notice. In response, Ms. [APPELLANT] requested an extension of time, her counsel noting that the family had “already begun the process of gathering the requisite documentation but more time [was] certainly needed.” There is no evidence that Ms. [APPELLANT] was prevented or precluded from obtaining any documents in 2016 from any source. Nor is there any evidence that Ms. [APPELLANT] obtained documents in 2016 but then lost or destroyed them in the subsequent years. [ 85 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] notes that the 2016 Notice was ultimately cancelled, but this does not explain why no documents or evidence whatsoever relevant to the allegations were apparently obtained in the ten months between the sending of the 2016 Notice and its cancellation. This considerably undermines the allegation that the alleged delay, and in particular any delay subsequent to 2016, caused the asserted prejudice by impairing Ms. [APPELLANT]’s ability to respond: [APPELLANT] at para 102. While Ms. [APPELLANT] argues that she was already alleging a prejudice due to an inability to obtain evidence in 2016, her submissions at that time were simply that the documentation was “difficult to locate and/or retrieve.” After this initial submission, she provided no indication or evidence about any difficulties in obtaining documents in 2016, other than the difficulty in obtaining a timely response from the [NAME] to the request filed under the [NAME] . [ 86 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] also argues that no reliance should be placed on the 2016 Notice because the allegations in it are different from those in the 2024 Notice, and as a result, the evidence needed to refute those allegations would not necessarily be the same. It is true that there are some differences in the particular documents and details referred to in the 2024 Notice compared to the 2016 Notice. However, the central allegation—that Ms. [APPELLANT] had materially misrepresented her residence in Canada—was the same. So, too, were many of the documentary references, including Ms. [APPELLANT]’s other passport and many of the emails with [APPELLANT]. The evidence needed to refute the central allegation, including notably evidence establishing that Ms. [APPELLANT] was in fact in Canada for all but 28 days between 2004 and 2008, would largely be the same in response to both notices. The fact that the 2016 Notice refers to some emails that were not referred to in the 2024 Notice and vice versa does not persuade me that Ms. [APPELLANT]’s knowledge of the 2016 allegations is irrelevant to her assertion of prejudice in the ability to obtain documents. [ 87 ] Second , the asserted impairment to the ability to respond must be considered in light of the nature of the case to be met. The 2024 Notice raises serious allegations of misrepresentation regarding Ms. [APPELLANT]’s residence, including conscious involvement in a scheme to hide relevant information from the [NAME], notably through the possession of a passport showing undisclosed travel. Ms. [APPELLANT] could have answered the case against her through a wide variety of possible information demonstrating that she did in fact reside in Canada in the 2004 to 2008 period. While Ms. [APPELLANT] points to an inability to obtain some documents that might be used for this purpose, the fact remains that she presented to the Minister no documents whatsoever to speak to any of the issues raised in the 2024 Notice. [ 88 ] A number of arguments that Ms. [APPELLANT] makes with respect to this issue are unsupported by any evidence. She submits, for example, that it is “unreasonable to believe that [she] would still retain documentation that relates to a period which is well over 15 years ago,” without presenting any evidence that she in fact did not retain any such documentation, or explaining the circumstances in which she lost, discarded, or deleted such documentation. [ 89 ] It is not every possible adverse impact on a party’s ability to respond that will result in a finding that there has been an abuse of process. Rather, there must be “proof of significant prejudice which results from an unacceptable delay” : [NAME] at para 101. I conclude that while the passage of time may have resulted in some documents becoming unavailable and some potential shortcomings in memory, Ms. [APPELLANT] has not established a “significant prejudice” to her ability to respond to the 2024 Notice that has been caused by delay in the revocation process. [ 90 ] As the existence of significant prejudice is a requisite element for finding an abuse of process, I conclude that there has been no abuse of process, regardless of whether the delays attributable to the Minister are considered inordinate. The Minister’s decision, which addressed Ms. [APPELLANT]’s submissions on abuse of process and reached the same finding with respect to prejudice for largely the same reasons, is correct and—to the extent that the reasonableness standard applies to relevant factual findings regarding prejudice—reasonable. C. The Minister’s decision was reasonable [ 91 ] Ms. [APPELLANT]’s final argument is that the Minister’s decision was otherwise unreasonable on its merits. When reviewing the merits of a decision, the Court applies the reasonableness standard: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 at paras 16–17, 23–25. On this standard, the Court does not undertake a reassessment of the matter to reach its own conclusions. Rather, it reviews the underlying decision to ensure it meets the requirements of a reasonable administrative decision, namely internal coherence, transparency, intelligibility, justification, and conformity with the applicable factual and legal constraints: [NAME] at paras 15, 83–86, 99–107. [ 92 ] That said, most of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s arguments with respect to the reasonableness of the decision relate to the Minister’s findings on the issue of abuse of process. Two of these—which concern the 2011 Notice being sent to the [NAME] and Ms. [APPELLANT] being subjected to revocation proceedings under three different regimes—relate to the question of whether the overall delay was inordinate.

For the reasons set out above, this question is not determinative given the absence of prejudice. Any error in the Minister’s reasons on these findings cannot have rendered the decision as a whole unreasonable. [ 93 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] also raises arguments under the heading of reasonableness pertaining to the Minister’s findings on prejudice. I have addressed these arguments, which relate to the 2016 Notice and the retention of documents, in addressing the question of prejudice above. They do not persuade me, on any standard, that the Minister’s conclusion that there was no abuse of process is in error. [ 94 ] Ms. [APPELLANT] identifies two further aspects of the Minister’s decision that she contends are unreasonable. [ 95 ] The first is a statement that Ms. [APPELLANT] had chosen in her submissions “not to address the misrepresentation allegations set out in” the 2024 Notice. She argues that she did make several attempts to address the misrepresentation allegations, citing in particular a submission made regarding an August 23, 2006, email. However, that submission was not made in response to the allegations in the 2024 Notice (which did not refer to the August 23, 2006, email); it was in response to the earlier Request for Information Letter. In her submissions in response to the 2024 Notice, Ms. [APPELLANT] almost exclusively addressed her allegations of unfairness and abuse of process. She presented a single paragraph under the heading “Substantive response to allegations,” which again referred to the unfairness and asked for a period of 60 days after receipt of full disclosure to provide a substantive response, without directly addressing any of the allegations. Given this submission, it was not unreasonable for the Minister to observe that upon review of the submissions, Ms. [APPELLANT] had chosen not to address the misrepresentation allegations. [ 96 ] The second relates to the Minister’s assessment of the hardship Ms. [APPELLANT] would face by reverting to permanent residence status upon revocation of her citizenship. She contends that the Minister ignored her submission that Mr. [APPELLANT], as the main breadwinner for the family, would not be able to find employment in Canada. [ 97 ] I cannot accept this argument. In addressing Ms. [APPELLANT]’s personal circumstances, the Minister referred directly to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s difficulty in finding employment opportunities in Canada. The Minister noted that permanent residents are entitled to enter and remain in Canada, to obtain social benefits, and to work or study anywhere in Canada. The Minister further noted that the relevant five-year period for the residency obligation under section 28 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27, would begin on the day that Ms. [APPELLANT]’s citizenship was revoked, and that it was speculative that she would be unable to meet her residency obligation. While the Minister did not expressly connect these observations with the submission regarding Mr. [APPELLANT]’s ability to find work in Canada, I am satisfied that the Minister meaningfully grappled with and addressed the key issues and central arguments raised by Ms. [APPELLANT]: [NAME] at para 128. Accepting Ms. [APPELLANT]’s argument based on a minor lacuna or superficial shortcoming in the reasons would amount to embarking on a “treasure hunt for error,” which is inconsistent with reasonableness review: [NAME] at paras 100, 102. [ 98 ] It is also worth noting that all of Ms. [APPELLANT]’s submissions were made on behalf of both her and Mr. [APPELLANT]. This included their submissions regarding their personal circumstances, one of which related to Mr. [APPELLANT] being the sole breadwinner of the family. The Minister’s decision regarding the revocation of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s citizenship, issued on the same day as that relating to Ms. [APPELLANT], directly refers to that submission and concludes that despite not being able to find employment in 2021 and 2022, it is speculative to presuppose that he would be unable to find work in Canada in the future. This direct and express response to the submission, albeit in the decision pertaining to Mr. [APPELLANT] rather than her own, underscores in my view that the submission was not ignored as Ms. [APPELLANT] contends.

IV. Conclusion [ 99 ] As Ms. [APPELLANT] has not demonstrated that the Minister’s decision is either unfair or unreasonable, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. [ 100 ] Neither party proposed a question for certification pursuant to paragraph 22.2(d) of the Citizenship Act . I agree that no serious question of [NAME] importance is involved in the matter.

JUDGMENT IN T-3087- 24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that The application for judicial review is dismissed. “Nicholas McHaffie” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-3087-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING:

HELD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: November 13, 2025 SUPPLEMENTARY WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: [NAME] 19–20, 2026; MarCh 17, 20, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: june 23, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME], [NAME] [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent