GLGI Donation Appeal Struck Down for Lack of Donative Intent

OUTCOME: Struck Out

Docket: 2022-551(IT)I BETWEEN: [APPELLANT] Appellant, and HIS [NAME] [NAME], Respondent . Motion determined by Written Submissions Before: The Honourable Justice David E. Graham Participants : For the Appellant: [redacted] Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] The appeals of the reassessments of the Appellant’s 2009 and 2010 taxation years are struck without leave to amend. Signed this 22nd day of May 2026. “[NAME]. [NAME]” [NAME]. Citation: 2026 TCC 94 Date: 20260522 Docket: 2022-551(IT)I BETWEEN: [NAME]. [APPELLANT], Appellant, and HIS [NAME] [NAME], Respondent.

REASONS FOR [RESPONDENT]. [ 1 ] By order dated March 19, 2026, I gave eleven taxpayers who had participated in the [NAME[NAME] (“[NAME]”) the chance to explain why their appeals should not be struck without leave to amend for abusing the Court’s process. [ 2 ] One of those taxpayers withdrew his appeal. One conceded the [NAME] portion of his appeal. One did not respond by the deadline and, as a result, I have struck his appeal without leave to amend. [ 3 ] The remaining eight taxpayers all filed written submissions. None of them satisfied me that they would be raising new facts or new arguments that could somehow overcome what I described in my Order as the donative intent problem. Similarly, none of them satisfied me that their appeal involves some other issue over which the Court has jurisdiction. They simply made the same stale arguments that have failed in this Court time and again – arguments that it would be an abuse of this Court’s process to allow to proceed. [ 4 ] I will address the specific arguments raised by the Appellant, [NAME] [APPELLANT], below. A. Donative Intent [ 5 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] argues that he is a good person who cares about others in his community and has previously made donations to various charities. [NAME] who have appeared before the Court have made the same argument. It does not work. [ 6 ] Donative intent is determined on a donation-by-donation basis. Mr. [APPELLANT]’s general character or previous charitable gifts are irrelevant to the question of whether he had donative intent in respect of his purported [NAME] donations of approximately $108,000 in 2009 and 2010 just as his lack of donative intent in [NAME] would have been irrelevant to the validity of the $10 legitimate gift that the Reply indicates the Minister allowed in 2009. [ 7 ] [NAME] frequently tell the Court that they have previously made charitable donations. What these taxpayers fail to mention is that the charities that received those donations gave them receipts for the amount of cash they donated, not an amount three to eight times greater than that. They came away from those donations poorer, not richer. [ 8 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] also makes an argument that I have a hard time imagining he actually believes. Under the scheme, Mr. [APPELLANT] purportedly received a distribution of courseware from a purported trust that he, in turn, purportedly donated. Using what appear to be figures from his 2009 tax year, he argues that he must have had donative intent because the courseware that he purportedly donated was worth more than the tax refund he received and therefore he lost money. Even if I accepted that the trust existed and that Mr. [APPELLANT] received ownership of the courseware (both things that Justice Pizzitelli found were not true in [NAME] v. The Queen [1] ), this was all part of the scheme. Comparing Mr. [APPELLANT]’s situation before entering into the program to his situation after doing so, he was richer, not poorer. He had no donative intent. [ 9 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] says that he was not approached about the program by a [NAME] promoter, but rather by a long-standing colleague. He suggests that this shows he had donative intent. I cannot see the connection between these two things. [ 10 ] In summary, Mr. [APPELLANT] has not satisfied me that his appeal raises any new facts or arguments that could overcome the donative intent issue. Other Arguments [ 11 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] raises a number of other arguments. I will address them briefly. Due Diligence [ 12 ] [NAME] commonly argue that they were duly diligent. Mr. [APPELLANT] is no different. He says that he “undertook a detailed and independent due diligence process” and “consulted with a professional accountant to review the tax implications of the arrangement” . [ 13 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] has not asserted that the reassessments were issued beyond the normal reassessment period or that he was assessed gross negligence penalties.

Accordingly, his due diligence or lack thereof in deciding to participate in [NAME] is irrelevant. Cash Portion [ 14 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] argues that he should, at least, be entitled to claim a donation for the cash that he paid. As I explained at paragraph 6 of my Order, the Federal Court of Appeal has already made it clear that this argument does not work because there is still a lack of donative intent ( [APPELLANT] v. [NAME] [2] ). Fair Market Value [ 15 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] asserts that he did independent research to determine the fair market value of the courseware that he purportedly received. He says he deserves the chance to present his position on fair market value at trial. It appears that he is actually taking the position that [NAME] vastly underestimated the value of the courseware. [ 16 ] Leaving aside the fact that Mr. [APPELLANT] would also have to prove that he actually had ownership of the courseware, the fair market value of the courseware would only be relevant if Mr. [APPELLANT] had donative intent. Since he has not satisfied me that he can overcome the donative intent problem, the fair market value of the courseware is irrelevant. [ADDRESS] [ 17 ] Mr. [APPELLANT] asserts that it would be unfair to deprive him of his day in Court but he does not explain why other than that he wants the chance to make the above arguments. He does not address the concerns I set out in my Order concerning consistency, judicial economy or finality. [ 18 ] As I stated in my Order, the fact that Mr. [APPELLANT] has not personally had a chance to make the same arguments about the same facts is far outweighed by the potential risks to the integrity of the judicial system of allowing his appeal to continue. Conclusion [ 19 ] Based on all of the foregoing, Mr. [APPELLANT]’s appeal is struck without leave to amend. Costs are awarded to the Respondent. Signed this 22nd day of May 2026. “[RESPONDENT]. [RESPONDENT]” Graham J. CITATION: 2026 TCC 94 COURT FILE NO.: 2022-551(IT)I STYLE OF CAUSE: [NAME]. [APPELLANT] v. HIS [NAME] [NAME] OF HEARING: Motion determined by Written Submissions

REASONS FOR

JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Justice David E. Graham DATE OF

JUDGMENT: May 22, 2026 PARTICIPANTS: For the Appellant: [redacted] Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] COUNSEL OF RECORD: For the Appellant: [redacted] n/a Firm: n/a For the Respondent: [redacted] Ottawa, Canada [1] 2015 TCC 244. [2] 2025 FCA 94 (lave to appeal denied 2026 CanLII 11877 (SCC)).