EI Benefit Appeal Refused: Voluntary Leave Without Just Cause

OUTCOME: Refused

[TRANSLATION] Citation: AP  v  Canada Employment Insurance Commission , 2026  [NAME]  227 Social Security Tribunal of Canada Appeal Division Leave to Appeal Decision Applicant: [redacted] Representative: [COUNSEL] (counsel), [NAME] [[NAME]] Respondent: [redacted] Decision under appeal: [NAME] decision dated February 5, 2026 (GE‑25‑3086) Tribunal member: [NAME] date: March 23, 2026 File number: AD-26-131 On this page Decision Overview Issues I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal Conclusion Decision [ 1 ] Permission to appeal is refused. The appeal won’t go ahead. Overview [ 2 ] The [APPELLANT], [NAME]., applied for Employment Insurance ( [NAME] ) regular benefits. Footnote 1 She said that she had to take leave without pay because she was running in the federal election. Footnote 2 [ 3 ] The Canada Employment Insurance Commission (Commission) decided that it could not pay the Claimant benefits from March 24, 2025, to April 28, 2025. That was because she voluntarily took leave from work without just cause. Footnote 3 The Commission also decided that she wasn’t entitled to receive benefits for the period from April 29 to May 5, 2025. That was because she was on vacation and so wasn’t available for work. Footnote 4 [ 4 ] The [APPELLANT] asked for that decision to be reconsidered. She wrote that she didn’t take leave voluntarily but had to do so to take part in the election. Footnote 5 She said that she would rather have kept working while running as an election [NAME]. [ 5 ] The Commission upheld its decisions on both issues—the leave from work and not being available for work. Footnote 6 It decided that the [APPELLANT] wasn’t entitled to benefits from March 26, 2025, to May 5, 2025. [ 6 ] The [APPELLANT] appealed the decision to the [NAME]. It dismissed her appeal. It decided that she wasn’t entitled to receive benefits because she voluntarily took leave from work without just cause, and that this wasn’t the only reasonable alternative. Footnote 7 It also decided that she wasn’t available for work. Footnote 8 [ 7 ] The Claimant is now asking the Appeal Division for permission to appeal. The Appeal Division can hear an appeal on the merits only if permission to appeal is given. Footnote 9 I am not giving permission to appeal for the following reasons. Issues [ 8 ] The issues are as follows: a) Is there an arguable case that the [NAME] made an error of law? b) Is there an arguable case that the [NAME] based its decision on an important error of fact? I am not giving the Claimant permission to appeal The legal test for giving permission to appeal [ 9 ] I can only give permission to appeal if the [APPELLANT] raises arguable grounds that could allow her to succeed. Footnote 10 I have to refuse permission to appeal if I am satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success. Footnote 11 A reasonable chance of success means that the [APPELLANT] could argue her case and possibly succeed. [ 10 ] The appeal has to relate to one of the grounds of appeal set out in the Department of Employment and Social Development Act  ( DESD  Act). This means that I have to decide whether there is an arguable case that the [NAME]: failed to follow the principles of procedural fairness made an error of jurisdiction made an error of law based its decision on an important error of fact Footnote 12 [ 11 ] So, I have to give permission to appeal if the [NAME] may have made one of these errors and whether that error would give the Claimant’s appeal a reasonable chance of success. [ 12 ] To give my decision, I looked at the administrative file that was before the [NAME], listened to the hearing recording, read the [NAME] decision, and carefully reviewed the Claimant’s application to the Appeal Division and the arguments made in support of it. Footnote 13 The Appeal Division can’t intervene on issues of mixed fact and law [ 13 ] The [APPELLANT] argues that the [NAME] made an error of law by finding that taking leave without pay wasn’t the only reasonable alternative. Footnote 14 [ 14 ] First, I have to point out that this alleged error isn’t an error of law. An error of law happens when the [NAME] applies the wrong legal test or doesn’t consider all the elements that a legal test requires. But applying a settled legal test to the facts of a case is an issue of mixed fact and law. Footnote 15 [ 15 ] In a similar case, where a claimant denied that she voluntarily left her job without just cause, the Federal Court of Appeal said that the Social Security Tribunal had applied the correct legal test to decide whether the claimant was entitled to benefits. It had to decide whether she had no other reasonable alternatives but to leave her job when she did, in the circumstances. Footnote 16 The Federal Court of Appeal noted that this matter can be considered an issue of mixed fact and law. Footnote 17 [ 16 ] The Appeal Division can’t intervene on an issue of this nature unless an issue of law can be identified or an important error of fact has been made. Footnote 18 In [NAME].’s case, no issue of law can be identified. The Claimant hasn’t shown that the [NAME] may have made an important error of fact. There is no arguable case that the [NAME] applied the wrong legal test [ 17 ] The Claimant hasn’t shown any arguable ground that the [NAME] applied the wrong legal test or applied the legal test incorrectly. It applied section 32(1) of the Employment Insurance Act  ( [NAME]). That provision says that a claimant who voluntarily takes a period of leave from their employment without just cause isn’t entitled to receive benefits if the period of leave was authorized by the employer and a return-to-work date was agreed to. The [NAME] also applied section 29(c) of the [NAME]. That provision says that all the circumstances have to be considered to determine whether the [APPELLANT] had just cause for taking leave. There is no arguable case that the [NAME] based its decision on an important error of fact [ 18 ] The Claimant argued before the [NAME] that she had to take leave without pay and repeated this argument before the Appeal Division. In its decision, the [NAME] wrote that the [APPELLANT] said her employer had threatened to reduce her work hours. So, she had no choice but to take leave without pay. Footnote 19 She argues before the Appeal Division that she never said her employed had threatened her, but that she was [translation] “forced” to choose between part-time work or leave without pay. Footnote 20 [ 19 ] Before the Appeal Division, the Claimant argues that she never claimed her employer threatened her and that, as a result, the [NAME] erred in how it assessed the facts. Yet I note that it was in fact the [APPELLANT] who raised the issue of having been [translation] “threatened.” Also, in her arguments before the [NAME], it was written that her employer [translation] “backed her into a corner by threatening to reduce her hours by a lot if she didn’t agree to take leave without pay ....” Footnote 21 So, it is surprising that she is now criticizing the [NAME] for having considered her own argument that she had been threatened. [ 20 ] There is no arguable case that the [NAME] made findings of fact in a perverse or capricious manner. It considered the [APPELLANT] position. But it found that the employer supported the [APPELLANT] in her efforts. Footnote 22 It also found that she wasn’t threatened with having her work hours reduced. Footnote 23 [ 21 ] The [NAME] decided that the [APPELLANT] voluntarily took leave without pay. The Claimant argues before the Appeal Division that she never asked for leave without pay. Footnote 24 But the evidence supports the [NAME]’s finding that she voluntarily took leave without pay. The evidence on file shows that she herself filled out and signed a request for leave without pay with her employer. Footnote 25 Also, at the hearing, her counsel asked her the following question: [translation] “In the end, what was chosen was leave without pay—why?” She testified that it was because she knew that if she went to part-time work under conditions that weren’t very clear in terms of hours, she would not have access to an alternative source of income like [NAME] . Footnote 26 So, the evidence supports the [NAME]’s finding, and I can’t intervene. [ 22 ] There is no arguable case that the [NAME] overlooked important evidence or made findings of fact that the evidence clearly contradicts. The [NAME] considered all of the evidence on file. It said that it reviewed the file, heard the Claimant, and considered the parties’ submissions, before finding that the Claimant voluntarily took leave without pay. Footnote 27 There is no arguable case that the [NAME] made errors of law There is no arguable case that the [NAME]’s reasons are inadequate [ 23 ] The Claimant argues that the [NAME] contradicted itself by saying a reasonable alternative would have been for the Claimant to work part-time when, at the same time, it decided that the reduced hours and earnings justified the leave without pay. Footnote 28 [ 24 ] Inadequate reasons can constitute an error of law. But the Claimant seems to have misunderstood the [NAME] decision. [ 25 ] The [NAME] didn’t decide that the reduced work hours justified the leave without pay. On the contrary, the [NAME] wrote at paragraph 27 of its decision that the Claimant didn’t have just cause for taking leave without pay because of her reduced work hours. Footnote 29 The [NAME] noted that her employer offered her part-time work during the election campaign. It found that she refused to work part-time because that would provide a lower income than [NAME]  benefits. Footnote 30 It reiterated at paragraph 29 of its decision that it didn’t accept her argument that she had just cause for taking leave without pay because of her reduced work hours. Footnote 31 The last sentence of paragraph 29 said that the reduced work hours would be a major change to her pay conditions. It seems to refer to the argument the Claimant raised rather than to the [NAME]’s finding. [ 26 ] To explain why the Claimant didn’t have just cause for taking leave without pay because of her reduced work hours, the [NAME] correctly noted that the Claimant caused her unemployment situation . Footnote 32 That was because she could have worked part-time for the same employer but instead chose not to work at all and to go back to  [NAME] . But the Federal Court said that the [NAME] “has the goal of ensuring the safety of citizens by offering assistance to individuals who have lost their employment and by helping unemployed persons return to work.” The Federal Court explained that this is why someone can’t receive benefits if they take a period of leave voluntarily and without just cause. Footnote 33 [ 27 ] In this case, the [NAME] found that it would have been a reasonable alternative to accept part-time work during the election campaign instead of choosing to take leave without pay and leaving herself with no income. There is no arguable case that the [NAME] gave reasons that weren’t logical or consistent. The [NAME] didn’t have to decide whether it was appropriate for the employer to allow the Claimant to work full-time [ 28 ] The Claimant claims in her application and arguments before the Appeal Division that the [NAME] made an error of law in its interpretation of the Public Service Act  (PSA). She criticizes the [NAME] for having decided that her employer could not allow her to work full-time while she was running for a party in the federal election. Footnote 34 [ 29 ] But that isn’t what the [NAME] decided. It wrote that the PSA doesn’t say that a public servant can keep working while being a [NAME] in an election. Footnote 35 That was in response to the [APPELLANT] argument that she should have been allowed to keep working full-time while running as a [NAME] in the federal election. [ 30 ] The [NAME] didn’t have to decide what the employer could or could not allow the Claimant to do under a provincial law. It correctly noted this in its decision. It explained that its role wasn’t to interpret the rules that applied to labour relations for [NAME]. Footnote 36 It also noted that she would have to find another remedy if she believed that her employer had misinterpreted the PSA. Footnote 37 The [NAME] is responsible for applying the [NAME] and gets its authority from the DESD  Act. It isn’t responsible for interpreting the PSA. It also isn’t responsible for reviewing an employer’s behaviour. [ 31 ] The [NAME] wrote that it wanted to address the [APPELLANT] arguments. The undisputed facts on file are that the [APPELLANT] employer, the [NAME], told her that she could not work full-time during the election campaign. That was the [NAME]’s interpretation of the PSA. The Claimant testified before the [NAME] that her employer told her it wasn’t possible for her to keep her full‑time working conditions. Footnote 38 She said that her employer offered her leave without pay or leave with partial pay. Leave with partial pay meant reducing the number of work hours. Footnote 39 [ 32 ] The [NAME] said at paragraph 13 of its decision that the [APPELLANT] had these two options if she wanted to run in the federal election while employed by the [NAME]. Footnote 40 The [NAME] noted that the employer tried to find a compromise to allow the [APPELLANT] to run as a [NAME] in the election. [ 33 ] So, there is no arguable case that the [NAME] made an error of law. Deciding whether the leave without pay was taken voluntarily didn’t require a legal interpretation of the PSA. There is no arguable case that the [NAME] made an error of law by limiting its analysis of the [APPELLANT] availability to the fact that she could have kept her job if she worked part time [ 34 ] Even though the [NAME] disentitled the [APPELLANT] from receiving benefits under section 32(1) of the [NAME], the Commission also decided that she wasn’t entitled to benefits because she wasn’t available for work for the period from March 26 to May 5, 2025. Footnote 41 Section 18(1)(a) of the [NAME] says that to be entitled to be paid benefits, the Claimant had to be capable of and available for work and unable to obtain suitable employment. Section 50(8) of the [NAME] also says that a claimant has to prove that they are making reasonable and customary efforts to obtain suitable employment. Footnote 42 [ 35 ] The [NAME] reviewed the Claimant’s availability by applying those two statutory provisions. [ 36 ] The legal test developed to determine availability under section 18(1)(a) involves applying the three factors set out in [NAME] . Footnote 43 Based on settled case law on this matter, the [NAME] decided that the Claimant had to prove the following three points: She wanted to go back to work as soon as a suitable job was available. She was making efforts to find a suitable job. She didn’t set personal conditions that unduly limited her chances of going back to work. Footnote 44 [ 37 ] In her application and arguments to the Appeal Division, the Claimant didn’t dispute that this was the correct legal test. Instead, the [APPELLANT] argued that the [NAME]’s analysis was unduly limited to the fact that she could have kept her job even with the reduced hours. Footnote 45 She criticized the [NAME] for overlooking the evidence of her job-search efforts when it analyzed her availability. [ 38 ] The Claimant hasn’t shown that her argument has a reasonable chance of success. The [NAME] specifically considered the [APPELLANT] job-search activities in its decision when analyzing her availability. It considered her testimony that finding a job during the election campaign was her priority. Footnote 46 It noted at paragraph 44 of its decision that it considered her testimony that she had made some efforts to find a job. Footnote 47 But it found that employers were hesitant to hire her for a short period of time. In fact, she testified before the [NAME] that a [NAME] told her she could not be hired because she would be leaving after three weeks. Footnote 48 [ 39 ] The [NAME] also made it clear that it considered the Claimant’s job‑search activities at paragraph 54 of its decision. As part of its analysis of the second [NAME] factor—the one dealing with efforts to find a suitable job—the [NAME] referred to the analysis it had already carried out in its decision of “reasonable and customary” efforts to find a job under section 9.001 of the Employment Insurance Regulations  ( [NAME]). Footnote 49 The [NAME] said that it used the job-search activities listed in the [NAME] as a reference. Footnote 50 [ 40 ] The [NAME] wrote that the Claimant’s efforts to find a job weren’t enough. Footnote 51 It was open to the [NAME] to make that finding. There is no arguable case that the [NAME] made an error in law by not considering some elements of a legal test. [ 41 ] Then, the [NAME] decided that the Claimant had set personal conditions that unduly limited her chances of going back to work. It found that she was looking for a temporary job while she was taking part in an election campaign. Footnote 52 The evidence on file supports this finding. The [APPELLANT] testified that she was looking for full-time work [translation] “that could be done in three weeks.” Footnote 53 She also said that she was looking for a [NAME] or someone who would have been happy to hire her for three weeks. Footnote 54 [ 42 ] The [NAME] compared these personal conditions that the Claimant had set with the fact that she already had a job and that her employer would have allowed her to work part-time during her election campaign. Footnote 55 So, there is no arguable case that the [NAME] only considered her employer’s offer to work part time. Additional remarks [ 43 ] The Federal Court requires us to review the entire file to decide whether the [NAME] may have made errors other than those the [APPELLANT] alleged. Footnote 56 But the Court asks us to do this only when the claimant is self-represented. [ 44 ] Because the Claimant is represented by counsel as part of this appeal, I don’t need to assess whether the [NAME] may have made errors that the [COUNSEL] and her counsel didn’t raise. I explained why I am satisfied that there are no arguable grounds that the errors alleged by the Claimant would give the appeal a reasonable chance of success. [ 45 ] In conclusion, I note that the [NAME] decision is consistent with other administrative decisions about people applying for  [NAME] while running as election candidates. Even though that decision isn’t binding, I find it relevant to mention a [NAME]) decision with very similar facts. Footnote 57 A claimant said that her leave without pay wasn’t voluntary because she needed to take leave from work to run as a [NAME] in an election. She argued that she wanted to stay in her job, but the law that applies to [NAME] required her to take leave during the election period. The decision-maker found that asking for leave without pay was still voluntary. [ 46 ] In another similar case, the [NAME] decided that a claimant who left her job to run as a [NAME] in an election had voluntarily left her job even though she had other options. Footnote 58 As a result, she was disentitled from receiving benefits. Conclusion [ 47 ] Permission to appeal is refused. This means that the appeal won’t go ahead. Footnotes Footnote 1 See the benefit claim at GD3-7. Return to footnote 1 referrer Footnote 2 See the benefit claim at GD3-8. Return to footnote 2 referrer Footnote 3 See the notice of decision at GD3-20. Return to footnote 3 referrer Footnote 4 See the notice of decision at GD3-20. Return to footnote 4 referrer Footnote 5 See the reconsideration request at GD3-23. Return to footnote 5 referrer Footnote 6 See the notice of decision at GD3-30. Return to footnote 6 referrer Footnote 7 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-2 at para 2. Return to footnote 7 referrer Footnote 8 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-2 at para 3. Return to footnote 8 referrer Footnote 9 See section 56(1) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act  ( DESD  Act). Return to footnote 9 referrer Footnote 10 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2016  FC  115 at para 12. Return to footnote 10 referrer Footnote 11 See section 58(2) of the DESD  Act. Return to footnote 11 referrer Footnote 12 See section 58(1) ofthe DESD  Act. Return to footnote 12 referrer Footnote 13 See the Claimant’s arguments at AD1B-2 and following. Return to footnote 13 referrer Footnote 14 See the application to the Appeal Division at AD1-4. Return to footnote 14 referrer Footnote 15 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2026  FC  249 at para 27. Return to footnote 15 referrer Footnote 16 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2015  FCA  48. Return to footnote 16 referrer Footnote 17 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2015  FCA  48 at para 6. Return to footnote 17 referrer Footnote 18 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2023  FCA  169 at para 80. Return to footnote 18 referrer Footnote 19 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-4 at para 19. Return to footnote 19 referrer Footnote 20 See the Claimant’s arguments at AD1B-7 at para 13. Return to footnote 20 referrer Footnote 21 See the Claimant’s arguments before the [NAME] at GD10-3 at para 4. Return to footnote 21 referrer Footnote 22 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-6 at para 23. Return to footnote 22 referrer Footnote 23 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-7 at para 30. Return to footnote 23 referrer Footnote 24 See the Claimant’s arguments before the Appeal Division at AD1B-3 at para 3(e). Return to footnote 24 referrer Footnote 25 See the request for leave without pay at GD2-43. Return to footnote 25 referrer Footnote 26 Listen to the [NAME] hearing recording at 20:50. Return to footnote 26 referrer Footnote 27 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-4 at para 16. Return to footnote 27 referrer Footnote 28 See the application to the Appeal Division at AD1-4. Return to footnote 28 referrer Footnote 29 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-6. Return to footnote 29 referrer Footnote 30 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-6 at para 27. Return to footnote 30 referrer Footnote 31 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-7 at para 29. Return to footnote 31 referrer Footnote 32 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-7 at para 28. Return to footnote 32 referrer Footnote 33 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]) , 2019  FC  137 at para 28. Return to footnote 33 referrer Footnote 34 See the application to the Appeal Division at AD1-4. Return to footnote 34 referrer Footnote 35 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-6 at para 26. Return to footnote 35 referrer Footnote 36 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-5 at para 22. Return to footnote 36 referrer Footnote 37 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-7 at para 30. Return to footnote 37 referrer Footnote 38 Listen to the [NAME] hearing recording at 17:40. Return to footnote 38 referrer Footnote 39 Listen to the [NAME] hearing recording at 18:08. Return to footnote 39 referrer Footnote 40 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-4. Return to footnote 40 referrer Footnote 41 See the notice of decision at GD3-29. Return to footnote 41 referrer Footnote 42 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-8 at para 38 and following. Return to footnote 42 referrer Footnote 43 [NAME]  v  Canada Employment and Immigration Commission , A-56-96 and A-57-96. Return to footnote 43 referrer Footnote 44 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-11 at para 50. Return to footnote 44 referrer Footnote 45 See the Claimant’s arguments at AD1B-5. Return to footnote 45 referrer Footnote 46 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-9 at para 43. Return to footnote 46 referrer Footnote 47 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-10 at para 44. Return to footnote 47 referrer Footnote 48 Listen to the [NAME] hearing recording at 27:55. Return to footnote 48 referrer Footnote 49 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-12. Return to footnote 49 referrer Footnote 50 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-12 at para 54. Return to footnote 50 referrer Footnote 51 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-12 at para 55. Return to footnote 51 referrer Footnote 52 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-12 at paras 56 and 57. Return to footnote 52 referrer Footnote 53 Listen to the [NAME] hearing recording at 26:55. Return to footnote 53 referrer Footnote 54 Listen to the [NAME] hearing recording at 27:10. Return to footnote 54 referrer Footnote 55 See the [NAME] decision at AD1A-12 at para 57. Return to footnote 55 referrer Footnote 56 [NAME]  v  Canada ([NAME] [NAME]), 2016  FC  615 at para 10. Return to footnote 56 referrer Footnote 57 See CUB 17867. Return to footnote 57 referrer Footnote 58 See HW  v  Canada Employment Insurance Commission , 2020  [NAME]  453. Return to footnote 58 referrer