Tribunal Dismisses Discrimination Complaint Against an Government Agency

OUTCOME: Dismissed

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2024 CHRT 109 Date: October 11, 2024 File No.: T2467/2420 Between: [NAME_1] Complainant - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - [NAME_2] Respondent Decision Member: [NAME_3]. OVERVIEW [ 1 ] [NAME_1], the Complainant, worked for [NAME_2], the Respondent, from January 2004 until April 2017 as an interviewer employed by [NAME_4] ([NAME_4]). [NAME_1] self-identifies as a visible minority of South Asian origin. After initially working in a [NAME_5], [NAME_1] joined the [NAME_4] ([NAME_6] or ‘[NAME_4]’) in 2007 as a field interviewer. [NAME_7] was a mobile team of interviewers that conducted health interviews and surveys across Canada. [NAME_1] loved her work with [NAME_7] and things were going well when she began to report to a new Senior Interviewer (SI). [NAME_1] was then removed from the [NAME_7] and returned to her home [NAME_8] in 2016 following a decision to start using bilingual interviewers only on the [NAME_4]. [ 2 ] [NAME_1] alleges that she experienced adverse differential treatment in employment on the grounds of race, colour and national and ethnic origin and that she was treated unjustly and unfairly compared to her white colleagues, contrary to sections 7(a) and (b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act (“the Act”). In particular, [NAME_1] alleges that she was unfairly targeted with respect to the application of various policies, that she was subject to discriminatory and inappropriate behaviour by her supervisor, and that when [NAME_7] switched to a bilingual team, her removal was a pretext for discrimination. Finally, [NAME_1] alleges [NAME_2] retaliated against her for filing a human rights complaint when she was not selected in a selection process for positions in her home [NAME_8], effectively terminating her employment with [NAME_2]. [ 3 ] [NAME_2] denies the allegations and says that [NAME_1] is a frustrated employee who did not get along with her supervisor and assumed that all managerial decisions she did not like targeted her personally. It argues that interpersonal conflicts in a traveling team of colleagues who spend a lot of time together are bound to occur, but that none of these challenges had any link to discrimination or a protected characteristic under the Act. It says that running [NAME_7] involved significant planning, time and resources, and that operational decisions had to be made, including changes to the staffing structure. None of those decisions had to do with [NAME_1]’s race, colour or ethnicity. [NAME_2] also denies that the non-renewal of [NAME_1]’s term employment was orchestrated in retaliation for her human rights complaint. It says there is no evidence to support [NAME_1]’s claim that anyone involved in the selection process knew about her human rights complaint. [ 4 ] The Commission is a party to the proceedings and acts in the public interest. It did not participate at the hearing. [ 5 ] [NAME_1] is an intelligent, articulate woman who represented herself admirably throughout these proceedings. My findings do not take away from her skills and experience as an interviewer, which were recognised by her employer given the length of her employment and the evidence I heard about her performance. But on the evidence before me and the law I am bound to apply, I do not find that she has met the test for discrimination or retaliation under the Act.

II.

DECISION [ 6 ] [NAME_1]’s complaint is dismissed. She has not established that it was more likely than not that [NAME_2] subjected her to adverse differentiation at least in part due to her race, colour or national and/or ethnic origin, nor that she was retaliated against for filing a human rights complaint. [NAME_1] is not entitled to any remedy under the Act.

III. CONTEXT A. The Structure of the [NAME_4] and [NAME_7] [ 7 ] The [NAME_4] is a distinct organization responsible for carrying out the collection of [NAME_4] data for statistical programs throughout Canada. It plays a supporting role for [NAME_2] but is listed as a separate agency under Schedule V of the Financial Administration Act. [ 8 ] Within the [NAME_4], there are two levels of employees: interviewers and SIs. SIs are responsible for day-to-day supervision of other interviewers, including training, assignment of work, performance evaluation and approval of leave requests. [NAME_4] interviewers are paid on an hourly basis and have fluctuating workload levels, depending on the nature of assignments available. Collective agreements govern terms of employment for [NAME_4] interviewers. The SI reports to the Data Collection Manager (DCM), who reports to the Regional Program Manager, who ultimately reports to the Director for the [NAME_9] [NAME_8], who in turn reports to the Director General for the [COMPANY_10]. [ 9 ] [NAME_7] was launched in 2007 and aims to collect important health information about Canadians to determine relationships between disease risk factors and health status. It is an example of one of many surveys to which [NAME_4] interviewers could be assigned. [NAME_7] includes two components: 1) the collection of direct health measures by medical experts (e.g. blood tests, weight); and 2) a household [NAME_4] which collects information on how Canadians feel about their overall health. This case only relates to work performed in the second category, namely the collection of [NAME_4] responses. [ 10 ] [NAME_7] was staffed with existing, qualified [NAME_4] interviewers who would travel from one site to the next along with medical experts. [NAME_4] employees across Canada could respond to Expressions of Interest to indicate their desire to be considered for an assignment on the [NAME_7]. Over the years Expressions of Interest were solicited when additional team members were required, and criteria were adjusted to reflect the organisation’s operational needs. Accepting an assignment with [NAME_7] did not impact an interviewer’s substantive position or their existing terms of employment. B. [NAME_1]’s work with [NAME_2] from 2003 until 2007 [ 11 ] [NAME_1] was hired in December 2003 to work as a Core Field Interviewer for the [NAME_5] in Scarborough, Ontario. She was initially trained to conduct a [NAME_4] of housing spending but also worked on other assignments, sometimes taking on multiple surveys at a time. She conducted in-person interviews as well as telephone interviews and received a linguistic allowance because she could do interviews in multiple languages, including Hindi, Urdu and Arabic. [NAME_1] did not conduct any interviews in French. She enjoyed the work, received positive performance appraisals, and did not have any issues in the workplace. C. [NAME_7] project: 2007-2009 [ 12 ] [NAME_7] went live on January 2, 2007 and was managed by the Collection Planning Division ([NAME_11]) in Ottawa. [NAME_7] initially required interviewers to be bilingual and to meet the federal government language test level of “BBC”. [NAME_1] applied to be an interviewer after seeing an Expression of Interest but did not meet the language requirements. She continued working on various contracts through the [NAME_5] in Scarborough. [ 13 ] [NAME_1] joined [NAME_7] during Cycle 1 of the project in the fall of 2007 when [NAME_7] waived the language requirement. D. [NAME_1]’s grievances [ 14 ] [NAME_1] filed a number of grievances regarding issues related to this complaint. [ 15 ] On April 24, 2013, [NAME_1] grieved her removal from the [NAME_7] following a verbal dispute with her colleague in February 2013. On April 17, 2016, the Complainant grieved [NAME_2]’s decision not to renew her assignment to the [NAME_7] on the grounds that she was not bilingual. [NAME_1] grieved the Employer’s decision to not conduct a selection process and not to evaluate her language skills. She also grieved the use of what she believed was an expired and outdated qualifying list of candidates. [ 16 ] On June 10, 2016, after she filed her human rights complaint, [NAME_1] filed a grievance alleging that she had experienced adverse differential treatment based on her race due to discriminatory intent and motive on the part of the SI on the [NAME_7]. On November 14, 2016, the Complainant filed a grievance alleging adverse differential treatment and lack of work assignments. She also requested that she be granted indeterminate status. On May 30, 2017, [NAME_1] grieved the non-renewal of her term contract and requested that she be immediately reinstated.

IV. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES A. Conduct of the hearing [ 17 ] At the outset of the hearing, I proposed asking [NAME_1] open-ended questions and allowing her to provide any additional evidence that was not addressed by my questions. The parties consented to my proposal. I also told the parties to intervene at any time if they had concerns about any of my questions. They did not raise any concerns with respect to my questions during [NAME_1]’s evidence or any time during the hearing. [ 18 ] I did not require opening statements from the parties but gave them the opportunity to make a brief statement if they wished. I also asked for input about the issues in dispute and how I characterised them. I suggested that given that [NAME_1] made a number of allegations in her SOP, we structure these in three buckets: 1) allegations related to [NAME_12]; 2) allegations regarding changes to [NAME_7]; and 3) allegations of retaliation related to the 2017 hiring process. The parties agreed. [NAME_1] confirmed that she was not alleging that she was terminated on the basis of a protected ground, but rather only that filing of her human rights complaint was a factor in her contract not being renewed in 2017. [ 19 ] [NAME_1] intended to call three witnesses at the hearing, namely [NAME_13], [NAME_14] and [NAME_15], all of whom were interviewers with [NAME_7]. [NAME_15] was summonsed to appear but did not testify. [NAME_2] called five witnesses, namely [NAME_16], [NAME_17], [NAME_12], [NAME_18] and [NAME_19]. B. [NAME_15]’s request to be an interested party [ 20 ] [NAME_1] intended to call [NAME_15] as a witness at the hearing. She submitted a summary of [NAME_15]’s proposed evidence in keeping with the Tribunal’s direction to the parties to submit detailed will-say statements in advance of the hearing. Shortly before the start of this hearing, [NAME_15] contacted the Tribunal and expressed concerns about testifying. [ 21 ] When [NAME_15] appeared at the hearing, she said that [NAME_1]’s proceeding was being used to create a false narrative about [NAME_7] being converted to a bilingual programme and that there was a conflict between information being addressed in [NAME_1]’s case and another proceeding. She was prepared to read out her written statement but did not want to testify. I told [NAME_15] that the purpose of her being called as a witness was to hear her oral evidence, that [NAME_1] would ask her questions, and that [NAME_2] would have the opportunity to cross-examine her. I denied her request to speak to [NAME_2]’s legal counsel and representative. [NAME_15] later wrote to the Tribunal and said she needed to consult legal counsel as I had been dismissive of her concerns. [NAME_15] also made a request that the decision to issue her summons be reconsidered. [ 22 ] I sought submissions from the parties about how to proceed. [NAME_2] advised they would object to an adjournment request, and to the admissibility of [NAME_15]’s written statement. [NAME_1] did not want to wait for [NAME_15] to seek legal counsel, nor did she want to seek an adjournment to try and have the summons enforced and chose to proceed without [NAME_15]’s oral evidence. C. [NAME_15]’s request to be added as an interested party [ 23 ] After her brief appearance at the hearing, [NAME_15] filed a motion to be added as an interested party to the proceedings and asked for the opportunity to submit a personal impact statement because she wanted the Tribunal to know about the negative experience she had while working for [NAME_2], and that the issue is one of abuse of women in vulnerable and low-paying positions. Among other things, in her motion [NAME_15] referred to an alleged conflict related to the Respondent’s decision to transition [NAME_7] to the [NAME_5]. [ 24 ] The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to allow any interested party to intervene in regard to a complaint (section 50(1) of the Act and Rule 27(3) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure). The onus is on the interested party applicant to demonstrate how their expertise will be of assistance in the determination of the issues. Interested party status will not be granted if it does not add significantly to the legal positions of the parties representing a similar viewpoint. The Tribunal must also take into account its responsibility under s.48.9(1) of the Act to conduct proceedings expeditiously and informally in determining the extent of an interested party’s participation. Adding an interested party can be disruptive of Tribunal proceedings and is not warranted simply because the moving party is interested in the outcome of a case or has a personal interest in the proceedings. [ 25 ] The applicant for interested party status must show that: a) its expertise will be of assistance to the Tribunal; b) its involvement will add to the legal positions of the other parties; and c) the proceeding will have an impact on the moving party’s interests. Walden et al. v Attorney General of Canada , 2011 CHRT 19 at para. 23 [ Walden ]. [ 26 ] The Tribunal has held that a person or organization could be granted interested person status if they are impacted by the proceedings and could provide assistance to the Tribunal in determining the issues in dispute, and if the assistance adds a different perspective to the positions taken by the other parties , and furthers the Tribunal’s determination of the matter ( First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) , 2016 CHRT 11 at para.3). [ 27 ] [NAME_1] and [NAME_2] opposed [NAME_15]’s request. Both were concerned about the timing of this request, the delays that would result and the prejudice that would flow from [NAME_15]’s participation at this late stage in the proceeding. [NAME_2] argued that [NAME_15] does not offer any unique expertise that would enhance the Tribunal’s decision-making process. The parties also agreed that [NAME_15] could have given evidence and shared the facts outlined in her motion by testifying. [ 28 ] After hearing from the parties on the request I issued an oral ruling dismissing the request. Although I had already ruled on the motion, [NAME_15] later sent the Tribunal a communication withdrawing documents she sent to the Tribunal without legal counsel, namely her motion to be added as an interested party, her request for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s issuance of a summons, the ‘impact statement’ she submitted, and any other correspondence she sent in after July 9, 2021. [ 29 ] I did not find that granting [NAME_15] interested party status would have offered any particular expertise to the Tribunal or assisted me in my task, namely, to determine whether [NAME_2] infringed [NAME_1]’s rights under the Act and if so, the appropriate remedy for such infringement. I also found that the timing of her proposed addition as an interested party would prejudice and disrupt the rights of the parties. The Tribunal does not grant interested party status to an individual simply because they are personally interested in what is happening in the Tribunal’s proceedings. That status is not interchangeable with being a witness for one of the parties. This is [NAME_1]’s complaint and [NAME_15] could have testified if she wanted to be heard on evidence relevant to [NAME_1]’s complaint. [ 30 ] [NAME_2] objected to the admissibility of [NAME_15]’s written statement in light of the fact that they could not cross-examine the witness. After hearing from the parties on this issue, I admitted [NAME_15]’s statement, but told the parties that I would hear submissions on the weight, if any, to be given to the statement as [NAME_15]’s evidence could not be challenged. I address this below with regard to my findings specific to each allegation. D. Language of the proceeding [ 31 ] The hearing was conducted in English. [NAME_2] called one witness, [NAME_12], who testified in French. The Tribunal arranged simultaneous interpretation which was available to all participants and observers who wished to use it. E. Terminology [ 32 ] [NAME_1]’s allegations are based on race, national or ethnic origin, and/or colour. I will refer to them collectively as “protected characteristics.” I am referring to individuals in this decision who are not Caucasian as racialized. I will refer to individuals who are Caucasian as White.

V. ISSUES [ 33 ] I must determine the following issues: 1. [NAME_1] established a prima facie case of discrimination under section 7 of the Act because [NAME_2] subjected her to adverse differential treatment, at least in part due to her race, colour or national or ethnic origin? a) If yes, has [NAME_2] established a valid justification for its otherwise discriminatory actions? b) If [NAME_2] cannot establish a justification, what remedies should be awarded that flow from the discrimination? 2. [NAME_2] retaliate against [NAME_1] for filing a human rights complaint contrary to s. 14.1 of the Act by requiring her to compete for a position and ultimately not selecting her? If yes, what remedies should flow from the retaliation? VI.

REASONS AND ANALYSIS A. Legal Framework (i) Discrimination under s.7 of the Act [ 34 ] [NAME_1] alleges discrimination in relation to employment based on race, colour or national and ethnic origin, contrary to section 7 of the Act . There are two parts to proving discrimination in the employment context. [ 35 ] The complainant has the onus of proving the existence of a prima facie case. The use of the expression “ prima facie discrimination” must not be seen as a relaxation of the complainant’s obligation to satisfy the Tribunal in accordance with the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities, which they must still meet ( Québec (C.D.P.D.J) v. [COMPANY_20]., 2015 SCC 39, at para 65 [ [NAME_20] ]. [ 36 ] To establish a prima facie case, the complainant has to prove that it is more likely than not that they meet all three parts of this test: 1) they had a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Act ; 2) they experienced an adverse impact with respect to employment; and 3) the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact ( Moore v. B.C. (Education) 2012 SCC 61 , at para 33). [ 37 ] The protected characteristic does not have to be the only factor in the adverse treatment and no causal connection is required (see, for example, First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada ( for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) , 2016 CHRT 2 [ FNCFCSC ] at par. 25). [ 38 ] In determining whether discrimination occurred, the Tribunal may consider the evidence of all parties. The respondent can present evidence to refute an allegation of prima facie discrimination, put forward a defence justifying the conduct under s.15 of the Act, or do both (see [NAME_20] at paras 64, 67, 81; [NAME_21] v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2018 CHRT 23 at paras 61, 63-67). [ 39 ] If the complainant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the respondent must justify its decision or conduct based on the exemptions set out in the Act or developed by the courts ( [NAME_20] , supra , at para 37). [ 40 ] Racial stereotyping will usually be the result of subtle unconscious beliefs, biases and prejudices ( [NAME_22] v. [NAME_23] (Canada) Ltd . (2005 BCHRT 302 at para 482)). In determining whether an inference of racial discrimination is more probable than the explanation offered by the respondent, the Tribunal must be mindful of the nature of racial discrimination as it is understood today and that it will often be the product of learned attitudes and biases and often operates on an unconscious level ( [NAME_24] v. [NAME_25] , 2010 ONSC 3884 at para 75). In a case where direct evidence of discrimination is absent, “it becomes necessary ... to infer discrimination from the conduct of the individual or individuals whose conduct is at issue. ... The conduct alleged to be discriminatory must be analyzed and scrutinized in the context of the situation in which it arises” ( [NAME_26] v. [NAME_27] Company , 1988 CanLII 108 (CHRT) at pages 10-16 [ [NAME_26] ]). B. Retaliation [ 41 ] Retaliation complaints are founded on the fact that a previous human rights complaint was filed, rather than on prohibited ground of discrimination ( [NAME_28] v. [NAME_29] First [NAME_29] , 2024 CHRT 81 at para 18). To make out a case of retaliation, the Complainant must show that: a) they previously filed a human rights complaint under the Act; b) they suffered an adverse impact; c) filing the complaint was a factor in this adverse impact. ( First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada) 2015 CHRT 14, at paras 4 and 5) [ 42 ] Proof of intention to retaliate is also not necessary, and the Tribunal may rely on a complainant’s reasonable perception that the act was retaliation for filing a human rights complaint (see [NAME_30] v. [NAME_31] , 2016 FC 894 at paras 63-64). A respondent may present evidence to refute the allegation of prima facie retaliation, although their explanation must be reasonable and not a pretext.

VII. FINDINGS OF CREDIBILITY [ 43 ] Much of this case turns on my findings of fact with regard to the alleged incidents and on my assessments of credibility. In some instances, witnesses presented starkly divergent accounts of what happened, and, where it was necessary to resolve a conflict in the evidence, I have set out my reasons below. [ 44 ] In assessing credibility and reliability in this case, I have applied the traditional test set out by the [ADDRESS] of Appeal in [NAME_32] v. [NAME_33] , 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354. When making credibility findings, I have tried to determine which account of the facts in relation to each issue is “in harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable” in the circumstances. [ 45 ] I have considered the following factors in assessing whether a witness’s testimony is in “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities” : • The internal consistency or inconsistency of evidence; • The witness’s ability and/or capacity to apprehend and recollect; • The witness’s opportunity and/or inclination to tailor evidence; • The witness’s opportunity and/or inclination to embellish evidence; • The existence of corroborative and/or confirmatory evidence; • The motives of the witnesses and/or their relationship with the parties; and • The failure to call or produce material evidence. (see [NAME_34] v. Toronto Police Services Board , 2020 HRTO 574 (CanLII),at para 50, citing [NAME_35] v. [COMPANY_36] , 2009 HRTO 920 at paras 12‑14; [NAME_37] v. [COMPANY_38] ., 2009 HRTO 717 at paras 35-36). A. Issue 1: [NAME_1] established a prima facie case of discrimination under section 7 of the Act? (i) [NAME_1] qualify for protection from discrimination because she has a protected characteristic? [ 46 ] Yes. There is no dispute that [NAME_1] has a characteristic protected under the Act. The respondent did not argue that [NAME_1] does not fall with the ambit of the protections of the Act . (ii) [NAME_1] suffer an adverse impact with respect to employment? (iii) Was [NAME_1]’s race, colour or national and/or ethnic origin a factor in the adverse treatment? [ 47 ] [NAME_1] has failed to meet the requirements of the second and/or third parts of the prima facie test for all the incidents or conduct she alleges were discriminatory. In some cases, I do not find that she has established that she suffered an adverse impact or adverse differential treatment. For those incidents where [NAME_1] has satisfied this part of the test, I do not find that she established a link with a protected characteristic. I have set out my findings below under each alleged incident of discrimination in analysing the second and third parts of the test. [ 48 ] I have organised [NAME_1]’s allegations of discrimination into two broad categories. First, [NAME_1] makes several claims of adverse differential treatment while she was working with [NAME_7] and [NAME_12] was her supervisor. She alleges that [NAME_12] discriminated against racialized interviewers and gave preference to her White, Francophone colleagues. Second, [NAME_1] alleges that [NAME_7] was changed to a bilingual programme as a way to get rid of her, at least in part due to a protected characteristic. B. ALLEGATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION WHILE ON THE [NAME_7] [ 49 ] For two years [NAME_1] enjoyed what she described as a dream job. Interviewers would travel across Canada, spending six weeks at a time interviewing Canadians in person. The team dynamic was a positive one and they would socialise at the hotel, have BBQs, and spend time together on weekends, sharing meals and traveling together. The interviewers enjoyed the benefits of travel reward programs and were even permitted to use their government rental vehicles to travel outside city limits to places like Banff. According to [NAME_1] the whole dynamic changed when the team began to report to [NAME_12] who created a culture of exclusion. The team was no longer a cohesive unit. [ 50 ] Witnesses for both parties testified about a number of challenges in the group. The following examples are indicative of the nature of problems I heard about: interviewers feeling excluded because they weren’t invited to social events; the holding of a “fake goodbye dinner” ; interviewers gossiping about one another; the organization of poker games; interviewers receiving late night calls from a colleague needing to be picked up after a night of partying; interviewers who felt management was playing favourites; ‘rowdy’ behaviour and conversations about interviewers’ sex lives; interviewers claiming they did not receive new official [NAME_2] jackets; and interviewers allegedly abusing government policy on the use of rental vehicles and per diems . [ 51 ] [NAME_2] argues that interpersonal relationships were strained in the [NAME_7] as would be expected in any diverse team working under unique conditions, but that the reasons for these tensions were entirely unrelated to discrimination. [ 52 ] I agree. As set out below, I have no difficulty finding that [NAME_12] and [NAME_1] disliked each other and that the team was replete with division and unhealthy group dynamics. But I am not persuaded that these challenges or any behaviour on the part of [NAME_12] was connected to a protected characteristic. There were a number of reasons for the antipathy between [NAME_1] and [NAME_12], but the evidence does not support an inference as to a link to [NAME_1]’s race, colour or ethnicity. [ 53 ] It is not my task to make findings on general allegations of unfairness, nor to pass judgment on the professionalism or conduct of federal public servants whose salaries are paid by taxpayers and who were purportedly conducting important surveys on the health of Canadians while traveling around Canada. It is neither my t ask to judge the managerial skills of [NAME_12] or the DCM to whom she reported, or more broadly, the governance and management of [NAME_7] in the absence of a nexus with the Act. My focus is only on whether [NAME_1] experienced adverse differential treatment while working with [NAME_7] at least in part because of a protected characteristic. [ 54 ] [NAME_17] was the Assistant Chief of Health Surveys from 2011 to 2016. She managed the administration of the [NAME_7], including their per diem and travel requests. The DCM reported to [NAME_17] and [NAME_17] in turn reported to [NAME_39], the Chief of Health Surveys. [NAME_17] d escribed the traveling [NAME_6] group as a “dysfunctional family.” She was aware that there was discord and favoritism in the group and that the DCM, [NAME_40], had her clique. Some interviewers “partied” and liked to drink, and others did not. [NAME_17] testified that she had been working with the DCM to correct some of the problematic behaviour in the group. [ 55 ] I acknowledge that an individual can suffer exclusion from an employment activity or group social event at least in part because of a protected characteristic. The dynamic is further complicated by the fact that lines between the workday and interviewers’ off time were blurred because they were on the road together for weeks on end. I also acknowledge that it can be difficult to parse out culture and language from other factors involved in workplace dynamics to determine why a manager or supervisor has their “favourites.” [ 56 ] But I am not persuaded that [NAME_41]’s experiences as part of the group and the divisions among interviewers were caused by discriminatory conduct on the part of [NAME_12]. [ 57 ] [NAME_14], another interviewer on the team who had previously worked with [NAME_12], described being thrown into a “pit of snakes” when she joined the [NAME_4]. People were awful to one another. [NAME_14] described those who were not close to [NAME_12] as the “left-overs” or “rejects” , a group that included [NAME_1] and [NAME_13], as well as white interviewers. The “left-overs” were tolerated but not invited to social outings and largely consisted of people who did not like to go out drinking. [NAME_12] also acknowledged in her evidence that she had challenging relationships with [NAME_1], [NAME_15], [NAME_14] and another interviewer, [NAME_42]. [ 58 ] I also find that [NAME_1] herself contributed to these fraught dynamics and to divisions in the group. [NAME_12] testified that when she joined [NAME_7], [NAME_1] told her that she would have a hard time integrating in the team as she was French‑speaking. [NAME_14] also told [NAME_12] that [NAME_1] called [NAME_12] “White Trash” and spoke badly about the management of the team. [NAME_12] also reported the comments to the DCM because she thought [NAME_1] was having a negative impact on the morale and functioning of [NAME_7] and addressed this with [NAME_1]. According to [NAME_12], [NAME_1] denied making the comments but continued disrespecting her authority and also had conflicts with a few of the other interviewers. [ 59 ] [NAME_12] acknowledged in her evidence that [NAME_1] achieved positive response rates as an interviewer. She generally gave [NAME_1] positive performance evaluations but said that the problem was [NAME_1]’s attitude. She wrote that “she must work on her relationships with supervisors and colleagues in order to improve her role on the [NAME_7]” and that [NAME_1] “does not accept constructive criticism which makes communication very difficult.” She also testified that she received a number of complaints from [NAME_4] respondents who said they did not like [NAME_1]’s approach or found her intimidating. She also received complaints from hotel managers at some sites because hotel staff found [NAME_1]’s requests demanding. [NAME_12] testified that it was obvious [NAME_1] detested her, did not want to listen to her feedback and would refuse to admit her mistakes. [NAME_12] maintains she was the one who was mistreated by [NAME_1], starting with how she was greeted when she joined [NAME_7]. [ 60 ] Several members of the [NAME_7], including [NAME_1], filed a workplace complaint against [NAME_12] in March 2016. The complaint alleges, among other things, harassment and unfair and preferential treatment of team members. I agree with [NAME_2] that the group complaint does not substantiate [NAME_1]’s claim that [NAME_12] targeted racialized interviewers. Had discrimination been a concern on the part of [NAME_1], it would be reasonable to expect that there would be some mention of this in what is otherwise a quite detailed and extensive complaint. Yet the only mention of racial discrimination in the whole seven-page complaint relates to an incident involving [NAME_13], who alleged that [NAME_12] was racist when she accompanied her on an on interview and offered to conduct it in her place when the [NAME_4] respondent initially refused to participate. None of the other allegations in the group complaint mention discrimination or a protected characteristic. [ 61 ] [NAME_13] testified that she initially enjoyed working on [NAME_7] and traveling across Canada, but that she was subject to demeaning, belittling discriminatory treatment by [NAME_12] and that the DCM would not do or say anything to stop this behaviour. [NAME_13] said [NAME_12] created a toxic environment and she thought she was being observed more closely than others because she had a different skin colour and was not Francophone. [ 62 ] [NAME_12] testified that she believed she had a very positive relationship with [NAME_13] until she started reading the materials related to this complaint. [NAME_13] never raised any concerns with her or told her that she felt she was being treated differently compared to the rest of the team. She found [NAME_13] a hard-working interviewer and had nothing negative to say about her performance. [NAME_12] also testified that [NAME_13] had complained to her that [NAME_1] would ask her to do things for her, and that she told her that she was not [NAME_1]’s lapdog. When asked about the incident mentioned in the group complaint, [NAME_12] testified that after the [NAME_4] respondent declined to participate in the [NAME_4], she offered to conduct the interview herself as this was a technique used to try to improve response rates. She denied that this had anything to do with race and says that this was standard practice and a commonly used technique. [ 63 ] I accept [NAME_12]’s evidence about [NAME_13] and that she had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to act as she did in the observation. In her evidence about the unhealthy dynamics in the team, [NAME_12] referred to [NAME_1], [NAME_15], [NAME_14] and another interviewer she had problems with, but at no point raised [NAME_13] as a problem or as someone who impacted the group dynamics in a negative way. [NAME_13] testified that she felt mistreated by [NAME_12] because she was not White, she has not provided more than her own suspicions about what she believed [NAME_12] thought about her. Throughout her evidence describing divisions in the group, [NAME_13] did not say these tensions were due to race or colour or ethnicity, but rather mentioned linguistic tensions between Anglophones and Francophones, and the fact that some interviewers liked to socialise and go drinking, whereas others kept to themselves and preferred to focus on work. [NAME_13] also testified that she complained about [NAME_12] to [NAME_17] but did not mention race or another discriminatory ground. In my view, [NAME_13]’s evidence does not support [NAME_1]’s allegations about [NAME_12] creating divisions and problems at least in part because of discrimination. [ 64 ] In sum, I accept [NAME_2]’s submission that interpersonal issues in the [NAME_7] were distinct from discrimination. I acknowledge that there is often no direct evidence to support allegations of racial discrimination, and that I must evaluate the alleged discriminatory conduct in the context of the situation in which it arises. But in my view, [NAME_1] has not presented more than her subjective belief and speculation to support her allegations of discrimination in the team. I cannot draw an inference that race or another protected characteristic was a factor in how the [NAME_7] operated in the absence of any material facts that are capable of supporting such a claim. [NAME_1] has failed to establish a link between the group dynamics and [NAME_12]’s alleged discriminatory attitude. C. Allegations of discriminatory comments [ 65 ] [NAME_1] nor [NAME_13] testified that [NAME_12] made discriminatory comments to them or in their presence. [NAME_1] did testify that she once saw [NAME_12] making a face when describing a Black interviewer. [ 66 ] [NAME_14]’s evidence about [NAME_12] stands in stark contrast to that of [NAME_1] and [NAME_13]. According to [NAME_14], [NAME_12] made a number of discriminatory comments and displayed an openly discriminatory attitude. For example, when the [NAME_4] was in Regina, the fridge in [NAME_14]’s room broke and [NAME_12] told her she wanted nothing to do with the manager of the hotel, because “it’s that Black woman.” According to [NAME_14], [NAME_12] would openly admit that she had dislikes of certain cultures and ethnic groups. When asked if she heard [NAME_12] make discriminatory comments about [NAME_1], [NAME_14] responded that she thought she may have, but she could not pinpoint any. She said she did hear [NAME_12] make a comment that [NAME_1] and [NAME_13] were “penny pinchers” who did not waste a lot of money, that they were never well-dressed, and that is the way ‘they are’ or ‘it is in their culture’. [ 67 ] [NAME_14] also testified about an incident involving [NAME_43], another interviewer, who she allegedly heard making comments about Quebec’s “loi sur la laïcité” , and who said that “if they are not happy to follow our rules, they can go back to their countries.” According to [NAME_14], when she raised concerns about [NAME_43]’s comments to [NAME_12], she was told not to bother about the incident and that “it’s just [NAME_43], she does not understand things.” [ 68 ] At the end of her evidence, [NAME_14] testified that she felt it was her duty to speak up when she sees discrimination. She also said that you could not have an SI saying things like “I finally got my all-White bilingual dream team.” In cross-examination, [NAME_14] was asked why she did not mention this comment earlier in her evidence when explicitly asked about any discriminatory comments [NAME_12] may have made, and why it would not be the first comment that came to mind. She said she misunderstood the question and thought she was being asked about comments made about [NAME_1] or [NAME_13]. [NAME_14] also said that by the time [NAME_12] made the “dream team” comment, [NAME_1] had already left the team. [ 69 ] [NAME_12] strongly denied making any of these comments or making a face about anyone. She also denied ever having referenced her desire for an “all-White dream team” or that she had informal discussions with [NAME_14] about [NAME_1] or any other topic, except when [NAME_14] came to her to say that [NAME_1] had called [NAME_12] “White trash.” According to [NAME_12], [NAME_14] was one of the four interviewers who wanted her gone and had it in for her and she was not someone she would talk to more than necessary. [ 70 ] [NAME_12] also testified that she spoke with both [NAME_43] and [NAME_14] about the incident and that [NAME_43] had a different account of what happened. [NAME_43] said she was speaking to a friend at a table, [NAME_14] heard her say the word “Muslim” and proceeded to come over and intervene, such that the discussion got heated. [NAME_12] ultimately decided not to discipline either woman but reported the incident to her supervisor, and it ended there. [ 71 ] In the face of such divergent evidence about allegedly discriminatory comments and conduct, I prefer [NAME_12]’s. I cannot reconcile the gravity of the comments [NAME_14] said she heard, on several occasions, with the fact that she did not raise these concerns or mention them to anyone. [NAME_14]’s evidence was direct and candid, and she testified about these incidents without hesitation. But in my view, it is not in keeping with the rest of [NAME_14]’s evidence that she would simply keep quiet about such egregious comments and conduct. I have difficulty accepting that someone as articulate and engaged as [NAME_14], who, by her own account, would speak up when something was wrong or unfair or unjust, would not have raised concerns about discrimination on the part of [NAME_12]. For example, [NAME_14] did not hesitate to intervene and report [NAME_43] making allegedly discriminatory comments at a breakfast table, even though she was not a party to that conversation. She also reported the ‘White Trash” comments to [NAME_12]. She was the human rights contact person for the union and also testified that she followed up on behalf of the group complaint against [NAME_12] when the interviewers did not receive a timely response. An email confirmed this and her communication on behalf of the group of interviewers. [ 72 ] In my view, it is implausible that [NAME_14] would not have reported any of the allegedly discriminatory comments made by [NAME_12], or that word would not have gotten around to [NAME_1] or others, particularly given the amount of inter-group discussion there was about all manner of things, from preferred hotel rooms to rental vehicles to invitations to social events. I do not believe that a group of interviewers who took the time to file a seven-page single-spaced group complaint that included concerns about the availability of new navy-blue Statistic Canada jackets, would omit mention of blatantly discriminatory comments. [ 73 ] I have also considered that both [NAME_14] and [NAME_12] acknowledged that they did not like one another. To a large extent, preferring [NAME_14]’s account also means accepting that [NAME_12] would confide or share her thoughts about any number of things with [NAME_14], including what she thought about [NAME_1]. In my view, it is not credible that [NAME_12] would feel comfortable speaking with [NAME_14] in that way given the past they both acknowledged they had and their mutual disdain for one another. [NAME_14] acknowledged that she was removed from the [NAME_7] in September 2016 for having made unprofessional comments about management. It is clear that there was significant tension between [NAME_12] and [NAME_14]. [ 74 ] I found [NAME_12]’s evidence straightforward, forthright, and credible. When asked why the Complainant’s witness would say she made discriminatory comments if it were not true, [NAME_12] responded that she knows the people involved and that their accounts amount to a web of lies. She candidly said it would take nothing away from her life were [NAME_1] to be successful in this proceeding and receive a financial award, but that she believes for [NAME_1] to get a real sum of money, she needed to invent a number of allegations. [NAME_12] was open about the fact that she did not care for [NAME_1], [NAME_14] and [NAME_15], and that there were some interviewers she did not befriend or have good relationships with. I accept her evidence that she would not willingly speak to [NAME_14], share her views with her or otherwise confide in her. [ 75 ] Finally, I have considered that [NAME_17] and [NAME_16], the Regional Program Manager for the [NAME_9] [NAME_8], testified that neither [NAME_1], nor any other interviewer, brought concerns about discrimination to their attention. [NAME_16] met with the interviewers when she travelled to sites. She also attended a training as they were preparing to take over [NAME_7] at the end of 2013. The interviewers were not a group that was afraid to speak out about issues that bothered them, or that would hold back from complaining about problems they believed were occurring in the [NAME_7]. The absence of any mention of discrimination is telling and does not support a finding that [NAME_12] made those comments, as alleged by [NAME_14], nor of discrimination more broadly within the group as alleged by [NAME_1]. [ 76 ] Finally, although [NAME_1] wanted to rely on [NAME_15]’s statement, I give it no weight. [NAME_15] makes serious allegations about [NAME_12] but did not testify. The Tribunal did not hear her oral evidence, nor did the Respondent have the opportunity to test it. In addition, as the Respondent argues, [NAME_15] makes allegations about [NAME_12] that were not made in the presence of [NAME_1] and are not included in [NAME_1]’s allegations as having contributed to her experience on [NAME_7]. The written statement is of limited value in light of the allegations before me. Further, I accept [NAME_2]’s argument that putting weight on [NAME_15]’s unsworn statement, which includes allegations that [NAME_12] made explicitly discriminatory comments, without affording the Respondent the opportunity to cross-examine [NAME_15] and test that evidence and her credibility is unfair. D. Allegations of more severe discipline [ 77 ] [NAME_1] alleges that she was more harshly disciplined following an incident involving a former colleague, [NAME_44]. According to [NAME_1], [NAME_12] used the incident to have her removed from [NAME_7]. [ 78 ] In or around February 2013 at a hotel in Calgary, [NAME_44] and [NAME_1] got into a heated exchange in an elevator after breakfast. Both women were yelling and exchanged profanities. According to [NAME_12], the argument started over the topic of goat cheese. [NAME_1] disputes this and says she had a history with [NAME_44], who confronted her, wanting to know if she had complained about her to [NAME_39], the Chief of Surveys. According to [NAME_1], [NAME_44] said: “I know it’s you who complained, you are a bitch” , and [NAME_1] responded: “You are the bigger bitch.” [ 79 ] [NAME_12] and [NAME_14] testified that they heard the two women arguing in raised voices. [NAME_12] said that she heard foul language, including “you fucking bitch” and “you whore.” She reported the incident to the DCM, who told her to document what happened and send the account to [NAME_39]. The Director for the [NAME_9] [NAME_8] sent both [NAME_1] and [NAME_44] a letter advising them that their behaviour had been unprofessional. [ 80 ] Regardless of the cause of the conflict, or the specifics of the profanities uttered, there is no dispute that both [NAME_1] and [NAME_44] used foul and inappropriate language. Both received the same letter and both were removed from the [NAME_4]. There is also no dispute that [NAME_1] sent a letter to the Director in Ottawa following the incident, taking full responsibility for her part in the inappropriate behaviour, and explaining that she believed the situation resulted from an accumulation of stressful events. [ 81 ] [NAME_1] does not deny what occurred with [NAME_44] and her part in it, she alleges that management’s response to the incident shows that she was subject to more severe discipline than [NAME_44], who she says regularly engaged in inappropriate conduct like calling other interviewers and asking them to pick her up in town after a night of partying. [NAME_1] also claims the incident was just a pretext for [NAME_12] to get rid of her. [ 82 ] I do not find the evidence supports [NAME_1]’s claims of more severe discipline nor that she has established a connection to a protected characteristic. While I heard evidence from both [NAME_1] and Respondent witnesses about [NAME_44] blurring the lines of social life and acceptable professional behaviour, I do not find the discipline [NAME_1] received to be disproportionate to her conduct, even if it was the first such serious incident in her case. It was reasonable for the Director to give both women the identical letter in the circumstances, and [NAME_1]’s claims that she was treated more harshly because of a protected characteristic are speculative. [ 83 ] Further, I do not find that [NAME_12] had a role to play in determining what discipline should flow from the incident. [NAME_17] testified that [NAME_12] did not have anything to do with the disciplinary decision. Rather, [NAME_12] reported the incident to her superior and the Director for [NAME_9] [NAME_8] issued the letter and made the final decision. I accept [NAME_12]’s evidence that she had no idea what action was going to be taken and that she was surprised by how serious the consequences were, namely the removal of both women from the [NAME_4]. [ 84 ] Finally, although both [NAME_1] and [NAME_44] were removed following that cycle of the [NAME_4], [NAME_1] was allowed to return in April 2015 after a period in 2014 when [NAME_2] decided to use bilingual interviewers when the [NAME_4] moved to several consecutive bilingual sites. This weakens [NAME_1]’s claim about the discriminatory nature of the disciplinary action taken, or even about the supposed influence [NAME_12] had on her fate with the [NAME_4]. [NAME_44], on the other hand, was not brought back to the [NAME_4] and was placed elsewhere by [NAME_2]. E. Hotel room assignment [ 85 ] [NAME_1] alleges that when she arrived at the Pembroke site in January 2016, [NAME_12] deliberately assigned her a room in the basement of the hotel, whereas the other interviewers had rooms on the third floor. [NAME_1] alleges this incident is another example of [NAME_12]’s preferential treatment of White interviewers and her discriminatory conduct. [ 86 ] According to [NAME_1], she went to complain at the front desk but was told they were following [NAME_12]’s instructions not to allow room changes and that they would have to wait and speak to the DCM, [NAME_40]. [NAME_1] stayed with [NAME_13] that night because she could not travel down the stairs with heavy suitcases to her assigned basement room. According to [NAME_1], another interviewer was allowed to change her room without getting [NAME_12]’s permission to do so. [ 87 ] [NAME_12] denied having chosen the rooms, which were assigned by the hotel, and said that in nine years working with the [NAME_4], she did not get involved in selecting rooms for interviewers. She recalled that upon her arrival at the hotel, she went to inspect the room assigned to [NAME_1], which was 5 steps down the stairs from the main level. She found it clean and acceptable. The DCM had advised that [NAME_1] was not permitted to change rooms and that she would have to wait until the following morning to make any changes. According to [NAME_12], [NAME_1] refused to go to her room. She eventually learned that the hotel did agree to change [NAME_1]’s room for her though she was not sure when. Another interviewer, [NAME_45], who is White, also had a room on the basement level and did not change rooms. [ 88 ] [NAME_17] testified that generally speaking, hotel staff assigned rooms randomly. According to the administration guide, interviewers were not permitted to change rooms other than for emergencies such as a flood or other extenuating circumstances to avoid hotel staff receiving multiple requests based on personal preference such as an interviewer complaining that a colleague had a better room than they did. [NAME_17] referred to an email dated November 9, 2013, from [NAME_11] to a hotel for a reservation. Among other things, the email states that “[t]he team is aware that any issue must be brought to my or [the DCM’s] attention, and not directly to your staff.” [NAME_17] explained that this rule existed to avoid multiple requests being directed to hotel staff over [NAME_15] issues or preferences. [ 89 ] [NAME_1] has not made out a case of discrimination. Even if I accept that she suffered adverse treatment by having to spend a night in a room on the basement level of a hotel, she has provided no evidence to support a connection to a protected characteristic other than her own suspicions. A White interviewer had a room in the basement as well. [NAME_1] eventually changed rooms, and any claim that she was assigned the room by [NAME_12] is at odds with the Respondent’s evidence, which I prefer on this point. [NAME_17], [NAME_12] and [NAME_16] all testified that hotel arrangements were handled at the DCM level and above, and room assignments were made by hotel staff, which I accept. The email [NAME_17] referenced also mentioned the policy regarding room assignments. F. Allegations about travel policies, and rental vehicles [ 90 ] [NAME_1] makes several allegations that [NAME_2] applied its rules and policies regarding travel in a discriminatory way that favoured [NAME_12] her friends. Use of rental cars and personal vehicles [ 91 ] [NAME_1] alleges that the rules about the use of government vehicles were not applied in a fair and consistent way. First, she alleges that when the [NAME_4] was at the Windsor site, management prohibited interviewers from using rental vehicles beyond city limits because they suspected she and [NAME_13] were using their vehicles to travel home. Second, [NAME_1] alleges that she was unfairly prohibited from leaving her personal vehicle at the Orillia site, whereas other White interviewers were allowed to do so. [ 92 ] [NAME_13] and [NAME_14] also testified that the Windsor site was the first time they were required to provide their keys and mileage and were told they could not use their government-rented vehicles for personal use. [ 93 ] [NAME_17] testified management had been advised that some interviewers were thinking of going to Detroit while in Windsor, though she could not recall who she had heard that from or if in writing or orally. [NAME_17] explained that travel to the United States was not permitted with a government vehicle. [ 94 ] [NAME_12]’s evidence was that [NAME_14] told her that [NAME_1] was intending to take the rental car for a 12-hour trip, which she then reported to her supervisor. [NAME_39], the Chief of Health Surveys, instructed [NAME_12] to record the mileage on the team’s rental vehicles that weekend to ensure interviewers were not using rental vehicles for improper use. [NAME_12] did so for all [NAME_6] staff, including herself and the DCM. [ 95 ] These changes about the use of government rentals were added to [NAME_7] administrative guide. All interviewers received a printout of the guidelines, effective March 25, 2013. Going forward, they were only permitted to make reasonable use of government rental vehicles to buy groceries and do some personal shopping as long as this was within the city limits of the [NAME_4] site. [ 96 ] In my view, [NAME_1] has not established a prima facie case with regard to the allegations about the Windsor site, or more generally about the application of policies regarding the use of vehicles, including personal vehicles. [NAME_1] acknowledged that an email was sent to the entire team reminding them of the policy about not using rental vehicles beyond city limits. I accept that while the Windsor site may have been the first and only site where keys were taken and mileage recorded, those measures were implemented in response to concerns that interviewers were planning to travel to Detroit given its proximity to Windsor. [ 97 ] [NAME_2]’s actions in recalling the fact that interviewers were prohibited from using cars rented in the name of the Crown to travel to the United States was not only reasonable in light of concerns that this could happen but was arguably a requirement from an employer accountable for the stewardship of public funds and resources. Travel to the U.S. was clearly prohibited, and in my view, [NAME_1]’s claims that she and [NAME_13] were being targeted because of a prohibited ground are purely speculative. I accept that the employer received information that caused concern about possible travel to the United States, and it acted on it, as it should have. [ 98 ] [NAME_1] argues that I should discount [NAME_17]’s evidence because she could not remember or pinpoint what information they were given that interviewers were thinking of traveling to the United States from Windsor. She alleges that [NAME_17] fabricated evidence to mislead and shift focus away from what the real purpose of the directives were. I accept [NAME_17]’s evidence which was credible and straight-forward. [NAME_1] has made a bald allegation about [NAME_17] deliberately lying or fabricating evidence which I do not accept. [ 99 ] I also do not find that [NAME_1] has made out a prima facie case of discrimination regarding the parking of personal vehicles. While she alleges that other interviewers were allowed to park their personal cars at sites while she was not allowed to do so, I accept [NAME_17]’s evidence that no interviewers were allowed to park their personal vehicles at hotels. She provided a clear rationale for this rule, namely that hotels had asked [NAME_2] to limit the number of vehicles parked in the lot to ensure there was room for other guests. Further, three other interviewers were told that they could not keep their vehicles on site, and not just [NAME_1]. (i) Travel allowances [ 100 ] [NAME_1] alleges that another interviewer, [NAME_43], requested to work in her hometown while still being on travel status and maintaining a hotel room that [NAME_1] saw her using, in violation of the applicable travel directive and the CMHS Administration Guide. [NAME_1] alleges that [NAME_43], who is White, was allowed to break the rules, whereas she was removed from travel status when working in Toronto in early 2009. [ 101 ] [NAME_14] also testified about this alleged irregularity and said that [NAME_12] allowed [NAME_43] to stay with the group and gave her a hotel room and a vehicle, even though she was in her home community, contrary to the travel directive. [NAME_14] also said that she saw other interviewers, including [NAME_12], coming and going with rental cars on unauthorized home visits while claiming per diem on travel status. [NAME_14] reported this irregularity to the DCM at the time and another superior, eventually wrote to the Office of the Chief Statistician and filed a complaint with the Public Service Integrity Commission. [ 102 ] [NAME_16] testified that all requests for private accommodation and home visits were approved at the Assistant Director level. [NAME_12]’s evidence on this point was that [NAME_43] made the arrangement directly with the DCM at the time and that it was not her decision. [ 103 ] It is not the Tribunal’s task to determine whether [NAME_7] was properly managed, or to determine whether [NAME_43] or other interviewers acted in violation of government policy while working on [NAME_7]. [NAME_1] bears the onus of establishing that it was more likely than not that any adverse impact she experienced because of the uneven application of policy was due at least in part to a protected characteristic. She has not done so, and any such connection is speculative and is based on [NAME_1]’s subjective belief. (ii) Breakfast Receipts [ 104 ] When the [NAME_4] was at the Windsor site, interviewers were permitted to claim their breakfast expenses. [NAME_1] alleges that despite having submitted all her receipts, [NAME_12] prevented her from being reimbursed for the 25 breakfasts she had at the site. [ 105 ] [NAME_1] introduced a copy of her VISA statement in support of her position that she did indeed go to the restaurant and paid for her breakfasts. She also relies on an email dated April 18, 2013, from [NAME_12] to [NAME_39]. In the email [NAME_12] asks [NAME_39] if she wants her to go and sit at the Cora’s restaurant between 7 and 8 a.m. to see if [NAME_1] is really going to the restaurant, or “just picking up receipts of others when she goes by there.” The email goes on to suggest that [NAME_1] is eating at the hotel, while also claiming reimbursement for a month of breakfasts. [NAME_12] asks [NAME_39] whether she should “take more pictures in the morning.” [ 106 ] [NAME_12] testified that she was not involved in the decision to deny the claims but would compile the receipts and send them along with the expense claim, as was the regular process. She never took photos of [NAME_1] but had heard that other interviewers had photographed [NAME_1]’s car in the parking lot, ostensibly to show that [NAME_1] was not leaving the hotel in the morning to eat breakfast as she claimed. According to [NAME_12], [NAME_1] would watch what the other interviewers would do, and so she was getting a taste of her own medicine. [ 107 ] The Respondent relies on an email from the travel analyst to [NAME_1] dated April 30, 2013 which states as follows: “Hi [NAME_1], I didn’t hear back from you, so for now, we will process your claim without the Cora’s breakfasts but we will include the Tim Horton’s one. That way at least you will not be penalized for the rest of your claim. Have a good day!” [ 108 ] I do not find [NAME_1] has made out a prima facie case of discrimination. While she was not reimbursed for the breakfasts , she admitted at the hearing that she did not follow up or provide the credit card statements as requested by the travel analyst. I also do not accept that [NAME_12] was behind the decision not to reimburse her, even though she had been communicating with [NAME_39] about going to check on [NAME_1]. [ 109 ] [NAME_1] did not get reimbursed because she did not comply with the requirement to submit the requisite documentation, as all interviewers were required to do. The onus was on her to do so, and I do not find any connection with a protected characteristic. Her employer is responsible and accountable to taxpayers for the disbursement of public funds, and it is not discrimination to ask her to comply with the relevant policy and to submit the requisite documentation in order to be reimbursed. G. DISTRIBUTION OF WORK AND THE SWITCH TO A [NAME_6] [ 110 ] In addition to her allegations of discrimination involving [NAME_12], [NAME_1] makes several allegations of discrimination related to how work was distributed, how [NAME_7] was staffed and about [NAME_2]’s decision to move to a bilingual team. She also alleges that [NAME_12] was behind many of these decisions that impacted her. [ 111 ] [NAME_2] argues that all assignments and decisions about [NAME_7] were workload-driven and based on operational requirements. Interviewers like [NAME_1] had no guarantee of hours, and the renewal and status of term employees’ contracts was subject to the availability of work. Decisions were made by senior management and not by [NAME_12]. The duration of [NAME_7] was not set, and staffing was done on a rolling basis to reflect current needs as they arose. [ 112 ] [NAME_1] has not established that any staffing decisions, even if informed by input from [NAME_12], were discriminatory. While some witnesses agreed that [NAME_12] could have input on a decision, she did not have final authority. [NAME_1]’s claims that [NAME_12] was behind any number of staffing decisions, including overall decisions about the management of [NAME_7], are entirely based on her own suspicion. It is not even that one SI would yield the kind of influence [NAME_1] claims, particularly in a [NAME_4] that was managed either from Ottawa or within the [NAME_8], and which involved multiples layers of management and decision-making. (i) The move to a fully bilingual team [ 113 ] Between 2007 and 2016, [NAME_7] comprised both unilingual and bilingual interviewers. When the [NAME_4] moved to French-speaking sites, unilingual interviewers were sent back to their home regions and additional interviewers who had the requisite language skills were brought in to replace them. [ 114 ] [NAME_2] decided to move to a bilingual interviewer team to work on both bilingual and unilingual sites in 2015. As a result, all four unilingual interviewers, including [NAME_1], were reassigned back to their home regions. [NAME_1]’s assignment with [NAME_7] was not renewed past April 4, 2016 and she returned to Scarborough to carry out the remainder of her contract, which was further extended from April 2016 to April 2017. [ 115 ] [NAME_1] alleges that the shift to a bilingual team was a continuation of [NAME_12]’s various attempts to remove her from the [NAME_4], and that she and [NAME_13] were replaced by unilingual White interviewers. According to [NAME_1], the need for French was just used as a pretext and [NAME_2] continued to hire unilingual interviewers. [NAME_1] also takes issue with the fact that management used an existing list of bilingual interviewers to staff the positions instead of opening up a competitive process. She further alleges that she had been learning French, which her employer knew about, yet she was never offered French testing or training, whereas White interviewers were. [ 116 ] [NAME_2] submits that it made the switch to a bilingual team because it was cheaper and more efficient to do so and was in the best interests of the organisation as a whole. It submits that its operational decisions have no connection to a protected characteristic. [ 117 ] I agree. [NAME_1] may disagree with the decision to move to a bilingual team and with the way the change was announced and staffed, but her suspicions and subjective belief that these decisions were due in part to her ethnicity, race or colour are not sufficient to establish discrimination under the Act. In my view, there is no evidentiary basis to support a claim that a protected characteristic of [NAME_1] factored into the Respondent’s decisions to change the way the [NAME_4] was run. [ 118 ] [NAME_18] was the Director General for the [COMPANY_10] from 2014 to 2019 and was responsible for overseeing the regional offices of [NAME_2] where [NAME_4] data collection for the department takes place. [NAME_18] testified that in or around the middle of 2015, the Director for the [NAME_9] [NAME_8] recommended moving [NAME_7] to a fully bilingual interview team after consultation with the assistant Director and Regional Program Manager. [NAME_18] ultimately approved the decision because moving unilingual interviewers in and out of the [NAME_4] when there was a need for French-speaking interviewers required an outlay of significant time and expense. An October 2015 email exchange between [NAME_18] and [NAME_46], the Director for [NAME_9] responsible for [NAME_6], confirmed that they would be replacing the Anglophone interviewers for the April 2016 collection in Montreal and would continue with a team of fully bilingual interviewers going forward. [NAME_46] notes in that email that the affected individuals would be replaced and would not be coming back to the team. [ 119 ] [NAME_1] was not singled out in this decision, and both White and racialized interviewers were impacted. Further, while [NAME_12] was candid in her testimony about preferring a bilingual interviewer team because of the amount of work and training it involved to onboard bilingual staff each time the [NAME_4] moved to French-speaking sites, I do not accept that [NAME_12] was behind this decision or that it was a pretext to target [NAME_1] personally to get her off [NAME_7]. Simply put, this decision was well above [NAME_12]’s pay grade. [ 120 ] [NAME_1] alleges that the Respondent used an expired qualifying list of interviewers to staff the bilingual vacancies in contravention of the [NAME_4] Employee Handbook, she has not established any basis to link that decision to a protected characteristic. [NAME_2] submits that it chose to use an existing list of interviewers with the requisite language skills and that in any event, the list did not have a specific timeframe for its validity. [ 121 ] After the switch to bilingual interviewers, unilingual interviewers were occasionally assigned to [NAME_7] on a temporary basis when there was a need for specific language abilities or specialised skills. [NAME_1] alleges that the fact that she was not assigned back to [NAME_7] on a temporary basis was discriminatory and that [NAME_12] had input into the selection of the interviewers. [ 122 ] I find [NAME_1]’s claims purely speculative. [NAME_16] testified about the temporary assignments and explained that at the time there was no need to reassign [NAME_1] to [NAME_7] based on her skillset. There were a number of cases that required certain third language fluencies such as Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, and Russian, and work was given to interviewers with those language skills. [NAME_1] speaks Hindi, [NAME_7] sample did not require that language profile at that time. [ 123 ] Beyond the fact that [NAME_1] has not established a link to a protected characteristic, I also find [NAME_1]’s claims that [NAME_12] was behind the staffing decisions to be baseless. I accept [NAME_12]’s evidence that she had nothing to do with the recruitment of the new bilingual interviewers and was not involved in the [NAME_5] decision-making. (ii) French language testing and training [ 124 ] [NAME_1] also alleges that she should have been offered language testing and training far earlier on. She relies on an email dated October 27, 2015 that shows that members of senior management were aware of her French training and efforts to improve her French language skills. She alleges that preventing her from being tested and trained was part of [NAME_12]’s plan to keep her out of [NAME_7] and out of a bilingual position. [ 125 ] The Respondent submits that it was not required to offer language testing or training but that in any event, any decision not to test or offer training to [NAME_1] had no connection to a protected characteristic. [ 126 ] I agree. [NAME_1] has not supported her claims about why she was not offered language testing with anything more than her own beliefs or speculation and [NAME_2] has provided a reasonable explanation for its decision. [NAME_16] testified that language training was never considered for [NAME_1] because it was not required in the [NAME_5] where she worked which was not a designated bilingual area. [NAME_1] was eventually offered bilingual testing as a result of the settlement of a grievance she filed after [NAME_7] moved to a fully bilingual team. [NAME_1] was tested by the DCM in February 2017 and scored 72/160, well below the pass mark of 120-129/160, and therefore failed to qualify for a bilingual position. [NAME_16] spoke with [NAME_1] about the results of her evaluation and offered a re-test that could be arranged at the Toronto office at a date and time convenient to [NAME_1]. [NAME_1] never followed up to do the retest. With respect to [NAME_1]’s claim that other interviewers were offered testing whereas she was not, [NAME_16] testified that [NAME_15] was offered testing as the result of an agreement settling a grievance, but [NAME_15] did not participate and did not make a request for language training. (iii) Indeterminate status [ 127 ] [NAME_1] alleges that [NAME_2]’s decision not to make her indeterminate was discriminatory. She says she made the request on many occasions, both on her own and through her union representative and that the employer never made her indeterminate, despite her far exceeding 3 years of continuous employment and having positive performance appraisals. [ 128 ] The Respondent relies on a term extension letter dated March 29, 2016 that [NAME_1] signed and accepted from [NAME_4], which states that “nothing in this letter should be construed as an ongoing appointment, nor should you anticipate continuing employment at the expiration of this offer.” [ 129 ] [NAME_1] takes the position that she should have been able to continue with the [NAME_4] until its completion. She argues she should have been granted indeterminate status, which would have avoided the need for the yearly term assignments. [NAME_1] admitted in cross-examination that she signed several contracts and admitted that every term had to be renewed. Despite being a term employee, she takes the position that she was guaranteed employment for the duration of [NAME_7], as long as there were no performance issues. [ 130 ] At the hearing, [NAME_1] testified she knew the majority of people who had been made indeterminate, and that they are Caucasian. She did acknowledge that an interviewer who is of Asian descent was made indeterminate. [NAME_16] testified that decisions about granting of indeterminate status were made by head office. Determinations about indeterminate status were made on the basis of workloads, performance, years of service, and how decisions may affect other interviewers’ schedules. [NAME_16] also testified that two interviewers were made indeterminate in the [NAME_8], one who was White, and one racialized. When asked why [NAME_1] was not granted indeterminate status, [NAME_16] explained that it is possible that at the time [NAME_7] was managed by Ottawa, which may be the reason why she was not considered for indeterminate status for [NAME_9] [NAME_8]. [ 131 ] [NAME_1] has not supported her allegations of discrimination with evidence. As I have already set out above, this Tribunal is not a general reviewing body for government staffing and processes. While the Respondent’s process and its approvals are complex to decipher, I have not been presented with evidence to support an inference that a protected characteristic was a factor in the decision not to make [NAME_1] indeterminate. [ 132 ] The Act is not catch-all legislation to address perceived error with the way government staffing is conducted or programs are managed Even if there are lessons to be learned with the way [NAME_7] was managed, or with the conduct and professionalism of the public servants involved – the Tribunal is not a body to deal with general allegations of unfairness or injustice unless there is a connection to a protected characteristic. [NAME_1] has not established that link and all of her allegations regarding the [NAME_7], its staffing and the way interviewers were hired are dismissed. I accept the Respondent’s evidence that it made decisions to promote operational efficiency, and that while it is unfortunate that these decisions had a negative effect on [NAME_1] and other interviewers, including [NAME_12] at times, [NAME_1]’s claims that this was due to her race, colour or ethnicity are speculative. H. [NAME_2] retaliate against [NAME_1] through its 2017 selection process or by failing to continue her employment? [ 133 ] No. [NAME_1] has not established that the filing of her human rights complaint in 2016 was a factor in [NAME_2]’s decision to run a selection process in 2017, nor in its decision not to retain her for a position in Scarborough. The Respondent’s selection process was fair, objective, and did not involve individuals who were even aware of [NAME_1]’s human rights complaint. [ 134 ] [NAME_1] was offered a position in Scarborough for a term assignment from April 2016 to April 2017 after [NAME_7] moved to a bilingual team. At that time, there were four interviewers in the Scarborough office, all of whom were in term positions. In February 2017, [NAME_1] was advised that based on current and forecasted workloads in Scarborough, there was only enough work for two interviewers. [NAME_2] decided to launch a selection process to decide which interviewers to retain. [NAME_1] participated in a competition along with the three other local interviewers but was not one of the two top candidates. [ 135 ] [NAME_1] alleges that she was forced to apply and compete for a job she had already been working in since 2003. She claims she was deliberately targeted because the timing of the recruitment process coincided with the end of her term in April 2017. She alleges that she was not selected and her employment with [NAME_2] was terminated as direct retaliation for having filed a complaint with the Commission in May 2016. [ 136 ] [NAME_2]’s position is that the decision to reduce the number of interviewers in Scarborough was unrelated to [NAME_1]’s May 2016 human rights complaint and that senior management decided to reduce the number of interviewers on staff nationwide due to an overall decline in workload. [ 137 ] [NAME_16] testified that there was not enough work to sustain four interviewers in Scarborough. She referred to contemporaneous notes of her calculations and forecasts from December 2016 about the distribution of work which had informed the decision to only retain two interviewers. She explained that had [NAME_2] kept four interviewers, each individual would only have received an average of 10 hours of work per week, whereas under their collective agreement, interviewers were not eligible for benefits under 13 hours per week. Overall, it would also have cost more to retain four interviewers rather than two. I accept the Respondent’s explanation and that the decision made was based on operational requirements. [NAME_1]’s claims that she was deliberately targeted or that the number of positions was reduced because of her human rights complaint is not supported by the evidence. [ 138 ] Further, I accept that [NAME_16] was not aware of [NAME_1]’s human rights complaint when she reached the conclusion to reduce the number of interviewers, and only learned of it in 2019, a few weeks before she retired. The Director ultimately made the decision to run a competition after consulting with input from head office, human resources, the [NAME_8], and the assistant Director. [NAME_1] has not established any link between that decision-making process and her human rights complaint. [ 139 ] I also do not accept that [NAME_1]’s complaint was a factor in her not being selected at the end of the selection process. [NAME_1] and three other candidates, two of whom were racialized, participated in the competition. [NAME_16] was involved in the coordination of the staffing process but was not on the selection board. [NAME_1] was not successful because she did not score as well as the two individuals who were ultimately selected, both of whom are racialized. [ 140 ] [NAME_19] worked as a Human Resources advisor supporting staffing in the [NAME_9] [NAME_8] at the relevant time. She testified that [NAME_16] asked her to create assessment tools and a rating guide as part of a selection process that was being launched because there was not enough work in the [NAME_8] for four interviewers. [NAME_19] was on the selection board with two other individuals to conduct interviews, none of whom had previous knowledge of the candidates or the Scarborough location. In addition, the panel was not provided with any information about any of the candidates prior to the interview. After the interviews were completed, [NAME_19] sent [NAME_16] and the Assistant Director of Operations a summary of the scores for the four candidates for each of the four questions corresponding to mandatory [NAME_4] competencies. [NAME_1] scored 28 out of 40. [NAME_19] only learned about [NAME_1]’s human rights complaint when she was contacted in connection with the hearing of this complaint. [ 141 ] [NAME_1] also alleges that by requiring her to participate in a competition that may have resulted in her working with a manager she had problems with in the past, the Respondent was going against her doctor’s orders, which is also evidence of retaliation. [NAME_16] testified that the selection process would not have changed the duty to accommodate [NAME_1] if that requirement was still on file. [NAME_1] has presented no evidence to link this allegation to the filing of her human rights claim. [ 142 ] I am not persuaded that the circumstances of the 2017 hiring process were connected, even in part, to the filing of [NAME_1]’s human rights complaint. Her employer reduced the number of positions in the [NAME_8] based on workload, which it was entitled to do, and ran a selection process which the evidence shows was fair and objective. Those involved did not know [NAME_1] or have knowledge of her human rights complaint. [NAME_1] provided no evidence to counter the respondent’s evidence and to support her allegations of reprisal. She was not successful because she did not do as well as the other candidates in the competition. That is not retaliation, but rather is the nature of a competition.

VIII. CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES AND OF COUNSEL [ 143 ] Finally, I would like to commend [NAME_1] and counsel for [NAME_2] for their cooperative, respectful, and collegial approach from the very beginning of these proceedings. Human rights issues are challenging to litigate, and by their very nature touch at the heart of an individual’s dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms. [ 144 ] Parties are also required to be respectful and courteous of each other and of the Tribunal process. It is the job of the presiding member to ensure that the parties respect these rules and that the process remain fair. But decision-makers cannot do this alone, and the parties and counsel have an important role to play so that the process feels fair and accessible to all, regardless of the end result or outcome. [ 145 ] As adjudicators and decision-makers, we must often intervene and provide direction when parties or their representatives demonstrate incivility. But we do not comment often enough when all those involved in a legal proceeding are cooperative and professional, despite their differences. Counsel for the Respondent were commendable in their approach in this file. They offered to assist in preparing a joint book of documents, providing hard copies of materials to the Complainant, and responded to concerns in a proportionate and fair way at the hearing. This also made the process more efficient. They chose their battles wisely and did not make mountains out of molehills. [ 146 ] For her part, [NAME_1], a self-represented litigant, was prepared, respectful of Tribunal orders and directions and conducted herself commendably throughout the process. [NAME_1] also made reasonable and reasoned requests. All parties participated remotely during the pandemic, at a time that was difficult for so many Canadians, and as the Tribunal and myself as presiding Member attempted to balance these demands. Their approach and conduct made what was a challenging time far more bearable. [ 147 ] I thank both parties and counsel for their collegiality and patience with the Tribunal in these matters. Signed by [NAME_3] Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario October 11, 2024 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record Tribunal File: T2467/2420 Style of Cause: [NAME_1] v. [NAME_2] of the Tribunal Dated: October 11, 2024 Date and Place of Hearing: Videoconference July 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 2021 Appearances: [NAME_1] , for herself No one appearing , for the Canadian Human Rights Commission [NAME_47] , [NAME_48] and [NAME_49], for the Respondent