First-tier Tribunal Sets Pitch Fees Based on Inflation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY) Case References : MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0015-0032 Property : [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] Applicant : [redacted] : Horsley Law Respondents : [redacted] Representative :

[COUNSEL] (except in relation to the administrators of the estate of [NAME])

Type of [NAME] : Mobile Homes Act 1983 – Schedule 1 Chapter 2 Paragraph 16 or Chapter 4 paragraph 14 Tribunal Members : Judge [NAME] of Hearing : 6th January 2026 Date of Decision : 26th March 2026

DECISION

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DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL

(1) The pitch fee payable by each Respondent for the period 1st May 2025 to 31st March 2026 is as set out in the attached Annexe B.

REASONS

The [NAME]

1. These are linked applications for the determination of new pitch fees for 2025 for various park homes situated on a [NAME] at [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE] (“the [NAME]”). The Applicant is the [NAME] owner. The Respondents are the respective occupiers of the pitches in question.

Background

2. The Applicant served Pitch Fee Review Forms dated 18th March 2025, requiring each Respondent to pay an increased pitch fee with effect from 1st May 2025, by reference to the 2.5% CPI increase since the previous year (but also subject to aggregated prior inflationary increases totalling 20.5% from 2020 to 2023, and additional sums said to be referable to the Applicant’s costs of improvements). In the absence of agreement as to the proposed increase, on 21st May 2025, applications were made to the Tribunal under Paragraph 16 of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (as amended) for the determination of a new level of pitch fee in each case.

3. The issue for the Tribunal to determine is the new level of the pitch fee for each of the Respondents.

4. On 22nd October 2025, the Tribunal issued directions which provided for the parties to prepare statements of case in turn, starting with the Respondents, and for a hearing to be listed.

5. In response to directions, the Respondents and the Applicant made submissions to the Tribunal.

6. An inspection of the [NAME] was arranged and notice of the inspection was given to all parties. The inspection took place on the morning of 6th January 2026. After the inspection had concluded, the Tribunal convened a hearing at the [ADDRESS] [POSTCODE], to hear from the parties.

7. The Applicant is represented by [NAME]. There is a [COMPANY] in respect of the [NAME], and the Respondents (except in relation to the administrators of the estate of [NAME]) present their response through [NAME] of the [NAME].

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Relevant Law

8. Annual reviews of pitch fees on protected sites are governed by statutorily implied terms under the Mobile Homes Act 1983.

9. Paragraph 20 of the Implied Terms set out in Chapter 2, Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983 states that – unless it would be unreasonable to do so – it is presumed that the pitch fee will be adjusted annually by reference to the percentage increase or decrease in inflation (the Retail Prices index until July 2023, and the Consumer Prices Index thereafter) based on the difference between the latest index and that published for the month 12 months prior to the month to which the index relates.

10. The [NAME] owner must give the occupier written notice accompanied by a prescribed Pitch Fee Review Form. The Tribunal notes that the prescribed forms have been used and that the relevant time limits have been complied with.

11. Paragraph 18(1) Chapter 2, Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983 requires that:-

When determining the amount of the new pitch fee particular regard shall be had to—

(a) any sums expended by the owner since the last review date on improvements— (i) which are for the benefit of the occupiers of mobile homes on the protected [NAME]; (ii) which were the subject of consultation in accordance with paragraph 22(e) and (f) below; and (iii) to which a majority of the occupiers have not disagreed in writing or which, in the case of such disagreement, the appropriate judicial body, on the [NAME] of the owner, has ordered should be taken into account when determining the amount of the new pitch fee;

(aa) in the case of a protected [NAME] in England, any deterioration in the condition, and any decrease in the amenity, of the [NAME] or any adjoining land which is occupied or controlled by the owner since the date on which this paragraph came into force (in so far as regard has not previously been had to that deterioration or decrease for the purposes of this subparagraph);

(ab) in the case of a protected [NAME] in England, any reduction in the services that the owner supplies to the [NAME], pitch or mobile home, and any deterioration in the quality of those services, since the date on which this paragraph came into force (in so far as regard has not previously been had to that reduction or deterioration for the purposes of this subparagraph);

Inspection

12. The inspection took place on the morning of 6th January 2026. In attendance were a number of the Respondents (including [APPELLANT]) and various

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representatives for the Applicant ([COUNSEL] of Counsel, [COUNSEL], and [COUNSEL]). The Tribunal members viewed the layout of the [NAME], and noted the features of the original, older pitches as against those of the newer pitches and ongoing development works.

Hearing

13. The subsequent hearing took place during the afternoon of 6th January 2026 at the Blackburn SSCS Tribunal. The Applicant was represented by [COUNSEL] of Counsel. The Respondents were represented by [COUNSEL], with the exception of the administrators of the estate of [NAME] (who stayed for the beginning of the hearing but needed to leave part-way through).

14. The Tribunal and the parties had the benefit of a 682-page hearing [NAME], including the relevant [NAME] papers, evidence and parties’ statements of case.

Applicant’s Case and Evidence

15. Prior to the hearing, [NAME] had submitted a detailed skeleton argument which the Tribunal had read.

16. Counsel introduced the Applicant’s case. Prior to the Applicant taking on a long term lease of the [NAME], its representatives met in November 2019 with the residents and the freeholders. He said that the Applicant was seeking to gauge the approach of the residents. He asserted that there had been universal acceptance at that meeting of a proposal for the residents to sign up to new agreements. All residents signed those agreements at the meeting, except for two who signed them later. It was the Applicant’s case that a significant financial investment, upon acquisition by the Applicant, was predicated on agreed increases in the residents’ pitch fees being implemented through these agreements.

17. The residents subsequently sought to countermand those agreements, and refused to pay the new pitch fees which had been proposed. They applied to this Tribunal, in separate proceedings, for an order determining that the agreements were of no effect. That [NAME] was upheld, although not on basis of the residents’ allegations of coercion. In the Tribunal’s related decision of December 2024, it held that the written statements had been subject to an infraction of the “cooling off” period. Counsel asserted that the residents had initially considered that the proposed new pitch fees had been reasonable, and that it was relevant that the Applicant’s decision to acquire a lease of the [NAME] was induced by this collective view.

18. [COUNSEL] noted that the Applicant had taken over operations in 2019, and that there had been no effective uplift in the pitch fees since then (albeit he conceded that that there had been an abortive attempt to increase the pitch fees in recent years). He accepted that the reference in the evidence to there having been a pitch fee increase in January 2023 was incorrect.

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19. [COUNSEL] referred to the calculations used and explained that these were cumulative (but not compound). These start from a base figure of either £148 or £160 (depending on the particular pitch) and increases are applied each year in turn. He explained the Applicant’s table of figures demonstrating the level of increase which would be permitted using the CPI presumption alone, alongside the amount actually being sought. A sample of this began with a sample current pitch fee of £148. Cumulative RPI / CPI on that amount was 23%, equivalent to £34.04 (total £182.04). The Applicant is proposing £432.04, some £250 more, which the Applicant says reflects the cost of improvements. The £250 monthly element, plus inflation thereon at £43.22, comes to £6,401.54 per month when aggregated across the various pitches. [COUNSEL] explained that this was equivalent to amortisation of the improvements over 40 years, in effect, without taking interest rates into account.

20. [COUNSEL] asserted that there had been about £250,000 of investment and improvements in the last 5 years.

21. [COUNSEL] then called the Applicant’s witness, [COUNSEL], to confirm the contents of her witness statement as her evidence in chief. She was tendered for cross-examination.

22. [NAME] was questioned by [NAME]. He pressed her on two key areas. One was the distinction between the Applicant’s expenditure being for improvements as against repairs and routine maintenance, and the second was to what extent the Applicant had consulted with the Respondents before undertaking improvements.

23. [NAME] expressed her view that the original meeting between the Applicant’s representatives and the residents in 2019 amounted to a consultation because all residents were present and had consented to the agreement offered. However, when questioned about this, she admitted that she was not present at or involved in the meeting in 2019 and so she could not say what expenditure was taken into account then.

24. When further questioned, [NAME] evidence on how much of the expenditure was actually for improvements and how much was for repairs and routine maintenance was vague. She said that “most” work carried out had been as a direct result of residents informing the Applicant of areas to attend to and that “most” work undertaken by [NAME] was to bring the [NAME] up to standard. When questioned as to how many of the bills or invoices related to work carried out to expansion of the park and empty homes, rather than for the benefit of existing residents, she said that “most” were for the benefit of all residents – including kerbs put in, street lights, and electricity sub stations.

25. On the issue of consultations, she admitted that much of the work was done without formal prior consultation. She could not give any further information about what consultations had been undertaken.

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26. [NAME] also noted that [COUNSEL] had adduced additional statements from [NAME] and [NAME], but accepted that they were not present at the hearing to be cross-examined.

Respondents’ Case and Evidence

27. [NAME] presented the case on behalf of the Respondents (except for the administrators of the estate of [NAME]). He had previously submitted a statement dated 10th November 2025, which had acted both as a statement of case and a form of witness statement. Mr [NAME] supplemented this with oral submissions/evidence.

28. Mr [NAME] set out the background to the previous Tribunal decision and the circumstances under which the 2019 agreements were countermanded. He argued that the purposes of the higher pitch fee increases were unclear to the Respondents, and asserted that [NAME] had not been able to explain how the figures were quantified. He considered that figures had been “plucked out of the air”, with no breakdown of how monies would be or had been spent. He also asserted that the Respondents were never consulted or told what the increase was for.

29. He also asserted that the Applicant had inexplicably delayed applying to the Tribunal for a determination of the pitch fee. He said that in February 2021, the Applicant had purported to increase pitch fees from the revised 2019 baseline, but only relying on the inflationary increase and without adducing any evidence of expenditure. He challenged the basis for the Applicant doing so now, years afterwards. Again, he said that a further purported review followed around 12 months later and again on an inflation-only basis, with no additional expenditure referred to. He contended that this indicated that in 2019 there was no additional expenditure that they considered to be relevant for the next 2 years.

30. Mr [NAME] made a key assertion that the items of expenditure listed on the most recent pitch fee review forms all related to the expansion of the park, not improvement of the existing facilities for the benefit of the Respondents. He highlighted removal of a mound of earth, and installation of kerbs street lamps. He noted that work on developing premises which were ancillary to the original layout of the [NAME] should be excluded from costs which are relevant to pitch fees paid by existing residents. He went further to suggest that in fact all proposed costs put forward in 2019 were ineligible for consideration under the current pitch fee review for that reason, and noted that the two purported pitch fee reviews which had followed made no mention of any eligible expenditure. In summary, his case was that there was no written or organised expenditure regarding improvements for which the Respondents ought to pay.

31. To illustrate his point, he referred to two new lodges having been constructed in 2019, and two more in 2021. He said that new bases were added, and lots of infrastructure was provided for these. From the Applicant’s list of expenditure, he referred to:-

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- Credit meter ([NAME] p.632) and Second credit meter ([NAME] p.641 – but that none of the Respondents has one - Topographical survey ([NAME] p.637) – that this was of no benefit to residents - Two domestic distribution boxes ([NAME] p.647) and two domestic Dimplex heaters ([NAME] p.654) – for the benefit of the newer pitches

32. Mr [NAME] also made a broader assertion that the invoices relied upon by the Applicant do not describe what the associated works actually were. He referred to some invoices relating to electricians working for 2 or 3 days, but claimed that he never saw works of that nature and duration taking place. He asserted that whilst residents had made requests for works to be done, these were only for routine maintenance and not for improvements. He said that the only notable exception to this was when the residents complained to Fylde Borough Council about a failure to enforce standards regarding aspects of the [NAME] and that this had since been resolved relatively recently (when questioned, he confirmed that this related to a compliance notice in November 2024 but that none of those works had actually been undertaken as yet).

33. [NAME] put it to Mr [COUNSEL] that it had not been possible for the Applicant to consult with the [COMPANY] as it was not formed until February 2025.

34. Mr [NAME] also confirmed, when questioned, that the Respondents would agree with inflationary increases for the last three years. Although he said that he would have been prepared to agree something beyond that originally, he now felt that the Respondents had been treated with contempt.

35. Mr [NAME] also clarified that the ratio of “new” to “old” pitches was as follows:-

• There is planning permission for up to 43 pitches in total as of now • At present, 23 of these pitches are occupied and 5 are empty (some of which are currently just concrete bases) • The original [NAME] layout comprised 14 pitches, of which 1 is empty

Determination

36. The Tribunal heard closing arguments from Mrs [COUNSEL] for the Respondents and from [NAME]. The Tribunal then concluded the hearing and retired to deliberate over its determination.

Evidential Assessment

37. It is not in dispute that the Applicant served pitch fee increase notices upon the Respondents, and that these complied with the requirements of the statutorily implied terms as regards timing and contents of the same.

38. The Tribunal notes that there is a procedural and evidential burden on either party to persuade the Tribunal to depart from the statutory presumption of inflationary increase, which is disputed in this case. The Applicant is contending for a higher figure, so it bears the burden of persuading the Tribunal

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that it would be “unreasonable” to peg the increases to the rate of inflation (RPI or CPI from time to time as the case may be).

39. The Tribunal were, in that regard, unimpressed with the Applicant’s evidence. The Applicant primarily relies upon a table of invoices presented by [NAME], at pages 668 to 670 of the [NAME], totalling £243.387.90 of expenditure between 20th January 2020 and 18th February 2025. These almost invariably provide virtually no meaningful narrative of the nature of the works undertaken or costs incurred. A typical example of this is set out below:-

01/03/2023 LY1951 2023.03.01 - [NAME] £2322.17- 3778AHI930 - 01.03.23.pdf £ 2,322.17

40. In and of itself, this is – to put it bluntly – practically indecipherable and totally lacking in any meaningful detail save as to the amount and date of the invoice.

41. Turning to that invoice as an example, it is reproduced at page 618 of the [NAME]. It is an invoice for the supply of building materials:-

• BUILDING SAND BULK BAG • CASTLE CEMENT MULTICHEM PLASTIC BAG 25KG NOMINAL • BRICK MATTERS STAFFORD SMOOTH PERFORATED BLUE 65MM BRICK PK560 • IBSTOCK CHESTERTON TRADESMAN HEATHER MIXTURE 73MM PH464

42. There is no corollary explanation, anywhere in the Applicant’s evidence of [APPELLANT], as to what these building materials were in fact used for. Whilst it states that the materials were delivered to the [NAME], it inherently provides no evidence that these materials were in fact used upon the [NAME] at all, let alone whether they were applied for the purposes of repair or improvement (or to which parts of the [NAME]).

43. The Tribunal notes that the same approach is adopted by the Applicant in relation to each line of expenditure referred to, and a similar paucity of information is ubiquitous throughout the Applicant’s documentary evidence.

44. One of the rare instances of where slightly more information is offered is the invoice of [NAME], dated 18th October 2023 and reproduced at pages 601 and 602 of the [NAME]. It totals £181,254.00 and thus represents the lion’s share of the Applicant’s expenditure referred to. Of these costs, £87,500.00 (plus VAT at 20%) is attributed to “Clearance of overgrown area & construction of 7no new pitches including tarmac driveways & paving footpaths.” This one item accordingly accounts for over half of the total costs incurred on this invoice. The expenditure could only be for the benefit of the Applicant, not the Respondents, since it relates to works of development and expansion rather than improvement, and which were not for the benefit of the [NAME]. This serves to cast serious doubt upon the reliability of the Applicant’s assertion that most of the works were improvements for the benefit of the Respondents.

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45. [APPELLANT] evidence as to works undertaken by the Applicant at the [NAME] is limited to paragraphs 25 to 27 of her statement. These paragraphs are perfunctory in the extreme and provide no detail beyond a very broad brush outline of the types of works carried out over an extended period. The Tribunal finds it quite remarkable that a party to a litigated dispute could hope to justify, under judicial scrutiny, over a quarter of a million pounds of expenditure by reference to half a side of A4 of text, a table which makes little sense to anyone other than the person who prepared it, and a document dump of invoices without any further narrative.

46. The witness statement of [NAME] is of very poor detail, brief, and only in fact refers expressly to some £265 of expenditure, which was in any event in the nature of a repair rather than an improvement. He did not attend the hearing to confirm his statement, and no explanation for his absence was offered. This was particularly surprising given that he had attended the inspection of the [NAME] only a matter of a few hours beforehand and that he was presumably notified of the hearing time and location by his employer. In accordance with the criteria set out at Section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for his absence, the Tribunal is entitled to treat his evidence with caution and to place minimal weight upon it.

47. The Tribunal also records similar observations regarding the witness statement of [NAME]. Again, he did not attend the hearing to confirm his statement, and no explanation for his absence was offered. In accordance with the criteria set out at Section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995, and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for his absence, the Tribunal is entitled to treat his evidence with caution and to place minimal weight upon it. In any event, the Tribunal finds that he offers no evidence in relation to any factors which are relevant to the Tribunal’s considerations in these proceedings. Its inclusion in the [NAME] is peculiar.

48. In response to the Applicant’s evidence, the Respondents – through [APPELLANT] – challenged the Applicant to demonstrate how the costs which were allegedly incurred had benefitted the [NAME] by way of improvement, and also to what extent any improvements had been for the benefit of the Respondents rather than for the benefit of the Applicant (through lettings of newly developed pitches). The Applicant’s evidence fell very far short of meeting that challenge.

49. [NAME] invited the Tribunal to find that [COUNSEL] evidence was substantially unchallenged. The Tribunal declines to do so. He said that it was “not her fault” that she was not cross-examined in detail. But the Tribunal considers that it is entirely her fault that her evidence was so flimsy in the first place. The Respondents were entitled to put the Applicant to proof and to conclude that detailed cross examination was not required because there was no substantive case to answer.

50. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant has not cogently demonstrated which elements of the expenditure referred to in its evidence were (a) for improvements as opposed to repairs; or (b) for the benefit of the Respondents as opposed to the Applicants (or future occupiers). Inevitably, at least some of

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the expenditure on certain significant items will have been to the Applicant’s sole or primary benefit, as identified above regarding the [NAME] invoice. If the Tribunal is to apply some generality of approach, as suggested by Counsel, then if anything it fatally undermines the reliability and credibility of the Applicant’s evidence as to the purposes for which costs have been incurred and operates in favour of the Respondents’ case.

51. The impression left by the evidence of [NAME] under cross examination, and of the unchallenged evidence of [APPELLANT], was that expenditure by the Applicant was largely reactive, with little planning and no formal consultation. The Applicant appears to have treated “improvements” the same way as running repairs and has not provided sufficient evidence to help the Tribunal distinguish one from the other. Although the lack of consultation is of marginal relevance per se, as the [NAME] did not exist until 2025, it is nonetheless indicative of the Applicant’s overall approach to the works.

52. The Tribunal finds that the issues around the 2019 “agreements” are of little to no actual relevance to the statutory considerations. They were not evidence of actual expenditure in subsequent years. They might have been evidence of the Applicant’s intentions regarding its plans for expenditure. But “the best laid schemes o’ mice and men gang aft a-gley” – the Applicant needed to prove, at least on the balance of probabilities – that it actually committed the expenditure that it had originally intended to. The Tribunal was not prepared to indulge the Applicant with an assumption that it had, and the Applicant failed to produce cogent evidence of what it had in fact done.

53. The Tribunal accordingly finds that the Applicant has failed to discharge the evidential burden that it has expended any substantial sums (or, if it had, what those sums were) since the last review date on improvements which are for the benefit of the occupiers of mobile homes on the protected [NAME]. The Applicant has failed to prove its own case due to a remarkable deficiency of its own witness evidence.

Conclusion

54. As the Tribunal finds that it would not be unreasonable to do so, the increases in the pitch fees are, accordingly, limited to the rates permitted by inflation in accordance with the agreed calculations.

55. For the avoidance of any doubt, the entirety of the Applicant’s previous expenditure cannot be referred to again in any future pitch fee reviews.

Should the Tribunal make any order regarding the costs of the proceedings, and if so then what?

56. Under Rule 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the Tribunal may make an order requiring a party to reimburse to any other party the whole or part of the amount of any fee paid by the other party which has not been remitted by HM Courts and Tribunal Service.

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57. Since the Respondents have consistently indicated their agreement to a statutory inflationary increase in their pitch fees, and the Applicant has failed to persuade the Tribunal otherwise, the Tribunal considers that these applications could have been avoided if the Applicant had proposed pitch fee increases which were limited to inflation only – the Respondents would most likely have agreed to the same. These proceedings were instigated by the Applicant through its own deleterious approach. The Tribunal declines to make any order for reimbursement of its Tribunal fees.

Name: Judge [NAME]: 26th March 2026

Rights of appeal

1. By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the Tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have.

2. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal ([NAME]), then a written [NAME] for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case.

3. The [NAME] for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the [NAME].

4. If the [NAME] is not made within the 28-day time limit, such [NAME] must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the [NAME] for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit.

5. The [NAME] for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party [NAME] the [NAME] is seeking.

6. If the Tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further [NAME] for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal ([NAME]).

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Annex A- List of Respondents

Case Reference Respondent MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0015 [RESPONDENT]. [RESPONDENT]/30UF/PHI/2025/0016 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0017 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0018 Executors of Mr [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0019 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0020 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0021 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0022 Mr & Mrs [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0023 Mr [NAME]. [NAME] & Ms [NAME]. [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0024 Executors of [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0025 Mrs & Mrs [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0026 Mr [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0027 Mr & Mrs [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0028 Mr & Mrs [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0029 Mr & Mrs [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0030 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0031 [NAME]/30UF/PHI/2025/0032 Mr & Mrs [NAME]

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Annex B- Determinations of Pitch Fees

Case Reference Respondent Fee Effective MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0015 [RESPONDENT]. [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0016 [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0017 [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0018 Executors of Mr [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0019 [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0020 [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0021 [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0022 Mr & Mrs [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0023 Mr [NAME]. [NAME] & Ms [NAME]. [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0024 Executors of Mr & Mrs [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0025 Mrs & Mrs [NAME] £182.04 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0026 Mr [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0027 Mr & Mrs [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0028 Mr & Mrs [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0029 Mr & Mrs [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0030 [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0031 [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025 MAN/30UF/PHI/2025/0032 Mr & Mrs [NAME] £196.80 1st May 2025