Federal Court Denies Class Action Certification Over Pleading Issues

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260611 Docket: T-3089-24 Citation: 2026 FC 772 Ottawa, Ontario, June 11, 2026 PRESENT: The [NAME_1]: [NAME_2] Plaintiff and HIS MAJESTY THE KING Defendant

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT [ 1 ] This is a motion for certification of a class action under Rule 334.16 of the Federal Courts Rules , SOR/98-106 [the Rules]. The proposed class is defined as persons, including estates, that received a supplementary death benefit under the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act , RSC 1985, c C-17 [CFSA, or the Act] upon the death of a participant who was over the age of 61 at the time of their death. [ 2 ] The proposed representative Plaintiff, [NAME_2], is a Quebec resident who alleges that the Defendant erred in calculating the amount of a supplementary death benefit under the Act, resulting in underpayment to class members. [ 3 ] For the reasons that follow, this motion will be dismissed. The Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his Statement of Claim.

I. Facts A. Background [ 4 ] Under the CFSA and Canadian Forces Superannuation Regulations , CRC, c 396 [CFSR, or the Regulations], current, former, and certain reserve force members of the Canadian Armed Forces [CAF] are eligible to receive financial benefits based on years of pensionable service and contributions to the Canadian Forces Superannuation Account and Canadian Forces Pension Fund. [ 5 ] At issue in this case is the supplementary death benefit [SDB] administered under the Act. The SDB is a decreasing term life insurance benefit. The “basic benefit” of the SDB provides twice its participant’s annual salary rounded up to the nearest multiple of $250. Once a participant reaches the age of 61, the SDB reduces at a rate of 10% per year to a final paid-up benefit of $5,000. The reduction applies on either the first day of April or the first day of October, depending upon which of the two dates follows the participant’s sixty-first birthday. [ 6 ] A participant may designate a beneficiary for the SDB, including their own estate (which is the beneficiary by default), another person who is over the age of 18 on the date of designation, or a charitable, benevolent, religious, or educational organization or institution. [ 7 ] The foundational claim in the Plaintiff’s action is that the Defendant has underpaid beneficiaries of the SDB under Part II of the CFSA by miscalculating the annual reduction. Section 52 of the Regulations specifies that the amount of an SDB is: with respect to the deceased participant, subject to a reduction of 10% to be made from [the first day of April or the first day of October, whichever date immediately follows each anniversary of the participant’s birthday, commencing with their 61st], for every year of age in excess of 60 attained by the participant … twice the salary of the participant [or the nearest multiple of $250]. à l’égard du participant décédé, celui ci-après réduit de dix pour cent à compter du lendemain de [chaque premier jour d’avril ou chaque premier jour d’octobre, selon celle de ces dates qui suit immédiatement chaque anniversaire de naissance du participant à partir de son 61e], pour chaque année de l’âge du participant ultérieure à soixante ans … le double du traitement du participant [ou le plus petit multiple de 250 $]. [ 8 ] The Plaintiff interprets the CFSR as imposing a declining balance rather than a straight-line reduction in the SDB’s value annually. At the stage of certification, the facts that the statute imposes such a reduction and that the Defendant has accordingly underpaid proposed class members by misinterpreting the CFSR must be assumed to be true. [ 9 ] Through the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff seeks remedies for what he puts forward as the misapplication of the Act and Regulations under several common law causes of action: negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. In his memorandum of fact and law for this motion, he submits that the facts pertaining to these common law causes of action also meet the requirements under articles 1457, 1493–1496, 1309, and 1439 of the Civil Code of Québec , CQLR c CCQ-1991 [the Code], but no citations to the Code are included within the pleadings. B. Representative plaintiff [ 10 ] [NAME_3], a Quebec resident, served as a member of the CAF from May 22, 1979, until September 26, 2000. She died on April 5, 2023, at age 63. [NAME_2], who is her son and the proposed representative plaintiff in this action, is also a Quebec resident. [NAME_2] was designated as the beneficiary for [NAME_3]’s SDB. [ 11 ] In this action, [NAME_2] contends that the SDB received by him was improperly calculated. He claims that the 10% annual reduction in the SDB should be calculated on a declining balance of the benefit rather than a reduction based on the principal amount. [ 12 ] As a further issue, [NAME_2] claims that [NAME_3]’s annual pay on release was $45,372.00, while the basic benefit of the SDB was calculated using a final salary of $42,612.00. It was confirmed at the hearing that this secondary issue is not the focus of the class action, as it is an individual issue considered to be specific to [NAME_2].

II. Issues and Law A. Certification [ 13 ] The core issue is whether this action meets the criteria for certification as a class proceeding under Rule 334.16(1): (a) the pleadings must disclose a reasonable cause of action; (b) there must an identifiable class of two or more persons; (c) the claims of the class members must raise common questions of law or fact, whether or not those common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members; (d) a class proceeding must be the preferable procedure for the just and efficient resolution of the common questions of law or fact; and (e) there must be a representative plaintiff who (i) would fairly and adequately represent the interest of the class, (ii) has prepared a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members as to how the proceeding is progressing, (iii) does not have, on the common questions of law or fact, an interest that is in conflict with the interests of other class members, and (iv) provides a summary of any agreements respecting fees and disbursements between the representative plaintiff or applicant and the solicitor of record. [ 14 ] The parties agree that the first criterion is met unless it is “plain and obvious” that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed by the Plaintiff, and that the remaining criteria need only be supported by “some basis in fact” ( Canada v [NAME_4] , 2021 FCA 186 at paras 91, 94). [ 15 ] However, the unique facts of this case give rise to a preliminary issue that, though seemingly correctable, is currently before this Court and must be examined. B. Pleadings in common law [ 16 ] The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s claim is rooted in civil law but improperly pleaded in the common law exclusively. The sole representative plaintiff is and was at all relevant times a resident of Quebec, and yet the pleadings do not assert any claims under the civil law. Because of this, the Defendant argues that [NAME_2]’s personal claim is not properly pleaded to begin with. This, the Defendant submits, provides a sufficient reason to refuse certification of this action as a class proceeding. [ 17 ] The Defendant submits that this preliminary issue on its own defeats three of the five certification criteria — namely, the requirements for a reasonable cause of action, the existence of common issues, and an appropriate representative plaintiff under paragraphs 334.16(1)(a), (c), and (e) of the Rules, respectively — so it should be dealt with at the outset. [ 18 ] The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant’s objection is superficial. If the requisite elements of the causes of action under the Code are pleaded, then, the Plaintiff says, the fact that the Code itself was not pleaded does not defeat the certification motion. The Plaintiff reminds this Court on this motion that pleadings must be read generously, accommodating any inadequacies that are merely the result of drafting deficiencies (see [NAME_5] v Canada , 2024 FCA 199 at para 76).

III. Plaintiff’s position A. Sufficiency of pleadings [ 19 ] The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is objecting to the absence of express references to specific Code provisions in the Statement of Claim, which is an objection to the form of the pleadings rather than their substance. The Plaintiff submits that this argument fails to demonstrate that it is plain and obvious that a viable cause of action has not been disclosed but instead focuses improperly on whether the pleadings have adopted particular juridical terminology. [ 20 ] The Plaintiff proposes that the material facts pleaded establish fault, loss, and causal connection, which are analogous to the elements necessary to prove extracontractual civil liability under article 1457 of the Code, and that the absence of a reference to this provision in the pleading does not negate the sufficiency of the pleadings. [ 21 ] The Plaintiff relies upon the case of [NAME_6] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2024 ONSC 3800, aff’d 2025 ONCA 713 [ [NAME_6] ]. At paragraphs 347–351 of [NAME_6] , the Plaintiff submits that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected precisely what the Defendant is arguing here: that a lack of pleadings under the Code meant that the representative plaintiffs could not satisfy the criterion for certification requiring common questions, or the equivalent of Rule 334.16(1)(c). [ 22 ] The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant argues in this case, as in [NAME_6] , that the Plaintiff’s failure to present pleadings in the civil law are fatal to his claim by undermining the basis in fact for the existence of common issues or the suitability of the representative plaintiff for putative class members outside of Quebec. The Plaintiff says that this is a non-issue since the Court recognized in [NAME_6] that article 1457 of the Code gives requirements to provide duty, breach, causation, and injury or harm, which are analogous to the elements of the common law tort of negligence ( [NAME_6] at para 351). [ 23 ] [NAME_6] was a case concerning a class of immigration detainees, the Plaintiff submits that it applies with equal force to defeat the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff’s pleadings in the common law are deficient. The Plaintiff argues that the pleadings support claims in negligence, unjust enrichment, and a breach of fiduciary duty just as effectively as they support claims of extracontractual liability under article 1457, unjust enrichment under articles 1493–1496, and a breach of an administrator’s obligation to act prudently and diligently under article 1309 of the Code. [ 24 ] To support this argument the Plaintiff refers to the evidence of [NAME_7], the Senior Director of Pension Program Management and Oversight at [COMPANY_8]. Under cross-examination, the following exchange took place: Q. Is there any separate administration for Quebec residents? A. No. It's all based out of the same office. Q. Same office, okay. And so all beneficiaries of the SDB, regardless of province, are all treated the same? A. Correct. Q. Perfect. Thank you. So, just to double check, reconfirm, would a resident of Quebec be subjected to any different requirements or procedures than, say, a resident of Nova Scotia? A. No. [ 25 ] The Plaintiff offers that this establishes that there is no difference in the administration of the SDB. In [NAME_6] , Quebec residents were included in the proposed class and the Plaintiff says that the only distinction raised by the Defendant in this case is that a Quebec resident is not simply a class member, but the sole representative plaintiff. [ 26 ] Counsel argues it follows that if a Quebec resident may be a class member in a national claim under the logic endorsed in [NAME_6] , they are equally able to act as a sole representative plaintiff in a national class (see Rule 334.12(1), which provides that a member of a class of persons may commence an action on behalf of the class members). [ 27 ] The Plaintiff advances that the SDB is a federally administered program which applies the same regardless of where the beneficiary resides, since the federal Crown is not located in any particular province ( [NAME_9] v Canada , 2003 SCC 9 at para 39 [ [NAME_9] ]). [ 28 ] Other jurisprudence further supports allowing this certification motion, according to the Plaintiff. For example, in [NAME_10] v Canada , 2008 FC 624, this Court previously certified a national class action including Quebec residents. The Plaintiff says the same is true of White et al v Canada (28 November 2025), Ottawa T-512-24 (FC). [ 29 ] The issues raised in the above consented cases included questions of a duty of care, its breach, unjust enrichment, and aggregate damages, among others. The Plaintiff says that these are like what he is seeking in the present case and that these two cases therefore stand as important and reliable examples of class proceedings being certified even where they include Quebec residents. Even though both of those certification orders were issued on consent, the Plaintiff says is still important precedent given the certification test would have been conducted. [ 30 ] The Plaintiff points to the common questions in [NAME_11] v Attorney General of Canada , 2006 BCSC 101 at para 10 , aff’d 2008 BCCA 539, aff’d 2011 SCC 12 [ [NAME_11] ], where unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty relating to the same provisions respecting the SDB under the CFSA that are raised in this case were among the issues before the courts. The common questions were also certified on consent in [NAME_11]. [ 31 ] The Plaintiff submits that [NAME_2]’s claim will not result in improperly applying the common law to an issue governed by civil law. Rather, he says that this Court need only recognize that the SDB is uniformly administered across Canada such that the injury at issue in this action is captured sufficiently by the common law pleadings and would apply analogously to the relevant provisions of the Code. [ 32 ] Based upon the reasoning in [NAME_6] , the Plaintiff submits that the satisfaction of the requisite elements of the Defendant’s extracontractual civil liability “can be efficiently assessed together with the common law negligence analysis” ( [NAME_6] at para 351). B. Responses to Defendant’s objections [ 33 ] The Plaintiff addressed the jurisprudence relied upon by the Defendant. First, the Defendant points to [NAME_12] v Canada , 2015 SCC 35 [ [NAME_12] ], where the SCC observed that the suppletive law giving rise to extracontractual civil liability in Quebec or tort liability in a common law province is determined by the law where the right of action arose (at para 158). [ 34 ] To this, the Plaintiff answers that the SCC occasionally conducts analysis of both the common law and civil law simultaneously in that very decision ( [NAME_12] at paras 58, 161). As [NAME_12] was decided before [NAME_6] , the Plaintiff said at the hearing that the former does not defeat the latter. I stop here to note that was likely a misspoken remark. Under the doctrine of vertical stare decisis , I am bound to follow [NAME_12] . The fact that [NAME_6] is a more recent decision than [NAME_12] is immaterial. Moreover, paragraph 158 of [NAME_12] , which is where the Defendant directs the Court’s attention, simply provides commentary on the effects of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act , RSC 1985, c C-50 [CLPA]. [ 35 ] The Plaintiff stated his case was distinguishable from [NAME_13] v Canada (Attorney General) , 2025 FC 753 [ [NAME_13] ]. This was a summary judgment of a class proceeding concerning survivors of the Sixties Scoop who were excluded from a previous settlement. Justice Sébastien Grammond found that the children in the Adopt Indian Metis Program, administered in Saskatchewan, were owed a duty of care. The plaintiffs in [NAME_13] had brought forward a broader claim on behalf of other provincial programs, but the Court did not accept all of them. [ 36 ] The Plaintiff likewise attempts to distinguish his case from [NAME_14] v Canada , 2025 FC 476 [ [NAME_14] ]. Justice Jocelyne Gagné commented in that case upon pleadings which failed to establish a civil law cause of action. She noted that the parties did not provide an analysis of any doctrine or jurisprudence specific to Quebec, simply submitting instead that “article 1457 of the CCQ [is] merely a codification of the common law tort of negligence … [or] that it [is] akin to the common law duty of care.” [ 37 ] The Plaintiff says that, unlike [NAME_14] , in this case counsel have made substantive submissions about specific articles of the Code and have adequately demonstrated that those articles are analogous to the comparable common law causes of action included in the pleadings. [ 38 ] The Plaintiff states that [NAME_2] should be the representative plaintiff for this proposed class action and that the analysis of the common law and civil law causes of action may be considered in tandem once the action proceeds to a determination on merit. If any issues arise in the meanwhile, the Plaintiff submits that case management may also be used to facilitate and support this process. [ 39 ] The Plaintiff invites this Court to contemplate the impact of accepting the Defendant’s argument that a representative plaintiff from Quebec must ground their claim in civil law when bringing such an action. Counsel submits that it will generate more uncertainty. For example, the Plaintiff asks whether all proposed national class actions will now need to include both a representative plaintiff from Quebec and the common law provinces, especially since there is nothing in the Rules that suggests this should be the case.

IV. Analysis [ 40 ] Though I do not disagree with some of the Plaintiff’s arguments, as I will explain in further detail below, I ultimately agree with the Defendant that this matter must be struck. However, the Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his pleadings. [ 41 ] The Defendant points to section 3 of the CLPA, which expressly provides that the liability of the Crown must be separately addressed for damages arising in Quebec and the common law provinces: Liability 3 The Crown is liable for the damages which, if it were a person, it would be liable (a) in the Province of Quebec, in respect of (i) the damage caused by the fault of a servant of the Crown, or (ii) the damage resulting from the act of a thing in the custody of or owned by the Crown or by the fault of the Crown as custodian or owner; and (b) in any other province, in respect of (i) a tort committed by a servant of the Crown, or (ii) a breach of duty attaching to the ownership, occupation, possession or control of property. Responsabilité 3 En matière de responsabilité, l’État est assimilé à une personne pour : a) dans la province de Québec : (i) le dommage causé par la faute de ses préposés, (ii) le dommage causé par le fait des biens qu’il a sous sa garde ou dont il est propriétaire ou par sa faute à l’un ou l’autre de ces titres; b) dans les autres provinces : (i) les délits civils commis par ses préposés, (ii) les manquements aux obligations liées à la propriété, à l’occupation, à la possession ou à la garde de biens. [ 42 ] Additionally, the Defendant cites article 3126 of the Code in this regard, which provides: 3126. The obligation to make reparation for injury caused to another is governed by the law of the State where the act or omission which occasioned the injury occurred. However, if the injury appeared in another State, the law of the latter State is applicable if the author should have foreseen that the injury would manifest itself there. In any case where the author and the victim have their domiciles or residences in the same State, the law of that State applies. 3126. L’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à autrui est régie par la loi de l’État où le fait générateur du préjudice est survenu. Toutefois, si le préjudice est apparu dans un autre État, la loi de cet État s’applique si l’auteur devait prévoir que le préjudice s’y manifesterait. Dans tous les cas, si l’auteur et la victime ont leur domicile ou leur résidence dans le même État, c’est la loi de cet État qui s’applique. [ 43 ] The Plaintiff is and was at all relevant times a resident of Quebec, as was his mother. The SDB was paid to the Plaintiff in Quebec. Because the consequences of the impugned administration of the SDB are held to constitute the injury, which manifested in Quebec, civil law is the applicable suppletive law. While the Plaintiff emphasizes that [NAME_15] are administered in one place for all beneficiaries, paragraph 3(a) of the CLPA clearly indicates that the Crown’s liability arises in Quebec if the damages are experienced there rather where the act of maladministration occurred. [ 44 ] The issue with respect to certification is not that [NAME_2] lives in Quebec, because it is true that national class proceedings often include Quebec residents. The issue is that the action at this stage only engages the interests of a single identified person who is held out as the representative plaintiff. That person’s claim is subject to civil law, but the pleadings are presented under common law causes of action without precision as to the operative articles of the Code, the elements of each, and how those legal requirements are related to the material facts that have been pleaded. [ 45 ] The delicate role that must be observed by the Court in circumstances where claims that involve a questionable intersection of the common law and civil law was expressed well by Justice Grammond in [NAME_13] , and it is worth reproducing his analysis at some length here: [86] Indeed, in their statement of claim, the Plaintiffs asserted that where the acts of Canada’s servants took place in Quebec, they gave rise to extracontractual liability pursuant to article 1457 of the Civil Code of Québec , instead of liability in tort at common law. Nevertheless, in both their written and oral submissions, the Plaintiffs adopted an entirely different position and argued that the case is wholly governed by “federal common law” and that the civil law plays no role, even where the cause of action arose in Quebec. [87] I am unable to agree with the Plaintiffs. Except perhaps in admiralty matters, there is no such thing as a “federal common law,” if one means by that term a freestanding and comprehensive body of private law that displaces provincial law in certain areas … The Plaintiffs have framed their claims in private law terms, namely the tort of negligence and fiduciary duty. These claims are captured by section 3 of the  Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and even if they were not, the more general principle that, subject to statutory exceptions, the federal Crown’s private law relationships are governed by the law of the province concerned requires the application of Quebec civil law where the cause of action arises in that province. [88] Relying on [NAME_16] v Canada, 1989 CanLII 122 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 322, the Plaintiffs argue that the present matter is governed by “federal common law” because it is concerned with the federal government’s relationship with Indigenous peoples. However, that case does not assist the Plaintiffs … [90] Nor does the “national” dimension of the present class action have any bearing on the applicable law. A class action is a procedural vehicle that does not affect the law applicable to the substance of each member’s claim … Where the class comprises members residing in Quebec and other provinces or territories, or where the claim encompasses causes of action arising in Quebec and elsewhere, the court must ascertain which claims are governed by Quebec law and decide the case accordingly. [91] … I cannot simply assume that the result under Quebec law would be the same as under the common law, for this would amount to applying the common law in Quebec; see, in this regard, [NAME_14] v Canada , 2025 FC 476 at paragraphs 194–195. [92] … I am not in a position to decide the motion with respect to causes of action arising in Quebec. I must then dismiss the motion for summary judgment with respect to these causes of action. ( [NAME_13] at paras 86–92, emphasis added) [ 46 ] I admit that there are some difficulties with the Defendant’s position and could be explored further by a higher court. For example, in [NAME_9] , the Supreme Court held that the federal Crown’s non-assumption of a provincial locale entails that “rights and duties between the federal Crown and residents of Canada” appear to arise “otherwise than in a province” (at para 39). [ 47 ] However, I cannot accept bald assertions that any determinations flowing from an analysis of the common law causes of action would necessarily result in an identical outcome under the purportedly analogous civil law causes of action. As Justice Gagné has said, drawing loose similarities between the common law and hypothetical civil law actions will “fall short of capturing the many differences” between the two legal systems ( [NAME_14] at para 195). The Plaintiff has done essentially the same in this case as was done in [NAME_14] — he has asked this Court to accept an analogy between the available causes of action under the common law and the civil law while articulating his reasoning exclusively under the common law causes of action. [ 48 ] Contrary to the Plaintiff’s submission, I do not find that [NAME_6] assists his case. In that case, there were two representative plaintiffs who had properly pleaded infringements of their rights arising from state conduct which transpired in a common law jurisdiction ( [NAME_6] at paras 4, 112, 121). But that is not the situation here. As well, unlike the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the Federal Courts are functionally bijural courts, which makes [NAME_6] particularly unpersuasive in reaching a determination on this issue. [ 49 ] In [NAME_17] v Canada , 2021 FC 504 at paras 218–219, this Court found that a plaintiff who brought only generalized pleadings about liability under articles 1457 and 1621 of the Code had failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action. [ADDRESS] of Appeal agreed with this determination ( [NAME_17] v Canada , 2023 FCA 128 at paras 86–87). [ 50 ] In this case, no provisions of the Code were pleaded to begin with, so it leaves the Court in a deeply disadvantaged position to determine whether the material facts pleaded are sufficient to disclose reasonable causes of action under the civil law as required to meet the first threshold criterion for certification. [ 51 ] Class proceedings do not modify or create substantive rights, nor do they alter rules of subject-matter jurisdiction ( [NAME_18] v [COMPANY_19] , 2006 SCC 19 at paras 17–19). [NAME_2]’s individual rights are enforceable only under civil law, the Defendant is correct in arguing that his claim must be anchored in the proper legal context. The civil law cannot be subsumed within or made subservient to the common law in a legitimately bijural country. [ 52 ] I cannot help but heed the warnings given in [NAME_20] to refrain from assessing vaguely asserted civil law cause of actions in the absence of meaningful submissions about them. In written and oral submissions, counsel for the Plaintiff did not substantively advance the civil law aspects of his claim. [ 53 ] Based on what is required by section 3 of the CLPA, it is therefore plain and obvious that the Statement of Claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action in the civil law, as required by the fact that the Plaintiff’s cause of action arose in Quebec.

Accordingly, the first certification criterion under Rule 334.16(1)(a) is not met, which is dispositive of this motion. [ 54 ] While the Plaintiff argues that this objection to the current version of the claim is merely a dispute about “drafting semantics” or nothing but a request for “optimal juridical terminology,” I do not agree. This is fundamental to the claim and, as the parties agree, it can be easily remedied. [ 55 ] To address the elephant in the room: I am not saying that every class action that is national in scope must have a representative plaintiff from Quebec and one from a common law province, given that neither the Rules nor the jurisprudence suggest that is necessary. The sole identified class member here is a Quebec resident, and the pleadings were only brought in the form of common law causes of action, so there is a genuine disconnection between the facts and law deployed in the pleadings. [ 56 ] [NAME_2] is not prohibited from acting as the sole representative plaintiff for a national class in this action, since the evidence suggests that putative class members across the country are substantially in the same situation with respect to the administration of [NAME_15]. He is only prohibited from pleading his own personal cause of action under a legal system which is not applicable to him. [ 57 ] If the Plaintiff properly pleads his own personal claim under the civil law and adequately articulates how those allegations are mirrored in the common law, he may be able to persuade this Court that his claim asserts common issues across Canada. I do not accept the suggestions of counsel that this is a mere technicality which should be sorted out through case management after I have agreed to grant certification. [ 58 ] While the Defendant argues that there are several other deficiencies with the pleadings that should lead to striking the claim in its entirety, I am not prepared to do so. The Plaintiff expresses willingness to address any deficiencies, and requests leave to amend the Statement of Claim. This will be granted.

V. Conclusions [ 59 ] For the above reasons, this motion will be dismissed with leave to amend the Statement of Claim within 90 days of the date of this order or as otherwise ordered. [ 60 ] With this dismissal and grant of leave to amend, it would be premature to make any determinations on the current version of the claim’s satisfaction of the certification criteria under Rule 334.16(1). [ 61 ] As prescribed by Rule 334.39(1), no costs are ordered.

JUDGMENT in T-3089-24 THIS COURT’S

JUDGMENT is that : The motion is dismissed. The Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim within 90 days or as otherwise ordered by the case management judge. No costs are ordered. "[NAME_1]" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-3089-24 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME_2] v HIS MAJESTY THE KING PLACE OF HEARING: Halifax, Nova Scotia DATE OF HEARING: March 2, 2026

REASONS AND

JUDGMENT: [NAME_1] J. DATED: June 11, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME_21] [NAME_22] [NAME_23] For The PLAINTIFF [NAME_24] [NAME_25] [NAME_26] For The DEFENDANT SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME_28], Nova Scotia For The PLAINTIFF Attorney General of Canada Halifax, Nova Scotia For The DEFENDANT