Federal Court Rejects PRRA Appeal: No New Evidence Found

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260603 Docket: IMM-9588-24 Citation: 2026 FC 723 Ottawa, Ontario, June 3, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME]: [APPELLANT] Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT I. Overview [ 1 ] The Applicant [APPELLANT] is a citizen of Nigeria. He arrived in Canada in September 2018 and filed a claim for [NAME] protection. His claim was denied by the [NAME] Protection Division [RPD] and the [NAME] Appeal Division [[NAME]] of the [NAME] [IRB]. Both the RPD and the [NAME] determined that Mr. [APPELLANT] had viable internal flight alternatives in Abuja and Ibadan. [ADDRESS] dismissed Mr. [APPELLANT]’s application for leave to commence a judicial review of the [NAME] decision. [ 2 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] subsequently filed an application for permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate [[NAME]] grounds, based on establishment and the best interests of his then-unborn child. He also pursued a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA], claiming a forward-facing risk of persecution in Nigeria at the hands of the Black Axe gang and the government. A senior immigration officer [Officer] of [NAME] [[NAME]] refused the applications. Representing himself before the Court, Mr. [APPELLANT] now seeks judicial review of both decisions. Although the judicial review applications were not consolidated, the matters were heard together. [ 3 ] This judgment concerns the judicial review of the PRRA decision. Another judgment, issued contemporaneously, involves the [NAME] decision: [APPELLANT] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 722 [ [APPELLANT] No. 1 ]. [ 4 ] For the reasons below, Mr. [APPELLANT]’s PRRA judicial review application will be dismissed because he has not established that the PRRA decision is unreasonable or procedurally unfair.

II. Procedural History [ 5 ] The procedural history in this matter is substantially as described in [APPELLANT] No. 1 (at paras 6-10). Among other steps leading up to the judicial review hearing, Mr. [APPELLANT] sought to strike the Respondent’s supporting affidavit of [RESPONDENT] [NAME] [[NAME]]. I note that each [NAME] in the [NAME] judicial reviews, while not identical, are nearly so. I determined in [APPELLANT] No. 1 (at para 28 ) that the [NAME] in both matters would not be struck but rather I would assess the weight to be given to it in the context of the PRRA judicial review. The [NAME] is discussed in the Analysis. [ 6 ] In addition, Mr. [APPELLANT] attempted to file a document titled “Applicant’s Further-Reply Memorandum of Argument.” He did not seek leave of the Court to file this material, nor did he make any submissions about why it should be accepted. The Registry thus forwarded this document to the Court under rule 72 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [ Rules ], for disposition. This issue also is discussed in the Analysis.

III. Issues [ 7 ] I find that this matter raises the following issues: Should the Court accept the Applicant’s Further-Reply Memorandum of Argument? What weight should the Court give Mr. [APPELLANT]’s affidavit evidence in the PRRA Applicant’s Record [[NAME]]? Is the PRRA decision unreasonable? Was the PRRA decision made in a procedurally unfair manner? Has the judicial review process before this Court given rise to procedural unfairness? IV. Analysis A. The Applicant’s Further-Reply Memorandum of Argument will be rejected [ 8 ] I am satisfied that the Applicant’s Further-Reply Memorandum of Argument is unacceptable and, therefore, it will be rejected for filing, pursuant to paragraph 72(2)(a) of the Rules . [ 9 ] The Further-Reply document is unacceptable because further reply written submissions generally are not permitted on judicial review applications; an applicant’s further memorandum of argument replaces an applicant’s memorandum and reply memorandum. Here, this is explained at paragraph 10 of the February 23, 2026 order of (former) Justice Elizabeth Heneghan granting leave in Court File IMM-9588-24 [Leave Order]. In addition, an applicant can make oral submissions in reply to a respondent’s further written submissions at the oral hearing. B. Mr. [APPELLANT]’s affidavit evidence in the [NAME] will be given little or no weight [ 10 ] I determine that Mr. [APPELLANT]’s affidavit evidence in this matter seeks to introduce before the Court materials that were not before the Officer. The evidence also is largely irrelevant to the PRRA analysis and to this judicial review. I thus give those portions of the affidavits described below no weight. [ 11 ] Mr. [APPELLANT]’s affidavit evidence in the Application Record is comprised of his affidavit and his spouse’s affidavit, both dated July 8, 2024. In addition, Mr. [APPELLANT] filed his own further affidavit on March 13, 2026, having the same date as the filing date. [ 12 ] None of the documents attached as exhibits to these affidavits is contained in the certified tribunal record. Mr. [APPELLANT] submits that because these documents were before the decision-maker on his [NAME] application, the decision-maker should have considered them when making a PRRA determination. I disagree. [ 13 ] It is an accepted principle that the evidence before the Court on judicial review is confined to the evidence that was before the administrative decision-maker. This means material that was not before the decision-maker generally is inadmissible as extrinsic evidence, unless it meets a recognized exception: [COMPANY] of Canada v [NAME] ([NAME]) , 2012 FCA 22 [ [NAME] ] at paras 19-20. In my view, none of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s evidence satisfies any of the three exceptions outlined in [NAME] (at para 20). [ 14 ] Further, [NAME] applications and processes are distinct and involve different considerations which must not be confused nor duplicated: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2026 FC 494 [ [NAME] ] at para 25. [ 15 ] In the PRRA context, the decision-maker is tasked with examining whether a person would be at risk of persecution, torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if they were removed to their home country. Canada’s commitment to the principle of non-refoulement requires that there be a review of risk prior to removal, the PRRA, codified in section 112 of the Immigration and [NAME] Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ]. It is a final or near final option that a [NAME] under an enforceable removal order may have to remain in Canada. [ 16 ] There is a close connection between the risk assessed during a PRRA and that assessed before the [NAME] under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA : [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2010 FC 491 at paras 28-29. That said, the PRRA is concerned with forward-facing or new risk to the PRRA applicant that was not considered by an earlier decision-maker, such as an RPD or [NAME] panel. It is not an opportunity to have the same risk reassessed, nor is it the appropriate vehicle to have the potential harms to family members left behind in Canada assessed. [ 17 ] Inherently, the evidence required to support an [NAME] application under section 25 of the IRPA and relevant [NAME] factors, such as establishment in Canada and the best interests of the child [BIOC], differs from the evidence needed to show a forward-facing risk in one’s home country (i.e. a country other than Canada). [ 18 ] Here, as in [NAME] (above, at para 26), Mr. [APPELLANT] has mixed up “the concepts of (i) hardship, relevant on an [NAME] application, (ii) risk, assessed on a PRRA, and (iii) irreparable harm, considered on stays of removal, as well as the jurisprudence relating to these three different assessments.” [ 19 ] To some extent, Mr. [APPELLANT]’s confusion appears to stem from the stay order issued on July 12, 2024 in connection with the PRRA Application for Leave and Judicial Review. Mr. [APPELLANT] was granted an interim stay of removal on the basis that “the Respondent has [not] shown reasonable consideration of the Applicant’s child who was born in [DATE].” This is the only reason given for granting the stay. It is unknown what record was before the Court on the stay motion, or what was argued before the presiding judge. [ 20 ] Jurisprudence of this Court, however, is clear that [NAME] considerations and the concept of irreparable harm in stays of removal are not relevant to [NAME]: [NAME] , above at para 26. Consequently, I find that Mr. [APPELLANT]’s supporting evidence in his PRRA judicial review, focused as it is on [NAME] and stay of removal considerations, is largely irrelevant and, thus, is given no weight. [ 21 ] I add that I find it unnecessary in the end to assign any weight to the [NAME] because it is directed to evidence on which Mr. [APPELLANT] sought to rely regarding the [NAME] establishment factor, which is irrelevant to PRRA considerations. The [NAME] and cross-examination address the issue of whether the certified tribunal record was missing a letter from the [NAME] and a support letter from Mr. [NAME], attached as Exhibits “B” and “C” respectively to Mr. [APPELLANT]’s further affidavit dated March 13, 2026 (i.e. whether these documents were before the administrative decision-maker). The [NAME] affidavit and cross-examination and the at-issue support letters were considered in [APPELLANT] No. 1 in the context of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s motion to strike the [NAME], which was dismissed. [ 22 ] Finally, to the extent that Mr. [APPELLANT]’s evidence contains background information, such as in the case of his spouse’s affidavit, I give this evidence little weight because it is of little assistance in the Court’s analysis of the applicable issues outlined above. C. The PRRA decision is not unreasonable [ 23 ] I am not satisfied that Mr. [APPELLANT] has met his onus of showing that the PRRA decision was unreasonable. [ 24 ] A reasonable decision is one that exhibits the hallmarks of justification, transparency and intelligibility, and is justified in the context of the applicable factual and legal constraints. The party challenging an administrative decision has the burden of showing that it is unreasonable: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v [NAME], 2019 SCC 65 [ [NAME] ] at paras 99-100. [ 25 ] The PRRA decision turns on the Officer’s finding of “insufficient objective evidence that would be indicative of new risk developments in either country conditions or personal circumstances which have arisen since the date of the IRB decision.” Noting the risk of harm described in Mr. [APPELLANT]’s PRRA application, the Officer concludes that Mr. [APPELLANT] “reiterated facts which are materially consistent with those already argued before the IRB and not capable of overcoming its findings” (i.e. that Mr. [APPELLANT] is neither a [NAME] nor a person in need of protection). [ 26 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] argues on the PRRA judicial review that the Officer erred by not addressing the totality of his evidence including community support letters, establishment in Canada, medical evidence; and family related evidence, including pregnancy documentation. Mr. [APPELLANT] also asserts that the medical evidence confirming his spouse’s pregnancy triggered a mandatory BIOC analysis, which the Officer did not undertake. In addition, Mr. [APPELLANT] takes issue with the Officer’s reliance on the prior IRB findings and failure to assess new or newly relevant evidence. [ 27 ] The Respondent counters that the purpose of a PRRA is to determine whether an applicant’s circumstances have changed since the [NAME] decisions such that they now would be in need [NAME] protection. A PRRA is forward looking, with the burden on the applicant to identify any new risk, and present evidence supporting this risk on a balance of probabilities. I agree with the Respondent. [ 28 ] As mentioned above, the PRRA is concerned with the future risk of harm to an applicant upon their return to their home country, and not what may be happening in Canada once they have left. Further, [NAME] considerations, including BIOC, and the concept of irreparable harm in stays of removal are not relevant to [NAME]. [ 29 ] I add that the CTR contains information pertaining to [NAME], a [NAME] who made a petition requesting police assistance to apprehend assailants. While this was “new” evidence in that was not before the IRB, the Officer found that it was irrelevant, noting that Mr. [APPELLANT] provided no explanation as to how this relates to his situation. Mr. [APPELLANT] has not shown how this finding was unreasonable. [ 30 ] I conclude that Mr. [APPELLANT] has conflated the [NAME] processes and considerations (per [NAME] , above, at para 25) and, thus, he has [NAME] to establish that the PRRA decision was unreasonable. D. The PRRA decision was made in a procedurally fair manner [ 31 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] has not convinced me that the PRRA decision was made in a procedurally unfair manner. [ 32 ] Questions of procedural fairness attract a correctness‑like standard of review: [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2018 FCA 69 at para 54; [NAME], above at para 77. The focus of the reviewing court is whether the process was fair and just in the circumstances: [NAME] v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FC 520 at para 24. [ 33 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] argues that the PRRA decision was rendered in a procedurally unfair manner because the Officer did not consider key evidence (i.e. the above-mentioned support letters from the [NAME] and Mr. [NAME]), explain how evidence was weighed, or demonstrate an independent assessment. Regarding the latter point, he submits that his PRRA application should have been handled by a different decision-maker than the [NAME] application. [ 34 ] Leaving aside the relevance of the “missing” support letters (which issue is addressed above), I found in [APPELLANT] No. 1 (at para 26) that Mr. [APPELLANT] had not established that the support letters were submitted as part of his [NAME] application. I find the same is true with respect to the PRRA application. The Officer cannot be faulted, in my view, for not discussing evidence that was not before them or, as in the case of the PRRA, was irrelevant in any event, even if I were to accept, which I do not, that the letters had been submitted. [ 35 ] As for the argument about the need for different decision-makers to determine the [NAME] applications, this Court long has recognized that these types of applications may be handled by the same officer, so long as the officer does not conflate, confuse or duplicate the decision-making processes: [NAME] , above at para 25, citing [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2006 FCA 394 [ [APPELLANT] ] at para 12. Here, Mr. [APPELLANT] seemingly suggests that duplication would have been appropriate and, therefore, he has not considered or presented any arguments in line with prevailing and binding jurisprudence to the contrary, especially the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Varga . E. The judicial review process before the Court does not give rise to procedural unfairness [ 36 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] similarly has not persuaded me that the judicial review process before the Court was procedurally unfair. [ 37 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] argues that the Respondent’s assertion he was late in filing cross-examination questions was incorrect. Mr. [APPELLANT] submits that he was compliant with the Leave Order because it required him to submit cross-examination questions on or before April 9, 2026, and he did so on that date at 6:44 pm. [ 38 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] also submits that these proceedings have been unfair because the Respondent did not try to settle the PRRA judicial review. Rather, the Respondent only tried to settle the [NAME] judicial review. In his view, this is contrary to paragraph 4 of the Leave Order because “partial settlement that leaves one impugned decision intact is not a settlement within the meaning contemplated by the Court.” He asserts that because both applications involved the same facts, evidence and arguments, and because the Respondent conceded that the [NAME] decision was unreasonable, the Respondent should have made the same concession regarding the PRRA decision. [ 39 ] The Respondent counters that Mr. [APPELLANT] in fact was late in submitting his questions but, nonetheless, they consented to an extension of the deadline. Further, the Respondent argues that the leave order neither required the parties to partake in settlement discussions, nor required the Respondent to settle the PRRA judicial review. In any event, says the Respondent, procedural fairness breaches relate to the decision-making process in which the Officer engaged to come to the underlying decision. Any alleged breach of fairness before this Court cannot ground a finding that the Officer breached their fairness obligations. I agree with the Respondent in all three respects. [ 40 ] First, contrary to his submissions, Mr. [APPELLANT] was late in conducting cross examination on the affidavit, as confirmed by the Court in the direction issued by Associate Judge Kirkland Shannon on Court File IMM-9771-24 (i.e. “[t]he period for completing cross examinations on affidavits having expired, …” ). Even so, the Respondent consented to an extension of the deadline, as evidenced by the Joint Amended Schedule filed with the Court on April 23, 2026. [ 41 ] Second, the Leave Order did not require the parties to participate in settlement discussions. Rather, it required the parties to consider, within 15 days of the order, the possibility of settlement and, only if they both agreed, to engage in settlement discussions. The Leave Order is very clear in this regard. [ 42 ] Third, the Leave Order did not require the Respondent to settle this matter. Separate leave orders issued in the [NAME] judicial reviews and nothing in them requires a settlement in one to dictate the outcome of the other, either in terms of how the Respondent approaches settlement discussions or how the matters are argued before and determined by the Court.

V. Conclusion [ 43 ] For the above reasons, I conclude Mr. [APPELLANT] has not established that the PRRA decision was unreasonable or procedurally unfair. This judicial review application thus will be dismissed. [ 44 ] Neither party proposed a serious question of general importance for certification. I find that none arises in the circumstances.

VI. Costs [ 45 ] Regarding the issue of costs, I note that, as occurred in [APPELLANT] No. 1 , Mr. [APPELLANT] has relied on cited case law that in many instances does not exist under the style of cause, or at the neutral citation, he provided. I find that this is a direct result of Mr. [APPELLANT]’s undeclared use of artificial intelligence in the preparation of his materials, such as in his Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Argument, presented to the Court. Costs were ordered against Mr. [APPELLANT] in [APPELLANT] No. 1 , in part because of his undeclared use of AI and his reliance on hallucinated caselaw (see paras 58-61).

Accordingly, they will not be ordered against him again here.

JUDGMENT in IMM-9588-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The judicial review application is dismissed. There are no costs. The style of cause is amended to identify the Applicant as [APPELLANT] instead of [APPELLANT] [NAME]. "[NAME]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-9588-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [APPELLANT] v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: halifax. nova scotia DATE OF HEARING: may 13, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME] J. DATED: June 3, 2026 APPEARANCES: [APPELLANT] For The Applicant (ON THEIR OWN BEHALF) [APPELLANT] [NAME] For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Attorney General of Canada Halifax, Nova Scotia For The Respondent