Federal Court Rejects Vaccine Mandate Challenge

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Date: 20260525 Docket: T-2536-23 Citation: 2026 FC 667 Ottawa, Ontario, May 25, 2026 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Duchesne BETWEEN: [NAME] AND [NAME] [NAME] / Moving Parties and HIS [NAME] THE KING, THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA [NAME] / Responding Parties

REASONS AND

ORDER [ 1 ] [NAME] have brought a motion pursuant to Rule 51 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [the Rules ] by which they appeal Associate Judge L.E. Trent Horne’s order made on November 28, 2024, that granted [NAME]’ motion to strike their amended statement of claim in part, with leave to amend. The Associate Judge is the case management judge assigned to case manage this proceeding [[NAME]] pursuant to Rules 383 and 384 of the Rules . [ 2 ] [NAME]’ motion and appeal is dismissed, with costs payable by [NAME] to [NAME], for the reasons that follow.

I. Background A. The Claims Advanced by [NAME] [ 3 ] [NAME] served and filed an amended statement of claim [the ASOC] on or about June 6, 2024. Their claims, understood broadly, are with respect to what they define in their ASOC as “Vaccine Mandates” and interim ministerial orders [[NAME]] that set out COVID-19 vaccine requirements through legislative means. [NAME]’ use of the expression “Vaccine Mandates” in their ASOC is limited to a political statement made on October 6, 2021, by the then Prime Minister. [ 4 ] The allegations made in the ASOC that are relevant for the purposes of [NAME]’ appeal may be generally summarized as follows. [ 5 ] [NAME] claim $ 1,000,000 in damages pursuant to subsection 24(1) of the [NAME] of Rights and Freedoms [the Charter ] for the alleged breach of their section 6, 7 and 15 Charter rights through the government’s use [NAME] that were in place between October 30, 2021, and June 20, 2022 [the Effective Period]. [ 6 ] The [NAME] were made pursuant to the Aeronautics Act, RSC 1985 c. A-2 and the Railway Safety Act RSC 1985, c. 32 (4th Supp.), and set out COVID-19 vaccination requirements for persons to engage in air and rail travel during the Effective Period. [ 7 ] [NAME] allege that the [NAME] violated their section 6 Charter right to enter, remain in and leave Canada as well as their section 7 Charter rights to life, liberty and security of the person by making having received a COVID-19 vaccine a precondition of travel by air to the United Kingdom during the Effective Period. By doing so, the government is alleged to have compromised their decision-making concerning their personal autonomy. That compromised decision-making authority is alleged to have undermined their dignity as human beings in a democratic society as well as their independence. [NAME] also argue that the violation of their section 7 Charter right of liberty was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. [ 8 ] [NAME] allege that the [NAME] violated their section 15 Charter rights of equality because they segregated them into an identifiable group of “unvaccinated” [NAME]. This distinction is alleged to have prejudiced [NAME]’ rights to access and make use of federally regulated transportation services, putting them at a disadvantage and withholding a benefit that was available to vaccinated [NAME]. Doing so is alleged to have perpetuated an unsubstantiated and prejudicial stereotype that unvaccinated [NAME] like [NAME] posed some higher risk of COVID-19 transmission or infection to persons within the transportation system. B. The Defendant’s Motion to Strike [ 9 ] [NAME] brought a motion to strike portions of [NAME]’ ASOC on the basis that: a) neither Plaintiff had pleaded that they are [NAME], and had failed to plead the necessary elements of a reasonable cause of action pursuant to subsection 6(1) of the Charter ; b) [NAME] had not pleaded that any IMO related to rail transport had any impact on them, and failed to plead the necessary elements of a reasonable cause of action pursuant to section 6 of the Charter with respect to rail transport; c) the section 7 Charter liberty interest claimed does not confer protection for the ability to travel by federally regulated means of transportation, and that an IMO which requires an individual to make a choice does not undermine [NAME]’ section 7 Charter liberty interest because they had the ability to make a choice to receive a vaccine or not; and, d) “vaccination status” is not an enumerated or analogous ground under section 15 of the Charter, is not an immutable personal characteristic, is the result of an individual choice, and it is therefore not contrary to section 15 of the Charter for individuals to be treated differently based on their choice whether or not to be vaccinated. [ 10 ] [NAME] also argued that leave to amend should not be granted to [NAME] except with respect to the section 6 Charter claim as it relates to air transport. [NAME] argued that the deficiencies in the section 7 and section 15 Charter claims were not susceptible to being cured by way of amendment because they were legally untenable. They also argued that [NAME]’ claims with respect to rail transport could not be cured by an amendment because [NAME] did not appear through their pleading to have had any interaction with rail transport. C. [NAME]’ Response and Motion for leave to further amend [ 11 ] [NAME] responded to [NAME]’ motion by delivering a responding record and by bringing a motion for leave to further amend their ASOC. Their motion for leave to further amend their ASOC sought to address and correct some of the shortcomings alleged by [NAME] in their motion record, and to add allegations and claimed remedies prior to the motion to strike being adjudicated. [ 12 ] [NAME]’ proposed further amended statement of claim [FASOC] included new allegations that the Plaintiff Mr. [NAME] is a [NAME] and had been a permanent resident in Canada during the Effective Period. Other new allegations included that Mr. [NAME] had not received a COVID-19 vaccine due to his deeply held beliefs about the right to control what he puts into his body, his right to make informed decisions concerning medical procedures, and his concern regarding the unknown safety profile of the COVID-19 vaccines. The Plaintiff Mr. [NAME] was alleged to be a [NAME] with double citizenship to Canada and the United Kingdom. Mr. [NAME] was alleged to share the same beliefs and concerns as Mr. [NAME] with respect to what he puts into his body, his right to make informed decisions regarding medical procedures, and his concerns over the safety profile of COVID-19 vaccines. [ 13 ] Mr. [NAME] sought to amend his pleading by alleging that his mobility rights contained in subsection 19(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , SC 2001, c 27 [ IRPA ] and in Article 12 of the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights [the ICCPR ] were breached by the effect of the Vaccine Mandates. [ 14 ] [NAME] sought to include new allegations that being denied access to and to use federally regulated transportation to leave Canada to visit the United Kingdom because of their refusal to receive a COVID-19 vaccine amounted to cruel and unusual treatment in breach of section 12 of the Charter. [ 15 ] [NAME] alleged that (a) revoking mobility rights for unvaccinated [NAME] is cruel and unusual treatment; (b) absent COVID-19, [NAME] would have every right to access and use federally regulated transportation and, therefore, leave Canada, and, (c) the government’s decision to deny [NAME] the ability to access transportation was degrading and dehumanizing and grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate in the circumstances having regard to the available scientific understanding of both the COVID-19 vaccine’s efficacy and non-pharmacological alternatives to vaccination. [ 16 ] [NAME]’ response to the motion to strike was that [NAME] had not met the high burden to be met to show that it is plain and obvious that their claims were doomed to fail.

II. The Order under Appeal [ 17 ] [NAME] dismissed [NAME]’ motion for leave to further amend their ASOC and granted the Defendant’s motion in part. By doing so, [NAME] struck the ASOC but granted [NAME] leave to amend their ASOC in accordance with the reasons delivered with the order. [ 18 ] Dealing first with [NAME] motion for leave to further amend their ASOC, [NAME] agreed with [NAME] that the proposed FASOC could be helpful to demonstrate how [NAME] could cure the defects in the ASOC even though [NAME] should not attempt to amend their pleadings while a motion to strike is pending. Despite well grounded misgivings regarding [NAME]’ manner of conducting the litigation and the apparent constant evolution of their pleading, [NAME] agreed to adjudicate [NAME]’ motion for leave to further amend their ASOC. [ 19 ] [NAME] reviewed the legal principles applicable to motions to strike as explained in R v [COMPANY] , 2011 SCC 42 [Imperial Tobacco], [COMPANY] v Babstock , 2020 SCC 19, and [NAME] v Canada , 2023 FCA 241 and [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 896. [NAME] noted that the requirements to be met for a reasonable cause of action to be disclosed are that the statement of claim must: (a) allege facts that are capable of giving rise to a cause of action; (b) disclose the nature of the action which is to be founded on those facts; and (c) indicate the relief sought, which must be of a type that the action could produce and the court has jurisdiction to grant. [NAME] also specifically noted that the Court’s approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to proceed to trial. [ 20 ] [NAME] took note that [NAME] had previously commenced an unsuccessful application to have the IMO declared unconstitutional due to their violations of [NAME]’ section 6, 7 and 15 Charter rights. A. Section 6 Charter rights [ 21 ] Turning to [NAME]’ claims that their section 6 Charter rights had been violated, [NAME] considered the specific wording of subsection 6(1) of the Charter and that it applied with respect to [NAME]. As [NAME] had not pleaded in their ASOC that they were [NAME], [NAME] held that their section 6 Charter claim was fundamentally flawed and was required to be struck. [ 22 ] [NAME] then considered whether leave to amend the deficient ASOC should be granted to [NAME] in light of the principles applicable to determining whether leave should be granted to amend a struck pleading as discussed in [NAME] v Canada , 2017 FC 786. Given the Defendant’s concession that [NAME]’ proposed FASOC asserted that Mr. [NAME] was a [NAME] at the material time, [NAME] granted [NAME] leave to amend the ASOC’s section 6 Charter claim as it relates to Mr. [NAME] only. [ 23 ] Leave was not granted to amend the ASOC with respect to Mr. [NAME], however, because the proposed FASOC pleaded only that he was a permanent resident and not a [NAME] at the material time. After considering jurisprudence argued by [NAME], [NAME] held that the plain meaning of section 6(1) of the Charter – that the mobility rights granted by section 6 of Charter are rights granted to [NAME] and not to persons who are not [NAME] – excluded permanent residents such as Mr. [NAME] with the effect that his section 6 Charter claims could not be cured by an amendment. [ 24 ] [NAME] considered [NAME]’ claim that their Charter rights had been violated by the IMO that affected rail travel. Having observed that neither of [NAME] claimed that they intended to use or in fact sought to use rail travel to leave Canada at any time despite three revisions to their pleading, [NAME] concluded [NAME] had not suffered loss or harm from the IMO that applied to rail travel. As [NAME] directly stated during the hearing of the motion that they were not advancing a claim with respect to rail travel on the basis of public interest standing, [NAME] concluded that leave to amend should be refused with respect to the claims regarding section 6 Charter rights and the interim ministerial orders applicable to transportation by rail. [ 25 ] [NAME] came to the same conclusion with respect to any alleged violation of [NAME]’ section 6 Charter rights due to the IMO applicable to maritime travel for the same reasons. Leave to amend the ASOC with respect to the claims regarding section 6 Charter rights and the IMO applicable to maritime transportation was refused. [ 26 ] [NAME] turned to consider Mr. [NAME] proposed amendment to claim that his rights pursuant to subsection 19(2) of the IRPA had been breached. [NAME] observed that subsection 19(2) of the IRPA speaks only to a permanent resident’s right to enter Canada and that Mr. [NAME] right enter Canada is not an issue in the action, either as pleaded or as proposed to be pleaded. More importantly, [NAME] also observed that even if subsection 19(2) of the IRPA applied, as had been held by the Supreme Court of Canda in The Queen (Can.) v. [NAME], 1983 CanLII 21 (SCC), at pages 225-226, that there is no nominate tort on the breach of a statutory provision, and therefore no potential cause of action to be asserted. [NAME] held that any clauses or causes of action based on the IRPA were doomed to fail. [ 27 ] [NAME] then considered [NAME]’ proposed amendment to plead and rely on Article 12 of the ICCPR to bolster their argument that subsection 6(1) of the Charter should be read to include permanent residents rather than [NAME] only, and on the basis that a breach of Article 12 of the ICCPR constitutes a stand alone cause of action. [ 28 ] After considering the language of Article 12 of the ICCPR and the jurisprudence that has considered it in connection with section 6 of the Charter ( [NAME] v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ), 2013 SCC 47; Canada v [NAME] 1(a), 2023 FCA 120; [NAME] v [NAME] and Labrador , 2020 NLSC 125, [NAME] v [NAME] and Labrador , 2023 NLCA 22 [ [NAME] ], [COMPANY] v His [NAME] the King in Right of [NAME] and Labrador , 2024 CanLII 35287), [NAME] held that the ICCPR cannot be applied to amend or override the express language of the Charter as written, specifically to extend the subsection 6(1) Charter mobility rights beyond [NAME] to also include permanent residents. [ 29 ] [NAME] further considered that Article 12 of the ICCPR preceded the Charter and, to the extent it had been adopted in Canada, was in the language of section 6 of the Charter. [NAME] reasoned that the mobility rights of permanent residents as opposed to [NAME] is not a rule of customary law or a peremptory norm. [NAME] informed [NAME] at the hearing that they had omitted including a claim for damages for the breach of their Article 12 ICCPR rights in their proposed further amendments. [NAME] nevertheless considered whether a cause of action for an alleged breach of rights under the ICCPR alone could be available. After considering Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v [NAME] , 2002 FCT 877 and that the ICCPR forms no independent part of [NAME] domestic law, [NAME] found that a breach of the ICCPR does not constitute a stand-alone cause of action. [ 30 ] To cap the section 6 Charter and mobility rights issues on the motions, [NAME] found and ordered that: a) the ASOC be struck; b) it was plain and obvious that there is no stand-alone cause of action based on the ICCPR alone and that [NAME] could not plead and rely on Article 12 of the ICCPR as a separate cause of action; c) with respect to Mr. [NAME], that; leave to amend was granted to advance a claim based on subsection 6(1) of the Charter for international air travel only; and, he could plead and rely on Article 12 of the ICCPR in association with his claims based on subsection 6(1) of the Charter , provided that any such reliance was properly particularized; and, d) with respect to Mr. [NAME], that: it was plain and obvious that Mr. [NAME] could not rely on subsection 6(1) of the Charte r; leave for Mr. [NAME] to amend his section 6 Charter claim was refused. B. Section 7 Charter rights [ 31 ] [NAME] considered [NAME]’ claim that they were forced to make a “constitutional trade-off” by being forced to decide between protecting their bodily integrity and autonomy in refusing vaccination (described as a section 7 liberty interest) and exercising their section 6 mobility rights. [ 32 ] [NAME] considered the findings made by Justice Phelan in [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2006 FC 727 at paragraphs 74 and 75 [ [NAME] ] in light of [NAME] v. Longueuil (City) , [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, that, “the section 7 right to liberty encompasses only those matters that can properly be characterized as fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence.” , and that “The ability to travel where and when one wants outside Canada does not strike at that basic value of individual dignity and independence” such that the right to leave Canada does not constitute a section 7 Charter right to liberty. [ 33 ] Having considered these statements of what is encompassed within section 7 Charter rights, [NAME] then considered the allegations made by [NAME]. [NAME] agreed with [NAME] and their observations that [NAME] were not deprived of the ability or the liberty to make a choice to accept or refuse a COVID-19 vaccine. [NAME] also agreed with [NAME] and their observations that [NAME]’ decision to refuse a COVID-19 vaccine carried consequences, and that those consequences included an inability to leave Canada by air transportation during a time. [ 34 ] Considering the foregoing, and considering the reasoning in [NAME] that the inclusion of mobility rights in section 7 of the Charter under the guise of a “liberty” right would give rise to a new constitutional standard for mobility that is not included in the Charter, [NAME] came to agree with [NAME] and their observations that the fact that [NAME] may have faced consequences in terms of their ability to travel by air by making the choice to not accept the COVID-19 vaccine does not mean that those consequences amounted to coercion or were sufficient to trigger the section 7 Charter right to liberty. [ 35 ] [NAME] therefore determined that that it was plain and obvious that section 7 of the Charter could not be expanded to include mobility rights when such rights were already provided in section 6 of the Charter. [ 36 ] [NAME] therefore struck [NAME]’ section7 Charter claims without leave to amend because there could not be cured by better drafting. C. Section 15 Charter rights [ 37 ] [NAME] accepted that vaccination status is not an enumerated ground in section 15 of the Charter and has not been recognized as an analogous ground similar to the enumerated grounds that would serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the basis of merit but on the basis of an immutable personal characteristic, or on the basis of a personal characteristic that is changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity despite attempts to do so ( [NAME] v [COMPANY], 2022 ABCA 359 at paras 62-70 [[NAME]]; [NAME], [NAME] v [COMPANY] of Applied Arts and Technology, 2022 ONSC 5111 at paras 91-95; R v [NAME] , 2023 ONCJ 51 at paras 85-89; [NAME] v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 13). [ 38 ] That being said, [NAME] found that while the chances of having vaccination status recognized as an analogous ground for the purposes of section 15 of the Charter may be remote in light of the then current jurisprudence, he was not satisfied that such an argument is bound to fail if [NAME] alleged that vaccination would constitute an unacceptable cost to their personal identity, or would tear asunder immutable or even deeply held beliefs. [ 39 ] [NAME] therefore granted [NAME] leave to amend their ASOC to add a cause of action under section 15 of the Charter that must be fully and completely particularized. D. Section 12 Charter rights [ 40 ] [NAME] then considered the section 12 Charter claims that [NAME] sought leave to advance through their proposed FASOC and found that the claim as drafted did not disclose a cause of action. [NAME] found that the proposed section 12 Charter claim as briefly pleaded in the proposed pleading and was a little more than a statement that the denial of access to federally regulated transportation amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. [ 41 ] [NAME] nevertheless argued that they had intended to assert that the [NAME] constitute cruel and unusual treatment as opposed to punishment, and that this distinction made their section 12 Charter claim viable. [ 42 ] [NAME] considered the teachings of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME] v [NAME] (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 [ [NAME] ] at page 611 that “a mere prohibition by the state on certain action, without more, cannot constitute “treatment” under s. 12” , and that, “[Ms. [NAME]] is simply subject to the edicts of the [NAME], as are all other individuals in society. The fact that, because of the personal situation in which she finds herself, a particular prohibition impacts upon her in a manner which causes her suffering does not subject her to “treatment” at the hands of the state”. [ 43 ] [NAME] reasoned that there was no state control over [NAME] that compelled them to be vaccinated or unvaccinated, and that [NAME] were not engaged in the state administrative or justice system. [NAME], observed [NAME], were subject to [NAME] that applied to everyone. [NAME] teachings, [NAME] failed to see how the [NAME] could amount to cruel and unusual treatment. [ 44 ] [NAME] considered [NAME]’ argument that their loss of the ability to travel without vaccination was the result the [NAME] and was therefore the result of active state process and operation and rejected their argument. [NAME] reasoned that all legislation can be characterized as an action of the state and that, if [NAME]’ position was correct, every legislative or administrative act of government that adds a form of restriction could therefore be subject to section 12 of the Charter . [NAME] found that [NAME]’ argument had no support in [NAME] or other jurisprudence cited and relied upon. [ 45 ] [NAME] found that [NAME]’ section 12 Charter claim has no jurisprudential root and was conceptually outside the scope of section 12 of the Charter . Given the absence of foundation, [NAME] refused to grant leave to [NAME] amend their pleading to add a cause of action pursuant to section 12 of the Charter .

III. The grounds of Appeal [ 46 ] [NAME]’ notice of motion sets out that they seek to appeal [NAME]’s order only with respect to the striking of their section 7 claim and the “dismissal” of their section 12 claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. [ 47 ] With respect to the section 7 Charter claim, [NAME] plead in their notice of motion that [NAME] erred in law by: a) failing to address [NAME]’ argument with respect to Section 7 of the Charter and instead reframing the argument to focus individually on Section 6(1) and Section 7; b) failing to consider whether forcing [NAME] to decide between competing Charter rights could, in and of itself, ever engage the section 7 liberty interest and to provide reasons if it could not; and, c) not giving their novel argument of “constitutional trade-off” the consideration it deserved in accordance with the well-established principles applicable to a motion to strike. [ 48 ] With respect to the section 12 Charter claim, [NAME] allege that [NAME]: a) erred in law or mixed fact/law by dismissing [NAME]’ Charter claim on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in [NAME] ; b) erred in law by failing to consider that “treatment” under Section 12 of the Charter does not have a judicially fixed meaning and, by failing to consider whether it could apply to [NAME]’ circumstances such that the material facts, as pleaded, could disclose a cause of action under Section 12 of the Charter ; and, c) erred in fact, or fact and law, by finding that there was no “state control” over [NAME] with respect to the [NAME] such that section 12 of the Charter would be engaged and, further and by failing to engage in an analysis as to how and whether the term “treatment” might apply to these [NAME].

IV. The Standard of Review [ 49 ] Appeals from an associate judge’s orders are to be decided on the material that was before the associate judge at the time the order under appeal was made ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 102 at para 12; [NAME] v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2021 FC 486 at para 9, citing [NAME] v Canada , 2010 FC 577 at para 8; [NAME] v [NAME] , 2018 FC 325 at para 10). [ 50 ] The Federal Court of Appeal clarified in [COMPANY] v. Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology , 2016 FCA 215 [ Hospira ], at para 64, that discretionary orders of associate judges should only be interfered with when such decisions are incorrect in law or are based on a palpable and overriding error in regard to the facts. This flows from the application of the standard of review applicable to appeals set out in [NAME] v [NAME] , 2002 SCC 33 [ [NAME] ] which the Federal Court of Appeal held in Hospira applies to appeals from orders made by associate judges. [ 51 ] Pursuant to [NAME] , at paragraph 8, “[o]n a pure question of law, the basic rule with respect to the review of a trial judge’s findings is that an appellate court is free to replace the opinion of the trial judge with its own. Thus, the standard of review on a question of law is that of correctness.” [ 52 ] Questions of mixed fact and law involve applying a legal standard to a set of facts ( Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. [COMPANY]., 1997 CanLII 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 35). F actual findings or inferences require making a conclusion of fact based on a set of facts. Both mixed fact and law and fact findings often involve drawing inferences; the difference lies in whether the inference drawn is legal or factual ( [NAME] , at para 26). [ 53 ] Judicial exercises of discretion involve applying legal standards to the facts as found and are therefore reviewed on appeal as questions of mixed fact and law that allow for a whole range of possible answers that lie along a spectrum ( [NAME] v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157, at para 73). Questions of mixed fact and law, including exercises of discretion, can be set aside only on the basis of palpable and overriding error unless an error on an extricable question of law or legal principle is present. The application of an incorrect standard, a failure to consider a required element of a legal test, or a similar error in principle, can be characterized as an error of law that is subject to the standard of correctness. Where the legal principle is not readily extricable, then the matter is one of “mixed fact and law” and is subject to a more stringent standard ( [NAME] at para 36). [ 54 ] Factual findings or inferences require making a conclusion of fact based on a set of facts are reviewable on the standard of overriding and palpable error. A palpable and overriding error is an error that is both obvious and apparent, “the effect of which is to vitiate the integrity of the reasons” ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 230 at para 5). The “palpable and overriding error” standard of review is highly deferential ( [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FC 863 at para 17). [ 55 ] In the context of an appeal under Rule 51, “a case management judge is assumed to be very familiar with the particular circumstances and issues in a proceeding” and their “decisions are afforded deference, especially on factually-suffused questions” ( [COMPANY] v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 181 at para 14; [NAME] v Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2020 FC 986 at para 67; Canada v [NAME] , 2024 FCA 176 at para 42). [ 56 ] Decisions made on motions brought under subsection 221(1) of the Rules are discretionary in nature ( [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 110 at para. 2; [NAME] v. Canada , 2017 FCA 42 at paras. 23 and 31; [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2019 FCA 28 at paras. 8-20). In order to intervene in such matters, this Court must be satisfied that [NAME] erred on a question of law or committed a palpable and overriding error on a question of fact or of mixed fact and law ( [NAME] v. Canada , 2022 FCA 190, at para 4). As instructed by the Federal Court of Appeal in [COUNSEL] v. Canada , 2016 FCA 9, at paragraphs 9 to 12 [ [NAME] ], in the absence of an error of law or legal principle, an appellate court cannot interfere with a discretionary order unless there is an obvious, serious error that undercuts its integrity and viability. This is a high test, one that the case law shows is rarely met. This is particularly true when the order on appeal is an interlocutory, discretionary order of a case management judge, based on applying legal standards to factual findings based on the evidence before them ( [NAME], at paras 9 to 12).

V. The Applicable Law on a Rule 221(1)(a) Motion to Strike [ 57 ] The law applicable to a motion to strike pursuant to Rule 221(1)(a) is well established. It was summarized by Justice Pentney in [NAME] v. [NAME], District 12, and Her [NAME] the Queen , 2019 FC 1040, as follows: [13] Rule 221(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [Rules], sets out the framework that applies to this motion: Motion to Strike Requête en radiation 221 (1) On motion, the Court may, at any time, order that a pleading, or anything contained therein, be struck out, with or without leave to amend, on the ground that it 221 (1) À tout moment, la Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner la radiation de tout ou partie d’un acte de procédure, avec ou sans autorisation de le modifier, au motif, selon le cas : (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be, a) qu’il ne révèle aucune cause d’action ou de défense valable; (b) is immaterial or redundant, b) qu’il n’est pas pertinent ou qu’il est redondant; (c) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, c) qu’il est scandaleux, frivole ou vexatoire; (d) may prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action, d) qu’il risque de nuire à l’instruction équitable de l’action ou de la retarder; (e) constitutes a departure from a previous pleading, or e) qu’il diverge d’un acte de procédure antérieur; (f) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action be dismissed or judgment entered accordingly. f) qu’il constitue autrement un abus de procédure. Elle peut aussi ordonner que l’action soit rejetée ou qu’un jugement soit enregistré en conséquence. Evidence Preuve (2) No evidence shall be heard on a motion for an order under paragraph (1)(a). (2) Aucune preuve n’est admissible dans le cadre d’une requête invoquant le motif visé à l’alinéa (1)a). [14] As noted above, the law governing a motion to strike seeks to protect the interests of the plaintiff in having his or her “day in court,” while also taking into account the important interests in avoiding burdening the parties and the court system with claims that are doomed from the outset. In order to achieve this, the courts have developed an analytical approach and a series of tests that apply in considering a motion to strike. [15] The test for a motion to strike sets a high bar for [NAME], and the onus is on the defendant to satisfy the Court that it is plain and obvious that the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action, even assuming the facts alleged in the statement of claim to be true: R v [COMPANY], 2011 SCC 42 at para 17; Hunt v [COMPANY], 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959 at p 980. Rule 221(2) reinforces this by providing that no evidence shall be heard on a motion. In view of this Rule, the further evidence submitted by the Plaintiff in his response to the motion to strike cannot be considered. [16] The facts set out in the statement of claim must be accepted as true unless they are clearly not capable of proof or amount to mere speculation. The statement of claim must be read generously, and mere drafting deficiencies or using the wrong label for a cause of action will not be grounds to strike a statement of claim, particularly when it is drafted by a self-represented party. [17] Further, the statement of claim must set out facts that support a cause of action – either a cause of action previously recognized in law, or one that the courts are prepared to consider. The mere fact that a cause of action may be novel or difficult to establish is not, in itself, a basis to strike a statement of claim. Related to this, the claim must set out facts that support each and every element of a statement of claim. [18] As explained by Justice Roy in [NAME] v Canada, 2017 FC 786 at para 17 [[NAME]], “[a] modicum of story-telling is required.” The law requires, however, a very particular type of story to be set out in a statement of claim – one which describes the events which are alleged to have harmed the plaintiff, focused only on the “material facts,” and set out in sufficient detail that the defendant (and the Court) will know what the specific allegations are based on, and that they support the specific elements of the various causes of action alleged to be the basis of the claim. [19] [ADDRESS] generally shows flexibility when a party is self-represented, but this does not exempt the party from complying with the rules set out above: [NAME] v Canada, 2014 FC 39 at para 17. The reason for this is simple – it is not fair to a defendant to have to respond to claims that are not explained in sufficient detail for them to understand what the claim is based on, or to have to deal with claims based on unsupported assumptions or speculation. Neither is it fair to the Court that will have to ensure that the hearing is done in a fair and efficient manner. A court would have difficulty ruling that a particular piece of evidence was or was not relevant, for example, if the claim is speculative or not clear. This will inevitably lead to “fishing expeditions” by a party seeking to discover the facts needed to support their claims, as well as to unmanageable trials that continue far longer than is appropriate as both sides try to deal with a vague or ever-changing set of assertions. [20] A degree of flexibility is needed to allow parties to represent themselves and to have access to the justice system; but flexibility cannot trump the ultimate demands of justice and fairness for all parties, and that is what the Rules and the principles set out in the cases seek to ensure. [ 58 ] The Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada have clarified that the word “reasonable” as used in the context of a motion to strike for a failure to plead a “reasonable cause of action” has a particular meaning . [ADDRESS] is not to engage in an assessment of the odds of a cause of action ultimately succeeding when it considers whether a “reasonable cause of action” is pleaded. The applicable test is whether a cause of action has been pleaded that is not plain and obvious to fail ( [NAME] v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 199, at paras 29 to 31; application for leave to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, [NAME] v. [NAME], et al., 2021 CanLII 49683; Hunt v. [COMPANY] ., 1990 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1990] 2 SCR 959, at page 980 [ [NAME] ]). [ 59 ] The rules of pleading and their import on a motion to strike is well canvassed by the Federal Court of Appeal in [NAME] v. Canada , 2024 FCA 43, at paragraphs 51 to 61 [ [NAME] ]. They apply on this motion and are helpful in determining whether the Defendant has met his onus of showing that the Plaintiff’s statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action pursuant to sections 7 and 12 of the Charter . [ 60 ] Rule 174 requires that a pleading contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the party relies but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proven. What constitutes a material fact or an essential element of a claim is determined in light of the cause of action pleased and the relief sought. A plaintiff must plead the constituent elements of each cause of action or legal ground pleaded in summary form but with sufficient detail. The statement of claim must tell the defendant who, when, where, how and what gave rise to its liability. This is true with respect to all claims advanced, including claims of breaches of one’s Charter rights ( [NAME] v. Canada ([NAME] , 2015 FCA 227 at paras 17 to 21 [ [NAME] ]) . Depending on the nature of the claim advanced and whether claims were a state of mind or fraud are alleged, a plaintiff may also be required to provide exacting particulars of their allegations that support the claims advanced pursuant to Rule 181. [ 61 ] Allegations of fact that are patently ridiculous, incapable of proof, based on assumptions or speculations, inconsistent with common sense, are vague generalizations, or are otherwise not supported by any other material or particular facts are not to be considered as true for the purposes of the Court’s analysis on a motion to strike. Likewise, “the bare assertion of a conclusion upon which the court is called upon to pronounce is not an allegation of a material fact” ( [COMPANY] v. Attorney General of Canada , 2024 FC 810, at paras 22 and 23). Such bare assertions may also serve as the basis upon which the court may find that a pleading is an abuse of process ( [COMPANY] v Canada Revenue Agency , 2010 FCA 184 at para 34 [ Merchant ]). [ 62 ] Pleadings that assert bald conclusions of law are not proper. A conclusion of law may be pleaded, but the material facts that give rise to such a conclusion must be pleaded elsewhere in the pleading (Rule 175). Doing otherwise may also be an abuse of process that could cause the pleading to be struck ( Merchant ).

VI. Arguments and Analysis [ 63 ] [NAME]’ arguments contained in their written representations are not limited to the grounds of appeal pleaded in their notice of motion. This is unfortunate, irregular, and is contrary to proper practice before this court on an appeal pursuant to Rule 51 of the Rules. [ 64 ] [ADDRESS] will nevertheless consider the arguments advanced by [NAME] in both their notice of motion and in their written representations. A. [NAME] applied the correct principles applicable to a motion to strike [ 65 ] [NAME] considered the law and principles applicable to a motion to strike pursuant to Rule 221(1)(a) of the Rules, as well as the law and principles applicable to the issue of granting leave to amend a struck pleading. He made no error in principle or in law in this regard. [ 66 ] Subject to the discussion below with respect to the specific arguments made by [NAME], [NAME] also did not make any reversible error requiring the Court’s intervention when he applied the principles and the law governing a motion to strike and granted leave to amend a struck pleading in the specific manner he did. [ 67 ] Finally, [NAME] acted within the scope of his discretion and in accordance with the interests of justice when he considered [NAME]’ plainly improperly advanced motion for leave to amend their pleading and considered the content of [NAME]’ proposed FASOC in connection with the motion to strike. B. The Section 7 Charter claim (1) [NAME]’ arguments [ 68 ] [NAME] argue in their written representations that [NAME] “ignored the fact that the Government attempted to coerce [NAME] into vaccination by revoking their ability to exercise their mobility rights if they did not accept the requirement established by the Ministerial Order.” They do not identify whether they consider this alleged error as an error of law, of mixed fact and law, or an error of fact. [ 69 ] They also argue that [NAME] failed to address [NAME]’ argument on the motion that whether the Government could force [NAME] into deciding between protecting one right at the expense of sacrificing a freedom, thereby creating a “constitutional trade – off” , could engage [NAME]’ Section 7 liberty interest in and of itself. [ 70 ] They argue that they specifically argued before [NAME] that he should not consider sections 6 and 7 of the Charter in isolation. (2) [NAME]’ arguments [ 71 ] [NAME] argue that [NAME] was correct in striking [NAME]’ section 7 Charter claim because they had no independent section 7 claim to advance. [NAME], they argue, was also correct in rejecting [NAME]’ “constitutional trade-off” argument and their attempt to argue for a mobility right under section 7 of the Charter . [ 72 ] [NAME] argue that, as explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME] v [NAME] (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 (CanLII), while the liberty interest contained in section 7 of the Charter protects fundamental personal choices, this is not synonymous with unconstrained freedom. [NAME] remained free to make their own decisions about vaccination and, indeed, the allegations in their pleadings confirm that they did make their own decision about vaccination—they chose not to be vaccinated. [ 73 ] [NAME] argue that the fact that [NAME] may have faced consequences in terms of their ability to travel by air does not amount to coercion and is insufficient to trigger the section 7 Charter right to liberty. They argue that [NAME] were free to make their own choice regarding vaccination, and that they exercised their right to do so. They argue that the courts have consistently held that even where a mandate necessitates individuals to choose between vaccination and something else, they are not being forced to become vaccinated ( [NAME] v Canada , 2021 FC 1443 at para 59; [NAME] v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 1341 at paras 35-36 (aff’d 2022 FCA 120), Amalgamated Transit Union, [NAME] v Toronto Transit Commission , 2021 ONSC 7658 at para 77, [NAME] v [COMPANY] , 2022 BCSC 1675 at paras 154-155). [ 74 ] [NAME] further argue that [NAME]’ fundamental allegation is that they should have a constitutional right to choose not to be vaccinated and to travel by air. While they claim this is a “unique constitutional dilemma” , this argument is merely duplicative of [NAME]’ argument with respect to section 6 mobility rights. If there is a right to travel by air, it would be found within section 6. The case law is clear that mobility rights are meant to be understood through the lens of section 6, and it would be incoherent if different constitutional standards related to mobility were found in two sections of the Charter ( [NAME] at paras 74-75, [NAME] at paras 378-383; R v [NAME] , 2016 SCC 13 at paras 39-43, comparing sections 7 and 12). (3) [NAME] did not ignore [NAME]’ arguments regarding sections 6 and 7 of the Charter , and whether they should be considered individually or together [ 75 ] [NAME] considered the interplay between sections 6 and 7 of the Charter in a manner that recognized [NAME]’ argument that neither section 6 nor section 7 should be considered in isolation one from the other. [ 76 ] [NAME] specifically considered whether sections 6 and 7 of the Charter have an effect on each other. By considering the jurisprudence applicable to the interplay between sections 6 and 7 ( Kahdr at paras 74 and 75, and [NAME] ), [NAME] opined that [NAME]’ argument against considering each section separately and instead considering the sections together was contrary to the proper interpretation of the distinct Charter rights at issue in each of the sections. [ 77 ] [NAME] made no error in law or in principle. His reasoning and his conclusion are consistent law and principle on this issue. [ 78 ] As the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in [NAME] v. [NAME] and Labrador , 2026 SCC 5 [ [NAME] 2026 ] makes clear at its paragraphs 70 to 85 regarding the correct methodology for the interpretation of the Charter and of its provisions, sections 6 and 7 of the Charter should be interpreted individually considering their text, the interests they are meant to protect and the cardinal values they embody, while considering the Charter and its objectives as a whole without rigid contextualism. [ 79 ] [NAME] 2026 was released after the hearing of this motion and well after the hearing of the original motion before [NAME]. It is obvious that [NAME] did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent teaching on the issue of Charter interpretation. Nevertheless, [NAME]’s approach and determinations were consistent with the principles of Charter interpretation discussed in Hunter v. [COMPANY]., 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 and R. v. [COMPANY] ., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC) that were reiterated and elaborated upon in [NAME] 2026 . It is only after the individual Charter rights are considered individually that one should consider their connection to other related Charter rights. [ 80 ] [NAME]’ argument that [NAME] ignored their argument is not factually supported upon a review of [NAME]’s order and reasons and must be rejected as being without factual or legal foundation. (4) [NAME] considered [NAME]’ argument with respect to their section 7 Charter right to liberty and provided reasons on the issue [ 81 ] [NAME]’ arguments before [NAME] as to their section 7 Charter right to liberty are found at paragraphs 53 to 62 of their written representations on the original motion. [NAME]’ argument begins in earnest at paragraph 58 of their written representations before [NAME]. [NAME] argued that: […] the Ministerial Orders did cocerce [sic!] [NAME] into making a constitutional trade-off which, [NAME] maintain, violated their Section 7 liberty interest. Specifically, [NAME] were forced to decide between protecting their bodily integrity and autonomy in refusing vaccination (a liberty interest protected by Section 7 of the Charter) or exercising their Section 6 mobility right – they could not achieve both. In the case of Mr. [NAME], his choice to refuse vaccination meant that he was denied his right to leave Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27 and under the ICCPR. [ 82 ] This argument was reiterated in different words at paragraphs 59, 60 and 62 of their written representations before [NAME], and in particular at paragraph 61 as follows: There was no scenario in which [NAME] could have exercised and enjoyed both of their Section 7 and their respective mobility rights. The Ministerial Orders created a direct, inescapable constitutional trade-off which should not be permissible in a free and democratic society. [ 83 ] [NAME] explicitly considered [NAME]’ arguments and provided reasons for rejecting them at paragraphs 47 to 52 of his order and reasons. [NAME] retained that [NAME] were not deprived of their ability to make a choice to accept the COVID-19 vaccine or to refuse it and that section 7 cannot be expanded to include mobility rights when such mobility rights are specifically addressed in section 6. There was therefore no independent section 7 Charter right at issue in the litigation because that right had been exercised by [NAME] without state coercion when they refused to accept a vaccine. [ 84 ] [NAME] have reworded their argument regarding their section 7 Charter claim in their notice of motion for this appeal as being whether forcing [NAME] to decide between their section 6 and section 7 Charter rights could ever engage the section 7 Charter right to liberty. There is indeed some aspect of the hypothetical based on an unproven assumption that need not be answered in [NAME]’ reformulation of their argument. Whether something might ever happen with the consequences suggested by [NAME] is best left unanswered until a properly constituted evidentiary record is placed before the Court and is ripe for consideration ( [COMPANY] v. National Energy Board , 2011 FCA 360, at paras 6 and 10; [NAME] for [NAME] v. Canada (F.C.A.), 2008 FCA 229, at paras 109 and 110). [ 85 ] [NAME] determined at paragraph 50 of his order and reasons that there are consequences arising from the exercise of one’s right to refuse COVID-19 vaccine and that the consequences arising from that choice are insufficient to trigger the section 7 Charter right to liberty. He came to this conclusion after considering the allegations made, the arguments advanced, and [NAME] and [NAME] . [ 86 ] The Supreme Court of Canada briefly referred to the deprivation of the freedom of movement and how it can infringe the liberty interest under section 7 of the Charter at paragraph 136 of [NAME] 2026. [ADDRESS] observes that neither party sought leave from this Court to make additional submissions on this issue in light of [NAME] 2026 prior to this Order being released. [ 87 ] The solitary instance of the infringement of the liberty interest under section 7 of the Charter in connection with the freedom of movement identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME] 2026 is in R. v. [NAME], 2022 SCC 38, [2022] 3 S.C.R.

52 . In [NAME], the court reiterated that a concern for the protection of individual autonomy and dignity underlay the rights in section 7 of the Charter ( [NAME] , at para 51). The court also reiterated that the liberty interest found in section 7 of the Charter protects the right to make fundamental choices free from state interference, and protects against physical restraint ranging from actual imprisonment or arrest to the use of state power to compel attendance at a particular place ( [NAME] , at para 51). [ 88 ] The issue before the court in [NAME] was whether a sexual offender’s required registration pursuant to the Sex Offender Information Registration Act , SC 2004, c 10, engaged and breached the liberty interest protected by section 7 of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada found that the section 7 liberty interest was engaged because personal information was to be collected, under threat of imprisonment, for the purpose of monitoring a person in the community and promptly identifying the person’s whereabouts in the course of a criminal investigation ( [NAME] , at paras 57). The scheme contemplated continuous state monitoring and potential imprisonment as a penalty for the failure to comply. The offender had no choice but to comply or face consequences that imperilled his freedom of movement. The legislative scheme was plainly coercive and provided for the forced loss of the freedom of movement through imprisonment. [ 89 ] [NAME]’ pleaded section 7 Charter claim is based on the allegation that having to accept the consequences of a choice to refuse a vaccine is coercive and compromised their decision-making concerning their personal autonomy. Their allegation falls well beyond any reasonable comparison to the context, scheme and consequences considered in [NAME] and are properly distinguishable. [ 90 ] While I agree with [NAME]’s reasons and conclusions on the unsustainability of the section 7 claim advanced, I observe that there is an entirely other reason to conclude that [NAME]’ section 7 claims are deficient, unsustainable, and doomed to fail based on the allegations they have pleaded. [NAME] allege in their FASOC that they did not receive a COVID-19 vaccine “due to [their] deeply held beliefs about the right to control what [they] put in their bodies” . These allegations, framed as a central one for each of [NAME] in the pleading, contradict the alleged basis of their section 7 Charter claim that they were forced or coerced to accept a vaccine as a condition of their exercise of their section 6 rights. Pleading the basis of their section 7 Charter claim in substantively contradictory ways reflects the absence of any basis for the claim they seek to advance. [NAME]’ claim in this regard is that there were consequences to the choices they freely made based on their deeply held beliefs. The existence of consequences arising from a choice made on the basis of a deeply held belief as pleaded in this case does not give rise to an arguable section 7 Charter claim. [ 91 ] [NAME] have not established that [NAME] made a reviewable error in law or in principle in determining that [NAME]’ ASOC and proposed FASOC did not disclose a reasonable cause of action with respect to their section 7 of the Charter. [NAME] argument that [NAME] did not provide reasons for his conclusions is without factual foundation. (5) [NAME] adequately considered the self-styled “constitutional trade-off” argument [ 92 ] [NAME] argued that they were forced to choose between their section 7 Charter right to refuse a medical procedure and their section 6 Charter right to travel by air outside of Canada. They frame their argument as a “constitutional trade-off” . This argument fails upon consideration of their allegations as to the reason for their reason for refusing a vaccine as discussed immediately above. It also fails under the modest scrutiny when considered in light of the rights at issue as explained by [NAME] in his order and reasons. [ 93 ] [NAME] found that Mr. [NAME], as a permanent resident, has no section 6(1) Charter mobility right to assert. As he has no section 6(1) Charter right to assert, he cannot be forced to choose between a section 7 Charter right and an inexistent section 6(1) Charter right. The constitutional trade-off argument is therefore without foundation with respect to Mr. [NAME]. [ 94 ] [NAME] found that Mr. [NAME] exercised his section 7 Charter right to refuse a COVID-19 vaccine, as discussed above, and that the consequences of that decision’s impacts on his exercise of his section 6(1) Charter right for international travel remains a live issue going forward. There was no trade-off at issue as the section 7 right was exercised by refusing a vaccine due to his deeply held beliefs. [ 95 ] [NAME] adequately considered [NAME]’ “constitution trade-off” argument with respect to Mr. [NAME] to the extent that it was required in the circumstances. Styling the argument as a “novel” argument does not correct its lack of factual or legal foundation. [ 96 ] [NAME] have not established that [NAME] erred in law or in principle in his rejection of their “constitutional trade-off” argument. C. The Section 12 Charter claims (1) [NAME]’ arguments [ 97 ] [NAME] argue that [NAME] erred in law or in mixed fact and law by dismissing [NAME]’ intended section 12 Charter claim on the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in [NAME]. In their view, [NAME] is neither analogous nor comparable to their circumstances and is factually distinguishable. [ 98 ] They also argue that [NAME] is not authoritative as to the contours of what constitutes “treatment” within the meaning of section 12 of the Charter , and that “treatment” does not have a judicially fixed meaning in any event. They argue that [NAME] erred by failing to consider whether “treatment” could apply to [NAME]’ circumstances such that the material facts, as pleaded, could disclose a cause of action under Section 12 of the Charter . [ 99 ] They further argue that [NAME] erred in fact, or in fact and in law, by not finding that there was “state control” over [NAME] by virtue of the [NAME] and the regulation of air transport, and failed to provide reasons to explain why [NAME] were not under “state control” in the context of federally regulated transportation. [ 100 ] Finally, they argue that [NAME] did not refer to any jurisprudence that interprets “state administrative” and did not explain what “state administrative” might mean in context, and failed to consider Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. [NAME], 1992 CanLII 87 (SCC) [ [NAME] ], correctly. (2) [NAME]’ arguments [ 101 ] [NAME] argue that travel restrictions do not constitute “treatment” as contemplated by section 12 of the Charter. They argue that the binding decision [NAME] explains at pages 611 and 612 that while “treatment” under section 12 could include contexts other than of a penal or quasi-penal nature, a mere prohibition by the state on certain action, without more, cannot constitute “treatment” under s. 12. [NAME] argue that [NAME]’ alleged inability to fly to the United Kingdom is, at its most generous interpretation, a prohibition by the state on a certain action when certain conditions are not met. [ 102 ] [NAME] dispute that [NAME] did not provide reasons with respect to whether [NAME] were under “state control” . They note that [NAME] provided reasons for rejecting [NAME]’ argument at paragraph 66 of his reasons. They also dispute that [NAME] did not refer to jurisprudence regarding what is meant by a “state administrative” program, because [NAME] specifically addressed this issue at paragraph 65 of his reasons. [ 103 ] [NAME] argue that [NAME] , as pleaded by [NAME], does not apply here because the basic factual background of the matter is entirely different; the factual background in [NAME] involved whether deportation, outside of the criminal context, could fall within the scope of "treatment” in section 12 of the Charter . The legal context in [NAME] was also significantly different. (3) [NAME] provided reasons, considered what might constitute “treatment” and properly rejected [NAME]’ arguments [ 104 ] [NAME] sought to assert a section 12 claim and allegations in support of it in their FASOC. The allegations are contained in 2 paragraphs in their proposed pleading. The first of the two paragraphs pleads that the consequences of refusing a vaccine, i.e., being denied access to federally regulated air transportation to leave Canada, amounted to cruel and unusual treatment. The second paragraph alleges that the conditions on air travel constituted a revocation of mobility rights for unvaccinated [NAME] and that that revocation constitutes cruel and unusual treatment. [ 105 ] As discussed above, [NAME] considered [NAME] and [NAME]’ allegations. [NAME] found that [NAME] were not under “state control” that compelled them to be vaccinated or unvaccinated. [NAME] found that [NAME] were not engaged in the state’s administrative or justice system, and were subject to orders that applied to everyone. [NAME] explained his findings in reasons that engaged with the applicable jurisprudence, specifically [NAME], and distinguished the jurisprudence relied upon by [NAME]. [ 106 ] Reasons are sufficient if they show why a decision maker decided as they did. The object of reasons is not to show how the decision maker arrived at their conclusion, but rather why they made the decision they did. What the reasons must show is the logical connection between the decision and the basis for it, without requiring the decision maker to set out every finding or conclusion in the process of arriving at their decision ( R. v. R.E.M ., 2008 SCC 51, at paras 15 to 18; [NAME] v. [NAME] , 2020 FCA 61, at paras 20 and 21; Canada v. [COMPANY] , 2012 FCA 165, at para 50). The reasons must be “read as a whole, in the context of the evidence, the issues and the arguments at trial, together with ‘an appreciation of the purposes or functions for which they are delivered” ( R. v. [NAME] , 2016 SCC 33, at para 15). [ 107 ] [NAME]’s reasons explain why [NAME] rejected [NAME]’ section 12 Charter claim. While it may be that [NAME] desired a lengthier, more detailed discussion of their section 12 claim and the alleged factual basis for it, [NAME] made no error in providing the cogent, direct, and intelligible reasons he did. [NAME]’ arguments that [NAME]’s reasons were insufficient are without factual and legal basis. [ 108 ] [NAME] did not err in law or in principle when he discussed and considered the notions of “treatment” , “state control” and “state administrative system” in connection with [NAME]’ allegations and intended section 12 claim. [NAME] was correct in his consideration of [NAME] and its many insights with respect to the meaning of section 12, when it is engaged, when it might be engaged, and when it is not engaged. [ 109 ] As noted by [NAME], [NAME] argue incorrectly that [NAME] was “rendered almost two decades after [NAME] .” [NAME] was rendered in 1992, the year prior to [NAME] being released, and was considered in [NAME]. [NAME] therefore does not circumscribe the application of [NAME]; [NAME] clarifies and comments upon [NAME]. [ 110 ] [NAME] properly considered the discussion at pages 611 and 612 of [NAME] as to what may constitute “treatment” and when one may find there to be “state control over an individual” in order for the state action in action to constitute “treatment” under section 12. [NAME] correctly considered [NAME] and its teachings that one must be within the special administrative control of the state, with an active state process in operation that involves an exercise of state of control over the individual before “treatment” within the meaning of section 12 may be found. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in [NAME] at page 612, and repeated the courts many times since, as well as relied upon by [NAME]: “[…] In the present case, the appellant is simply subject to the edicts of the [NAME], as are all other individuals in society. The fact that, because of the personal situation in which she finds herself, a particular prohibition impacts upon her in a manner which causes her suffering does not subject her to "treatment" at the hands of the state . The starving person who is prohibited by threat of criminal sanction from "stealing a mouthful of bread" is likewise not subjected to "treatment" within the meaning of s. 12 by reason of the theft provisions of the Code, nor is the heroin addict who is prohibited from possessing heroin by the provisions of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-1.”. (The court underlines) [ 111 ] [NAME]’s conclusion that there was no state control over [NAME] that compelled them to be vaccinated or unvaccinated and that section 12 of the Charter does not apply in these circumstances was correct. [NAME]’s conclusion that [NAME] were not engaged in the state administrative or justice system when they chose to not receive a vaccine despite their displeasure with the consequences of their freely made decision on their ability to engage in air travel outside of Canada was also correct. [NAME]’s conclusion that the [NAME] and their impact on [NAME] did not constitute “treatment” within the “state administrative or judicial system” was also correct. [ 112 ] [NAME]’ arguments regarding [NAME]’s consideration and disposition of their intended section 12 Charter claim fail and must be rejected.

VII. Conclusions [ 113 ] [NAME]’ motion and appeal from [NAME]’s order is therefore dismissed. [ 114 ] The parties informed the Court at the hearing of this motion and appeal that they had agreed that the unsuccessful party would pay the successful party costs of this motion fixed in the amount of $ 2,000. [NAME] shall be ordered to pay costs of [NAME] accordingly.

ORDER in T-2536-23 THIS COURT’S

ORDER is that : [NAME]’ motion and appeal is dismissed. [NAME] shall pay [NAME] their costs of this motion which are fixed pursuant to Rule 400 of the Rules at $ 2,000. “Benoit M. Duchesne” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: T-2536-23 STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME]. v. [NAME]. PLACE OF HEARING: HYBRID HEARING DATE OF HEARING: november 3, 2025 reasons aND order: [NAME], j. DATED: MAY 25, 2026 APPEARANCES : [NAME] For [NAME] [NAME] For [NAME] SOLICITORS OF RECORD : [NAME] [COMPANY], Ontario For [NAME] of Canada Toronto, Ontario For [NAME]