SST Allows Appeal: Employer Must Provide Clear Return-to-Work Notice

OUTCOME: Allowed

[TRANSLATION] Citation: [NAME]  v  Canada Employment Insurance Commission , 2026  SST  200 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: [COUNSEL], [NAME] Respondent: [redacted] Representative: [COUNSEL] under appeal: General Division decision dated February 23, 2026 (GE-26-368) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Videoconference Hearing date: May 6, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Respondent’s representative Decision date: May 25, 2026 File number: AD-26-166 On this page Decision Overview Issues Analysis Remedy Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is allowed. [ 2 ] The General Division based its decision on important errors of fact. [ 3 ] I gave the decision that should have been given. [ 4 ] The [APPELLANT] didn’t lose his job at X because of misconduct. This means that he isn’t disqualified from receiving Employment Insurance ( [NAME] ) benefits under section 30 of the Employment Insurance Act  ( [NAME]  Act). Overview [ 5 ] The [APPELLANT], M. L., applied for [NAME]  regular benefits. Footnote 1 The Canada Employment Insurance Commission (Commission) found that he had either voluntarily left his job or lost it because of misconduct. So, the Commission decided that he could not get benefits because he had stopped working at X on October 20, 2025. Footnote 2 [ 6 ] The [APPELLANT] asked the Commission to reconsider its decision. Footnote 3 The Commission upheld its decision, saying that he had committed misconduct. Footnote 4 [ 7 ] The [APPELLANT] appealed this decision to the General Division. Footnote 5 The General Division dismissed his appeal. The General Division found that he had lost his job because of misconduct, and that, as a result, he was disqualified from receiving [NAME]  benefits. [ 8 ] The [APPELLANT] asked the Appeal Division for permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was given. [ 9 ] The [APPELLANT] argues that he didn’t lose his job because of misconduct. Footnote 6 He was on a leave of absence for the fishing season as of March 2025. He says that he didn’t know he could lose his job because he wasn’t available to go back to work on October 20, 2025. He had told his employer as early as October 7, 2025, that he would ultimately not be available to work as a deckhand on October 20, 2025. He had written to them that he would keep them informed of when he would next be available. He argues that the employer never replied to him. So, he didn’t know that he had to show up on October 20, 2025, or risk losing his job. He also argues that he never voluntarily left his job. Footnote 7 [ 10 ] The Commission argues that the Appeal Division has to dismiss the appeal. But, if the Appeal Division decides that the General Division made an error in its decision, the Commission wants the Appeal Division to find that the [APPELLANT] voluntarily left his job at X without just cause. Issues [ 11 ] To determine the outcome of this appeal, I have to decide the following issues: Did the General Division base its decision on important errors of fact? If so, what is the appropriate remedy? Analysis The grounds of appeal that allow the Appeal Division to intervene [ 12 ] The appeal has to involve one of the grounds of appeal set out in thelaw. So, I have to decide whether the General Division: breached the principles of procedural fairness made an error of jurisdiction made an error of law based its decision on an important error of fact Footnote 8 [ 13 ] I only need to find one error to intervene. The General Division based its decision on important errors of fact [ 14 ] I might intervene if the General Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it. Footnote 9 So, I might intervene if the General Division made findings that the evidence doesn’t support. Footnote 10 The General Division ignored important elements of the employment contract in making the finding of fact that the Claimant had breached it [ 15 ] The General Division found that the Claimant had breached the initial agreement with X in paragraph 16 of its decision. The General Division said that the fact he didn’t propose a return date after postponing his reinstatement twice breached the initial agreement with X. Footnote 11 [ 16 ] Later in its analysis, the General Division found that the Claimant hadn’t met his contractual commitments to the employer. These commitments were set out in the probationary agreement signed in October 2024. Footnote 12 The General Division cited the fact that he had to work 1,280 hours during his probation and work 40 hours per week. [ 17 ] Respectfully, the General Division, in its analysis, ignored many factual elements found in the employment contract. It ignored the fact that the contract: was a permanent employment contract provided for a probationary period of 1,280 hours worked, but didn’t say that these hours had to be worked by a specific date didn’t include any reasons for terminating the contract related to an obligation to be available on specific dates or to complete the probationary period by a specific date [ 18 ] As a result, the General Division found that the misconduct resulted from breaching the employment contract. But the General Division made an error when it decided that the Claimant had breached the terms of his contract. Rather, the evidence shows that the employer chose to terminate his job unilaterally, since he was still on probation. The employment contract allowed the employer to terminate the contract unilaterally and without giving notice during the probationary period. The General Division ignored the evidence that the Claimant was on a leave of absence for the fishing season when it found the following: he had to have known he would lose his job if he didn’t go back to work on October 20, 2025 [ 19 ] In analyzing misconduct, the General Division made an error by ignoring the following fact: The Claimant was on an unpaid leave of absence that the employer authorized when the employer terminated his job. [ 20 ] The employer had allowed the Claimant to be absent during the fishing season. It confirmed that, from the moment he was hired, it knew that his main occupation was fishing. [ 21 ] In fact, a representative of the employer confirmed the following facts: The [APPELLANT] was hired as a deckhand, even though his main status was that of a fisher. The Claimant went back out to sea every year to fish when the fishing season started. The employer had agreed with the [APPELLANT] that he could go to sea once the fishing season started. He would go back to work as a deckhand once the season ended. The employer had authorized the leave of absence. The Claimant took a leave of absence on March 9, 2025, for the fishing season. The Claimant had initially announced that he would go back to X in mid‑August 2025. Footnote 13 [ 22 ] Even though the return had been scheduled for mid‑August, a specific return date wasn’t set. In fact, the Record of Employment ( ROE ) that X provided showed that the reason for issuing the ROE was a [translation] “leave of absence,” and that there was no scheduled date for a call‑back. Footnote 14 [ 23 ] This means that the obligation to work 40 hours per week set out in the employment contract didn’t apply to the Claimant. This was the case from the moment the employer allowed him to take a leave of absence to go fishing. [ 24 ] So, the General Division made an error in relying on the evidence that the employment contract required 40 hours of work per week. This was despite the employer confirming that it had allowed the Claimant to take a leave of absence for the fishing season, as of March 9, 2025. [ 25 ] The Federal Court of Appeal has already said that it is possible to discard evidence after weighing and assessing it. But the General Division could not ignore it, especially if those facts lay at the very core of the dispute concerning the concept of misconduct. Footnote 15 The General Division ignored evidence that the employer didn’t tell the Claimant he had to work on October 20, 2025, or risk losing his job [ 26 ] The General Division didn’t consider that the employer had never told the Claimant that he had to go back to work on a specific date. [ 27 ] In fact, the General Division didn’t weigh the evidence that the employer never told the Claimant that he had to go to work on October 20, 2025, or else he would be let go. [ 28 ] The evidence shows, rather, that when the Claimant wrote to his employer on October 7, 2025, saying that he would not be ready to go back to work on October 20, 2025, after all, the employer didn’t reply. [ 29 ] Given that the Claimant was on an unpaid leave of absence at the time, the General Division should have considered and weighed this evidence. In fact, there having been no warning or clear policy is an important factor to consider in finding whether he knew or should have known that he could lose his job by not going back to work on October 20, 2025. [ 30 ] Not considering this evidence constitutes an important error of fact. Remedy I will give the decision that should have been given [ 31 ] The parties want me to give the decision that should have been given. I agree that this is the appropriate remedy in this case. [ 32 ] The record is complete. I am now able to analyze the evidence myself to give a decision. The facts of the case don’t give rise to an analysis from a voluntary leaving perspective [ 33 ] At the Appeal Division, the Commission argues that the General Division decision isn’t based on an error. Footnote 16 I note that the General Division found that the [APPELLANT] lost his job because of misconduct. [ 34 ] But the Commission goes on to argue the following: If I were to intervene in the General Division decision, like I am doing in this case, I would have to find that the Claimant voluntarily left his job at X without good cause. Footnote 17 [ 35 ] The Commission relies on Federal Court of Appeal decisions to support its arguments. Footnote 18 It argues that the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that dismissal for misconduct and voluntary leaving might be dealt with together under the disqualification in section 30 of the [NAME]  Act. Footnote 19 [ 36 ] In its arguments, the Commission said that, in the case of Mr. [NAME]., [translation] “the dismissal isn’t the real cause for losing the job, but rather the direct and foreseeable consequence of the [APPELLANT] behaviour, so the situation calls for an analysis on the basis of voluntary leaving.” Footnote 20 The Commission said that he left his job by [translation] “refusing to go back to work on October 20, 2025.” The [APPELLANT] didn’t voluntarily leave his job [ 37 ] The facts of the case show that it was the employer who decided to terminate the [APPELLANT] job unilaterally. [ 38 ] First, the employer never claimed that the [APPELLANT] left on his own. Representatives of the employer said many times that it was the employer who terminated his probation and let him go. Footnote 21 The employer also sent him a termination letter. Footnote 22 [ 39 ] In this letter, the employer wrote that the [APPELLANT] wasn’t meeting the expectations of his position as a deckhand. The employer wrote that it wanted to tell Mr. [NAME]. that his job was being terminated. It was clearly the employer who decided to terminate his probationary period and the employment relationship. [ 40 ] The [APPELLANT] didn’t voluntarily leave his job. He had been given permission to take an unpaid leave of absence for the duration of the fishing season. He was in contact with X to set the date for when he would go back to them. It was the employer who terminated the employment relationship by ending his probationary period. There are no conflicting facts here that require an analysis from the voluntary leaving perspective. [ 41 ] Also, the Claimant testified before the General Division that he reapplied to X in December 2025 to try to be rehired as a deckhand. Footnote 23 So, the evidence shows that he wanted to keep his job as a deckhand, and that he tried to get the position again even after it was terminated on October 20, 2025. But he was told that [NAME] was no longer hiring fishers because it was too complicated. [ 42 ] So, I find that the facts of the case don’t support a finding that the Claimant voluntarily left his job. [ 43 ] It is true that, in some cases where the facts are conflicting, the Tribunal might consider whether the disqualification under section 30 of the [NAME] from the perspective of misconduct or voluntary leaving. But the facts of the case have to support this. [ 44 ] But the concepts of voluntary leaving and misconduct aren’t interchangeable. [ 45 ] The Federal Court of Appeal teaches us the following: In a case where it isn’t clear whether the unemployment results from the employee’s own misconduct or from the employee’s decision to leave, the finding of the court of first instance can be based on any of the two grounds for disqualification, as long as it is supported by the evidence . Footnote 24 [ 46 ] In the present case, there is no ambiguity, unlike in [NAME] 25 and [NAME]. Footnote 26 [ 47 ] Also, in a recent case, the Federal Court pointed out that misconduct and voluntary leaving are two separate grounds of disqualification. Footnote 27 In [NAME] , the Federal Court decided that it was reasonable for the Appeal Division to have considered the issue only from the perspective of misconduct, rather than voluntary leaving. [ 48 ] I also note that the Commission insists that the General Division decision contains no error. So, it acknowledges that the legal test for misconduct applies to Mr. [APPELLANT].’s case. The Claimant didn’t lose his job because of misconduct [ 49 ] A claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits if they lose a job because of misconduct. Footnote 28 [ 50 ] For there to be misconduct, the claimant’s conduct has to have been wilful or so reckless as to approach wilfulness. Footnote 29 [ 51 ] The claimant also has to know, or ought to have known, that their conduct could impair the performance of the duties owed to their employer, and that losing their job was a real possibility. Footnote 30 [ 52 ] There has to be a causal link between the alleged misconduct and the job. For there to be misconduct under the [NAME]  Act, the claimant’s conduct has to constitute a breach of an express or implied duty resulting from the contract of employment. Footnote 31 The concept of misconduct includes “any conscious contravention of a measure put in place by an employer.” Footnote 32 [ 53 ] I find that the facts of the case don’t allow me to find that the [APPELLANT] committed misconduct. [ 54 ] The [APPELLANT] didn’t wilfully act against an employer’s measure or directive. There was no measure or directive telling him that he had to go back to work by October 20, or else he would lose his job. The [APPELLANT] could not have known that he would lose his job if he didn’t go back to X on October 20, 2025 [ 55 ] The employer never told the [APPELLANT] that he had to make himself available on October 20, 2025, or else he would lose his job. But, on October 20, 2025, X terminated his job, saying that he wasn’t meeting the expectations of his position as a deckhand. Footnote 33 [ 56 ] When Service Canada asked about the job being terminated, the employer’s representative said the following: The [COUNSEL] had completed 1,104 probationary hours out of 1,208 when the unpaid leave of absence was authorized. The employer said that, since he hadn’t gone back to work on the agreed date of October 20, 2025, and hadn’t given any other dates of availability, the employer terminated his job. Footnote 34 [ 57 ] First, I note that I don’t have to decide whether the employer’s decision to terminate the job was legitimate. But, to understand the context surrounding the [APPELLANT] job termination, I note that the employment contract allowed the employer to rescind the contract unilaterally during the probationary period. And it didn’t have to give notice or pay compensation. Footnote 35 This means that the employer didn’t need a reason to terminate the job during the probationary period. [ 58 ] So, the fact that the employer decided to terminate the Claimant’s probation doesn’t necessarily mean that he committed misconduct. [ 59 ] To find whether the [APPELLANT] committed misconduct under the [NAME]  Act, I have to decide whether he knew or should have known that his conduct could lead to his job being terminated. The employer never told the Claimant that he had to go back to work on a specific date [ 60 ] The [APPELLANT] employer had agreed, when hiring him, that he would be able to take an unpaid leave of absence for the duration of the fishing period. The exact dates of when he would leave and return weren’t determined in advance. [ 61 ] When he was hired, the [APPELLANT] told the employer when he planned to be away. In fact, on November 1, 2024, he told his supervisor that he would be able to work as a deckhand until March 15, 2025, because of the fishing season. He also said that he would be available to return as a deckhand in mid‑August. Footnote 36 He emailed his employer the following: [translation] “If you need more information, don’t hesitate!” Footnote 37 This shows concern for his duties toward his employer. He told his employer in advance about the dates of the fishing season, and he said that he was available to share any other information, if needed. [ 62 ] When the Claimant took his leave of absence from X in March 2025, it wasn’t known when he would return. Footnote 38 It should be noted that the deckhand job is based in Montréal while the fishing takes place in Gaspésie. [ 63 ] The [APPELLANT] said that the fishing ended on August 30, 2025. Footnote 39 But after fishing ended, he had to carry out maintenance on equipment such as boats, wire traps, lines, fishing rods, and so on. [ 64 ] The employer confirmed that the [APPELLANT] didn’t go back to work as a deckhand in mid‑August as originally planned. Footnote 40 [ 65 ] The employer said that it had contacted the Claimant to find out when he would be available in September 2025. Footnote 41 The employer said that he wasn’t available to return in September. [ 66 ] So, I find that, in August and September 2025, the employer had accepted that the [APPELLANT] wasn’t ready to go back to work as a deckhand. Even so, his leave of absence continued to be authorized, even though he wasn’t available to go back to X immediately. [ 67 ] In addition, the fact that the employer accepted when the Claimant said that he would not be available to go back to work as a deckhand implies the following: The return date had to be suitable for the [APPELLANT], and it had to align with his fishing‑related work schedule. [ 68 ] This shows that the employer didn’t consider the Claimant not going back to work as early as August or even September 2025 to be a breach of his duties toward the employer. [ 69 ] On September 18, 2025, a representative of the employer told Service Canada that the [COUNSEL] was still on an unpaid leave of absence, and that he was supposed to go back to work for X on October 26. Footnote 42 [ 70 ] Later, the employer and the Claimant refer to October 20 as the return date. The changes in the date show that it hadn’t been clearly set. [ 71 ] On October 20, 2025, the employer told Service Canada that it had contacted the [APPELLANT] to agree that he would go back on October 20. Footnote 43 The [APPELLANT] confirms that he agreed to this date with the employer. I note how important it is that this date was mutually agreed on. The employer asked him when he would be available. This might have led the [APPELLANT] to believe that he could go back on a date that suited him, based on his remaining fishing duties. [ 72 ] As early as October 7, 2025, the evidence shows that the Claimant wrote to the employer to tell it that, after all, he would not be able to go back to work as a deckhand on October 20, 2025, as agreed. In his email, he wrote that he would not be available on October 20 because he had to fulfill certain commitments. Footnote 44 He said the following: [translation] “[I] would rather let you know now so that you can plan accordingly. I will also keep you updated on my future availability. Thank you very much for your understanding and flexibility.” Footnote 45 [ 73 ] The employer never responded to the Claimant’s email dated October 7, 2025, either to demand that he go back to work on October 20, 2025, or to tell him that he had to specify another return date. The evidence shows that the employer did receive the email. Footnote 46 The employer’s coordinator also forwarded his email to three other representatives of the employer. She said [translation] “fyi,” an abbreviation for [translation] “for your information,” after receiving it on October 7, 2025. [ 74 ] So, the Claimant didn’t know that the employer wasn’t accepting that he could not go back to work on October 20, 2025. The employer never told him, between October 7 and October 20, 2025, that he had to show up on October 20 or risk losing his job. [ 75 ] I find that the Claimant should not have known that he would lose his job if he didn’t show up on October 20, 2025. In fact, throughout the relationship with the employer, communications were smooth, and the employer consulted him about his availability. [ 76 ] It is clear that, as of August 2025, the employer and the Claimant were communicating to set a return date based on when he would be available. So, I find that the employer was flexible regarding when the Claimant would go back to his position as a deckhand position. The employer contacted him a few times to see when he would be ready to go back to work. The employer didn’t unilaterally set a return date. [ 77 ] The Claimant can’t be faulted for not going back on a specific date. This is because, on two occasions, in August and September 2025, the employer accepted that he wasn’t available to go back to work. It continued to consider him on an authorized leave of absence. The employer didn’t find it problematic that he wasn’t available in August and September. [ 78 ] It is true that, usually, an employment contract requires the employee to be present at work. But, in this case, the employee was on an unpaid leave of absence that had been authorized. This is an entirely different factual situation that requires the employee and employer to communicate to establish the parameters for returning from an unpaid leave of absence. [ 79 ] The Claimant said that he wanted to allow the employer to plan by telling it in advance that he would not be ready by October 20. He testified before the General Division that, if he had known that X needed him without fail as early as October 20, 2025, he would have arranged to go back to Montréal for that date. Footnote 47 But the employer never told him that it considered it essential for him to go back on October 20, 2025. [ 80 ] I find that the Claimant had no idea that not going back to work on October 20, 2025, would result in his job being terminated. He was on an authorized leave of absence. As early as October 7, he said that he would not be available to return on October 20. He didn’t receive any response from the employer saying that this wasn’t suitable. The employer had previously allowed him to postpone his return date without any issues. The employer never told him that, if he didn’t show up on October 20, he would lose his job. [ 81 ] The Claimant showed that he was willing to comply with the employer’s requirements by speaking over the phone, writing emails, and making himself available for any questions the employer might have. He also testified that he would have arranged to go back to X for October 20, 2025, if he had known that the employer absolutely needed him on that date. [ 82 ] Misconduct involves a “reprehensible action” that “deserves to be reprimanded, taken back, or sanctioned.” Footnote 48 We are far from that. [ 83 ] I see the difference between the facts of Mr. [NAME].’s case and other cases where claimants lost their jobs because they were absent. This was classified as misconduct. [ 84 ] In [APPELLANT] , the Claimant lost his job because of misconduct. He had received numerous warnings regarding his absenteeism going back more than one year, and three to four times within the month preceding his dismissal. Footnote 49 [ 85 ] In [APPELLANT] , the Claimant lost his job because he was repeatedly absent. This absenteeism was admonished in repeated notices of suspension . So, the Federal Court of Appeal found that “the respondent could not have been unaware that the breach of his obligations under his employment contract was of such scope that it was normally foreseeable that it would be likely to result in his dismissal.” Footnote 50 [ 86 ] In Mr. [NAME].’s case, the evidence on file shows that he was never warned. No return date was set after the fishing season when his leave of absence was authorized. The employer contacted him many times to find out when he would be available, not to impose a return date on him. The employer had no policy or rules in place that required probationary hours to be completed within a set time frame or that governed unpaid leaves of absence. [ 87 ] So, the Claimant wasn’t aware that the employer expected him to be at work on October 20, 2025. It wasn’t foreseeable that, by not showing up for work on that date, he would lose his job. This means that he can’t be accused of a wilful or intentional act. The Claimant could not have guessed the employer’s needs, even though he acted proactively by communicating regularly with his employer and offering his collaboration. [ 88 ] So, the Claimant didn’t commit misconduct. Conclusion [ 89 ] The appeal is allowed. [ 90 ] The General Division based its decision on important errors of fact. [ 91 ] I gave the decision that should have been given. [ 92 ] The Claimant didn’t lose his job because of misconduct. This means that he isn’t disqualified from receiving [NAME]  benefits. Footnotes Footnote 1 See the application for benefits at GD3-4. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See the notice of decision at GD3-81. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See the reconsideration request at GD3-84. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See the notice of decision at GD3-105. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See the notice of appeal at GD2. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See the Appellant’s arguments at AD3-2. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See the arguments that the Appellant made after the hearing at AD5-3. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See section 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act  ( DESD  Act). Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See section 58(1)(c) of the DESD  Act. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2018  FCA  118 at para 6. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See para 16 of the General Division decision at AD1A-4. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See para 23 of the General Division decision at AD1A-6. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-30. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See the Record of Employment ( ROE ) at GD3-25. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2005  FCA  87 at para 7. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 See the Commission’s arguments at AD4-6. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See the Commission’s arguments at AD4-7. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 See the Commission’s arguments at AD4-7. The Commission refers to the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2004  FCA  176; and Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-1598-92. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See the Commission’s arguments at AD4-7. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See the Commission’s arguments at AD4-7. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See the notes of telephone conversations with representatives of the employer at GD3-69 and GD3-75. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See the probation termination letter at GD3-68. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 Listen to the recording of the General Division hearing at 0:36:43. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2004  FCA  176 at para 6. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2004  FCA  176. In [NAME] , the Claimant was incarcerated. He wanted to keep his job, but he was no longer available for work because he was incarcerated. The employer had to let him go, since he was no longer available to carry out his duties. It was in this factual context that the Federal Court of Appeal said that the disqualification might be based on misconduct or voluntary leaving. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , A-1598-92. In [NAME] , the Claimant said that he had voluntarily left his job, while the employer said that it had let him go for being absent. The Federal Court of Appeal decided that interpreting the facts slightly differently based on this contradictory evidence was acceptable. This was because the subject of the decision under review was the disqualification from receiving Employment Insurance ( [NAME] ) benefits. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See the Federal Court decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2026  FC  584 at para 18. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See section 30(1) of the Employment Insurance Act . Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2026  FCA  89 at para 25. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2007  FCA  36 at para 14. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See the Federal Court decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2024  FC  1544 at para 59. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See the Federal Court decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2024  FC  1544 at para 60. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 See the termination letter at GD3-68. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-69. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See the employment contract at GD3-102. The contract says that the employer might rescind the contract unilaterally during the probationary period. And it doesn’t have to give notice or pay compensation. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See the email dated November 11, 2024, at GD3-98. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See the email dated November 11, 2024, at GD3-93. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See the ROE at GD3-23. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-66. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-30. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-30. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-28. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 See the notes of a telephone conversation at GD3-30. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See the email dated October 7, 2025, at GD3-97. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 See the email dated October 7, 2025, at GD3-97. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See the email dated October 7, 2025, at GD3-96. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 Listen to the recording of the General Division hearing at 0:35:50. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 See the Federal Court decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2024  FC  1544 at para 60. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in [NAME]  v  Canada (Attorney General) , 2007  FCA  36 at para 19. Return to footnote 49 referrer Footnote 50 See the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canada (Attorney General)  v  [NAME] , 2005  FCA  339 at para 5. Return to footnote 50 referrer