Federal Court Rejects Judicial Review of Internal Flight Alternative Decision

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260706 Docket: IMM-4526-25 Citation: 2026 FC 908 Ottawa, Ontario, July 6, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP [RESPONDENT] Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicants, [APPELLANT] [Principal Applicant or [NAME]] [APPELLANT] [[NAME] or [NAME]], are citizens of Libya. They report a fear of persecution and harm from militia groups in that country. [ 2 ] The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] found the Applicants were neither Convention refugees, nor persons in need of protection. In a decision dated February 5, 2025, the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] dismissed the Applicants’ appeal and confirmed the RPD’s decision. The determinative issue was the availability of an internal flight alternative [IFA] in Benghazi, Libya. [ 3 ] In seeking judicial review of the RAD’s decision under subsection 72(1) of the [RESPONDENT] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], the Applicants argue that the RAD erred in failing to consider the Administrative Deferral of Removal [ADR] in place for Libya, misapprehending or failing to account for the evidence before it, and making findings that are not supported by the evidence. The Respondent submits it was reasonably open to the RAD, based on the evidence before it, to conclude the Applicants had a viable IFA in Benghazi, and that the existence of an ADR for Libya does not render the RAD’s decision unreasonable. [ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

II. Background [ 5 ] The [NAME] reports that, while working as a salesperson in September 2022 in Tripoli, he was kidnapped by armed members of the [NAME] who stole money he had collected for his employer. He managed to escape from his kidnappers, but was informed by his mother that armed men had come looking for him at his family home. Upon escaping, he received medical treatment, reported the incident to police, and went into hiding at his grandfather’s home, and then his uncle’s home, in different districts located in the Tripoli region. In January 2023, the [NAME] travelled to Tunisia where he applied for a United States [US] visa, which was granted. [ 6 ] The [NAME] asserts that he fears his business partner in Tripoli who, in August 2022, pressured him to turn over his share of their joint business venture in return for money. The partner subsequently refused to pay the agreed amount, and the [NAME] filed a police complaint. While the [NAME] was on a trip to Tunisia, his brother informed him that armed militia members, connected to the [NAME], had attended his home looking for [NAME], ransacked the home, and fired shots, injuring his father. Upon his return to Libya in November 2022 to renew his passport, the [NAME] went into hiding before leaving Libya for Egypt in December 2022. The [NAME] returned to Libya a month later and also applied for a student visa at the US embassy in Tunisia, which was granted. [ 7 ] In March 2023, the Applicants, who are family friends, travelled from Libya to Tunisia and then to the US. They entered Canada on March 16, 2023, and initiated their claims for protection in April 2023. [ 8 ] At the outset of the hearing held on September 20, 2024, the RPD identified the following issues – “credibility, [section] 97 [of the IRPA], and an internal flight alternative in Benghazi.” The Applicants provided post-hearing written submissions addressing the issues raised by the RPD. [ 9 ] In a decision dated October 18, 2024, the RPD assessed the Applicants’ claims under subsection 97(1) of the IRPA, finding neither claim formed a nexus to any of the Convention grounds set out at section 96 of the IRPA. The RPD then found, on a balance of probabilities, the Applicants’ allegations to be credible, with the exception of the [NAME]’s claim that his agent of harm is connected to the [NAME] specifically. The RPD, however, determined that the Applicants have a viable IFA in Benghazi and dismissed their claims.

III. Decision Under Review [ 10 ] In concluding that the RPD was correct in determining that the Applicants were neither Convention refugees, nor persons in need of protection, the RAD first noted that the Applicants had not submitted new evidence or requested an oral hearing. [ 11 ] The RAD then reviewed the RPD’s decision and noted that, unlike the RPD, it had conducted its analysis under both sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA because persecution was alleged on grounds that included mistreatment by militias based on tribal affiliations and/or perceived political opinions. The RAD also declined to draw a negative inference based on new issues raised in the Applicants’ post-hearing submissions. [ 12 ] In considering the availability of an IFA in Benghazi, the RAD adopted and applied the well-established two-part test set out in [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Employment [RESPONDENT] ), 1991 CanLII 13517 (FCA). In considering the first prong of the test, the RAD found there to be no serious possibility that the Applicants would face persecution or that, on a balance of probabilities, they would be personally subjected to torture, a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment by the agent of harm if they relocate to Benghazi. In considering the second prong, the RAD found relocation to Benghazi to be objectively reasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the Applicants.

IV. Issue and Standard of Review [ 13 ] This application raises a single issue – Is the RAD’s IFA analysis reasonable? [ 14 ] The Parties submit, and I agree, that the merits of the RAD’s decision are to be reviewed on the presumptive standard of reasonableness. [ 15 ] A reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” ( Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) v [NAME] , 2019 SCC 65 at para 85 [ [RESPONDENT] ]; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2023 SCC 21 at para 8). The party challenging a decision has the burden of demonstrating to a reviewing court “sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” ( [NAME] at para 100).

V. Analysis [ 16 ] In written submissions, the Applicants argued the RAD erred in considering both prongs of the IFA test. However, in the course of oral submissions, counsel [NAME] advised, in response to a question from the Court, that the argument challenging the RAD’s consideration of the first prong of the IFA test would be abandoned. Instead, the Applicants focused their submissions on the alleged errors made by the RAD in considering the second prong of the test. It is those arguments that I consider in the analysis that follows. [ 17 ] The second prong of the IFA test requires that the decision-maker consider the conditions in the proposed IFA and determine whether, in all the circumstances including the applicant’s personal circumstances, it would be unreasonable for the applicant to seek refuge in the proposed IFA. The Federal Court of Appeal described the test as follows in [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Employment [RESPONDENT]) , 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA) at 598: Rather, the question is whether, given the persecution in the claimant’s part of the country, it is objectively reasonable to expect him or her to seek safety in a different part of that country before seeking a haven in Canada or elsewhere. Stated another way for clarity, the question to be answered is, would it be unduly harsh to expect this person, who is being persecuted in one part of his country, to move to another less hostile part of the country before seeking refugee status abroad? [ 18 ] The threshold for demonstrating a proposed IFA is unreasonable is high – an applicant must demonstrate “nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area.” Hardship arising from factors including the absence of family, employment, status in the community, or a lower standard of living, whether considered individually or collectively, will only render an IFA unreasonable where an applicant demonstrates this high threshold – a risk to life or safety – has been met ( [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA) at para 15). [ 19 ] In submitting the RAD erred in considering the second prong of the test and whether it was objectively reasonable to expect them to seek safety in Benghazi, the Applicants submit the RAD: (1) ought to have considered the existing ADR for Libya; (2) failed to consider the objective circumstances in Libya, including the large number of internally displaced persons [IDPs] and the inadequacy of the state’s capacity to support access to housing, security, opportunities to obtain employment, and other basic services for IDPs; (3) engaged in an analysis that focused on improving conditions and whether other persons were worse off in Benghazi, rather than considering whether it was reasonable to expect the Applicants to relocate to Benghazi; and (4) relied on findings of fact that were unsupported by the evidence and engaged in speculation resulting in it negating the hardship the Applicants would encounter in Benghazi. [ 20 ] I am not persuaded by any of these arguments. [ 21 ] The Applicants take the position the ADR was a relevant factor that the RAD was required to consider under the second prong of the test. I disagree; an ADR responds to temporary and generalized circumstances, such as armed conflict or natural disaster impacting the entire population. It does not impact on the individualized assessment to be undertaken where considering whether a claimant is a Convention refugee or person in need of protection (IRPA, ss 96, 97; [RESPONDENT] Protection Regulations , SOR/2002-227, s 230; [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2005 FC 680 at paras 12–15). [ 22 ] In this regard, I also note that the Applicants raise the existence of the ADR and its relevance in considering the second prong of the IFA test for the first time in this application. A decision-maker cannot be faulted for failing to address an argument that was not before it, and for this reason new arguments and issues are not generally considered on judicial review ( [RESPONDENT] v Canada (Citizenship [RESPONDENT]) , 2024 FC 1484 at paras 26–27; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v [COMPANY] , 2011 SCC 61 at paras 22–26). [ 23 ] Contrary to the Applicants’ submissions, the RAD did engage extensively with the country condition evidence for Libya. In doing so, the RAD acknowledged the challenges relocation poses [NAME] personally and in light of the general conditions that have impacted upon the quality of life of all Libyans. However, the RAD also noted the evidence indicating improving conditions and setting out the profile of those that face specific risks, noting the Applicants do not fit the identified profiles. [ 24 ] Nor did the RAD unreasonably engage in a comparative consideration of the Applicants’ circumstances with the circumstances of others who may face worse conditions. In considering whether the high threshold for finding an IFA to be unreasonable had been satisfied, it was open to the RAD to note the country condition evidence disclosing the improvement in conditions over time. It was also open to the RAD to note that the challenges in Libya were particularly acute for persons possessing certain profiles, including [NAME], children and [NAME], and to note the absence of evidence disclosing that the Applicants satisfied any of these profiles. [ 25 ] Finally, I am not persuaded that the Court’s intervention is warranted on the basis that the RAD relied on findings of fact unsupported by the evidence and/or engaged in speculation. While I acknowledge it may have been preferable for RAD to adopt language that spoke to the absence of evidence indicating, for example, that the Applicants were not able-bodied or would not have the support of family in Benghazi, the failure to do so where, as here, the Applicants have the burden of demonstrating the proposed IFA is unreasonable does not undermine the reasonableness of the RAD’s decision. Judicial review is not a treasure hunt for error ( [NAME] at para 102).

VI. Conclusion [ 26 ] The application for judicial review is dismissed. [ 27 ] Neither Party has proposed a serious question of general importance for certification, and I agree that none arise.

JUDGMENT IN IMM-4526-25 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : This application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified. “Patrick Gleeson” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-4526-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP [RESPONDENT] OF HEARING:

HELD BY VIDEOCONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: June 29, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: july 6, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] [NAME] [NAME] [RESPONDENT] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] [RESPONDENT] and Solicitor Surrey, [NAME] of Canada Vancouver, British Columbia For The Respondent