Employment Judge Extends Time Limit Due to Mental Health Issues

OUTCOME: Allowed

Case Number: 6014460/2024 & 6008841/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Watford

On:

5 March 2026

Before:

Employment Judge Bartlett

Representation Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

1. The claimant’s claims for unfair dismissal and automatic unfair dismissal are out of time. It was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to submit the unfair dismissal and automatic unfair dismissal claims in time and I have extended time in respect of them.

REASONS

1. At a preliminary hearing on 12 November 2025 Judge Davey set down the following issues to be decided at this preliminary hearing:

The Tribunal will determine:

1 Whether the complaints of unfair dismissal and automatic unfair dismissal were presented within the time limits.

2 If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?

3 If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period?

2. The list of issues for the final hearing agreed at the preliminary hearing sets out the following (for background):

In respect of claims made in case number 6014460/2024 (“the first claim” –

GoC1), the claim form was presented on 9 October 2024 and early conciliation lasted from 13 August 2024 to 24 September 2024. Any complaint about something that happened before 14 May 2024 may be out of time.

In respect of claims made in case number 6008841/2025 (“the second claim” – GoC2): 1 The claim form was presented on 14 March 2025 and early conciliation lasted from 11 February 2025 to 17 February 2025. Any complaint about something that happened prior to 12 November 2024 may be out of time. Case Number: 6014460/2024 & 6008841/2025 PHCM Order 10 of 21 September 2023; 2 Is the Early Conciliation Certificate number with reference R228838/24/44 a valid certificate for the purpose of triggering the modified limitation regime in section 207B Employment Rights Act 1996 ("ERA") such that the second certificate with reference R124548/25/79 does not extend the Claimant’s time limit for issuing his claims? If so, any claims relating to acts or omissions prior to 15 December 2025 (including the Claimant’s resignation on 3 December 2024) may therefore be out of time.

The Facts

3. The table below based on Mr [NAME] submissions usefully summarises key dates.

DATE ACTION 13.08.24 C filed ACAS Early Conciliation (“[NAME]”) notification under reference number R228838/24/44 24.09.24 ACAS issued [NAME] under reference number R228838/24/44 (“First [NAME]”) 09.10.24 C presented ET1 under case number 6014460/2024 (“First Claim”) 03.12.24 [NAME] resigned. This is the date taken in respect of his effective date of termination (“EDT”) 11.02.25 C filed [NAME] notification under reference number R124548/25/79 17.02.25 ACAS issued [NAME] under reference number R124548/25/79 (“[NAME]”) 02.03.25 Primary limitation date for presentation of complaints in connection with alleged constructive dismissal subject to any extension pursuant

to [NAME]. 14.03.25 C presented ET1 under case number 6008841/2025 (“Second Claim”)

The Law

4. S111 ERA sets out the time limits relevant to these claims, The reference at s111(2A) to s207B is to the ‘stop the clock’ provisions which arise as a result of ACAS conciliation and an [NAME].

S18A Employment Tribunal Act 1996, Requirement to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings sets out:

(1) Before a [APPELLANT] (“the [NAME] claimant”) presents an application to institute relevant proceedings relating to any matter, the [NAME] claimant must provide to ACAS prescribed information, in the prescribed manner, about that matter… (8) A [APPELLANT] who is subject to the requirement in subsection (1) may not present an application to institute relevant proceedings without a certificate under subsection (4).

Were the complaints of unfair dismissal and automatic unfair dismissal presented within the time limits?

5. The respondent’s submission is that only one [NAME] certificate is possible in respect of 'proceedings relating to any matter' ETA 1996 s 18A(1), and that any additional certificate issued by ACAS in relation to that “matter” will have been issued outside the statutory scheme and will have no relevance to the other statutory provisions relating to early conciliation and in particular s207B(2) ERA 1996. This means that any [NAME] after the first certificate does not have any effect on time limits.

6. The headnote in [NAME] v Nottingham City Council UKEAT/0303/17 (26 April 2018, unreported) sets out:

“Since Garau was not decided per incuriam and is not manifestly wrong, it should be followed: only one mandatory [NAME] process is enacted by the [NAME] provisions in section 18A Employment Tribunals Act 1996, and only one certificate is required for “proceedings relating to any matter”. A second certificate, where obtained and relating to the same matter, has no impact on the limitation period.”

7. [NAME] P goes on to state:

“[27] The central conclusion in Garau is that there is one mandatory conciliation process but nothing to prevent a claimant from contacting ACAS on a further occasion to seek assistance on a voluntary basis in order to achieve resolution

of his or her dispute (see paragraph 26). Once a claimant has embarked on the [NAME] process, the rules of the process apply in terms of extensions of time limits to the single mandatory process and not in relation to any subsequent process that relates to the same matter.

28. I consider that reasoning in Garau is plainly correct. While section 18A ETA refers to a certificate and the possibility of more than one certificate therefore exists, the words of section 207B ERA indicate that there is only one certificate envisaged as affecting time. Section 207B(2)(a) defines Day A as “the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned complies with the requirement in subsection (1) of section 18A”. It does not provide for “days” or the “latest date”. It identifies a single day only. Similarly, section 207B(2)(b) defines Day B as “the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned receives or, if earlier, is treated as receiving … the certificate issued under subsection (4)”. It does not provide “the day or, if more than one certificate is issued, the latest day”. Those are words that would have to be read into this provision if the Claimant’s argument is correct that multiple certificates can each separately have the effect of extending time.”

8. In [NAME] the EAT also considered the issue of the same “matter”. In that case the claimant had first contacted ACAS in relation to a disciplinary process that had been instigated by his employer as a result he was dismissed and it was after he had been dismissed he contacted ACAS and obtained an [NAME] certificate at this stage. The claimant pursued an appeal against his misconduct dismissal, his evidence was that he believed that he would be reinstated as a result of that appeal process but in the event his dismissal was upheld and it was at this stage that he approached ACAS for a second time and obtained the second [NAME]. In these circumstances, it was perhaps unsurprising that the EAT upheld the ET’s decision that this was the same matter for the purposes of s18A(1) ETA.

9. I was also referred to Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs v Garau [2017] ICR 1121, EAT, affirmed in [NAME] v Nottingham City Council UKEAT/0303/17 (26 April 2018, unreported) and [NAME] v [COMPANY] [COMPANY] [2024] EAT 168 (1 November 2024, unreported). I have considered these cases carefully.

10. It is not disputed that there are two [NAME] certificates in these cases and it is not disputed that they refer to the same parties. [NAME], which I am bound to do, I find that if, in this case both [NAME] are for same matter, the [NAME] can only be voluntary and would not have any impact on the limitation period.

Same Matter

11. Therefore I must consider whether the unfair dismissal and the automatic unfair dismissal are the same matter as those encompassed in First [NAME].

12. A number of EAT cases have considered what is encompassed in the “matter” covered by an [NAME] certificate and the factual matrix contained in the tribunal claim for the [NAME] certificate to fulfil the section 18A(8) requirement so that the Employment Tribunal has jurisdiction over the claim presented. Mr [NAME]

referred to [COMPANY] [COMPANY] v Morgan [2016] IRLR 924, [COMPANY] v Mills [2016] IRLR 96, [COMPANY] v [COMPANY]/0282/15, [2016] ICR 445.

13. It is useful to consider [COMPANY] v Morgan in some detail. The facts were:

“1…Moreover, on the facts of the present case, although the claimant’s resignation underlying her constructive unfair dismissal complaint occurred after the [NAME] certificate was issued, the proceedings related to a sequence of events that were in issue between the parties at the time of the [NAME] process, and accordingly she held that the claimant satisfied the [NAME] requirements in relation to the constructive dismissal complaint…

14. This sets out that only 1 [NAME] was obtained and only 1 ET1 was submitted. The issue is whether the [NAME] encompassed matters occurring after it was issued such that the [NAME] extended time. This is different to the facts in this case which are 1 [NAME] was issued and 1 ET1 was submitted, further events happened (the claimant’s employed ended) a second [NAME] was sought and issued and a [NAME] was submitted relying on the second [NAME] certificate.

15. The EAT went on to set out:

“18. We, like the Appeal Tribunal in the Science and Drake cases, consider it significant that Parliament used the word ‘matter’ in s.18A(1) rather than ‘cause of action’ or ‘claim’ and that the prescribed information required to be provided by a [NAME] claimant to ACAS to fulfil the obligations under the scheme is so very limited. The word ‘matter’ is broad and, as Langstaff J observed, may encompass not just the precise facts of a claim that bring it within a cause of action but also other events at different times and/or dates and/or involving different people. There is no obligation, as we have already indicated, when notifying ACAS to identify the matter itself nor the nature of any actual or [NAME] dispute, still less to provide the factual details or any background to that dispute. The only information required to be provided by a [NAME] claimant consists of names and addresses of the [NAME] parties.

19 It is also significant, in our judgment, that the process of conciliation is an entirely voluntary and confidential one. Once the [NAME] claimant has provided [APPELLANT] with the prescribed information, there is no requirement whatever for him or her to identify to [RESPONDENT], or indeed the [NAME], the subject matter or issues in dispute and no obligation whatever to enter into any discussions, still less meaningful ones, with the [NAME]. Although it is hoped that this will follow, there is no obligation to do so. The prescribed information need not even be complete and correct. What the process does (as Judge Eady QC explained) is to build in a structured opportunity for parties to take advantage of Acas conciliation if they choose to do so before a matter reaches litigation.

20 Against that background, the question of construction raised by Mr [NAME] is whether there is any temporal or other limit on the applicability of an early conciliation certificate in the context of “relevant proceedings relating to any

matter” that are commenced in relation to a cause of action that only crystallises after the early conciliation process is complete. The question, accordingly, is: what is meant by “relating to any matter”? In our judgment, these are ordinary English words that have their ordinary meaning. Parliament has deliberately used flexible language capable of a broad meaning both by reference to the necessary link between the proceedings and the matter and by reference to the word “matter” itself. We do not consider it useful to provide synonyms for the words used by Parliament. Provided that there are or were matters between the parties whose names and addresses were notified in the prescribed manner and they are related to the proceedings instituted, that is sufficient to fulfil the requirements of section 18A(1).

21 Section 18A could have been enacted so as to require the matters complained of in subsequent proceedings to pre-date any relevant early conciliation certificate, but Parliament chose not to do so. Equally, Parliament could have provided for a time limit on the validity of an early conciliation certificate but did not do that either. Nor does the legislation provide that a certificate cannot pre-date causes of action complained about subsequently as, again, Parliament could have done. Indeed, there is nothing express in the legislation that provides any temporal or other limitation on the use of an early conciliation certificate in relation to relevant proceedings, causes of actions or claims. Rather, the legislation is, as we have said, deliberately defined by reference to a broader term than “cause of action” or “claim”. We see nothing in the operation of the legislation that requires or entails a conclusion that the process and certificate only apply to events and allegations pre-dating the commencement of the process or the issue of the certificate or that requires any matter to be defined by reference only to the actual or alleged state of affairs or facts as at the date when early conciliation commenced or the certificate is issued. We do not regard the fact that claimants might bring claims about which early conciliation has not been conducted as significant in circumstances where there is no obligation to undertake any early conciliation at all and certainly no obligation to undertake it in relation to any particular claim. The only obligation on the [NAME] claimant is to obtain formal recognition that Acas has been relevantly notified before any proceedings are instituted, and the fact that the [NAME] has no right to engage in pre-claim conciliation at all and any contact with the [NAME] is entirely conditional upon the claimant’s consent is consistent with this view.

22 The employers’ shifting case, which now accepts that if a matter is in contemplation but has not occurred prior to the issue of the certificate it can be encompassed within the certificate provided it does not result in dismissal, has no underlying logic to it, in our judgment, and does not obviously emerge from the legislation itself. We do not consider that there is a difference in kind between a cause of action involving dismissal and other causes of action that do not result in dismissal and agree with Mr [NAME] that this is a red herring. In practice, it is easy to imagine a situation in which an individual contacts [NAME] complaining about a poor relationship that is deteriorating or developing in a particular and unacceptable way. The individual might have in his or her contemplation a belief that he is about to be dismissed, or that possibility might not yet have registered. Circumstances might exist where an individual’s relationship with his or her employer is breaking down but has not reached the point at which he or she feels bound to resign. We

cannot see why it makes all the difference in such a situation that the relationship has come to an end. In either case (whether a case involving continuing employment or one involving a resignation) the underlying deteriorating employment relationship based on bullying, discrimination, victimisation or whatever other cause can constitute matters between the parties whose names have been notified to [NAME], and the fact of employment subsequently terminating is simply an additional factual matter that either is or is not related to those earlier matters.”

23 Moreover, the fact that there is an ongoing power in the early conciliation officer to endeavour to promote the reinstatement or re-engagement of a complainant by the employer in section 18C(2) means that no safe conclusion that there is a temporal limit on early conciliation certificates can be drawn based on the mere existence of that power in section 18A(9). Ultimately, we can see no reason artificially to restrict the scope of the phrase “relating to any matter”. That does not mean that a certificate affords a [NAME] claimant a free pass to bring proceedings about any unrelated matter; it does not. In our judgment, it will be a question of fact and degree in every case where there is a challenge (and we hope and anticipate that there will be very few such challenges) to be determined by the good common sense of tribunals whether proceedings instituted by an individual are proceedings relating to any matter in respect of which the individual has provided the requisite information to [NAME]. In circumstances where the only requirement is to make contact with [NAME] but do nothing more and the information required to be provided is limited as it is, we do not consider that this construction defeats the object of the early conciliation process at all. [emphasis added]

16. Mr [NAME] also relied on [NAME] v [COMPANY]/0110/18. The facts are set out in paragraph 6:

“[6] I will start by summarising the sequence of events as follows: (1) The Claimant obtained an [NAME] certificate and brought a whistleblowing claim on the back of it; (2) the Claimant tried unsuccessfully to expand his claim by amendment, not adding any new causes of action but adding some new facts, more detail and some arguments; (3) that claim was struck out on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of succeeding at trial; (4) a further similar but slightly expanded claim was then brought, relying on the same matters as pleaded in the rejected amendments, reiterating the whistleblowing claim; (5) that claim added a new cause of action for race discrimination arising from the same factual matrix and from the new point that the employer was a [COMPANY]; and (6) for the second claim, the Claimant relied on the same [NAME] certificate as he had relied upon when bringing the first claim.”

17. The headnote records:

“[the Judge] should not have rejected the second claim under Rule 12(1)(c) of

the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013. However, the error was immaterial since the judge was bound by Rule 12(1)(b) to reject the claim as an abuse of process. The second claim duplicated the first claim and sought to add to it a new race discrimination claim which could and should have been litigated, if at all, in the first claim. The judge’s decision was upheld on that different ground.”

18. The Judgment gave some guidance and examples of what cases fall within a matter:

“49. A number of commonplace examples may help to illustrate the point. Claimants quite often bring a discrimination claim followed a little later by a victimisation claim; the latter claim founded on the protected act of bringing proceedings in the former claim. Does the victimisation claim relate to the same matter as the original discrimination claim? It is a question of fact and degree but the probable answer is yes; the “matter” is the dispute arising out of the employment relationship and the alleged discrimination and subsequent alleged victimisation.

50. The same reasoning is likely to apply where, for example, a disability discrimination claim is brought relying on alleged detriments during employment; and then a few months later a further disability discrimination claim is brought relying on dismissal for reasons connected with the disability. In both examples, it should not in principle make any difference whether the second claim is made by amending the ET 1 presented in the first claim or by presenting a second claim in a separate ET 1.

51. Cases that fall the other side of the line would be those where the connection between the first and second claims is merely that the parties happen to be the same: such as, in Mr [NAME] example, a whistleblowing claim followed up with a claim for unpaid wages where the withholding of wages is put forward as a separate issue and not a connected issue such as a further detriment suffered as a result of the whistleblowing. In such a case, there is merit in a further conciliation opportunity that may help settle the unpaid wages claim.”

19. [NAME] J went on to apply that to the facts of the case and conclude:

“56. I do not think it could sensibly be said that the second claim introduced a new and different “matter” because of the introduction of the new race discrimination claim. That claim was grounded in the same disputed factual matrix as the first. It was not based on different and subsequent unconnected events involving the same parties.” [emphasis added]

20. I find that the facts of [NAME] are very different to this case. The claimant had only obtained one [NAME] but relied on it in two ET1s, the second of which was held to be a duplicate but sought to add a race discrimination claim which should have been litigated in the first claim. Further, the [NAME] was struck out as an abuse of process. [NAME] [APPELLANT] obtained the First [NAME], used it to submit the First ET1, obtained a second [NAME] and used it to submit the [NAME]

21. I recognise that the same statutory wording, namely “matter” in s18A(8) ETA is in issue in all the cases and I must give the EAT authorities due weight. As [NAME] J set out in [NAME], the “true principle” in [COMPANY] is “… it will be a question of fact and degree in every case where there is a challenge … to be determined by the good common sense of tribunals whether proceedings instituted by an individual are proceedings relating to any matter in respect of which the individual has provided the requisite information to Acas….”

22. The claimant’s submission is that [NAME] encompasses the unfair and automatically unfair dismissal claims, the facts giving rise to these claims arose after the First [NAME] and after the First ET1 was submitted. Namely on 28 November 2024 when Dr [NAME] shifted the blame of the grievance and disciplinary process’ delays on to the claimant. Prior to this, the delays in the grievance procedure and delays in the disciplinary process were persisting but that these in themselves had not reached the stage of a fundamental breach but the final straw was an email from Dr [APPELLANT] which blamed the claimant for the delays.

23. At 8.1 on the [NAME] the claimant ticked unfairly dismissed and I am making a whistleblowing claim including dismissal or any other unfair treatment after whistleblowing.

24. The [NAME] was accompanied by a lengthy document setting out the claimant’s grounds of claim. I accept Mr [APPELLANT] submission that the [NAME] repeatedly and frequently refers to the First ET1. However, it is not disputed that the claimant’s employment ended not only after he obtained the First [NAME] but also after he submitted the First ET1.

25. The CMO from December 2025 set out the following:

26. Given the guidance in [COMPANY] and the extensive definition given to matter, I find I am compelled to find that both ET1s involved the same matter and therefore only the First [NAME] can extend time. This is because whilst resignation was not in the contemplation of the claimant at the time of obtaining the First [NAME], and Dr [NAME] conduct had not occurred, the wider circumstances were in existence and the events giving rise to the

[NAME] and [NAME] were not “subsequent unrelated events”. Further, the claimant’s situation falls squarely within that in [COMPANY]. As [COMPANY] and para 50 of [NAME] makes clear, that the events had not yet happened and were not in the parties’ contemplation at the time of the First [NAME] does not necessarily indicate that they are not part of the same matter. I find the resignation and events surrounding that are, as set out in [COMPANY], an additional factual matter that was related to previous matters.

27. This means that the [NAME] did not extend time with the effect that claims in the [NAME] predating 15 December 2025 are out of time.

Was it reasonably practicable to bring the claim in time?

28. Was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?

29. The burden of proof lies on the claimant as is set out in [NAME] v [COMPANY] [1978] IRLR 271, [1978] ICR 943.

30. In [COMPANY] v Brophy 2019 EWCA Civ 2490, CA, Lord Justice Underhill set out the essential points established in the case law: a. the statutory language is not to be taken as referring only to physical impracticability and for that reason might be paraphrased as whether it was ‘reasonably feasible’ for the employee to present his or her claim in time. b. if an employee misses the time limit because he is ignorant about the existence of a time limit, or mistaken about when it expires in his case, the question is whether that ignorance or mistake is reasonable. If it is not, then it will have been reasonably practicable for the employee to bring the claim in time. When assessing whether ignorance or mistake are reasonable, it is necessary to take into account any enquiries which the employee or his adviser should have made c. if the employee retains a skilled adviser, any unreasonable ignorance or mistake on the part of the adviser is attributed to the employee d. the test of reasonable practicability is one of fact and not of law.

31. In Palmer and anor v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council 1984 ICR 372, CA, the Court of set out that ‘reasonably practicable’ does not mean reasonable, which would be too favourable to employees, and does not mean physically possible, which would be too favourable to employers, but means something like ‘reasonably feasible’. [NAME] in [COMPANY] v Kauser EAT 0165/07 explained it in the following words: ‘The relevant test is not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but to ask whether, on the facts of the case as found, it was reasonable to expect that which was possible to have been done’.

32. The claimant says that it was not because of the following: a. Ignorance b. Ill-health

33. The claimant was an extremely articulate witness. He maintained his position of a number of points despite repeated challenges from Mr [NAME]; he was

consistent and was able to explain his answers, he accepted when he could not remember or when a point put to him was correct. He gave clear evidence and I found him to be truthful. I accept his evidence in its entirety.

Ignorance

34. Mr [APPELLANT] stated that the claimant had not mentioned ignorance and he did not think they relied on it. I recognise that Mr [COUNSEL] is a lay representative and the he is an academic specializing in sports performance. It seems to me that the claimant is relying on ignorance of the law because this is inherent in the claimant’s case that he thought he did need the [NAME] and so he was ignorant that the First [NAME] is the only one that could extend time.

35. I do not consider that the interplay between one or more [NAME] and their effects on time limits and what a matter means in this context is well- known. What is included in a matter is not entirely clear in the way that a 3 month time limit to submit an ET1 Is. It is a legal question which involves judgment. I consider that only a specialist employment lawyer would know about such matters. From the claimant’s involvement with ACAS they did not seem aware of the issue. I find that it is relatively easy to find out the time limit to submit an ET1 and that an Early Conciliation Certificate is needed from ACAS. I consider that the decision about what amounts to the same matter and if one or more Early Conciliation Certificates are needed is a much more difficult issue for a claimant to find out about. This tends towards the claimant’s ignorance being reasonable.

36. The claimant’s evidence was that he did not seek legal advice. At times he had a [NAME] and she said that she was inexperienced. She sent him some information about grievances and disciplinaries but she had no involvement in later matters such as the termination of employment and responses to the grievances and disciplinary. If the claimant had paid for advice from an employment lawyer he would not have been ignorant of the law. I do not consider not taking advice is unreasonable in the context that he had previously submitted an ET1 and had no issues with doing so. It is reasonable to consider that adopting the same course of conduct for the [NAME] was appropriate. I do not consider ignorance itself in this case is sufficient but I have considered in the entire context of was it reasonably practicable to have submitted the claim in time.

Ill-health

37. The claimant’s witness statement and oral evidence was unequivocal that the delay arose from a deterioration in his mental ill-health which resulted in diminished cognitive functioning.

38. The claimant provided supporting medical evidence that he suffered from mental ill health at this time, he was undergoing CBT and had been prescribed anti-depressants.

39. The GP records were printed out on 31 January 2025 and so they cannot provide evidence of matters after that date. However, they do set out that the

claimant was suffering from low mood, anxiety and distress immediately before that date and was prescribed anti-depressant medications.

40. There are two letters from Mr [APPELLANT], the [NAME] seeing the claimant. The first dated 7 February 2025 sets out:

41. The second dated 12 January 2026 sets out:

42. Mr [NAME] criticised the second letter as it had been prepared with litigation in mind. I recognise that criticism but I find that the letter is factual and that it is cogent evidence to support the claimant’s claims that his health deteriorated significantly from 12 February 2025 onwards and this had a significant impairment on his cognitive functioning.

43. The claimant’s evidence was that around 11 February 2025 he was starting to improve so that he could get in a position to submit his ET1 and this is why he contacted ACAS on that date. However, on 12 February 2025 he received the long awaited grievance outcome which was a report of 65 pages and the disciplinary outcome which ran to 166 pages. The receipt of these reports, following delays of around 260 days and 400 days respectively and their contents had such a profound effect on him that he was unable to submit his ET1 until 14 March 2025.

44. I found that the claimant gave persuasive evidence about the profound and incapacitating effect the receipt of these documents on 12 February 2025 had on him. He described their effect as catastrophic. He stated, and I accept, that he was obsessed with these outcome documents, he was obsessed with what they said and responding to them. He was all consumed by them and had no cognitive ability to deal with other matters. When he had submitted his response to them he moved on the next task, he had no ability to deal with more than one task at a time. The next task was to submit the ET1 and he did this within 2 days of submitting his response to the grievance and disciplinary.

45. The claimant’s witness statement and oral evidence was that after his resignation on 3 December 2024 (and before the events of 12 February 2025) his depression was such that he felt his life was unravelling, he could not manage day to day life, his relationship with his wife and son were damaged. His evidence was that the resignation itself detrimentally affected his already damaged mental health. He gave detailed oral evidence about this and I accept it. I find that around 3 December 2025 the claimant was suffering from mental ill health which affected his life significantly in many ways and he was not functioning well cognitively.

46. In [NAME] v [COMPANY] [1999] IRLR 488, the Court of Appeal set out that when asking whether it is reasonably practicable to lodge a claim within three months the overall limitation period is to be considered but “attention will in the ordinary way focus upon the closing rather than the early stages”.

47. Mr [NAME] relied on the EAT decision in [NAME] v Hampshire Area Health Authority [1982] ICR 200, EAT, which sets out that the existence of an impending internal appeal is not in itself sufficient to establish that it was not reasonably practicable to present a complaint to a tribunal within the time limit. I find that [APPELLANT] has limited applicability to this case. The claimant does not rely on the internal appeal process (the processes involved are not appeal processes of the alleged constructive dismissal in any event) themselves rather it is the impact the receipt of the outcomes had on the claimant that is relied on.

48. I have been referred to [COMPANY] v Britton [2022] EAT 108. The facts of that case concern a severely dyslexic claimant suffering from mental health issues which I find are significantly different from this case. In [NAME] there was no medical evidence before the ET, the claimant’s mental ill health only came to light during the judge’s questioning and he was able to attend work at that time.

49. Mr [NAME] referred to [NAME] v [COMPANY] 2006 EWCA Civ

689, CA, in which the Court of Appeal upheld the ET’s decision that relied in part upon the claimant writing coherent letters to a third party about his pension during the 3 month period in deciding that it was reasonably practicable. Mr [NAME] submitted this was pertinent to this case because the claimant had submitted lengthy and detailed appeals to the grievance and disciplinary processes on 12 March 2025 which was during the 3 month time limit. I consider that this is of limited assistance in this case where the claimant accepts that he did this but that doing so, so overloaded his limited cognitive functioning that, he could do nothing else until that task was completed.

50. To summarise, I make the following findings;

a. From before November 2024 the claimant was suffering from depression and anxiety and this was recorded by Dr [NAME] as severe symptoms of anxiety and depression. I recognise that this is based on self reporting by the claimant. This was a considerable time before any Employment Tribunal litigation had commenced. I have found the claimant to be credible and therefore I accept this as accurate such that between this date and 3 December 2025 the claimant was struggling to carry out day to day tasks, his family and other relationships were impaired and he was not functioning except in a limited way. The claimant was not at work because he was suspended;

b. From around 3 December 2025 the claimant’s mental ill health significantly deteriorated and this impaired his ability to focus, prioritise tasks and his cognitive functioning was impaired;

c. By 11 February 2025 when he contacted ACAS the claimant had in mind submitting the ET1;

d. The claimant was completely overwhelmed and unable to progress submitting his ET1 from 12 February 2025 until 14 March 2025. I recognise that the claimant submitted his disciplinary and grievance response on 12 March 2025 and the ET1 was submitted two days later. I accept his evidence that he was obsessed and consumed by the grievance disciplinary responses and that this reaction was because of his severe mental health problems at this time. I find that receiving the documentation from the respondent on 12 February 2025 was a supervening event.

51. As a result of these findings, I conclude that it was not reasonably practicable for the claimant to present his claim in time for the following reasons;

a. The claimant’s ill health before 12 February 2025 had seriously impacted his cognitive abilities, this ill-health resulted in the claimant taking more time to carry out tasks, lacking focus, failing to carry out day to day tasks, failing to maintain relationships and generally not functioning;

b. As he was getting in the position to lodge his ET1 he became completely overwhelmed on 12 February 2025. Given what was said in [NAME], this period is particularly relevant. I find that the completely overwhelmed state of the claimant which significantly impaired his cognitive

functioning not only in carrying out tasks but prioritization meant that it was not reasonably practicable to submit the ET1 in time.

52. The respondent does not submit that submitting the [NAME] two days after the submission of the disciplinary and grievance appeals was not a reasonable period.

53. Therefore, I have decided to extend time and the claims for unfair dismissal and automatic dismissal are not dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Approved by:

Employment Judge Bartlett 17 March 2026

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

20 May 2026

FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE