SST Allows Partial Appeal on EI Job Search Standards

OUTCOME: Allowed in Part

Citation: TH  v  [NAME] Commission , 2026  [NAME]  292 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Decision Appellant: [redacted] Representative: L. H. Respondent: [redacted] Representative: [COUNSEL] under appeal: [NAME] decision dated December 10, 2025 (GE-25-2934) Tribunal member: [NAME] of hearing: Teleconference Hearing date: March 17, 2026 Hearing participants: Appellant Appellant’s representative Respondent’s representative Decision date: April 13, 2026 File number: AD-25-826 On this page Decision Overview Issues Analysis Remedy My decision Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] The appeal is allowed in part. [ 2 ] The Claimant was available for work from June 1, 2025, to July 13, 2025, and from August 12, 2025, until at least the date of the [NAME] hearing on November 21, 2025. He is not disentitled from receiving regular benefits during these two periods. He remains disentitled from July 14, 2025, to August 11, 2025. Overview [ 3 ] T. [APPELLANT]. is the Appellant. I will call him the Claimant because this application is about his claim for [NAME] ( EI ) benefits. The Respondent is the [NAME] Commission, which I will refer to as the Commission. [ 4 ] The Claimant was employed at a job with a seasonal layoff. At the very end of his work term in December 2024, he had a medical emergency, which resulted in an extended period of disability. He applied for, and received, EI sickness benefits. When his sickness benefits ended, he obtained a qualified medical clearance to return to work. He asked the Commission for regular benefits. [ 5 ] The Commission refused to pay regular benefits because it said he was not available for work. The [APPELLANT] asked it to reconsider but it would not change its decision. [ 6 ] The [APPELLANT] appealed to the [NAME] of the Social Security Tribunal, which agreed with the Commission that the [APPELLANT] was not available because he had not proven a sufficient job search. [ 7 ] The [APPELLANT] asked the Appeal Division for permission to appeal, and I gave him permission. Issues [ 8 ] The issues in this appeal are: a) Did the [NAME] make an error of jurisdiction? b) Did the [NAME] make an error of fact when it found that the [APPELLANT] did not meet the job search effort requirement to prove his availability for work? c) Did the [NAME] make an error of law by requiring the [APPELLANT] to prove his availability for work through an “active, serious, continual and intensive job search, demonstrated by a verifiable record of job applications”? d) Did the [NAME] make any other errors argued in the Claimant’s submissions? Analysis [NAME] principles for appeals to the Appeal Division [ 9 ] The Appeal Division may only consider errors that fall within one of the following grounds of appeal: a) The [NAME] hearing process was not fair in some way. b) The [NAME] did not decide an issue that it should have decided. Or, it decided something it did not have the power to decide (error of jurisdiction). c) The [NAME] made an error of law when making its decision. d) The [NAME] based its decision on an important error of fact. Footnote 1 Error of jurisdiction [ 10 ] An error of jurisdiction is where the [NAME] fails to make a decision that it is required to make, or where it makes a decision that it is not authorized to make. [ 11 ] The [NAME] is required to consider all the issues that are on appeal. The only kind of decision that may be appealed to the [NAME] is the Commission’s reconsideration decision. So, the [NAME] has jurisdiction to consider issues that arise from the reconsideration decision only. Footnote 2 [ 12 ] The only one of the Claimant’s arguments that could be a jurisdictional argument is his argument that he should not be disentitled to benefits from November 21, 2025, to year end. The Claimant could be saying that the [NAME] had no jurisdiction to decide on his entitlement after November 21, 2025, or he could be saying that it should have decided on his entitlement after November 21, 2025. [ 13 ] Either way, the [NAME] did not make an error of jurisdiction. It did not actually decide that the Claimant could not prove his availability or be entitled to benefits after November 21, 2025, so it did not exceed its jurisdiction. [ 14 ] While the decision did find that the Claimant had not proven his availability “since June 1, 2025,” its decision was based on the evidence available at the time of the November 21, 2025, hearing. [ 15 ] Availability is assessed on an ongoing basis. Claimants are only entitled to benefits for those working days that they can prove their availability. The [NAME] decision does not prevent the Claimant from proving his availability, and his entitlement to benefits, after November 21, 2025. [ 16 ] Nor did the [NAME] refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. It could not know what the [APPELLANT] would do in the future, so it was in no position to make a decision about his future availability for work. [ 17 ] I appreciate that the Claimant has made other arguments that concern how the Commission made its decision and that the Commission seemed over time to be changing its reasons for denying benefits—but this does not change the fact that the [NAME] can only consider those issues arising from the reconsideration decision. It has no authority over the Commission’s investigative or other internal processes. [ 18 ] The [NAME] did not make an error of jurisdiction when it said that the Claimant was not available for work after June 1, 2025. Error of fact [ 19 ] An error of fact arises when the [NAME] has based its decision on a finding that ignores or misunderstands relevant evidence, or on a finding that does not follow rationally from the evidence. Footnote 3 [ 20 ] Making sufficient “job search efforts,” is one of the three “[NAME]” factors, which must be satisfied before a claimant can be considered available for work. Footnote 4 The [NAME] based its decision on a finding that the Claimant had not made sufficient job search efforts. [ 21 ] The [NAME] made an error of fact because it did not consider all of the evidence that was relevant to this finding. It did not consider the Claimant’s efforts to have his [NAME] (which I will call “Q”) accept him back to his regular job. [ 22 ] The Claimant’s argument that the [NAME] made an error of fact were not clearly focused on how the [NAME] overlooked or misunderstood his evidence that he made efforts to return to [NAME]. However, his Appeal Division submissions do note that he was making efforts to satisfy [NAME] that he was ready to return to work. [ 23 ] His submissions to the [NAME] referred to how he left “countless messages and [made] calls” to [NAME] in an effort to return to his job. He said he was unsuccessful, referring to the period from “June 1—return to work date and most of July.” He also said that [NAME] eventually told him that he needed to have the physical restriction removed. Footnote 5 This is consistent with what he told the Commission on September 29, 2025. He said that he convinced his doctor that he could return to work but that his employer had not been able to accommodate his limitations. Footnote 6 [ 24 ] The Claimant’s initial efforts to return to his pre-injury job was a kind of “job search effort.” The [NAME] made an error of fact by failing to consider this evidence. Error of law Did the [NAME] make an error of law by requiring the Claimant to prove her availability for work through an “active, serious, continual and intensive job search, demonstrated by a verifiable record of job applications”? [ 25 ] The [NAME] made an error of law. [ 26 ] It stated that “the courts have said that the determinative factor in assessing availability is an active, serious, continual, and intensive job search, demonstrated by a verifiable record of job applications.” In support of this proposition, it cited [NAME]  v.  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , A-239-90, a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. [ 27 ] However, the [NAME] decision does not articulate a test for availability, or stand for the principle outlined by the [NAME]. [APPELLANT] simply noted that the claimant had been disentitled because his job search had been inadequate, and that he was not disentitled because he went to [COMPANY] part-time. The [NAME] that decided the matter—before it was reviewed by the Federal Court of Appeal—had found that the claimant’s job search efforts were not sufficient to prove that he was available for work while he was attending [COMPANY]. Footnote 7 [ 28 ] Neither the Federal Court of Appeal, nor the [NAME], suggested that a claimant’s job search must be “active, serious, continual, and intensive.” Neither the Federal Court of Appeal, nor the [NAME], said that claimants must be able to prove their job search efforts with “verifiable records.” [ 29 ] The Commission argues that the [NAME] used [NAME] to make a finding of fact only, and not to impose a more stringent legal standard than is required by the [NAME] analysis. It supports its argument by noting that [NAME] was used by the [NAME] in a different case ( VL ) to support its assessment of the sufficiency of a job search. Footnote 8 It states that the [NAME] decision was appealed to the Appeal Division, and that the Appeal Division did not find the way the [NAME] used the [NAME] decision to be in error. Footnote 9 [ 30 ] I am not persuaded. The Appeal Division may not have explicitly rejected the [NAME]’s use of [NAME] in VL, but there is no reason to believe it turned its mind to the question. In VL , the Appeal Division accepted that the [NAME] made no error when it found that the Claimant did not satisfy two of the [NAME] factors by relying on a finding that the claimant focused his job search on certain work. The Appeal Division’s analysis did not mention the [NAME]’s use of [NAME]. It did not confirm that the [NAME] decision supports the principle for which it was used by the [NAME] in that case, or suggest that it would support the manner in which it was used in the present case. [ 31 ] I acknowledge that there is an apparent contradiction in the evidence that was before the [NAME]. The Claimant told the Commission that he was not applying for work and that there was no point in applying. But he testified to the [NAME] that he had been applying, and that he was working with an [NAME]. [ 32 ] The [NAME] is required to make findings of fact based on which evidence it accepts, and on how it weighs the evidence, and it must explain those findings in its reasons. So, it needed to either resolve the apparent contradiction or to explain why it chose one version of the facts over the other. [ 33 ] The [NAME] chose to believe that the [APPELLANT] was not applying for work. It said it could (possibly) give little weight to what the [APPELLANT] told the Commission (in his statements to the Commission) but that it could only do so if the [APPELLANT] had proof or a job search. This is another way of saying that it was compelled to give more weight to what the [APPELLANT] told the Commission because the [APPELLANT] did not support his testimony with “verifiable records” of a job search. [ 34 ] The [NAME]’s comments followed immediately from what it apparently believed to be settled law, which dictated both the nature and extent of acceptable job search efforts, and the manner in which a claimant must prove those efforts. That statement of law is incorrect. [ 35 ] As I noted in the leave to appeal decision, it was always open to the [NAME] to draw an unfavourable inference from the [APPELLANT] inability to document or support his testimony. But, in this case, the [NAME] did not weigh all the evidence. Instead, it relied on its misunderstanding of the law to disqualify certain evidence. [ 36 ] The Commission states that the [NAME] was just weighing the Claimant’s evidence, as it is required to do. It argues that the [NAME] was actually saying that the [APPELLANT] had a burden to support his testimony since it contradicts his earlier statement. [ 37 ] But this is also incorrect. The Commission’s notes of the [APPELLANT] initial statements to the Commission are not presumptively better evidence than his testimony at the [NAME], where his testimony is open to questioning and the context of his remarks is on the record. The [NAME] can choose to prefer his testimony without requiring him to corroborate it. [ 38 ] I would not normally interfere with a finding by the [NAME] that a claimant’s job search was either sufficient or not. This would typically be a question involving the application of settled law to the facts of the case, so it would be what is called a “mixed error of fact and law.” I do not have the authority to overturn mixed errors of fact and law. Footnote 10 [ 39 ] However, I do have the power to intervene where the error of mixed fact and law discloses an extricable legal issue. Footnote 11 In this case, the [NAME] weighed the [APPELLANT] evidence, according to a non-existent legal standard. I consider this to be an extricable error of law. Other errors [ 40 ] The Claimant submissions address other matters, but it is difficult to understand why the [APPELLANT] thinks they are errors. I believe that they arise out of a misunderstanding of the decision. I will try to explain related parts of the [NAME] decision. Reasonable and customary efforts (section 50(8) of the [NAME] Act) [ 41 ] The [NAME] did not find the [APPELLANT] to be unavailable because he had not made “reasonable and customary efforts.” It said that the Commission had not asked him to prove his job search in this way , and did not disentitle him under this section, so it did not apply to him. [ 42 ] However, that does not mean the Claimant cannot be disentitled in another way. Section 18(1) of the [NAME] Act ( EI Act) says that claimants are not entitled to benefits for any working day in their benefit period on which they cannot show that they are “capable of, and available for work, and unable to find suitable employment.” The “availability” part is assessed using the [NAME] factors. [ 43 ] The Claimant did not satisfy the [NAME] that he met the [NAME] “job search” factor. This requirement, and test, is completely separate from whether he should have had to prove, “reasonable and customary efforts.” The presumption of unavailability when a claimant is a full-time student [ 44 ] The [NAME] did not find the Claimant to be unavailable because he was going to [COMPANY] . When it found that he had rebutted the “presumption of unavailability,” it was finding that his [COMPANY] schedule did not, in itself, prevent him from showing that he was available for work. [ 45 ] If the [NAME] had found that the presumption applies, it would mean that the Claimant could not have proven his availability. However, the finding that the presumption did not apply to the Claimant does not mean that he was available. He had rebutted the presumption, so it was possible for the [NAME] to find he was available for work even though he also went to [COMPANY]. However, he still had to prove his availability by satisfying the [APPELLANT] factors. [ 46 ] The Claimant convinced the [NAME] that he satisfied two of the factors. The [NAME] agreed that he wanted to go back to work as soon as possible. And it also agreed that his physical limitations and [COMPANY] commitments were not “personal conditions” that unduly limiting his chances of going back to work. [ 47 ] The only reason the [NAME] did not accept that the Claimant was available for work was that it did not accept that his job search efforts were sufficient. Remedy [ 48 ] Because I have found that the [NAME] made errors in how it made its decision, I must consider how best to provide a remedy. I have the power to send the matter back to the [NAME] to reconsider, or I may make the decision that the [NAME] should have made. Footnote 12 [ 49 ] Both the Claimant and the Commission ask that I make the decision that the [NAME] should have made. Footnote 13 [ 50 ] I accept their recommendation. I have all the information that I need to decide what I need to decide. There is no reason to send it back to the [NAME]. My decision [ 51 ] The [NAME] made no error when it found that the Commission had not required the Claimant to demonstrate his job search according to section 50(8) of the EI  Act and section 9.001 of the [NAME] , and when it decided that he was not disentitled for that reason. I agree with the [NAME] that the Claimant is not disentitled for not complying with section 50(8), and I adopt the [NAME]’s reasons in that regard. [ 52 ] I also accept the [NAME] made no error in finding that the Claimant’s [COMPANY] was full time and that the presumption of unavailability applies. I also accept that the Claimant successfully rebutted this presumption. I again agree with the [NAME] and adopt the [NAME]’s reasons. [ 53 ] Finally, I accept that the [NAME] made no error when it found that the Claimant had both the desire to return to work as soon as work became available and that he did not set personal conditions that unduly restricted him from going back to work. I agree with the [NAME] that the Claimant satisfied these two [NAME] factors of the test for availability, applicable to section 18(1) of the EI Act. I adopt the [NAME]’s reasons. [ 54 ] The outstanding issue is whether, and when, the Claimant was able to show that his job search efforts satisfied the final [NAME] requirement. Did the Claimant’s job search efforts demonstrate the [APPELLANT] desire to return to work? [ 55 ] I must reevaluate the sufficiency of the [APPELLANT] job search because I have found that the [NAME] did not consider all of his efforts, and because it made a legal error when it evaluated his job search according to the wrong legal standard. [ 56 ] According to section 18(1)(c) of the EI Act, claimants must be “capable of and available for work and unable to find suitable employment.” They are only entitled to benefits for days in which they can prove this. [ 57 ] This means that a claimant may be able to prove that they should be entitled to benefits for a part of their benefit period, but not for another part. Evidence of availability or of non-availability at some particular time cannot necessarily be generalized over the entire benefit period. [ 58 ] I will consider the evidence of availability over there separate periods. The June 1 to July 13 period [ 59 ] Claimants are not entitled to benefits unless they are both capable of working and available for work. The Claimant applied to convert his sickness benefits to regular benefits after he received a qualified clearance to return to work. He was cleared to return to work effective June 1, 2025. [ 60 ] I accept that the Claimant was not entitled to regular benefits earlier than June 1, 2025, because he was not capable of work. He was capable of work as of June 1, 2025. [ 61 ] Once the Claimant was cleared for work, he tried to return to his previous job. He testified that he spoke with [NAME]. Footnote 14 His written submissions noted that he left multiple messages and [that he was] making calls to his employer, in efforts to have them take him back. He said that this was in the period between June 1, 2025, and “most of July.” Footnote 15 He also testified that he was going to his doctor and filling out forms for Q’s HR department in June. Footnote 16 [ 62 ] The [APPELLANT] initially directed his efforts towards his return to work with [NAME] only. His mother (who also testified in the hearing) said that the [APPELLANT] had not been looking for another job until around August, when he called Service Canada. The [APPELLANT] said that Service Canada told him he should be looking for other employment since he had not been called back by Q. Footnote 17 Before talking to Service Canada, the Claimant had not been searching for work elsewhere. [ 63 ] However, as the Federal Court of Appeal noted in the [APPELLANT] decision, [T]here is no hard and fast rule that a claimant must immediately engage in a job search in all circumstances, and other cases have recognized that claimants are afforded a reasonable opportunity to see if they will be recalled before being required to start looking for alternate employment. Footnote 18 [ 64 ] I consider that the period of time, in which the [APPELLANT] waited to hear whether the Q could accommodate his limitations, is analogous to that initial period in which an employee may wait for a recall before looking elsewhere. The Claimant was focused on returning to work at his pre-injury job during June and at least, part of July. He was communicating with [NAME] regularly, and he was completing paperwork for a return to work with Q, which began even before June 1, 2025. I note that the Claimant had a four-year history of working seasonally for [APPELLANT]. Footnote 19 If it had not been for the medical emergency that arose on his last working day before the seasonal layoff, he would likely have been recalled to work at Q, as he had been in other years. [ 65 ] Therefore, I accept that the [APPELLANT] efforts to convince his regular employer to take him back were sufficient to meet the job search effort criterion of the [NAME] test, for a reasonable period after he was cleared to return to work with limitations. The Commission’s notes indicate that it was considering the [APPELLANT] “preference or restriction and reasonable period.” This suggests that it was willing to at least consider him to be available for a time, based on his expectation of return to his [NAME]. But it could not reach him at that point. Footnote 20 [ 66 ] The [APPELLANT] said that Q “eventually” told him that they wanted the 50 lb. lifting restriction removed before he could return to work, but he did not give the date when he first learned that [NAME] would not accommodate his limitations. Footnote 21 He testified that he had completed a Functional Abilities Form (FAF) for Q. Footnote 22 That FAF was completed by a [NAME] on July 8, 2025. Footnote 23 It indicated that the Claimant’s lifting was limited to less than 25 kg. I infer from this that the employer did not tell him he could not come back to work yet until after July 8, 2025. [ 67 ] The Claimant’s written submission stated, “In being unsuccessful in returning to work at ‘Q’ for the Summer (June 1-return to work date and most of July), I had called Service Canada to reopen for benefits.” Footnote 24 He called Service Canada on August 8, 2025. From this, I infer that the employer told him he could not come back to work before August 8, 2025. [ 68 ] The Commission’s notes of September 26, 2025, record that the [APPELLANT] employer would not take him back with his existing limitations. Footnote 25 On October 16, 2025, the [APPELLANT] told the Commission that he was not available from July 13, 2025 , until December 31, 2025. At the same time, he also said that he was available and was currently seeking full-time employment, but that he could not work for his current employer until December 2025. Footnote 26 The [APPELLANT] testified that all of his physical limitations were actually lifted in November 2025. [ 69 ] These notes suggest to me that the [APPELLANT] understood that he could not return to work with Q until December 31, 2025, and that he knew this as of July 13, 2025. This is between July 8 and August 8. I accept that the [APPELLANT] knew that [APPELLANT] would not take him back with his physical limitations on July 13, 2025. It would not be reasonable for the [APPELLANT] to have maintained an exclusive focus on re-employment with Q, after July 13, 2025. [ 70 ] Therefore, I find that the Claimant was actively seeking to return to Q from June 1, 2025, up to and including July 13, 2025. I accept that this period of approximately six weeks was a reasonable period for the Claimant to have focused on his return to employment with his [NAME]. [ 71 ] During this period only, I accept that the Claimant was available for work. His efforts to return to work at Q represented a sufficient job search. [ 72 ] The Claimant is not disentitled from receiving benefits from June 1, 2025, to July 13, 2025. The period from July 14, 2025, to August 11, 2025. [ 73 ] I have found that the Claimant knew that [APPELLANT] would not permit him to return to work with his limitations, as of July 13, 2025. Starting July 14, 2025, the Claimant would need to demonstrate his job search through other efforts. [ 74 ] In the Claimant’s August 11, 2025, request for reconsideration, he said that he received the July 30 letter that denied him benefits on August 8, 2025. He said that he called Service Canada the same day, and that he came into the Service Canada Center on August 11, 2025. Footnote 27 He also completed his “availability for work” form on August 11, 2025. Footnote 28 In that form, he stated that he was available for work, subject to his medical limitations. [ 75 ] There is no evidence that the Claimant applied for work, or made any other job search efforts between July 14, 2025, and when he completed the availability for work form on August 11, 2025. In his testimony, he stated that he only started applying for other jobs in mid-August. Footnote 29 His mother said he was “not searching for another job” until mid-August. Footnote 30 [ 76 ] I find that the Claimant was not available from July 14 through to August 11, 2025, inclusive, because he did not satisfy the job search effort requirement of the [NAME] test. He was not engaged in any job search efforts within this period. The period from August 12, 2025, to November 4, 2025 [ 77 ] At his [NAME] hearing on November 21, 2025, the [APPELLANT] testified that he first met with a local [NAME] on November 5, 2025. Footnote 31 However, his mother explained that he had been looking for work on his own before then. Footnote 32 She said she had helped him with his resume and that he had been using job search engines, which she and the [APPELLANT] jointly identified as the “D” Work Authority [NAME] (I have abbreviated the full name for privacy reasons). Footnote 33 [ 78 ] The [APPELLANT] said he was doing a lot of his searching using this [NAME] tool, which he described as a government web site. Footnote 34 He said that [NAME] identifies job openings, and provides associated links to employer listings/web sites for job seekers to submit their application. His mother testified that he was not getting any emails or calls back, and his mother said she told him to book an appointment and look into the community resources available for job seekers. Footnote 35 [ 79 ] The [APPELLANT] testified that he applied for three jobs a week beginning in mid-August. Footnote 36 [ 80 ] This is inconsistent with other evidence that he gave the Commission. The [APPELLANT] spoke to the Commission on September 29, 2025, after he filed his reconsideration request. He told the Commission that [NAME] could not accommodate his limitations and that “as of May 31, 2025 [un]till present,” he was “not applying for other work.” Footnote 37 The [APPELLANT] spoke to the Commission again on October 23, 2025, saying that he was not actively seeking employment. The Commission’s notes record him as saying, “Why would I apply—nobody will hire me.” Footnote 38 [ 81 ] I have to decide whether to accept the [APPELLANT] testimony about his job search efforts or to accept what is reported in the Commission’s notes. [ 82 ] I would prefer it if the [APPELLANT] had saved a record of each job application that he made to job openings that he discovered through [NAME]. I agree with the [NAME] that he could have made a stronger case if he had more robust evidence of his job search. However, this does not mean I must reject the [APPELLANT] testimony. [ 83 ] The [APPELLANT] provided detailed evidence under affirmation. He was available to answer questions of the member and to provide whatever context was required. In addition, his testimony was corroborated and supplemented by the testimony of his mother, who was both aware of his job search efforts and assisting him in some of his job search activities. [ 84 ] There is no suggestion that the [NAME] found either the [APPELLANT] or his mother to be not credible generally, and they both appeared to have a clear recollection of the events. I have listened to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing, and I found nothing in the testimony itself to cause me to doubt that the [APPELLANT] and his mother believed what they were saying. [ 85 ] In contrast, there is no transcript of the Commission’s conversation with the [APPELLANT]. Its notes are very brief. It is unclear if the Commission’s questions are recorded exactly as they were posed to the [APPELLANT], and the notes provide neither a verbatim record of the [APPELLANT] answers, nor a summary that included context. No Commission representative appeared at the [NAME] hearing to confirm the accuracy or completeness of the notes. [ 86 ] There is always the possibility that the [APPELLANT] misunderstood the Commission’s questions, that his responses were misconstrued, or that these calls caught the [APPELLANT] during periods of discouragement. This is possible, but it is only speculation. Unfortunately, the [NAME] member did not ask the Claimant about his prior statements to the Commission, or give him an opportunity to explain any inconsistency. [ 87 ] I appreciate that the [APPELLANT] statements to the Commission are closer to the actual events, but I have not observed, nor can I infer from the evidence, that the [APPELLANT] recollection of events is inaccurate. Furthermore, his testimony is no more likely to be self-serving than his earlier remarks: The [APPELLANT] had been denied regular benefits by July 30, 2025, and contacted the Commission in mid-August. The Commission informed him what it required of him to prove his availability. By the time the [APPELLANT] spoke to the Commission in September and October, he already understood that he needed to be looking for work to receive benefits. [ 88 ] For all of these reasons, I prefer the [APPELLANT] and his mother’s testimony to the [APPELLANT] earlier statements to the Commission. Based on his testimony at the [NAME] and his Availability for Work statement, I find that the Claimant began an active job search for employment other than Q, immediately after August 11, 2025. [ 89 ] For the period from August 12, 2025, to November 4, 2025, I accept that the [APPELLANT] was engaged in job search activities such as working on his resume and searching the [NAME] for opportunities, and that he was submitting approximately three job applications per week. [ 90 ] I accept that these job search efforts satisfy the [NAME] job search factor. Period from November 5 to the date of hearing [ 91 ] The [APPELLANT] testified that he began meeting with an [NAME], and that his first appointment was November 5, 2025. He also said that he submitted job applications with the [NAME]’s assistance, and he submitted an appointment card indicating a meeting with her on November 19, 2025. At the time of his [NAME] hearing on November 21, 2025, he told the member that he had an upcoming appointment to do mock job interviews. [ 92 ] There was no evidence that challenged what the Claimant said about his job search efforts in the period from November 5, 2025, forward. [ 93 ] I accept that the Claimant was making the job search efforts he described from November 5, 2025. I find that these efforts were sufficient to show that he was available for work from November 5, 2025, to the date of the [NAME] hearing. Summary [ 94 ] Like the [NAME], I have found that the Claimant did not need to prove that he had made reasonable and customary job search efforts. I have also found that he successfully rebutted the presumption of unavailability that arose because he had a full-time [COMPANY] schedule. [ 95 ] I have accepted the [NAME]’s findings that the Claimant met two of the [NAME] factors from June 1, 2025, until at least November 21, 2025 (the date of his [NAME] hearing). He desired to return to work and that he was not setting conditions that unduly restricted his return to work. [ 96 ] The final [NAME] factor has to do with the Claimant’s job search efforts. I have accepted that his job search efforts were sufficient from June 1, 2025, to July 13, 2025, and from August 11, 2025, until at least November 21, 2025. This means that the Claimant is available for work during these periods because he has satisfied all three [NAME] factors. Conclusion [ 97 ] The appeal is allowed in part. [ 98 ] The Claimant was capable and available for work, and unable to find suitable employment from June 1, 2025, to July 13, 2025, and also from August 12, 2025, until at least the date of the [NAME] hearing on November 21, 2025. [ 99 ] He is not disentitled by reason of section 18(1)(a) of the EI Act within this period. Footnotes Footnote 1 This is a plain-language version of the three grounds. The full text is in section 58(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act ( DESDA ) . Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See section 113 of the [NAME] Act ( EI Act). Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 I have tried to make this error more understandable. This ground of appeal is defined in section 58(1)(c) of the DESDA : The [NAME] will have made an error of fact where it, “based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.” Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 These factors were described in a Federal Court of Appeal decision cited as [NAME]  v  [NAME] Commission , A-56-96 and A-57-96. The factors are: Having a desire to return to work as soon as possible; demonstrating that desire through job search efforts, and; not setting personal conditions that unduly limit the prospect of re-employment. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See GD7-2. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See GD3-28. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 The [NAME] was the final level of administrative appeal for [NAME] matters under a prior scheme. The Appeal Division performs the same function as the former [NAME]. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See VL  v  [NAME] Commission , 2025  [NAME]  1260. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See VL  v  [NAME] Commission , 2025  [NAME]  1259. Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]), 2018  FCA  21. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME] ), 2018  FCA  118. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See section 59(1) of the DESDA . Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See AD7-7. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:21:10. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 Supra note 5. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:17:00. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:17:55; 00:41:30. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2023  FCA  169, at para 82. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See GD3-27. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See GD3-18. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 Supra note 5. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:17:10; See also GD3-15. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See GD3-16. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 Supra note 5. Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 Supra note 6. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 See GD3-33. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See GD3-24. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 Supra note 5; see also GD3-27. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:25:40. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:41:30. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:22:00: See also GD7-14. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:23:35. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:22:35. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:22:55; 00:24:45. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 23:05. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 Listen to the audio recording of the [NAME] hearing at timestamp: 00:23:45; 00:25:40. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 Supra note 6. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 See GD3-35. Return to footnote 38 referrer