Employment Tribunal Rules in Favour of Claimant Over Unpaid Wages

OUTCOME: Allowed

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Case Number: 1308762/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Birmingham (hybrid)

On: 2-4 March 2026

Before:

Employment Judge Edmonds

Representation Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] reasons having been requested in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, the following reasons are provided:

REASONS

Introduction

1. The claimant is an [NAME] who came to the UK under a certificate of sponsorship which named the respondent as his employer. He says that he had been made an offer of employment, which he had accepted, and he came to the UK ready, able and willing to complete that role. He says that the respondent never provided him with work to do and never paid him and claims that this amounted to an unauthorised deduction from wages, amongst other things.

2. ACAS early conciliation commenced on 1 December 2023, and ended on 2023, with the claim form being presented to the Tribunal on 18 December 2023.

Claims and Issues

3. The relevant complaints had been determined at a Preliminary Hearing on 29 January 2025 (page 43) (“the Preliminary Hearing”). They were as follows:

1. Employment status

1.1. Was the claimant an employee of the respondent within the

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meaning of section 230 Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) and, if so what were the dates of employment?

2. Time limits

2.1. Given the date the claim form was presented and the dates of early conciliation, any complaint about something that happened before 01 September 2023 may not have been brought in time.

2.2. Were the claims made within the time limit in the ERA 1996? The Tribunal will decide:

2.2.1. Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act complained of? 2.2.2. If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit? 2.2.3. If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period?

3. Holiday Pay (Working Time Regulations 1998)

3.1. Did the respondent fail to pay the claimant for annual leave the claimant had accrued but not taken when their employment ended? 3.2. What was the claimant’s leave year? 3.3. How much of the leave year had passed when the claimant’s employment ended? 3.4. How much leave had accrued for the year by that date? 3.5. How much paid leave had the claimant taken in the year? 3.6. Were any days carried over from previous holiday years? 3.7. How many days remain unpaid? 3.8. What is the relevant daily rate of pay?

4. Unauthorised deductions

4.1. Was the claimant “ready, willing and able” to perform his duties for the respondent as established in Petrie v McFisheries Limited [1940] 1KB 258?

4.1.1. Was the claimant’s inability to work due to the external and involuntary factor of the respondents withholding work assignments? 4.1.2. Did the respondents offer any reasonable accommodation or alternative duties that the claimant could have performed, and did the claimant show willingness to engage in these?

4.2. Did the respondent make unauthorised deductions from the claimant’s wages and if so how much was deducted? 4.3. Were the wages paid to the claimant between 10 April 2023

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to 21 April 2024 less than the wages they should have been paid? 4.4. Was any deduction required or authorised by statute? 4.5. Was any deduction required or authorised by a written term of the contract? 4.6. Did the claimant have a copy of the contract or written notice of the contract term before the deduction was made? 4.7. Did the claimant agree in writing to the deduction before it was made? 4.8. How much is the claimant owed?

5. Unlawful Payments to Employer

5.1. Did the claimant have the right under section 15 Employment Rights Act 1996 not to have to make payments to the respondent? 5.2. Did the claimant make a payment to the respondent through [NAME] (“[NAME]”) in order to be interviewed by the respondent? 5.3. Did the claimant make payments to the respondent through [NAME] (“[NAME]”) for the claimant’s Certificate of Sponsorship to be released to the claimant? 5.4. Was the respondent in breach of section 15 EAR by receiving payments from the claimant through [NAME]? If so: 5.4.1. What amounts did the claimant pay the respondent? 5.4.2. What is the amount of recoverable payments to which the claimant is entitled?

6. Itemised Pay Statements

6.1. Did the respondent provide the claimant with itemised pay statement(s) in accordance with section 8(1) ERA 1996? 6.2. If the respondent failed to provide the claimant with itemized pay statement(s), should the Employment Tribunal make a declaration to that effect?

7. Remedy

7.1. How much should the claimant be awarded and is the claimant entitled to interest for delayed receipt in accordance with section 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and Section 69 of the County Courts Act 1984? 7.2. If the Tribunal has made a declaration under section 23(1)(b) ERA 1996 should the respondent compensate the claimant for any financial loss sustained in accordance with section 24(2) ERA 1996? 7.3. Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply? 7.4. Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it? 7.5. Is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?

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7.6. By what proportion, up to 25%? 7.7. When these proceedings were begun, was the respondent in breach of its duty to give the claimant a written statement of employment particulars or of a change to those particulars? 7.8. If the claim succeeds, are there exceptional circumstances that would make it unjust or inequitable to make the minimum award of two weeks’ pay under section 38 of the Employment Act 2002? If not, the Tribunal must award two weeks’ pay and may award four weeks’ pay. 7.9. Would it be just and equitable to award four weeks’ pay?

4. During the course of the hearing, the claimant withdrew the complaint about unlawful payments to the employer (issue 5 above) because, not being able to give oral evidence (see below about this), the claimant considered that he would be unable to prove his case on the balance of probabilities in respect of this matter. I dismissed that complaint on withdrawal.

5. One further matter to reference in relation to the [NAME] is that, whilst holiday pay appeared in the [NAME], on reading the papers I identified that this complaint had been the subject of a previous amendment application which was then withdrawn. Unfortunately neither representative before me were at the Preliminary Hearing and therefore it was not possible to ascertain exactly how something that had been subject to a withdrawn amendment application had been included in the [NAME]. We agreed to address the issue once I had read the papers more fully and each party had time to reflect on the matter. Having done so the respondent’s representative confirmed that the [NAME] had been previously agreed by the respondent and they were comfortable for the [NAME] to remain as it was drafted at the Preliminary Hearing. Therefore, I decided that, to the extent that any amendment was required, it had been granted by implication at the Preliminary Hearing through its inclusion in the [NAME].

Procedure, Documents and Evidence Heard

Withdrawal of claim against [NAME] respondent

6. At the Preliminary Hearing it had been recorded that the claimant had withdrawn his claims against the [NAME] respondent, Mrs [RESPONDENT], however it did not appear that any Judgment formally dismissing that claim had been sent to the parties. I therefore agreed to include that within my Judgment, which I did.

Documents

7. I was provided with a file of 390 pages (although not until the morning of the hearing, due to a delay on the respondent’s representative’s part, for which he apologised): references in these Reasons to a page are to the relevant page of that file.

8. Prior to the hearing, the claimant had written to the respondent on 29 October 2025, requesting disclosure of documentation relating to (a) the withdrawal of an offer of employment to the claimant, and (b) evidence of an

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induction meeting and the claimant being invited to that meeting. This arose from comments made in Mrs [NAME] witness statement. Ultimately, a purported letter withdrawing an offer of employment was provided to the respondent on 23 February 2026 (see below for my findings in relation to this document), leading to the claimant requesting proof of postage in relation to that document and proof of the withdrawal of the claimant’s sponsorship. The respondent said that there was no such proof of postage as it was sent first class post, and no proof of the withdrawal of sponsorship. In relation to the induction matter the respondent referred to an email chain in the file which the claimant did not accept was what had been requested but agreed that as the respondent said there were no other documents, it was a matter for cross examination. There was therefore no specific disclosure issue for me to address.

Evidence from abroad

9. I was provided with witness statements from the claimant and from Mrs [APPELLANT] on behalf of the respondent. Mrs [RESPONDENT] attended the hearing in person to give her evidence, however the claimant has moved back to India and dialled in remotely from India (with the Tribunal’s permission). India has not granted permission to individuals to give evidence by video from India in Tribunal proceedings on a blanket basis, and instead requests can be considered on a case by case basis according to the information set out on the FCDO site “Taking and giving evidence by video link from abroad in UK court cases and Tribunals”.

10. The claimant’s representative had applied to the [NAME] in London for permission to give evidence in these proceedings on 29 October 2025. Unfortunately, despite chasing the matter and seeking to use personal contacts of the representatives to secure a response, no response had been forthcoming before this hearing and I was provided with a witness statement from the claimant’s representative, [COUNSEL], setting out the actions she had taken. Therefore, I did not permit the claimant to give evidence remotely (and nor in fairness to the claimant was there any suggestion from him that I should). The parties each made submissions to me about the weight that I should attach to the claimant’s written witness statement, and I address that below. In addition, in light of his inability to give evidence from abroad, the claimant withdrew issue 5 set out above on the [NAME] day of the hearing.

11. Ultimately, the hearing proceeded with Mrs [COUNSEL] and the respondent’s representative attending in person, but the claimant and his representative both attending by video at their request (in the claimant’s case, because he was abroad, and in the representative’s case, because he was acting on a pro bono basis and not located in Birmingham, therefore the Tribunal agreed that he could attend remotely).

Weight to attach to oral witness evidence

12. I heard oral evidence from Mrs [NAME] and had a written witness statement from her however, as explained above, had only a written witness statement from the claimant. This was however, signed, dated and accompanied by a statement of truth. I had to consider how much weight to

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attach to the evidence, given the claimant’s inability to give oral evidence. The claimant said that his evidence should nevertheless be given weight by the Tribunal, the respondent said that it should not.

13. The statement itself remained admissible however I had to determine how much weight to attach to it. I was directed to section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 by the claimant’s representative which provides as follows, and which applies to civil proceedings before any tribunal in relation to which the strict rules of evidence apply:

Section 4 — Considerations relevant to weighing of hearsay evidence

(1) In estimating the weight (if any) to be given to hearsay evidence in civil proceedings the court shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the reliability or otherwise of the evidence. (2) Regard may be had, in particular, to the following— (a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original statement as a witness; (b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the matters stated; (c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay; (d) whether any [NAME] had any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters; (e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in collaboration with another or for a particular purpose; (f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight.

14. Whilst I do think that the claimant’s application for permission could perhaps have been made earlier than October 2025, I do recognise that it was [NAME] made a number of months before the hearing and in these circumstances it was not reasonable or practicable for the claimant to have given oral evidence. I also however recognise that the statement was prepared in September 2025, some time after the events and therefore is not contemporaneous. It does not however involve multiple hearsay.

15. As to whether there was any motive to conceal or misrepresent matters or whether the circumstances are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight, I find that the claimant was ready and willing to give evidence, and it is the lack of permission that prevents him from doing so. There is no attempt to conceal anything: to the contrary, he has withdrawn part of his claim in acceptance of the fact that without his oral evidence his prospects on that aspect were materially weaker than they otherwise would have been.

16. I also note, as will be apparent from my findings of fact, that much of what the claimant says is supported by contemporaneous documents. Therefore,

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in respect of those aspects, the claimant's witness statement is not prepared in isolation but can be read in that context and the contents verified through the documents themselves.

17. There are however some aspects which are not covered by documents, for example evidence about phone calls. These matters are matters upon which both the respondent's representative and I would have wanted to clarify certain points with the claimant and hear his evidence under oath about them. I do find that the respondent would certainly be prejudiced were the contents of those aspects of the statement to be accepted by the Tribunal without it having had the ability to do so.

18. Overall, I decided that the claimant's witness statement is admissible and that, in respect of those sections which cross refer to documentation, can be given substantial weight. However, in respect of those elements which do not cross refer to documents, particularly given the absence of cross examination and the fact that the statement was not prepared contemporaneously, whilst it is not discounted entirely in that it provides some form of chronology to matters, I do attach little weight to what the claimant says was the precise content of, for example, phone calls.

19. It is however also relevant to comment on the respondent’s oral evidence. Turning to the respondent's evidence, I heard evidence from Mrs [RESPONDENT] alone on behalf of the respondent. I make the following observations:

a. In respect of some matters, particularly in relation to phone calls and what she says that other employees of the respondent did in relation to progressing the claimant's application for employment, she was not party to those matters and from her evidence appears to be relying on what she says she thinks or believes happened, not what she actually knows. At best, it is hearsay evidence based on what the third party might have told her, but in many cases it appears that she does not even have any information from the third party (with both [NAME[NAME] (known as "[RESPONDENT]") and [RESPONDENT] [NAME] having left the respondent's employment some time ago). In addition, some of her evidence related to matters regarding Mr [RESPONDENT], [NAME] Manager, who [NAME] works for the respondent but who did not give evidence in these proceedings. Mrs [APPELLANT] herself never spoke to the claimant as far as I can tell other than one small email exchange. Therefore, whilst I lack oral evidence from the claimant about these matters, I equally lack oral evidence from the respondent on these matters. Here, I am not persuaded that it would not have been reasonable and practicable for those individuals to have given evidence: whilst two of them have left the respondent's employment, no attempts have been made to contact them to ask them to give evidence on behalf of the respondent in these proceedings.

b. As to what Mrs [RESPONDENT] has said she thinks would have been discussed in those phone calls, this is not only hearsay evidence but from the evidence I heard, I do not find that she actually had any information from the relevant individuals about what was discussed. I therefore attach no weight to what she has said about

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those things.

20. Therefore, in relation to matters about which there is no documentary evidence, I attach no weight to the claimant's written statement save for understanding the chronology of events, but equally attach no weight to what Mrs [NAME] has said about these matters either.

21. More generally in relation to Mrs [NAME] oral evidence, in addition to the point I have outlined about the reliability of her evidence on third party discussions with the claimant and third party actions, I also find that her evidence was at times inconsistent. I draw attention to certain examples of this in my findings of fact below. One particular example is in relation to the letter which appears at page 379 of the file where I have found that the document was not prepared on the date asserted by her and that the information she has put forward in evidence about it quite simply cannot be correct and contradicts itself. She also on occasion refused to accept the plain interpretation of the words contained within emails in the file, for example the email chain from August 2023 between the claimant and [APPELLANT] [NAME] (to which I again turn below).

22. I find generally that she answered the questions which were put to her in a way that she believed would best advance the respondent's case, rather than focussing on the precise question being asked of her.

For these reasons, I have decided that where there is a conflict between the documentary evidence and the evidence of Mrs [NAME], to prefer the documentary evidence and to prefer the ordinary reasonable interpretation that can be deduced from that documentary evidence, rather than the interpretation that Mrs [NAME] on occasion submitted that I should make.

Other matters

23. At the start of the [NAME] day of the hearing, the respondent’s representative requested that the hearing start late so that he could attend to a private matter relating to the case. I agreed, no objection having been raised by the claimant and the hearing ultimately started at 10.50am.

24. We had agreed that I would issue judgment first in respect of liability, and that remedy would be addressed thereafter (but within the three day hearing window). Having issued oral judgment, the parties’ representatives helpfully worked collaboratively together to seek to agree the sums owed as far as possible, as indicated in the Conclusions section below. Mrs [NAME] declined to attend the remedy section of the hearing, citing her mental health following her attendance at the first two days of the hearing.

Facts

The job offer

25. The claimant is an [NAME]. The circumstances of how the claimant came to be in contact with the respondent initially are not entirely clear: it is clear from the documents (e.g. pages 63, 66 and 67, 69, 70 and 71) that the claimant was in touch with individuals to whom he appears to have transferred some money (which he says was in order to secure a role in the

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healthcare sector in the UK and various associated costs). However, given the withdrawal of the allegations relating to the payment of money to those individuals, I do not need to make findings on exactly what happened.

26. What is clear is that the claimant had a [NAME] video interview with [APPELLANT[NAME], a trainee manager at the respondent at the time. On balance of probabilities I find that this took place on 9 February 2026, based on a [NAME] conversation of the same date (page 319), in which the claimant said "Its me [NAME] [APPELLANT]" which suggested prior contact between them and in which he provided his email address. It is accepted by the respondent that the claimant was "successful at the interview".

27. Another reason why I find that the interview was on 9 February 2023 is because I have seen the Certificate of Sponsorship for the claimant (page 64) which says that it was assigned on that date, along with evidence that a copy was sent to the claimant on that date (page 304) although it is not clear who the person was that sent it to him. This certificate has an expiry date of 10 May 2023, included the claimant's name and various details about him, and said that his work start date would be 27 February 2023 with his weekly hours of work being 40 hours per week, and gross salary of £22,880 per annum. The work address quoted was the respondent's [NAME] office at that time.

28. The respondent accepts that this certificate of sponsorship was obtained by it but Mrs [NAME] suggested in oral evidence the following:

a. That she thinks that they are not applied for on an individual basis and the employee's details would be inserted when the certificate of sponsorship was allocated at a later date; and

b. That the employment start date was potentially added by the authorities and not by the respondent themselves, and therefore it is not representative of the actual start date.

29. Mrs [COUNSEL] did not herself complete the certificate of sponsorship forms for the respondent, that was Mr [RESPONDENT] and therefore the points I have raised about her evidence of third party matters apply here. I have been provided with a link to government guidance called "Defined certificate of sponsorship: SMS manual 12". From this it is clear that it is the employer who fills in the box for start date, end date, job title, job type and salary amongst other matters. I find that this was a specific certificate of sponsorship for a specific role, which was due to commence on 27 February 2023 on the basis of 40 hours per week.

30. The next communication between [APPELLANT[NAME] and the claimant was not until 28 March 2023. There was no formal offer of employment emailed or sent to him in writing, and there is no record of what offer was made to him. The respondent's position is that the offer was subject to various things, namely the provision of relevant documents, an in-person registration, conducting all online training and attending an in-person induction meeting.

31. In the absence of any formal contract or offer letter, and with no oral evidence from either [NAME] in the job interview, I must decide on

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balance of probabilities what I think was the basis of the offer made to the claimant. The only contemporaneous documentation that we have on this point is the certificate of sponsorship itself. This was prepared on the day of the interview and clearly stated the start date to be 27 February 2023 based on 40 hours per week. On the balance of probabilities I find that this was the basis of the offer.

32. As to whether it was made subject to the conditions which the respondent relies on, I find on balance of probabilities that if there were those pre- conditions to the employment, these would have been made clear to the claimant through [NAME] or through email (noting that the claimant provided his email address to Ms [APPELLANT] on 9 February 2023), which it was not. I do however find that the claimant having the correct visa was understood by them to be a pre-requisite for employment, given that the next [NAME] message between them was on 28 March 2023 (page 319), when the claimant informed Ms [APPELLANT] that he had received his visa the previous day. Had that not been a pre-requisite, I consider on balance of probabilities that he would have been contacting them to ask why his work could not start on 27 February 2023. It is clear that from the claimant's perspective, he had understood that his work could not commence without that visa. I also find that by implication if nothing else, the claimant being present in the UK and in commutable distance from [NAME] work was another pre-condition of employment which the claimant clearly understood to be the case from the context of their various discussions.

33. In relation to the conditions which the respondent relies on I would also comment as follows:

a. Provision of relevant documents. I can see that the claimant did provide copies of various documents to a person named [NAME] (page 68, 70, 71) on 11, 14 and 15 February 2023. It is not however clear whether those were for the purposes of this role or for his visa application and there is a dispute about who [RESPONDENT] was and whether he [NAME] the respondent. More generally, there is nothing wrong with an employer requiring the provision of documents (in fact the respondent is right that it must do so) however I heard no evidence as to why this could not be electronic and then supplemented with physical copies on the first day of employment.

b. Attending an in-person registration. This is something that could happen on the first day of employment and in the absence of any documentation suggesting that this was a pre-condition, I find on balance of probabilities that it was not.

c. Conducting all relevant online training. The respondent's position is that employment could not start until the employee had completed relevant training, which it says the claimant had not. However, the respondent's licence to issue certificates of sponsorship was ultimately revoked in 2024, in part precisely because the respondent did not pay its workers until that training had been completed. The letter suspending the respondent's licence (page 201, at 205-206) clearly set out that the salary paid to workers must be reflective of that on the certificate of sponsorship and that

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training time forms part of working time. This quite clearly reflects the legal position. The fact that the respondent continued to argue that completing online training could legitimately be a pre-condition of carrying out work for the respondent is surprising to say the least. I find that any time spent carrying out training would be working time. The logical way for an employer to address this is for time to be set aside at the start of the employment period for the individual to carry out that training, before they start their duties.

d. An induction period. The respondent appeared to accept that individuals would be paid for this period. The respondent also says that it would have been at this time that a contract of employment would be issued.

34. The respondent's position is that due to regulatory requirements these things all had to be done before work could start. I agree that these are steps that would be required before the employee could carry out full duties, but that is not the same as the start date of employment. It is indeed common practice in many organisations for employees to start employment and spend the initial period of employment meeting training and regulatory requirements before undertaking normal duties. That is [NAME] part of the employment period and they are paid for it. For completeness, I note that the [NAME] set out a slightly different list of alleged pre- conditions for employment, but I have used the above list as the one put forward by the respondent in evidence.

The claimant’s arrival in the UK

35. On 28 March 2023 the claimant sent a message (page 319 and 140) confirming that he now had his visa and was arranging travel to the UK. He asked for information about where he would be based so he could find accommodation. There were then a series of discussions over the coming days, in which he indicated he would be travelling between 10 and 14 April 2023, and Ms [NAME] informed him that he would be primarily working in Stafford. On 9 April 2023 he said that he was flying to the UK on that day and had arranged accommodation in London for a week. (page 132). Given that he knew that his role would be in the Midlands and he was basing himself in London for that week I find that he was not intending to work during the initial few days.

36. On 12 April 2023, the claimant said that he was planning to attend the offices the following day (page 308). He was informed by Ms [NAME] that he could email the front and back of the BRP and it was not necessary to come in. Then on 14 April 2023 he updated with his accommodation address, and on 17 April 2023 he messaged on [NAME] requesting an update on procedures he needed to follow.

37. On 18 April 2023 (page 148) Ms [APPELLANT] emailed the claimant, inviting him to a new starter registration meeting on 19 April 2023. The email said congratulations on joining the team and asked for various documents to be emailed through. One of the items listed was a DBS check, however on the same day Ms [APPELLANT] sent a [NAME] message to the claimant (page 308) in which she said the DBS was not required at that time as he would

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be covered by his police clearance initially. The claimant provided a number of documents to Ms [APPELLANT] in the early hours of 19 April (page 152) and from the titles of those documents and based on him saying in that email "I have attached all the required documents" I find that these were the documents requested in their entirety.

The new starter registration meeting and failure to provide work thereafter

38. The meeting took place on 19 April 2023. The respondent has said that the claimant would have needed to provide hard copies of the documents, and in the absence of any indication that he did not (for example an email chasing for them after the meeting) I find that he did so.

39. The claimant had done what needed to be done in order for him to start work. The start date on his certificate of sponsorship had already passed and he was now in the country, with the right permissions, and living in the right location.

40. However, the respondent did not provide him with work, nor did they pay him. He was told to complete various training modules (page 150). In the email from Ms [NAME] telling him to do so, she describes this as being part of his induction (and not in fact separate to it): there is nothing setting out that employment will not start until this is done. This supports my finding that this was not a pre-condition of employment (and nor could it lawfully have been).

41. On 27 April 2023 the claimant updated Ms [APPELLANT] (page 308) that he was getting a car and doing the training sessions. Ms [NAME] replied to say that his references were awaited, however on 28 April 2023 the claimant emailed her to say that his [NAME] had told him that they had not received a reference request. In this email he also raised concerns about the fact he had been in the country for 3 weeks and not started duties yet. This supports the fact that the claimant's clear expectation was that work would start once he arrived in the respondent's location, and not that he would be subject to time-consuming pre-conditions of employment. I find that any delay in progressing the references was on balance of probabilities due to the respondent not progressing the matter.

42. In evidence Mrs [NAME] suggested that perhaps there had been a typo in Ms [NAME] email to that employer requesting a reference and it did not go through, therefore presumably accepting that this was an issue at the respondent and not the claimant.

43. On 14 May 2023 the respondent added the claimant to a [COMPANY] (page 316). On that date there was a message saying that there would be a group call on Tuesday morning to discuss the job and start dates. There were then a series of messages on Tuesday to point out both by the claimant and others that the respondent had not conducted that call. There was then a chaser from the claimant on 20 May 2023 but no response. On 22 August 2023 the respondent sent a message saying that new contracts were tendered for and there would be an update once feedback was received.

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44. In evidence the alleged [COMPANY] was discussed and Ms [NAME] referred to a different [COMPANY] that she said the claimant was part of in 2024 relating to the certificate of sponsorship removal. That makes no sense as by that time even on the claimant's own case, his employment had ended. What makes more sense is that this is the group that was referred to in paragraph 8 of the respondent’s [NAME]. If that is the case however, there is no evidence to suggest that the individuals in the group had been notified of any withdrawal of their offers of employment, as suggested in the [NAME].

45. What I do note however is that Mrs [NAME] also said in evidence that these [NAME] groups were set up to support individuals and answer questions, however it is clear from the message trail that this did not happen. The claimant's question went unanswered and the supposed call did not take place. Ultimately the claimant was randomly removed from the group in April 2024 by the respondent.

The claimant’s further contact requesting to start duties

46. On 30 May 2023 the claimant emailed the respondent saying that he had done the training and wanted to know when he can start. Mrs [NAME] replied saying HR will be in touch, it won't be long (page 156) There was no suggestion that he had not completed all of the training, nor that there was anything at all that the claimant [NAME] had to do. I find that what Mrs [APPELLANT] meant was that HR would be in touch when they had work to give the claimant to do. In this regard I find that the claimant's representative's submission made during the hearing, that what in effect the respondent was doing, was treating the claimant as a zero hours worker, was entirely correct. The problem of course was that the claimant was not a zero hours worker.

47. On 16 June 2023 the claimant emailed the respondent again to a central “HR” email address at the respondent asking about starting his duties and confirming that he had completed online training (page 158). Again there was no response to suggest that he had not done so. In his witness statement the claimant does say that he completed the training between April and August and there are certificates in the file suggesting that some training was not done until August. However, there is no evidence to show that the claimant was told to do those particular training modules in April, nor any chasers for him to do them, and in any event I have found that any time spent on training is working time.

48. The response that the claimant did receive on 16 June 2023 (page 160) from [APPELLANT] in HR instead said to contact Ms [NAME] for his induction and start date. He did so on the same date (page 159) but it appears that no induction / start date was provided to him. The respondent suggests that there was a phone call but no evidence of this has been provided other than Mrs [NAME] thinking that there was. I find, given what came next, that no satisfactory update was provided to the claimant at this point.

49. On 13 July 2023 the claimant chased again, directly to Mrs [APPELLANT] (page 156). He said that [NAME[NAME] had told him to contact her.

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50. On 2 August 2023 the claimant was sent an email by [APPELLANT] [NAME] about registration with the respondent (page 164). This was in effect a duplicate of what he had been sent by Ms [NAME] on 18 April 2023 and which had already been done. He replied, saying that he would attend the meeting but pointing out that it had already taken place. Ms [NAME] replied to say that [NAME], Service Manager, would be in touch shortly about his work schedule and requirements, that the register (i.e. registration) meeting was "no more necessary" and would be "rescheduled". Mrs [NAME] submits that this was not to be interpreted as meaning that the registration meeting was not needed, because of the word "rescheduled". However, the plain reading of the email and the chain in its entirety is that the meeting was not needed any more and would not take place on the scheduled date because he had already attended one in April. To suggest otherwise is fanciful. Equally, to suggest as the respondent has done that the claimant was the one who failed to attend this meeting, is fanciful. This is one of the things that goes to the credibility of Mrs [APPELLANT] evidence.

51. On 24 October 2023 the claimant emailed Ms [APPELLANT] saying that he was struggling due to what he described as unemployment but in reality what he meant was the lack of work duties and pay (pages 168-169). She replied on the same day saying that she would forward the email to managers and referenced seeing if they could help with a [COMPANY].

The respondent’s emails about not having the claimant’s documents

52. On 24 November 2023 Ms [APPELLANT] asked the claimant for an update on his employment situation: this is odd given the past history of the case (page 170) He replied on the same date saying that he was [NAME] waiting and raised financial concerns. She replied later that day saying that the respondent held no documents about him and asked whether he had been invited to registration. This was also odd given that she herself had had a discussion with him about that in August. He replied that day providing screenshots showing those discussions (page 171) and she replied saying that she could recreate his file. On 27 November 2023 she emailed again saying that he was not returning her calls. I find that by this point it was understandable if he was not, given that he was back to square one.

53. On 27 November 2023 the claimant emailed saying that he wanted to talk with a director or [NAME] manager (page 173) about the fact that he (and others) had not been given work. Ms [NAME] replied to say that she would forward the email to management. She also asked to be sent his registration documents again. In evidence Mrs [NAME] suggested that she did not think the email was passed to her however page 364 clearly shows that it was. In the absence of any evidence that shows that Mrs [NAME] acted on this, I find that she did not on balance of probabilities.

The purported withdrawal of employment offer letter

54. On 27 December 2023 the respondent purported to send a “withdrawal of employment offer” letter to the claimant (page 379). It was signed by Mr [APPELLANT]. This referred to the claimant not having complied with Ms

[APPELLANT] instructions on 2 August 2023. In relation to this letter, I note as follows:

a. The reasons for withdrawing the offer stated in the letter are different to those in the respondent’s [NAME] (page 33 at paragraph 7), which relied on a downturn in work.

b. It was only disclosed to the claimant in February 2026, despite disclosure taking place some months earlier. The respondent's position is in effect that it was found late in the day in the respondent's offices.

c. No proof of postage or electronic proof of creation date or sending date has been provided, despite the claimant requesting it. The respondent said that this was because it was sent first class and there was no proof.

d. The date on which it was sent is a date on which the respondent had previously (in an application for an extension of time in which to submit its ET3) said that Mr [NAME] was on leave (page 375). In evidence Mrs [NAME] suggested that it had been done electronically as both of them had a habit of working during holiday periods, but this is at odds with the point about first class post. If it had been created electronically abroad and sent by first class post from the UK, then there would be some form of trail showing it being sent electronically to someone in the UK so that they could print and post it. I also find that the signature on it appears to be a manuscript signature (noting that the first imprint is bolder than the rest of it) rather than a signature done via an app as the respondent suggested.

e. It is not clear why it would have been at that particular time that R would have decided to withdraw the offer on that basis.

f. This document is a letter, whereas all other communications are by email, [NAME] or by telephone.

55. I find that this document did not exist as at 27 December 2023 and was not sent to the claimant, for all the reasons outlined above. I find on balance of probabilities that this document has been created with the purpose of assisting the respondent in its defence to this claim. Ironically, however, it actually does the opposite, in that it contradicts the pleaded defence of a downturn in work. On that point, I find that, regardless of whether or not there was a downturn in work, the respondent did not in fact withdraw the job offer at any time, for any reason.

56. The claimant managed to secure alternative full time employment elsewhere and started that new role on 22 April 2024. He therefore quite properly accepted that his employment must have ended on 21 April 2024 to enable him to take up that role.

Law

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57. Section 13 of the ERA provides:

(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless—

(a)the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or

(b)the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction.

(2) In this section “relevant provision”, in relation to a worker’s contract, means a provision of the contract comprised—

(a)in one or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question, or

(b)in one or more terms of the contract (whether express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing) the existence and effect, or combined effect, of which in relation to the worker the employer has notified to the worker in writing on such an occasion.

(3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions), the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion.

(4) …..

58. A failure to pay any wages amounts to a deduction from wages ([NAME] v [NAME] ([NAME]) [1991] 1 [NAME] 609).

59. Where an offer of employment is made subject to conditions, and the employee accepts the offer, the contract does not take effect until those conditions have been satisfied. However, the conditions must be made clear to the employee ([NAME] v [NAME], [NAME] 1987 IRLR 321, CA).

60. Where an employee is ready, willing and able to work, then they are entitled to be paid even if the respondent does not provide work to them for them to do (unless there is an express or implied term to the contrary) (Petrie v MacFisheries [1940] 1 KB 258, [NAME] v [NAME] 2019 ICR 1279, CA). An employee who offers their services to their employer is entitled under common law to be paid unless there is a contractual term saying otherwise ([NAME] [COMPANY] 2000 IRLR 765, EAT).

61. Regulations 19, 33, 38 and 46 of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 provide that a worker must be paid national minimum wage in respect

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of time spent on training approved by the employer.

62. Section 8 of the ERA provides:

(1) A worker has the right to be given by his employer, at or before the time at which any payment of wages or salary is made to him, a written itemised pay statement.

63. Section 26 of the ERA provides:

Section 23 does not affect the jurisdiction of an employment tribunal to consider a reference under section 11 in relation to any deduction from the wages of a worker; but the aggregate of any amounts ordered by an employment tribunal to be paid under section 12(4) and under section 24 (whether on the same or different occasions) in respect of a particular deduction shall not exceed the amount of the deduction.

64. Section 38 of the Employment Act 2002 provides:

(1) This section applies to proceedings before an employment tribunal relating to a claim by a worker under any of the jurisdictions listed in Schedule 5.

(2) If in the case of proceedings to which this section applies—

a. the employment tribunal finds in favour of the worker, but makes no award to him in respect of the claim to which the proceedings relate, and b. when the proceedings were begun the employer was in breach of his duty to the worker under section 1(1) or 4(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (c. 18) (duty to give a written statement of initial employment particulars or of particulars of change or (in the case of a claim by an worker) under section 41B or 41C of that Act (duty to give a written statement in relation to rights not to work on Sunday), the tribunal must, subject to subsection (5), make an award of the minimum amount to be paid by the employer to the worker and may, if it considers it just and equitable in all the circumstances, award the higher amount instead.

(3) If in the case of proceedings to which this section applies— a. the employment tribunal makes an award to the worker in respect of the claim to which the proceedings relate, and b. when the proceedings were begun the employer was in breach of his duty to the worker under section 1(1) or 4(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or (in the case of a claim by an worker) under section 41B or 41C of that Act, the tribunal must, subject to subsection (5), increase the award by the minimum amount and may, if it considers it just and equitable in all the circumstances, increase the award by the higher amount instead.

(4) In subsections (2) and (3)— a. references to the minimum amount are to an amount equal to two

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weeks’ pay, and b. references to the higher amount are to an amount equal to four weeks’ pay.

(5) The duty under subsection (2) or (3) does not apply if there are exceptional circumstances which would make an award or increase under that subsection unjust or inequitable.

(6) The amount of a week’s pay of an a worker] shall—

a. be calculated for the purposes of this section in accordance with Chapter 2 of Part 14 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (c. 18), and b. not exceed the amount for the time being specified in section 227 of that Act (maximum amount of week’s pay).

….

Conclusions

65. Although at the hearing I reached my conclusions on liability first and then, following further submissions, on remedy, for ease I set out the conclusions on both liability and remedy in respect of each complaint in turn below.

Was the claimant an employee of the respondent within the meaning of section 230 ERA 1996 and, if so, what were the dates of employment?

66. As to whether the claimant was an employee, the respondent’s submission is simply that employment did not commence: they accept that, if it had, then he would be an employee (and therefore I do not need to concern myself with matters such as control, mutuality of obligation and personal service).

67. I have found that the proposed start date was 27 February 2023 and that the offer of employment was made on the basis of that start date. I have found that the only pre-conditions of employment were that the claimant was in the UK, had a valid visa and was a commutable distance from the workplace. He was in the UK from 10 April 2023 however he was in London initially and it was not until 14 April 2023 that he had accommodation in the Midlands. Therefore his employment commenced on 15 April 2023, the day after he communicated that this pre-condition had been met. For the avoidance of doubt, if I was wrong on that, and being a commutable distance was not a pre-condition then I conclude in the alternative that the claimant was not ready able and willing to attend work until that date.

68. I find that the claimant remained an employee until 21 April 2024: there having been no withdrawal of the offer from the respondent, nor any dismissal, nor any resignation prior to that point.

69. Whilst the claimant was not provided with work and did refer in his communications to a start date being requested, this was a start date for actual duties and did not prevent him from being an employee or entitled to pay prior to that date. As to the point raised by the respondent about the

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respondent not having the registration documents on file for the claimant, that is a matter for the respondent given that the respondent had apparently lost them. It does not prevent employment starting. In any event, I have not found that this was communicated as a pre-condition of employment.

70. Therefore the claimant was an employee of the respondent from 15 April 2023 to 21 April 2024.

Time Limits

71. The respondent’s representative confirmed to me during their submissions that they did not seek to argue that the claim had been presented outside of the relevant time limits. I conclude that the claim was made within the time limit in the ERA.

Holiday Pay

72. Having found that the claimant was an employee, he would be entitled to holiday and to accrued but untaken holiday on termination of employment. The respondent submits that no holiday is due given that he was not actually working, however he was an employee and I have seen nothing to suggest that the respondent required him to take holiday at any particular time. Therefore holiday would have continued to accrue. No payment in respect of accrued but untaken holiday was paid to him following the ending of his employment (or at any other time).

73. I therefore conclude that there was a failure to pay holiday pay to the claimant.

74. As to the calculation of what holiday pay was owed to the claimant, after giving oral judgment on liability, the parties were able to agree that the sum owed to the claimant in respect of holiday pay is £2,168.85 net. I therefore do not need to reach conclusions in respect of the specific sub-issues relating to the remedy for holiday pay from the [NAME] and I award the claimant £2,168.85 net. As I only have the net figure, and given that holiday pay is subject to deductions for tax and national insurance contributions, the respondent may gross up the figure so that the amount received by the claimant is the net amount.

Unauthorised deductions from wages

75. It is for the claimant to show that there were wages properly payable to him, which were not paid. I have found that the claimant was employed from 15 April 2023 to 21 April 2024. I have found that this was based on a 40 hour working week with a gross salary of £22,880 per annum.

76. During that period, the claimant was ready, willing and able to perform his duties, and the only reason he did not do so was because the respondent did not provide him with work. The respondent withheld work from him which was an external and involuntary factor preventing him from completing his duties.

77. There was therefore an unauthorised deduction from his wages in respect

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of the full amount of his gross salary during this period. The deduction was not required or authorised by statute, nor by a term of the contract, nor did he agree to the deduction.

78. Again, after I gave oral judgment on liability, the parties worked together to agree the amount owed to the claimant in respect of unauthorised deductions from wages. They agreed that this was £20,400.76 net and I award the claimant this amount. Again, as I only have the net figure, and given that wages are subject to deductions for tax and national insurance contributions, the respondent may gross up the figure so that the amount received by the claimant is the net amount.

79. Whilst the claimant’s Schedule of Loss referenced further financial losses attributable to the claimant’s complaint, during the remedy section of the hearing the claimant’s representative explained that those sums were no longer sought, given the claimant’s inability to give oral evidence about them.

Itemised pay statements

80. It follows, as the respondent accepts, that having determined that he was an employee entitled to pay, there was a failure to provide itemised pay statements.

81. However, given that the failure to provide itemised pay statements relates to the same matters as the unauthorised deductions from wages, the claimant did not seek any additional compensation in respect of this aspect of his claim (as otherwise he would have double recovery). No financial award is therefore made.

ACAS Code of Practice

82. The respondent did not comply with the ACAS Code of Practice for Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures (having not addressed the claimant’s complaints about not being provided with work). During the remedy section of the hearing the parties agreed that there should be an uplift of 20%, and I award that uplift. This amounts to £4,080.15 in respect of unauthorised deductions from wages and a further £433.77 in respect of holiday pay.

Failure to provide statement of terms

83. Given the complete absence of any contract of employment or statement of particulars of employment, I conclude that there has been a failure to provide a written statement of employment particulars as required under section 1 ERA.

84. The respondent submitted that there were exceptional circumstances such that it would be unjust or inequitable to make an award to the claimant in respect of this failure. The respondent’s position is that the respondent genuinely, albeit mistakenly, thought that the claimant was unable to start work and had not issued a contract of employment on that basis.

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85. I conclude that there were no such exceptional circumstances. The respondent made an offer of employment to the claimant, with a certificate of sponsorship setting out a clear start date of 27 February 2023. The respondent, whilst not a large employer, equally had some access to HR support or could have obtained it, and I have found that the claimant was offered employment to start on 27 February 2023 or as soon as the limited pre-conditions that I have found existed were achieved. I do not accept the respondent’s argument that it genuinely did not realise that it was employing the claimant in those circumstances.

86. In addition, the respondent not only failed to provide the statement of terms in itself, but also failed to provide any written confirmation whatsoever of what had been offered to the claimant, leaving the claimant to incur the significant expense of relocating to the UK and then [NAME] not providing the statement of terms once he had done so. There were no exceptional circumstances.

87. As to the amount of the award, for the same reasons I consider it just and equitable to award the higher amount of four weeks’ pay. The parties’ helpfully agreed that this amounts to £1,760 (being four weeks’ gross pay).

Other matters

88. During the remedy section of the hearing, and in order that matters could be concluded swiftly and oral Judgment given on that day, the claimant withdrew his claim for interest in respect of delayed receipt.

89. The claimant’s representative raised the issues of costs, and separate correspondence has been sent to the parties setting out how that will be considered.

90. The claimant’s representative further raised a question as to whether the respondent’s conduct should be referred as a potential contempt of court. This is not something that individual Employment Judges can do, and I therefore agreed to raise the matter with the Regional Employment Judge for consideration. This has been done. It will be for them to determine whether the matter should go any further and the parties will not be advised of their decision.

Employment Judge Edmonds

27 March 2026

Case Number: 1308762/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

(2) [NAME] at: Birmingham (hybrid)

On: 2-4 March 2026

Before: Employment Judge Edmonds

Representation Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

1. The claim against the [NAME] respondent is dismissed on withdrawal.

2. The complaint under section 15 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 in relation to alleged payments to the employer is dismissed on withdrawal.

3. The complaint of unauthorised deductions from wages is well-founded. The respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the claimant’s wages in the period 15 April 2023 to 21 April 2024 inclusive. The respondent shall pay the claimant £20,400.76 which is the net sum deducted. The respondent is responsible for the payment of any tax or National Insurance (and may gross up the sum payable so that, after tax and National Insurance, the amount received by the claimant is the amount set out above). No additional payment is to be made to compensate the claimant for financial loss attributable to the unauthorised deduction.

4. The complaint in respect of holiday pay is well-founded. The respondent made an unauthorised deduction from the claimant’s wages and/or was in breach of the Working Time Regulations 1998 by failing to pay the claimant for holidays accrued but not taken on the date the claimant’s employment ended (in respect of holiday accrued between 15 April 2023 and 21 April 2024 inclusive). The respondent shall paid the claimant £2,168.85 which is the net amount. The respondent is responsible for the payment of any tax or National Insurance (and may gross up the sum payable so that, after tax and National Insurance, the amount received by the claimant is the amount set out above).

5. The respondent unreasonably failed to comply with the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 2015 and it is just and

equitable to increase the awards in respect of unauthorised deductions and holiday pay payable to the claimant by 20% in accordance with s207A Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Therefore, the respondent shall pay the claimant the following sums, representing 20% of the amounts awarded above in respect of each of them:

a. Unauthorised deductions from wages: £4,080.15 b. Holiday pay: £433.77

6. The respondent failed to give the claimant written itemised pay statements as required by section 8 Employment Rights Act 1996 in respect of the period 15 April 2023 to 21 April 2024 inclusive. No separate financial award is made to the claimant in this regard.

7. When the proceedings were begun the respondent was in breach of its duty to provide the claimant with a written statement of employment particulars. There are no exceptional circumstances that make an award of an amount equal to two weeks’ gross pay unjust or inequitable. It is just and equitable to make an award of an amount equal to four weeks’ gross pay. In accordance with section 38 Employment Act 2002 the respondent shall therefore pay the claimant £1,760 (four weeks gross pay).

Employment Judge Edmonds

5 March 2026

Case Number: 1308762/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Birmingham (CVP)

On: 7 May 2026

Before: Employment Judge Edmonds

Representation Claimant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] COSTS

1. UPON the [NAME] (as defined in the order below) applying for an order that the Tribunal makes an order under the Legal Services Act 2007 section 194A (referred to simply as section 194A) that the [NAME] (as defined in the order below) pay costs to the receiving party (as defined in the order below)

2. UPON the hearing from the parties AND UPON the Tribunal considering Rules 72 to 76 and 82 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024

3. AND UPON the Tribunal concluding that the conditions in Tribunal rules 74(2)(a) is satisfied

4. AND UPON being satisfied that if the [NAME] were not [NAME] by a legal representative [NAME] of [NAME] then the Tribunal would have the power to make an order that the [NAME] pay the costs of the [NAME] and further that it would have made such an order

5. UPON the Tribunal considering section 194A

6. AND UPON being satisfied that the [NAME] (as defined in the order below) was [NAME] by a legal representative acting [NAME] of [NAME] as defined by section 194A(14)

7. AND UPON being satisfied that the [NAME] (as defined in the order below) was not [NAME] by a legal representative acting [NAME] of [NAME]

as defined by section 194A(14) and was not [NAME] by representation provided by way of legal aid as defined by section 194A(9)

8. AND UPON considering it appropriate to make an order under section 194A

9. AND UPON deciding not to consider the ability to pay of the [NAME] (as defined in the order below) to pay any costs order for reasons given orally at the hearing

THE TRIBUNAL’S JUDGMENT IS AS FOLLOWS

10. The respondent (as the [NAME]) is order to pay the Access to Justice Foundation (as the receiving party) £8,700 in respect of the claimant’s costs (being the [NAME]).

Approved by:

Employment Judge Edmonds

7 May 2026

Notes Summary reasons for the judgment having been given orally at the hearing, written summary reasons will not be provided unless a request was made by either party at the hearing or a written request is presented by either party within 14 days of the sending of this written record of the decision. All judgments (apart from judgments under Rule 51) and any full written reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribunal-decisions shortly after a copy has been sent to the claimants and respondents. If a Tribunal hearing has been recorded, you may request a transcript of the recording. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, you will have to pay for it. If a transcript is produced it will not include any oral judgment or reasons given at the hearing. The transcript will not be checked, approved or verified by a judge. There is more information in the joint Presidential Practice Direction on the Recording and Transcription of Hearings and accompanying Guidance, which can be found here:

www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/employment-rules-and-legislation-practice-directions/