Social Security Tribunal Rejects Claimant’s CPP Disability Pension Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: AT  v  [RESPONDENT] Development , 2026  [NAME]  211 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Representative: [COUNSEL] [NAME] under appeal: [NAME] decision dated September 4, 2025 (GP-25-41) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: May 12, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Respondent’s representative Decision date: May 27, 2026 File number: AD-25-778 On this page Decision Overview Issue Analysis Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] I am dismissing this appeal. The Appellant is not entitled to a [NAME] ( [NAME] ) disability pension. Overview [ 2 ] The Appellant is a 34-year-old woman with a history of anxiety and depression. She has had a number of occupations over the years, among them restaurant server, call centre worker, and web developer. She hasn’t worked since 2022. [ 3 ] The Appellant applied for a [NAME] disability pension in May 2024. Footnote 1 She claimed that he was unable to work because of mental health problems, as well as back and knee injuries and a condition known as polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS). [ 4 ] Service Canada, the Minister’s public facing agency, refused the application after determining that the Appellant did not have a severe and prolonged disability as of October 31, 2017, the last time he had [NAME] disability coverage. Footnote 2 [ 5 ] The Appellant appealed the Minister’s refusal to the Social Security Tribunal. The Tribunal’s [NAME] conducted a hearing by teleconference and dismissed the appeal. It found that, although the Appellant had some physical and psychological limitations at the end of her coverage period, she still had the capacity to regularly perform substantially gainful [RESPONDENT]. [ 6 ] The Appellant then applied for permission to appeal to the Appeal Division. In January, I granted the Appellant permission to appeal. Earlier this month, I held a hearing to discuss her disability claim in full. Issue [ 7 ] For the Appellant to succeed, she had to prove that, more likely than not, she became disabled during her coverage period. Under the [NAME] , a disability must be severe and prolonged: A disability is severe if it makes a claimant incapable regularly of pursuing any substantially gainful occupation. Footnote 3 A claimant isn’t entitled to a disability pension if they are regularly able to do some kind of work that allows them to earn a living. A disability is prolonged if it is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or is likely to result in death. Footnote 4 The disability must be expected to keep the claimant out of the workforce for a long time. [ 8 ] The parties agreed that the Appellant’s [NAME] disability coverage period ended on October 31, 2017. Footnote 5 As a result, I had to assess the Appellant’s condition as of that date and decide whether she had functional limitations that have impeded her ability to earn a living. Analysis [ 9 ] Having applied the law to the available evidence, I find that the Appellant did not have a severe and prolonged disability as of October 31, 2017. The Appellant had medical problems at the time, but they didn’t prevent her from regularly pursuing substantially gainful [RESPONDENT]. The Appellant’s disability wasn’t severe [ 10 ] [NAME] bear the burden of proving that they have a severe and prolonged disability. Footnote 6 I have reviewed the record, and I have concluded that the Appellant didn’t meet that burden according to the test set out in the [NAME] . [ 11 ] In her application for benefits, the Appellant said that she had not been able to work since December 2011 because of major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD). She rated many of her physical capacities as good to excellent, although she claimed to have difficulty standing, kneeling, and reaching because of old back and knee injuries. She also reported functional limitations to her ability to think, communicate, and work in teams. She said that, while she had good days and bad days, she experienced severe social anxiety that made it hard for her to remember details and concentrate on tasks. [ 12 ] The Appellant testified that she has been depressed since childhood. However, she didn’t receive mental health treatment until 2009, when she received counselling from a [NAME]. In 2015, she was put on antidepressants, starting with [NAME]. Since then, she has tried lots of drugs but has found it hard to find something effective with few side effects. [ 13 ] Dr. [APPELLANT] first diagnosed the Appellant with PCOS in 2018. The Appellant called it a “process-of-elimination” disease—one that’s hard to identify. The main symptom is abdominal pain, which puts her out of commission for two or three days per month. She manages it with birth control pills and prescription pain medications, such as tramadol, naproxen, and Tylenol #3. [ 14 ] The Appellant said that, after high school, she dropped out of community college, then worked at [NAME] and [NAME], followed by these short-lived jobs: LCBO – fired after two months for too many absences. [NAME] – injured her shoulder on the job after a year. She then went on workers’ compensation for five months and came back to modified duties but quit after her anxiety triggered a conflict with her manager. [NAME] – fired because of attendance and what her boss deemed her need for excessive supervision. [NAME] – quit because of allergies. [NAME] – went on workers’ compensation after breaking her nose in a workplace accident. [ 15 ] The Appellant acknowledged that some of these jobs ended for reasons other than her impairments. But she maintained that, even if she hadn’t suffered from allergies or sustained injuries, it would have been only a matter of time until she was let go because of anxiety-related performance issues. [ 16 ] The Appellant said that she was on a waiting list to see a [NAME] for three years. She finally got to see Dr. [NAME] in August 2025. Since then, she has seen him once, last October, having missed two other appointments because of anxiety attacks. [ 17 ] While the Appellant may be unable to hold a job now, that doesn’t mean she had a severe disability as of October 31, 2017. The Appellant says that she has been disabled for more than 10 years, but I can’t base my decision on just her subjective view of her capacity. Footnote 7 I also have to look at the available medical evidence. The Appellant’s medical evidence is less than compelling [ 18 ] The Appellant undoubtedly has mental health conditions, but the key question for me is whether those conditions prevented her from earning a living during her coverage period, which ended nearly nine years ago. Footnote 8  In the end, I didn’t see enough medical evidence to indicate that the Appellant was disabled as of October 31, 2017. [ 19 ] The Appellant has not provided any medical evidence from the relevant period. Indeed, there is only one doctor’s report on file that addresses the Appellant’s condition as it was before October 31, 2017. [ 20 ] In June 2024, the Appellant’s family doctor completed a medical questionnaire to accompany her patient’s [NAME] disability application. Footnote 9 Dr. [APPELLANT] [NAME] wrote that the Appellant had been experiencing disabling depression and anxiety since 2010 , resulting in symptoms of insomnia, low self esteem, psychomotor slowing, poor concentration, and weight gain. She said the Appellant had been diagnosed with attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in 2019, making her prone to procrastination and missing deadlines. [ 21 ] The ADHD diagnosis came two years after the Appellant’s coverage period ended, and I note that, according to Dr. [APPELLANT], the Appellant did not receive mental health counselling until 2020. It is not clear when Dr. [APPELLANT] began treating the Appellant. Her [NAME] medical questionnaire is the only evidence from her on file and, if she has additional reports or clinical notes, they were not made available to the Tribunal. [ 22 ] It is therefore unclear whether Dr. [APPELLANT] had first-hand knowledge of the Appellant’s condition in 2017 or whether she was relying on the Appellant’s subjective recollection of her condition at the time. Dr. [NAME] [NAME] questionnaire was accompanied by results from several online checklists, and they indicated severe to moderately severe psychological impairment. Footnote 10 But, again, these assessments were based entirely on the Appellant’s self-reported inputs and, in any event, they were generated many years after the end of her coverage period. [ 23 ] I note that there is no independent medical confirmation of the Appellant’s other claimed conditions: her PCOS or her spinal or knee pathology. [ 24 ] Finally, although Dr. [APPELLANT] supported the Appellant’s disability claim, she did not recommend that she stop working and expected she would be able to return to work, from home or in modified tasks, in one to two years. That does not suggest a prolonged disability according to the [NAME] ’s definition of the term. [ 25 ] The only other significant item of medical evidence on file is a report from a [NAME] dated August 2025. Footnote 11 Dr. [APPELLANT] [NAME] wrote that the Appellant had a decade-long history of chronic depression with consistent, daily symptoms such as difficulty getting out of bed, poor self-care, feelings of worthlessness, lack of energy, and a disrupted sleep pattern. These symptoms had worsened over the past four years, and she was now reporting anxiety attacks of one- or two-minutes duration several times per week. [ 26 ] I am not inclined to give Dr. [NAME] assessment a great deal of weight, again because it was prepared years after the Appellant’s coverage period and by a [NAME] who did not know the Appellant at the relevant time. Moreover, Dr. [APPELLANT] noted that the Appellant was well groomed, maintained good eye contact, and expressed thoughts that were organized and linear. Dr. [APPELLANT] also noted that sertraline had helped the Appellant and suggested further improvement was possible if she followed treatment recommendations, such as adopting good sleep habits, adjusting her medication, and engaging in physical activity. [ 27 ] The problem for the Appellant is that there is almost no medical evidence about her condition during her coverage period. The Appellant may have a history of mental health problems, but there is no compelling medical evidence to indicate that they prevented her from performing substantially gainful [RESPONDENT] as of October 31, 2017. Indeed, as we will see, the Appellant was well enough to later obtain a post-secondary diploma and sustain a [NAME] for several months. The Appellant’s condition didn’t prevent her from working in the real world [ 28 ] Whatever the Appellant’s medical condition as of October 31, 2017, she still had some ability to work at the time. I am reinforced in this view when I look at her overall employability. [ 29 ] The leading case on the interpretation of “severe” is [NAME] , which requires the Tribunal, when assessing disability, to consider a disability claimant as a “whole person” in a real-world context. Footnote 12 Employability is not to be assessed in the abstract, but rather in light of “all of the circumstances.” [ 30 ] When deciding whether the Appellant can work, I can’t just look at her medical conditions. I must also consider factors such as her age, level of education, language abilities, and past work and life experience. These factors help me decide she was able to work in the real world. [ 31 ] The Appellant’s background and personal characteristics were not barriers to her continued participation in the [NAME]. At the end of her coverage period, she was only 26 years old — still young and an age at which people are usually more adaptable than their older peers. She was fluent in English and already had several years of work experience in a variety of positions. She later demonstrated the ability and drive to go to college to upgrade her skills. [ 32 ] With this profile, the Appellant was well positioned to attempt to retrain and return to work. As we will see, she eventually succeeded in doing just that. The Appellant had substantially gainful earnings after her coverage period [ 33 ] I am satisfied that the Appellant didn’t have a severe disability as of October 31, 2017. But even if she did, her claim would still fail because she hasn’t shown that her disability was prolonged. [ 34 ] Under the [NAME] , a disability must be severe and prolonged. As noted above, a prolonged disability is one that is likely to be long continued and of indefinite duration or likely to result in death. The courts have held that to be prolonged, disability can’t be temporary or for a “closed” period. [ 35 ] A period is closed if it has a reasonably foreseeable end date. In a case called  [NAME],  the [NAME] ( [NAME] ) found that the claimant’s disability was not prolonged, because it was of a definite duration. The Federal Court of Appeal agreed with the [NAME] that the evidence showed the claimant was capable of returning to work following her cancer treatment, despite the fact that she had other health issues. Footnote 13 [ 36 ] In this case, the evidence shows that, whatever the Appellant’s impairment before October 31, 2017, it was neither prolonged nor continuous. [ 37 ] The Appellant testified that, after her many unhappy experiences in minimum wage jobs, she realized she needed training. She enrolled in a two-year computer coding program at [COMPANY] and started classes in October 2019. A few months later, the COVID-19 pandemic hit and all classes went online. [ 38 ] The Appellant emphasized that she missed classes, received accommodations, and was able to work from home at her own pace. But the fact remains that she finished a full-time vocational training program on time. This suggests capacity. [ 39 ] The Appellant went on to get a job. In November 2021, the Appellant was hired as a junior web developer at [NAME], a Montreal-based marketing agency that provided online staging for corporate events. Footnote 14 She started out coding and was then placed in quality assurance. She testified that, from the start, she missed a lot of days — calling in sick maybe 10 days a month. [NAME] took her aside and told her that her attendance was a problem, although she was never formally reprimanded. On days when she did show up, she was anxious all the time. She had great difficulty concentrating and had to read the same line over and over again. By the end of the day, she felt absolutely drained. She missed a lot of deadlines. [ 40 ] Still, she said that the quality of her work was good most of the time, and that she understood what she was doing outside difficult moments. However, in September 2022, HR called her in and told her she was being let go. The official reason was because she didn’t have seniority, but she wasn’t aware of anyone else being laid off. Later, [NAME] told her that that her termination had to do with her attendance. [ 41 ] The Appellant was terminated from her job, but there wasn’t enough evidence to persuade me that the termination occurred because of her medical condition. During her 10 months at [NAME], the Appellant appears to have earned around $52,000 in total — including $45,700 in 2022 alone — amounts well above the legislated threshold denoting “substantially gainful.” Footnote 15 [ 42 ] Asked how she managed to earn that much money in less than a year, despite her impairments, the Appellant replied that she benefitted from having landed in a somewhat dysfunctional workplace: she missed a lot of deadlines but, on the other hand, so did many of her co-workers. Eventually, though, her lack of productivity could not be ignored. [ 43 ] The Appellant argued that she was lucky enough to be able to “fly under the radar” at [NAME] for a long time, but I found that hard to believe. By her own account, the quality of her work was good. The job came with either a three- or six-month probationary period, which the Appellant apparently passed. The money she made from the job nearly tripled her highest previous annual income. [ 44 ] The Appellant says that she hasn’t worked, or tried to work, since. There’s no way that she can meet any deadline. Her ups and downs are completely unpredictable. On some days, she thinks she can go back to work, but then she can’t get out of bed for two weeks. She can’t offer an employer any guarantees. [ 45 ] That may be true now, but it doesn’t seem to have been true during her coverage period and for some time thereafter. The evidence shows that, whatever the Appellant’s debilities, she went on to work in two service jobs (which she left for reasons other than mental health problems), return to full-time studies, and earn more than $50,000 during a 10-month stint as a coder. Conclusion [ 46 ] The Appellant has long suffered from depression and anxiety and other physical ailments, but there wasn’t enough evidence to show that these conditions prevented her from working before October 31, 2017. In my view, she did not have a severe disability during her coverage period, nor did she have a prolonged disability, as indicated by her demonstrated capacity to regularly pursue substantially gainful [RESPONDENT] in 2021−22. [ 47 ] The appeal is dismissed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See the Appellant’s application for the [NAME] disability pension dated May 1, 2024, GD2-31. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See the Minister’s reconsideration decision letter dated November 29, 2024, GD2-6. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See section 42(2)(a)(i) (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-8/page-9.html#h-168630) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See section 42(2)(a)(ii) (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-8/page-9.html#h-168630) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 Under section 44(2) (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-8/page-10.html#docCont) of the [NAME] , a minimum qualifying period ( MQP ) is established by making threshold contributions to the [NAME] . The Appellant’s [NAME] contributions are listed on her record of earnings at GD2R-54. In this case the Appellant’s regular MQP ended on December 31, 2016. By application of the [NAME] ’s so-called proration provision, the MQP was extended to October 31, 2017. To benefit from the extension under some interpretations of the provision, the Appellant would have had to show, that she became disabled during the first 10 months of 2017. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See section 44(1) (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-8/page-10.html#h-168677) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See section 68(1) (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/C.R.C.%2C_c._385/page-7.html#docCont) of the [NAME]. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2008  FCA  33 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2008/2008fca33/2008fca33.html). Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 [NAME] medical reported dated June 14, 2024 by Dr. [NAME] [NAME], family physician, GD2-94. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 See Adult ADHD Self-Report Scale Symptom Checklist; [NAME], Mood Disorder, and GAD-7 Questionnaires, all completed by the Appellant on May 15, 2024, GD2-104. The Appellant again completed a series of on-line self assessments on October 15, 2025 — see GD1D-19. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See assessment report dated August 27, 2025 by Dr. [NAME] [NAME], [NAME], AD1D-4. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) 2001  FCA  248 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2001/2001fca248/2001fca248.html?resultId=50a3a1a9f40d4fa9a71bf4d9554d5762 &searchId=2026-01-29T15:37:06:581/18ddb8b8e9954593bb3992eb03809c94). Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] ), 2008  FCA  366 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2008/2008fca366/2008fca366.html). Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 Also see the Appellant’s [NAME] disability application dated May 1, 2024, GD2-42. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See the detailed breakdown by year of the Appellant’s [RESPONDENT] history, GD2-55. In 2022, the threshold was $17,489 – see section68.1(1) (https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/C.R.C.,_c._385/section-68.1.html) of the [NAME] . Return to footnote 15 referrer