EI Appeal Dismissed: Claimant Fails to Prove Good Cause for Delay

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Citation: MP  v  Canada [NAME] Commission , 2026  [NAME]  304 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Respondent: [redacted] Representative: [COUNSEL] under appeal: [NAME] decision dated January 20, 2026 (GE-25-3447) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: April 9, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Respondent’s representative Decision date: April 21, 2026 File number: AD-26-89 On this page Decision Overview Preliminary matters Analysis Remedy Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 2 ] The [NAME] made errors of fact and law. I have corrected those errors and made the decision the [NAME] should have made, but I have reached the same result. [ 3 ] The Claimant did not have good cause for delaying his application. He is not entitled to an antedate. Overview [ 4 ] [APPELLANT]. is the Appellant. I will call him the Claimant because this application is about his claim for [NAME] ( [NAME] ) benefits. The Respondent is the Canada [NAME] Commission, which I will call the Commission. [ 5 ] The Claimant was dismissed from his job in August 2024, but he did not apply for [NAME] until June 20, 2025. He asked the Commission to make his claim effective as of August 11, 2024 (which is called “antedating”). [ 6 ] The Commission refused to antedate his claim because it did not accept that he had good cause for delaying his application. The Claimant asked the Commission to reconsider but it would not change its decision. [ 7 ] The [APPELLANT] appealed to the [NAME] of the Social Security Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal. He is now appealing to the Appeal Division. [ 8 ] I am dismissing the appeal. The [NAME] made errors of fact and law, so I made the decision that the [NAME] should have made. However, I have reached the same result as the [NAME]. [ 9 ] The [APPELLANT] is not entitled to an antedate of his claim. Preliminary matters New evidence [ 10 ] The [APPELLANT] submitted an Autism and ADHD Assessment report dated February 5, 2026 (the “[NAME]”). He made multiple references to the substance of that report in his written submissions. [ 11 ] The [APPELLANT] is correct that the Appeal Division does not normally consider new evidence. Footnote 1 However, he argues that this is not “new evidence.” He says it only confirms what he already told the [NAME] about his condition. He says that he is just relying on the report to describe his functional limitations. [ 12 ] In the [APPELLANT] appeal to the [NAME], he indicated that he believed the functional implications of his ADHD were relevant. He did support his argument with medical evidence. He argued that the Commission should have obtained medical input. [ 13 ] If he had given the [NAME] report to the [NAME], I would be able to review whether it was properly considered. He did not, so it is new evidence to the Appeal Division. So are the Claimant’s references to the particulars of the report in his Appeal Division submission. [ 14 ] The [APPELLANT] may be using the report to expand on what he told the [NAME] about his conditions and their effects. Or he may believe that the report gives credibility to what he said about them to the [NAME]. Or both. In any case, he is submitting the report because he believes this additional information will help explain why he delayed his application. [ 15 ] This means that I cannot consider it. Whether the Claimant had good cause for the delay is the very issue that was before the [NAME]. I cannot use evidence that was not before the [NAME] to find that it improperly evaluated the evidence that was before it. Issues [ 16 ] The issues in this appeal are: a) Did the [NAME] make an error of law by applying a test for exceptional circumstances that was too strict? b) Did the [NAME] make an error of fact or law in how it evaluated the Claimant’s circumstances during the period of the delay? c) Did the [NAME] make an error of fact by overlooking evidence related to the Claimant’s explanation for his delay? d) Did the [NAME] make an error of law by failing to distinguish between ignorance of the facts and ignorance of the law? e) Did the [NAME] make an error of fact or law by improperly inferring the [APPELLANT] capacity to inquire into his rights and obligations? Analysis [NAME] for appeals to the Appeal Division [ 17 ] The Appeal Division may only consider errors that fall within one of the following grounds of appeal: a) The [NAME] hearing process was not fair in some way. b) The [NAME] did not decide an issue that it should have decided. Or, it decided something it did not have the power to decide (error of jurisdiction). c) The [NAME] made an error of law when making its decision. d) The [NAME] based its decision on an important error of fact. Footnote 2 The [NAME] made an error of law by applying a test for exceptional circumstances that was too strict [ 18 ] When the Commission establishes a claimant’s benefit period beginning on a date that is earlier than their claim application date, this is called antedating. A claimant must show that they had good cause for the delay throughout the entire period of the delay in order to obtain an antedate. Footnote 3 [ 19 ] The courts have said that claimants have “good cause” during the delay, when they have acted as a “[NAME]” would act in their circumstances. Footnote 4 The courts have also said that a “[NAME]” would take reasonably prompt steps to educate themselves to their rights and obligations under the [NAME] Act ( [NAME]) or [NAME] (Regulations). Footnote 5 [ 20 ] Where a claimant’s delay is related to their misunderstanding of their rights and obligations, they can only justify that delay by demonstrating exceptional circumstances. Footnote 6 [ 21 ] The Claimant argues that the [NAME] used the wrong legal standard. He says that it did not evaluate his actions according to the [NAME] standard. He says the [NAME] made an error of law because it required him to show that his circumstances were so exceptional that they prevented him from applying earlier. [ 22 ] The [NAME] did not replace the [NAME] test, as the Claimant asserts. The [NAME] acknowledged that the test is whether the [APPELLANT] acted as a [NAME] would have acted in his circumstances. And it explained that it had to evaluate what “[NAME] and [NAME]” meant, on the particular facts. [ 23 ] Essentially, the Claimant did not apply earlier because he did not believe he would qualify for benefits. The [NAME] was correct that the law requires a “[NAME] and [NAME]” person to take reasonably prompt steps to understand their rights and obligations under the [NAME]. [ 24 ] Likewise, the [NAME] was correct to acknowledge that it may still be possible for a claimant to demonstrate good cause even though they did not take reasonably prompt steps. But this requires the claimant to prove exceptional circumstances. The [NAME] correctly observed that the Federal Court of Appeal’s position is that such circumstances would have to be “very exceptional.” Footnote 7 [ 25 ] Nonetheless, the [NAME] overstated the requirements of “exceptional circumstances.” The [NAME] said that the “exceptional” circumstances, on which the Claimant relied, did not prevent him from inquiring about and applying for [NAME]. [ 26 ] The Claimant is correct that the law does not require him to show that his circumstances prevented him from applying earlier. The Federal Court of Appeal has said that this is too strict a test. It said that the claimant’s circumstances need not be so dire as to prevent them from making application. Footnote 8 [ 27 ] The [NAME] made an error of law by evaluating the Claimant’s circumstances against a standard that was more demanding than is required by the law. The [NAME] did not make an error of fact or law in how it evaluated the Claimant’s circumstances during the period of the delay [ 28 ] The [NAME] made neither an error of fact nor law in how it evaluated the effect of the Claimant’s circumstances on his ability to seek information about his [NAME]. [ 29 ] The Claimant did not apply for [NAME] until June 20, 2025. Then he asked for an antedate to August 11, 2024. So, the delay between when he applied and when he requested his antedate was roughly 10 months. [ 30 ] The [NAME] did not accept that the Claimant had good cause throughout the period of the delay, because it considered him capable of seeking information about his [NAME] despite his medical conditions and personal challenges. [ 31 ] The Claimant states that his circumstances affected him differently at different times. He argues that the [NAME] should have considered how his circumstances affected him at all times within the period of his delay. He also asserts that the [NAME] considered only whether each of his circumstances was individually exceptional. He argues that it should have considered whether the cumulative impact of his circumstances was exceptional. Changes in circumstances over the delay [ 32 ] The [APPELLANT] believes the [NAME] should have parsed out how his circumstances may have affected him differently at different times over the period of his delay. [ 33 ] The [NAME] summarized the [APPELLANT] circumstances. Then it acknowledged that the [APPELLANT] experienced a mental breakdown in the first couple of months after he left his job. It noted the [APPELLANT] medical conditions, including his ADHD and back pain, and it also noted that he adjusted his ADHD medication after his dismissal. It noted what the [APPELLANT] said about the effects of ADHD. The [APPELLANT] had said that his ADHD allowed him to carry out routine activities but that it interfered with non-routine activities. The [APPELLANT] considered job applications to be routine, but he considered matters involving [NAME] to be non-routine. [ 34 ] The [APPELLANT] rightly observes that the [NAME] decision does not analyze whether the [APPELLANT] circumstances affected him differently at different times over the delay period, but this is neither an error of law, nor of fact. [ 35 ] It is not an error of law because the law puts the onus on claimants to demonstrate good cause at all times during the delay—not just at certain times. It is not the Commission’s job to prove that the [APPELLANT] did not have good cause at any time throughout the delay, or at any particular time. [ 36 ] The [APPELLANT] specifically asked for his claim to be antedated to August 11, 2024. He did not ask the Commission to consider any other antedate than August 11, nor did he argue to the [NAME] that he would have had good cause at some other date. So, he had to show good cause at all times between August 11, and the date of his request. [ 37 ] Nor did the [NAME] make an error of fact. [ 38 ] The [NAME] did not accept that the [APPELLANT] circumstances affected his ability to look into his rights and obligations in an “exceptional” manner. This conclusion concerned the entire delay period. The [APPELLANT] believes that it was inappropriate for the [NAME] to generalize the effect of his circumstances over the entire delay period. [ 39 ] The [APPELLANT] was not clear about why he was making this argument, but I will review the implications. If he is maintaining that he wanted an antedate to August 11 as he originally requested, he would have had to show good cause continuously from that earlier date. So, it would not matter whether he could show good cause over only a portion of the delay. [ 40 ] But if he is arguing that he should be entitled to an antedate to some other “earlier day” that is more recent than August 11, he has not identified which day that earlier day would be, or what would have changed at that time. To obtain an antedate to some other earlier day, he would have to show that he had a change in his circumstances that reduced his ability to research and apply. And he would have to show that the effect on his capability after the change was “exceptional.” [ 41 ] The period in question would need to be a continuous period, and it would need to be the period that led up to his application: It is only possible for a claimant to obtain an antedate to some other “earlier day,” that is also the most recent date they had good cause. And the basis for that “good cause” would have to persist without any pause all the way to the date that the claimant applies for benefits. [ 42 ] The [NAME] would have had to select a new antedate on which the Claimant’s circumstances became exceptional, and it would have had to find good cause during the remaining delay that followed the change in circumstances. [ 43 ] To establish that the [NAME] made an error of fact in generalizing, the Claimant would have to show that the [NAME] ignored or misunderstood evidence that his circumstances had a greater impact, and were therefore more exceptional, within the entire delay period from this new antedate. He did not identify any such evidence that was ignored or misunderstood by the [NAME] [ 44 ] In fact, much of the evidence about the manner in which the [APPELLANT] circumstances affected him was [NAME] in nature. There were only a few rough estimates of dates and few milestone events. [ 45 ] For example, the [APPELLANT] told the Commission that he had an emotional breakdown after he was dismissed, but that he “rebounded” within about two months (or by October, November, or December of 2024). Footnote 9 [ 46 ] This suggests that some of his circumstances actually had less impact over time, although the [APPELLANT] did not speak as positively about his emotional progress since he had the breakdown, when he testified at the [NAME]. He clarified that he had been better able to cope after the first months only because his mother came to live with him. Footnote 10 She helped him to see his application through, although he said he was the one that initiated the investigation. Footnote 11 [ 47 ] Regardless, the [APPELLANT] ability to research and apply for [NAME] improved within a few months of his dismissal because of, or coincident with, the arrival of his mother. It does not matter whether he was able to cope better because his mental condition had improved or because he had the support of his mother. [ 48 ] On the other hand, there was some evidence that his circumstances worsened during the delay period. The Claimant described a back condition with sciatica that predated his loss of employment. He talked about how it was worsening progressively and his need for surgery. He stated that the pain from this condition limited his ability to look into [NAME]. Footnote 12 [ 49 ] The [NAME] did not mention that the [APPELLANT] back condition was progressively worsening, but this does not mean it did not consider his testimony. The [NAME] is presumed to have considered all the evidence before it. It does not need to refer to each and every piece of evidence. Footnote 13 [ 50 ] The question before the [NAME] was whether the Claimant—in his circumstances—could reasonably be expected to have conducted the research necessary to determine whether and when to apply for benefits, and to apply. [ 51 ] When he applied in June 2025, he demonstrated his ability to do the necessary research and apply, regardless of the state of his back. If he was capable in June, he was presumably also capable earlier, when his back was not quite so bad. Even if the [NAME] expressly accepted that his back condition had worsened, this could not have changed its decision. [ 52 ] The Claimant did not point to any evidence that the [NAME] ignored or misunderstood on which it could have found the [APPELLANT] entitled to a different antedate than the one he requested. Combined effect of circumstances [ 53 ] The [APPELLANT] also argued that the [NAME] did not address whether the combined effect of his various circumstances was exceptional. [ 54 ] I disagree. The [NAME] noted the Commission’s argument that the [APPELLANT] bereavement (from the loss of his sister) and the stress of his employment loss do not establish that he was incapable of inquiring and applying for [NAME]. Then it reviewed the [APPELLANT] circumstances, followed by an acknowledgement that he had multiple circumstantial and medical challenges during the delay. Footnote 14 Then it concluded that neither his “medical conditions nor his mental breakdown” prevented him from taking reasonably prompt steps. Footnote 15 [ 55 ] “Prevent” is more stringent than required by law, as I have already found. But the point here is that the [NAME] considered together all of the circumstances that were relevant . [ 56 ] The [APPELLANT] did not prove, or argue, that his other circumstances (such as his abrupt dismissal, the loss of his sister, his strained finances, and his childcare obligations) affected his ability to take reasonably prompt steps in a way that was independent of his mental breakdown or medical conditions. The Claimant’s capability was related to his physical, mental, and emotional health. His other circumstances were only relevant to the extent that they exacerbated, contributed to, or caused his mental breakdown or his medical conditions. [ 57 ] When the [NAME] considered the effect of his mental breakdown and his medical conditions on his ability to take reasonably prompt steps, it implicitly considered the effect of these other circumstances as well. The evidence on which the [NAME] relied [ 58 ] As a final point, the [NAME]’s decision must be based on an erroneous finding of fact to show an error of fact. The [NAME] decision did not actually depend on its own, independent, assessment of the nature or extent of the [APPELLANT] physical or mental conditions. The decision relied on what the [NAME] found about the [APPELLANT] demonstration of his specific ability to research and apply, as well as on his own assessment of his capability. [ 59 ] The [APPELLANT] testified that he talked to his employer in June 2025. This was when he learned he had not been dismissed for misconduct. Once he understood the reason for his dismissal, he looked into [NAME] and was able to apply. He submitted his application to the Commission on June 20, 2025, which would have been less than three weeks from when he obtained information that led him to believe he might be eligible. Footnote 16 [ 60 ] The evidence before the [NAME] did not explain how the Claimant could reacquire the capability to research and apply for [NAME], or why this occurred coincidentally with his new understanding that he could be eligible. In the absence of such evidence, the [APPELLANT] demonstrated capability in June, supports an inference that he had that capability for at least some period of time before he applied. [ 61 ] The [NAME] also relied on the [APPELLANT] self-assessment of his capability during the delay. The [APPELLANT] confirmed to the Commission that it was “his mistake” that he did not contact Service Canada once he began to improve from his emotional breakdown. Footnote 17 He also testified that he would have applied earlier if he had understood his employer had dismissed him without cause. Footnote 18 [ 62 ] The [NAME] found that the [APPELLANT] remained ignorant of his rights and obligations because of his misconception of his eligibility, and not because of any limitations imposed by his various circumstances. Given the Claimant’s admissions, it was open to the [NAME] to find as it did. It did not need to provide a detailed analysis of how the [APPELLANT] was affected by the various circumstances in his life over time. The [NAME] ignored evidence related to the [APPELLANT] explanation for his delay [ 63 ] The [NAME] found that the [APPELLANT] did not apply for benefits in a timely manner because he misunderstood the reason for his separation and because he had made assumptions about how his entitlement to benefits would be impacted. [ 64 ] The [APPELLANT] believes that the [NAME] should have focused on his misunderstanding of the facts. He was mistaken only about the employer’s reasons for dismissing him, rather than mistaken about the law. He said that the [NAME] did not “grapple with” whether he could reasonably have known the actual reason for his dismissal until June 2025. [ 65 ] The [APPELLANT] described the circumstances which caused him to reasonably believe that he had been dismissed for misconduct. Since the law disqualifies claimants who are dismissed for misconduct, he believes that these circumstances justified his belief that he was ineligible for [NAME]. He argues that they justified his failure to take reasonably prompt steps to understand his rights and obligations. [ 66 ] I agree with the [APPELLANT] that the [NAME] made an error of fact. The [NAME] failed to consider much of what the Claimant said about the manner of his dismissal, and what he said about how he understood the Record of Employment. This evidence was relevant to how he understood his dismissal and to the reasons he gave for his delay. [ 67 ] The [NAME] noted that the [APPELLANT] signed a release to obtain compensation, and that this led him to believe he had been dismissed for misconduct. It also noted that the [APPELLANT] experience in the UK led him to believe that employees are not entitled to social benefits if they are either compensated by their employer or if they are dismissed for misconduct. Footnote 19 [ 68 ] However, the [NAME] did not discuss the manner of the Claimant’s dismissal. The [APPELLANT] said that his employer would not give him a reference unless he signed a release. Footnote 20 He also said that his employer had informed him he was being dismissed, recovered his laptop computer, and that he was out of the building—all within the space of twenty minutes. He said that, in the UK, this kind of treatment would signify the employee was being dismissed for gross misconduct. Footnote 21 So this contributed to his belief that he was dismissed for misconduct, and that he was therefore ineligible for benefits. [ 69 ] The [APPELLANT] asserted that his ROE also contributed to his belief that he had been dismissed for misconduct. He said the ROE said he was “dismissed or suspended.” He understood that this implied misconduct. [ 70 ] The [NAME] paraphrased the Commission’s argument, which addressed the Claimant’s interpretation of the ROE . So, it was aware of the existence of this ROE evidence. Footnote 22 But the decision does not mention the ROE , or the Claimant’s reliance on it, when it summarizes the Claimant’s arguments, and the ROE does not factor into the [NAME]’s “good cause” analysis. [ 71 ] As I noted already, the [NAME] is normally presumed to have considered all the evidence in front of it. Footnote 23 In this case, the [NAME] did not consider evidence that could have been important to the decision. [ 72 ] The [APPELLANT] mistaken belief that his employer dismissed him for misconduct was a large part of his explanation for the delay. He repeatedly stated that he had been misled, or misled in part, by what was stated on the ROE , both in his request for reconsideration and in his Notice of Appeal documentation. Footnote 24 [ 73 ] I recognize that the ROE was not central to his testimony: When the [NAME] asked him about it, he moved on quickly. He testified that it was “not just the ROE ”; it was also the manner of his dismissal. Footnote 25 [ 74 ] But I accept that both the Claimant’s understanding of the ROE , and the manner of his dismissal were of sufficient importance that the [NAME] would have referred to them within its “good cause” analysis, if the member had turned her mind to that evidence. [ 75 ] I find that the [NAME] overlooked evidence about the circumstances of the [APPELLANT] dismissal and the ROE evidence, and that this was an error of fact. The [NAME] did not make an error by failing to distinguish between ignorance of facts and ignorance of the law. [ 76 ] The [NAME] noted that the courts have held that ignorance of the law and good faith do not amount to good cause. Footnote 26 [ 77 ] The [APPELLANT] believes the distinction is important. He argues that he did not delay his application because he was ignorant of the law. He says he believed he was not eligible for [NAME] because he was dismissed for misconduct, and that this is legally correct. He says his mistake was to believe he had been dismissed for misconduct. He argues he was mistaken only about the facts of his termination. He was not ignorant of the law. [ 78 ] And he believes that he had good cause for the delay from the time that he understood the facts. He looked into his eligibility and applied for benefits as quickly as he could after he understood his employer’s reasons for dismissing him. [ 79 ] He explained how his experience in the UK contributed to his mistaken belief that he had been dismissed for misconduct. He testified that he knew the employer had dismissed him “without cause,” and that employees who are dismissed “without cause” in the UK would not be eligible for the “job seekers allowance.” Footnote 27 But he also said that he believed his employer must have let him go for some kind of misconduct, because of how badly the employer treated him when his employment was terminated. [ 80 ] The [NAME] stated that the Claimant learned in June 2025 that the employer had hired someone to replace him. It wrote that he learned he “had been dismissed without cause, as opposed to for misconduct.” This implies that the Claimant did not know he had been dismissed “without cause” until June 2025. [ 81 ] I acknowledge that the [APPELLANT] told the Commission that he only learned he could apply for [NAME] when he saw a copy of his termination letter, because “the letter stated he was dismissed without cause.” Footnote 28 So that accords with what the [NAME] appears to have understood. [ 82 ] But the Claimant was actually more precise in his testimony. He testified that he obtained a copy of the termination letter in June 2025 and then discovered online that the employer had hired a replacement for him. This is what caused him to contact the employer, at which time he learned that his dismissal had nothing to do with his own conduct. He was quite clear that he knew he was dismissed “without cause” at the time of his dismissal in August 2024, but that he also thought that the employer dismissed him for “misconduct.” Footnote 29 [ 83 ] It seems that the Claimant was not ignorant about the facts; He was ignorant of the legal implications of the facts. He knew he had been dismissed “without cause” but was mistaken about the legal significance of such a dismissal. [ 84 ] I appreciate that the Claimant interpreted the circumstances of his dismissal in light of how the employer treated him. But he was legally incorrect if he assumed that his dismissal “without cause,” meant that he was disqualified from receiving [NAME], or if he assumed that “without cause” was just another way of saying misconduct. [ 85 ] Claimants who are dismissed “without cause” are not disqualified for that reason. Legally, termination “without cause” excludes misconduct, by definition. Claimants are disqualified from receiving [NAME] if they are dismissed for misconduct, which is defined according to a legal test that is unique to the [NAME] context. Footnote 30 The Commission must prove that the claimant was dismissed for misconduct, regardless of how the employer characterizes the dismissal. [ 86 ] In any event, it is not important whether the Claimant did not apply earlier because he was unclear on the facts or whether he delayed because he was unclear on the law. The courts have said only that “ignorance of the law” is not good cause. This does not mean that ignorance of facts is good cause. [ 87 ] The [NAME] noted what the courts have said about ignorance of the law, but it added that a [NAME] person is expected to take reasonably prompt steps to determine their entitlement to benefits. Footnote 31 Regardless of whether the Claimant made assumptions about facts or about the legal significance of facts, he still had to show that he acted as a [NAME] would act in his circumstances. [ 88 ] The [NAME] said that the Claimant’s incorrect assumptions do not amount to good cause. Footnote 32 There is no reason at law why “reasonably prompt steps” should not include the steps necessary to confirm uninformed assumptions related to rights and obligations for [NAME]—even if they were assumptions of fact only. [ 89 ] The [NAME] did not make an error by failing to distinguish ignorance of facts from ignorance of law. The [NAME] did not improperly infer the Claimant’s capacity to inquire into his rights and obligations under the [NAME] or Regulations [ 90 ] I understand that the Commission relied on the Claimant’s employment position and his job search. It used these factors to infer that the [APPELLANT] was capable of looking into his rights and obligations. [ 91 ] These arguments are not necessarily unreasonable. The [APPELLANT] had a position that required him to perform certain complex tasks. It would be appropriate to infer that he was capable of those tasks at the time he was doing them. And if he were capable of complex tasks at his regular job, one might reasonably infer he would be capable of different tasks at the same level, or of performing tasks of a lesser complexity. [ 92 ] However, it is not appropriate to draw inferences from generalities, without regard for the specific evidence. For example, there may be evidence that a person’s capabilities have changed over time, or that the new task, or the circumstances in which it must be performed, is not comparable to the original task in some material way. [ 93 ] The [APPELLANT] gave evidence about his actual job search between August 2024 and December 2025. He spoke of how seriously his dismissal had affected him and how it continued to affect him. For example, he said he was dealing with depression and anxiety and feelings of worthlessness. Footnote 33 He applied to a number of jobs, but testified he was invited to only one interview. He said he had a panic attack and could not attend the interview. Footnote 34 [ 94 ] It would not be [NAME] to extrapolate from the [APPELLANT] job search evidence that he had the mental or emotional capacity to educate himself about his rights and obligations under the [NAME] or Regulations. [ 95 ] It is also important to recall that the [APPELLANT] mental breakdown occurred after he was dismissed from his job. He gave evidence about how this affected his mental health and impaired his abilities in ways that would likely have interfered with his former job duties. It would not be appropriate to infer from his former ability to perform certain tasks that he could still do them following a mental breakdown. [ 96 ] However, the [NAME] did not accept the Commission’s invitation to infer the [APPELLANT] capacity from his job search. And it did not infer his capacity from his employment position, either. As I have already noted, the [NAME] relied on other evidence to justify its decision. [ 97 ] The [NAME] relied on the [APPELLANT] demonstrated ability to inform himself of the [NAME] application process and to apply. The [APPELLANT] confirmed he applied for benefits as soon as he understood that he had been dismissed without cause. (He did not say he applied as soon as he had the mental or emotional capacity to apply.) [ 98 ] The [NAME] also relied on the [APPELLANT] statement that he would have applied earlier if he had understood that his employer dismissed him without cause. This was essentially an admission that he had the “capacity,” if not the knowledge, to apply earlier (perhaps as early as the date of his dismissal). [ 99 ] In November 2025, he told the Commission he did not know he could receive [NAME] from Service Canada. When the Commission asked him why he did not contact Service Canada after his mental or emotional condition began to improve, he said only that it was his mistake. Footnote 35 However, the [NAME] asked the [APPELLANT] specifically if he would have been able to look into the social benefits if his employer had been more transparent about what dismissal meant in his case, and he replied, “absolutely.” Footnote 36 [ 100 ] The [NAME] held that the [APPELLANT] did not take reasonably prompt steps to seek information about his [NAME]. This was based on its finding that the [APPELLANT] delayed because of his misunderstanding and his assumptions. He did not delay because he was incapable of research. The Claimant has not pointed to any evidence that the [NAME] overlooked or misunderstood that is relevant to this finding. [ 101 ] The [NAME] did not draw improper inferences about the Claimant’s capacity to inquire into his rights and obligations under the [NAME]. Remedy [ 102 ] I have found that the [NAME] made errors in how it made its decision. Therefore, I must consider how best to provide a remedy. I have the power to send the matter back to the [NAME] to reconsider. But I may also make the decision that the [NAME] should have made. Footnote 37 Both the Claimant and the Commission ask that I make the decision that the [NAME] should have made. [ 103 ] I accept their recommendation. I have all the information that I need to decide what I need to decide. There is no reason to send it back to the [NAME]. My decision [ 104 ] I find that the Claimant did not have good cause for the delay in applying for benefits. [ 105 ] The [APPELLANT] was dismissed in August 2024. He did not apply for benefits until June 2025, because he did not know he would be eligible. He admitted that he would have applied earlier if he had known he could. He assumed that he was disqualified by virtue of the manner of his dismissal (including its actions on the day of his dismissal and negotiations around severance and a release of claims), as well as his understanding of the ROE . [ 106 ] The [APPELLANT] said he only learned in June 2025 that his [NAME] had not dismissed him for misconduct. He immediately educated himself on his potential eligibility for [NAME], and on the application process. He completed his application by June 20, 2025, with the help of his mother. The [APPELLANT] did not act as a “[NAME] and [NAME]” person in his circumstances [ 107 ] To prove that he had good cause, the [APPELLANT] had to show that he acted as a [NAME] would have acted in similar circumstances, throughout the period of the delay. [ 108 ] A “[NAME] and [NAME]” claimant is required by law to take reasonably prompt steps to educate themself to their rights and obligations under the [NAME]. This does not just apply to claimants who admit that they are ignorant of their rights and obligations. It also applies to claimants who think they know what they are doing, even if they do not. Claimants cannot simply assume that they know their rights and obligations without investigation. [ 109 ] The [APPELLANT] made assumptions of both fact and law. He did not take reasonably prompt steps to confirm that his assumptions were accurate. He assumed that the employer dismissed him for misconduct, and he assumed he would not be entitled to social benefits. Even though he spoke to several lawyers at the time of his dismissal, he confirmed that he did not ask what he had done to be fired, or ask about the availability of social benefits for unemployed Canadians. Footnote 38 [ 110 ] If the [APPELLANT] assumed that he could not receive benefits because of his belief that he was dismissed for misconduct, he did not ask anyone how misconduct was evaluated for [NAME] benefit purposes. If he believed that the employer had fired him for his misconduct unjustifiably, he did not ask whether it was open to him to challenge this (to obtain [NAME]). There is no evidence that he spoke with anyone at Service Canada or that he visited any government website, to obtain information about his prospects of receiving social benefits after his dismissal. [ 111 ] It was not [NAME] for the [APPELLANT] to make assumptions about the facts and the law, and to make no effort to confirm his assumptions. But in addition, the [APPELLANT] made assumptions that were themselves unreasonable. [ 112 ] The [APPELLANT] assumed he would not be eligible for social benefits, relying in part on his experience in the UK. But he had no reason to believe that the terminology, benefit programs, or the related law, would be the same in Canada as in the UK. [ 113 ] The [APPELLANT] said that he assumed he had been dismissed for misconduct. However, his employer told him the company was restructuring and that his position was being eliminated. In June 2025, he discovered the employer had replaced him. He called the employer, and learned that his conduct was not the reason his employer dismissed him. Footnote 39 His actions suggest that he believed the employer’s original explanation until June 2025, which is inconsistent with his stated belief that he had been dismissed for misconduct. [ 114 ] Nor was it [NAME] for the Claimant to assume from the manner of his dismissal that he would not qualify for [NAME] in Canada. He described how the employer had dismissed him in an abrupt and discourteous manner. He said that he did not believe the employer would dismiss him in such a manner unless it considered him to have committed some kind of misconduct. However, he has not admitted to any misconduct, nor was there evidence that the employer actually viewed any of his actions as misconduct. [ 115 ] The [APPELLANT] may have assumed that the Commission had to accept that he was dismissed for misconduct, if that was how the employer characterized his dismissal. But this was also incorrect. [ 116 ] In addition, it was not [NAME] for the [APPELLANT] to assume that what was described to him as a dismissal “without cause” meant that he was being dismissed for misconduct, or to assume that “dismissal,” given as a reason for issuing an ROE , signified a dismissal for misconduct. The actual words “without cause” suggest the exact opposite of misconduct. When a claimant is dismissed for misconduct, they might naturally assume their misconduct is the cause of their dismissal, which means they are dismissed, “for cause.” There is no semantic reason to assume that misconduct is implied in the term, “without cause.” [ 117 ] Neither is misconduct suggested by the “dismissal or suspension” reason or code “M” on the ROE . “Dismissal” does not imply fault. It is a neutral term. All of the possible reasons for separation are listed on the reverse of the ROE . Footnote 40 Except where there is a shortage of work, “Code M, Dismissal or suspension” is the only code available to an employer when it is the employer who initiates the separation—whatever the reason for the separation. [ 118 ] The Claimant also said that he assumed he had been dismissed for misconduct because his employer pressured him to accept a settlement agreement and sign a release. But the fact that his employer would give him more favourable separation terms if he signed an agreement, does not imply that his conduct was the reason for the separation. If anything, the employer would be more likely to seek a settlement and release where the employer is the one at fault and the employee did nothing wrong. The employer might wish to their legal exposure for wrongful dismissal or other claims by the employee. [ 119 ] I do not accept that the Claimant could not reasonably have known until June 2025 that he was not dismissed for misconduct. The Claimant made a number of unreasonable assumptions. But more importantly, it was unreasonable of him to make no effort to verify those assumptions until June 2025. The Claimant’s failure to take reasonably prompt steps is not justified by exceptional circumstances [ 120 ] The remaining question is whether the Claimant’s failure to promptly check his assumptions was justified by exceptional circumstances. [ 121 ] The Claimant has undoubtedly experienced great hardship. Some of his challenges predated the loss of his job. He is a single dad. He has ADHD. He has chronic back pain and is facing spinal fusion surgery. He is relatively new to Canada from the UK. [ 122 ] However, the loss of his job appears to have made his life significantly more difficult. He felt forced out of a profession to which he had devoted most of his working career. His finances were strained. His ADHD worsened significantly to where he doubled his medication dose. His back condition was painful and expected to worsen. [ 123 ] These circumstances resulted in something of an emotional or mental breakdown immediately after his job loss, which appears to have persisted to some degree. The Claimant spoke of how his confidence was affected and of his problems looking for work. He said that he was only able to cope because his mother had moved in to help him, but that this added to his feelings of inadequacy. [ 124 ] However, there is no evidence by which I might find that his capacity was so diminished by the physical, metal, emotional, and situational stressors during the period of delay that it would be unreasonable to expect him to look into [NAME] and apply. [ 125 ] I acknowledge that the Claimant’s various circumstances made it more difficult to research and apply for benefits. But he said he could do it. Despite all of his difficult circumstances, the Claimant’s testimony confirmed that he would have applied for [NAME] earlier, or looked into applying, if he had not believed that his employer dismissed him for misconduct. [ 126 ] And he showed that he could do it. Once he learned that his original assumptions were incorrect, he swiftly discovered his possible eligibility for [NAME] and how to apply. [ 127 ] In other words, the [APPELLANT] himself recognizes that he could, and would, have looked into his eligibility for [NAME], if not for his own misunderstanding. [ 128 ] I find that neither the Claimant’s various life circumstances, nor any combination of those circumstances, were so “exceptional” that it would be unreasonable to expect him to have looked into his [NAME] and applied earlier. [ 129 ] The Claimant did not take reasonably prompt steps, and his failure to do so was not justified by exceptional circumstances from either the August 11 antedate or any other “earlier day” on which he might otherwise have qualified. So, he did not act as [NAME] in his circumstances. [ 130 ] The Claimant did not have good cause for the delay in making application for benefits. Conclusion [ 131 ] The appeal is dismissed. [ 132 ] The [NAME] made an error of fact and an error of law. I have made the decision that the [NAME] division should have made. I have corrected the [NAME]’s errors, but I have reached the same result as the [NAME]. [ 133 ] The Claimant is not entitled to an antedate because he did not have good cause for the delay for the entire period of the delay. Footnotes Footnote 1 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2022  FCA  157; [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2019  FCA  256; [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME] ), 2016  FC  1387; [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME] ), 2014  FC  963. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 This is a plain-language version of the three grounds. The full text is in section 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act ( DESDA ). Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See section 10(4) of the [NAME]. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See Canada ([NAME] [NAME])  v  [NAME] , 2012  FCA  139. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See Canada ([NAME] [NAME])  v  [NAME] , 2010  FCA  336; and Canada ([NAME] [NAME])  v  [NAME] , 2011  FCA  266. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 Ibid. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See Canada ([NAME] [NAME])  v  [NAME], A-395-85 Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See Canada ([NAME] [NAME])  v  [NAME] , A-1783-83. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See GD3-36. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:52:20. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 01:07:15—1:07:30. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 01:03:50—1:07:10. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2012  FCA  82. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See paras 18 to 22 of the [NAME] decision. I note that the [NAME] did not recite the Claimant’s bereavement. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 See para 15 of the [NAME] decision. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:42:50 and at 1:09:15. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 See GD3-37. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 01:08:55 and at 00:42:50. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See para 18 of the [NAME] decision. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:38:40. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:43:20. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See para 7 of the [NAME] decision. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 Supra note 13. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 See GD3-24 and GD3-30; see also GD2-2, GD2-3, GD2-17, GD2-19, GD2-20. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:38:20. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See para 10 of the [NAME] decision. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:21:55; 00:25:00. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See GD3-34. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:22:06; 00:23:07. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]), 2007  FCA  36. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See para 27 of the [NAME] decision. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See para 28 of the [NAME] decision. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:50:15—00:51:10. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:59:50. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See GD3-37. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:42:50. Listen also to 01:08:55. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See section 59(1) of the DESDA . Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:45:40. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:26:48. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See GD3-16. Return to footnote 40 referrer