Appeal Dismissed: False Documents Lead to Deportation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507366 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 16 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 25-year-old citizen of India, against his liability for deportation which arose when he was served with a deportation liability notice (DLN). THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue on appeal is whether the appellant has exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature having regard to factors including: his attachment to New Zealand and his settlement here over the last three years, developed through employment, community involvement and connections with family in this country; his desire to remain living and working here; and the context around his provision of a document that saw him issued with a DLN notwithstanding that it had no material bearing on his dealings with Immigration New Zealand. [3] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal finds that the appellant does not have exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The appeal is declined.

2

BACKGROUND [4] The appellant was born in India. He is the only child of his parents, who live in India and are engaged in farming. [5] In mid-2022, while in India, the appellant applied for a student visa to undertake a cookery diploma at a New Zealand tertiary institute. Immigration New Zealand declined his application as it was not satisfied that he demonstrated having sufficient funds during his stay. Immigration New Zealand also raised a concern about the appellant’s bona fides, or genuine intentions to come to study, regarding his explanation for changing his field of study from [COMPANY] management. The appellant had provided a [COMPANY] management diploma certificate awarded in April 2022 by a university in India and examination results for this course of study. He was seeking to study cookery and lacked knowledge of this chosen field of study in New Zealand. [6] In January 2023, the appellant applied for an accredited employer work visa, to work as a laundry/room attendant at a [COMPANY] in Queenstown. No specific qualifications or work experience was required for this position, although the appellant’s application was accompanied by a copy of his [COMPANY] management diploma qualification and examination results for this course. [7] The appellant arrived in New Zealand on 19 February 2023, having been granted a two-year accredited employer work visa. He commenced his employment at the [COMPANY], and later in 2023 secured a variation of conditions to his visa to work as a [NAME] auditor/porter at the [COMPANY]. [8] In February 2025, the appellant made an application for a student visa to study a Level 5 diploma in health and wellbeing. He advised Immigration New Zealand that he wanted a career as a healthcare assistant and provided copies of his secondary school and diploma qualifications and examination results. Immigration New Zealand granted this visa on 6 March 2025. [9] The appellant did not commence his studies as, two weeks after being granted the student visa, on 21 March 2025, he applied for an accredited employer work visa based on having an offer of employment as a [NAME] manager ([COMPANY] service manager) with a [NAME] in Queenstown. [10] According to the job description for the offered position, the employee required a hospitality degree/diploma or at least three years of relevant experience. In his application, the appellant recorded that he met the minimum skills

3 requirements of the position: he held a qualification at Level 4 or higher on the [NAME], namely his Level 5 [COMPANY] management diploma; and he held relevant work experience through his [NAME] [COMPANY] employment. [11] On 25 March 2025, Immigration New Zealand granted the appellant an accredited employer work visa valid for three years. Deportation Liability Notice (DLN) [12] On 28 August 2025, Immigration New Zealand served the appellant with a DLN, relying on section 157 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act). It had determined that there was sufficient reason to deport the appellant because he had provided false and/or misleading information through the provision of a fraudulent document in support of his visa applications. Immigration New Zealand advised that the appellant’s [COMPANY] management diploma certificate and examination results, that he had provided in support of his student visa application of February 2025 and his work visa application of March 2025, had been verified by the awarding university in India as false. [13] Immigration New Zealand advised the appellant that he had 14 days to provide good reasons why his deportation should not proceed, and of his right to appeal to the Tribunal on humanitarian grounds against his liability for deportation. [14] On 11 September 2025, the appellant made his good reason request. It was submitted, in summary, that: (a) The appellant accepted that he provided a forged qualification document, which was a “single foolish act”. However, this document did not facilitate his securing entry to New Zealand through his initial accredited employer work visa and was not submitted in support of his initial employment. While the document was attached to his later visa applications, it was not necessary for his eligibility for these earlier visas and was irrelevant to Immigration New Zealand’s assessment and grant of the visas. The appellant had provided the qualification document to his immigration agent and did not realise it would be appended to his subsequent visa applications. This was a single misrepresentation by the appellant, and he was otherwise of good character.

4 (b) The appellant is valued by his current and [NAME] employers and engaged in employment where he holds substantial accountability, illustrated by having recently been granted a manager’s certificate by the local licensing inspectorate. He is embedded in the local community in a tourist destination where staff shortages in hospitality continue to be reported, and he is trained and proven in his current role. (c) Deportation of the appellant would exceed merely upholding the integrity of the [NAME]. It would sever the appellant from his employment, his family support in New Zealand, his community contribution, and the financial support that he provides to his family in India. It would mark him with a stigma that would impact all future visa applications, for a mistake that never affected a visa outcome. [15] On 23 September 2025, Immigration New Zealand informed the appellant that it had considered his request and submissions but determined to uphold his deportation liability. It did not accept that there were good reasons why his deportation should not proceed, citing, in summary, the following factors: (a) The appellant’s provision of this fraudulent document was not a single act but appeared more akin to a pattern of conduct: he had also provided this document to support his initial (unsuccessful) student visa application of 2022. While it was contended that the forged document never facilitated his entry to New Zealand or his meeting the requirements of the visas he applied for, it was the submission of fraudulent documents, regardless of their materiality, that undermined the integrity of the [NAME] and was a serious breach. Further, Immigration New Zealand noted that when the appellant was spoken to by compliance officers at the time he was issued with the DLN, he maintained that the document was not false and advised that he did not need this document because he already met the visa requirements. (b) The appellant’s community participation and integration, and his support of such organisations, was acknowledged, as was the fact that he was considered a valuable employee. Immigration New Zealand noted that the appellant helped his family in India financially, but it did not accept that the cessation of such financial support would have the significant impact that the appellant had claimed, given that he had

5 spent just over two and a half years in New Zealand but otherwise lived with his family in India. His New Zealand work experience should assist him to secure employment in India through which to financially support his family if necessary. (c) Immigration New Zealand acknowledged the enduring consequences for the appellant of having provided a false document, which may have a significant impact and affect his ability to obtain a future visa. However, it considered that his actions were not an isolated or accidental event: he “purchased” a false document which (in the absence of an explanation) was for the sole purpose of securing a visa; he submitted this document on more than one occasion; and when questioned, he maintained that the document was genuine. [16] On 24 September 2025, the appellant lodged this appeal with the Tribunal. STATUTORY GROUNDS [17] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [18] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the [NAME] Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34].

6 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [19] The appellant’s case is set out in counsel’s submissions (15 October 2025), which largely reiterate the submissions presented in support of his good reason request. They can be summarised as follows: (a) The appellant is a young man who made one serious mistake before ever entering New Zealand. He accepts full responsibility for procuring a false document in his youth, despite it not being material to any visa outcome. This was a single isolated lapse of judgement committed before the appellant had ever interacted with Immigration New Zealand. (b) The appellant has built a life of integrity, diligence and service in New Zealand, and deportation would destroy his future. His ongoing employment demands reliability, accuracy and integrity and he continues to have the trust of his employer. The issuance to him of a manager’s certificate to supply alcohol further affirms his good character. He fills a genuine labour market need in a region dependent on tourism and hospitality, and deporting a trained professional would harm both the appellant and New Zealand’s objectives in supporting the tourism economy. He has shown a sustained commitment to the community through his volunteer involvement and assistance with various [NAME], and his blood donations and first aid certificate illustrate his civic responsibility. (c) The appellant has close extended family settled in New Zealand, particularly [NAME] and their families, and his [NAME] grandmother, from whom they each derive reciprocal emotional and practical support, and he sends regular remittances to his parents and grandmother in India. (d) The humanitarian consequences of the appellant’s deportation would be unjust or unduly harsh in light of all the circumstances, which extend to both New Zealand and India, such that cancellation of his deportation liability is warranted. Deportation would rupture his community bonds and waste his investment in this country; his [NAME] would suffer distress and moral injury at losing a loved family member; his family in India would lose an income stream which would cause them hardship; and a wider circle

7 of New Zealanders would be deprived of a committed worker and community participant. (e) For the appellant, the consequences of deportation are disproportionate to his wrongdoing. Deportation from New Zealand would permanently affect his immigration record and close off legitimate future travel, work and study. It would immediately curtail his employment, and he would lose the [NAME] and community settlement he has worked hard to build. For the appellant, the emotional toll of his removal, from where he is valued and productive, would be immense. (f) The appellant’s behaviour since his arrival in New Zealand illustrates rehabilitation and remorse. His wrongdoing did not facilitate his entry to New Zealand and did not influence any visa decision. The visas that he has held were granted to him based on criteria that he objectively satisfied. Deportation, “years after” the behaviour at issue, would be punitive and signal that no actions can redeem a mistake, which does not align with New Zealand’s values of fairness. Rather than protect the integrity of the [NAME], it would see exclusion replacing rehabilitation, which is clearly unduly harsh. The appellant has already faced significant consequences from his actions, which have taught him the seriousness of his lapse of judgement. (g) It would not be contrary to the public interest for the appellant’s deportation liability to be quashed. His continued presence promotes public confidence in a proportionate [NAME]; he is employed, compliant and contributing to society; and there is no risk to public order or safety through his remaining in New Zealand. Materials and Documents [20] In support of the appeal, counsel provides the following documents: (a) A letter (5 September 2025) from the appellant’s current employer, confirming the appellant’s employment with the business, as [NAME] manager, and providing a summary of his duties; and a selection of payslips recording his full-time employment on a pay rate of $31 per hour.

8 (b) Payslips for the appellant’s [NAME] [COMPANY] employment, where he was paid an hourly rate of $28.18. (c) A copy of the appellant’s manager’s certificate issued under the Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012, which is valid to 15 May 2026. (d) Character reference letters (various dates in September 2025) written in support of the appellant, from approximately a dozen persons, including: (i) several [NAME] the appellant is involved with and/or has been actively engaged; (ii) the appellant’s [NAME] manager at his earlier [COMPANY] employment; (iii) the appellant’s [NAME] members including [NAME], their husbands, and his grandmother; and (iv) the appellant’s parents who reside in India. (e) Evidence of the appellant’s completion of an essential first aid course (18 September 2023), and confirming that he has been a NZ Blood donor. ASSESSMENT [21] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided on appeal. It has also considered Immigration New Zealand files in relation to the appellant’s temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records for the appellant. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [22] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. [23] The exceptional circumstances test is a threshold inquiry, and the threshold is a “high one”: Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR

9 765 at [53]. As the High Court observed in [NAME] v Removal Review Authority [1994] NZAR 509 at 514: [C]ircumstances which may cause difficulty, hardship and emotional upset to persons the subject of removal orders, or those associated with them, will not suffice to meet the requirement unless the circumstances themselves or their consequences can legitimately be characterised as exceptional. The appellant’s time in New Zealand [24] The appellant is a 25-year-old man from India who has been living in New Zealand for the last three years. For the duration of his stay, he has been working and living in Queenstown, where he is contributing through his employment in the [NAME] and has begun to feel settled through his community involvement. He has family support here, with members of his extended family with whom he spends time also living in the South Island. It is his strong desire to continue living in New Zealand and pursue a future in this country. The appellant’s liability for deportation and exceptional circumstances [25] The appellant’s liability for deportation arose when Immigration New Zealand served him with a DLN in August 2025, for his earlier provision of a false document (a university diploma qualification certificate from India) that he procured when in India, prior to making a visa application to travel to New Zealand. [26] Counsel properly acknowledges that an appeal of the present kind is not a vehicle by which Immigration New Zealand decisions may be reviewed or overturned. The Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction is confined to ascertaining whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in the appellant’s case. The focus of the Tribunal in this regard must be on the consequences or effects of deportation: see Minister of Immigration v Q [2020] NZCA 288. [ADDRESS] of Appeal in Q went on to state: [31] … The provision [section 207(1)(a)] requires a comparison of those consequences or effects with the likely position if the person concerned is not deported. The question then is whether the adverse effects or consequences of deportation relied upon by the applicant amount to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. [27] The courts have been clear in finding that the reason a person has become liable for deportation, or their level of culpability, is not a consequence or effect of deportation: see Q at [33]–[34]; and [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2018] NZHC 2616. As was stated in [NAME] at [85]: “Ultimately, it is the consequences or effects

10 of deportation on the person that is at the heart of the first stage of the inquiry under s 207”. [28] In terms of the statutory test at section 207 of the Act, the Court of Appeal in Q saw this as a three-stage inquiry, with section 207(1) comprising two considerations: whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature; and whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand (see Q at [30]–[33]). [29] The Tribunal makes this observation because many of counsel’s submissions on whether there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances focus on the harshness of upholding the appellant’s liability for deportation, in the context of his life and circumstances in New Zealand and his actions that led to his current predicament. However, just as the reason why a person has become liable for deportation, and their culpability, is not relevant to an assessment of exceptional humanitarian circumstances, the proportionality of their being made liable for deportation is not directly relevant to that first stage of the inquiry. As set out above, the focus in an assessment of exceptional humanitarian circumstances is on the consequences or effects of deportation on that person. [30] Counsel’s submissions — that the humanitarian consequences of the appellant’s deportation would be unjust or unduly harsh in all the circumstances — are relevant to the second stage of the inquiry, namely whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported. First, the Tribunal must consider whether there are, in fact, exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, arising from the consequences or effects of the appellant’s deportation (and relevant factors have been identified by counsel at [19(b)–(c)] above). Only once this finding has been made in the affirmative, can the Tribunal then address whether these exceptional humanitarian circumstances would make the appellant’s deportation unjust or unduly harsh and, if so, where the public interest lies. The appellant’s circumstances in New Zealand [31] During his three-year stay in New Zealand, the appellant has held near continuous employment in several hospitality-related positions in Queenstown. His arrival in New Zealand was to take up employment as a laundry/room attendant at a [COMPANY] for which no specific qualifications were required. Six months later, he moved into the position of [NAME] auditor/porter. His [NAME] manager, in her letter of support provided on appeal, describes the appellant as an outstandingly reliable and responsible employee who demonstrated a calm professionalism and took pride in

11 his role. He was trustworthy and diligent, and a highly respected and well-liked member of the team. [32] The appellant is currently employed as a [NAME] manager with a [NAME], a position he has held since April 2025. Counsel submits that the appellant continues to have the trust of his employer. The Tribunal accepts this submission at face value. [33] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant has progressed in hospitality-based roles, and currently holds a responsible position with duties that involve reservations, financial transactions and oversight, and liaising with higher management. He is also making a modest financial contribution to New Zealand through his employment, and the Tribunal acknowledges that he is contributing to a region in a sector that experiences difficulties securing long-term employees in lower-paid service-related roles. [34] However, there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant’s skills and experience are unique or irreplaceable. His current employment as a [COMPANY] service manager is not on Immigration New Zealand’s Green List, which denotes roles for which workers are needed in New Zealand. Beyond holding an essential first aid certificate and being issued with a manager’s certificate by the local district licensing authority (which is a mandatory requirement for overseeing premises that provide alcohol for on-premises consumption), there is no indication that the appellant holds any specific industry-related or employer-invested training. [35] Given the evidence before the Tribunal, there is nothing to suggest that the appellant’s departure from New Zealand would have a significantly negative impact, either on his employer specifically or the region and industry sector in which he works. Any inconvenience to his employer in replacing him is not an exceptional humanitarian circumstance. His contribution to the workforce in New Zealand through his employment in the [NAME], is modest. Moreover, it is not a humanitarian consideration of the type contemplated by section 207 of the Act. Impact on appellant’s parents in India [36] Through his employment, it is said that the appellant has been able to provide financial support to his parents and paternal grandmother in India. It is submitted that deportation would see his family lose this income stream, which would cause them hardship. However, there is no evidence that the appellant is the primary source of financial support for his parents and grandmother in India. In fact, the

12 evidence before the Tribunal suggests the contrary. The appellant’s parents write, in their letter produced on appeal, that such is their son’s caring nature, after he came to New Zealand he still wanted to financially support them, even though they are “financially sound”. Settlement and connections in New Zealand [37] Aside from his employment, it is submitted that the appellant is well-settled in the South Island, having developed [NAME] and community connections through his involvement with various [NAME]. Letters from several [NAME] refer, variously, to his good character and his presence and active involvement in community events, which assists to strengthen their communities and cultural development. He has volunteered at the local temple both in Queenstown and in a South Island city when he visits the city. Aside from the appellant’s engagement with these [NAME], the Tribunal has received evidence of his having donated blood 18 months ago. [38] The appellant’s involvement in his local ethnic community is not well outside the normal run of circumstances. For temporary migrants who come to New Zealand and find themselves wanting to connect and settle in what is a different and often unfamiliar cultural environment, this is a common scenario. Moreover, there is no evidence of the appellant’s wider settlement and integration in New Zealand beyond these organisations. The appellant will likely have made friendships and connections through his employment, and perhaps also through his living arrangements in Queenstown. [39] Counsel’s submissions, and the tenor of the letters of support produced on appeal, describe the appellant as a law-abiding and responsible young man of good character and integrity, who holds a position of trust in his workplace and is living a responsible life in New Zealand that involves acts of service and contributing to the community. However, there is nothing about these features that distinguishes the appellant from other temporary visa holders who live and work in their local community in New Zealand. Indeed, immigration instructions require that visa applicants be of good character. Impact on appellant’s [NAME] members [40] There is evidence that the appellant has familial connections in New Zealand. A [NAME], and an [NAME], each live in Christchurch with their young families, as does the appellant’s grandmother who states that she migrated here in July 2025

13 and joined the [NAME]’s household. The appellant evidently spends time with these family members through reciprocal visits and holidays together. Letters from these family members describe the appellant as a caring man of good character, who positively contributes to their family life and enriches their lives in New Zealand. His young cousins particularly enjoy spending time with him. The Tribunal notes their strong support for him to remain in New Zealand. [41] The Tribunal acknowledges that the appellant’s presence in New Zealand strengthens these family members’ support network in New Zealand. It is also likely that, for the appellant, who is said to derive emotional and practical support from these proximate family members, their presence increases his own feelings of settlement and belonging in New Zealand. However, there is no entitlement for a family member to remain in the country where their extended family have elected to settle. As disclosed, the nature of the relationship between the appellant and his [NAME], who reside in a city several hours’ drive away from where he lives and works, reflects a typical intergenerational extended family bond. Beyond the family’s disappointment of the appellant’s departure from New Zealand, in terms of his physical presence and their hopes for his future here as a migrant, there is no suggestion that their settlement would be negatively impacted by his absence to establish this as an exceptional circumstance. [42] It is submitted that deportation would have a significant negative emotional impact on the appellant, who has worked hard to build a life in New Zealand. The appellant’s parents and [NAME], who are (the only writers) evidently aware of his liability for deportation, state that the appellant would be miserable and depressed at having to return to India and his dream of an independent life in New Zealand would be “shattered”. [43] However, beyond the bitter disappointment of having to leave the country where the appellant strongly desires to pursue a future and departing in circumstances that are not of his own choosing, there is nothing to suggest that there is anything exceptional that arises from this. While counsel’s submission and the statements of the appellant’s family are noted, the Tribunal observes that it has not received any firsthand evidence from the appellant on appeal. [44] There has never been any certainty that the appellant would be able to remain in New Zealand on a long-term or permanent basis. He has held only temporary visas during his stay in this country. Disappointment at separation has to be considered in that context. While it is likely that his plan was to pursue

14 residence at some stage, this is a future goal shared with numerous temporary migrants and it remains latent. On return to India [45] The appellant lived in India until his arrival in New Zealand three years ago, as a 22-year-old. It remains an environment that is entirely familiar to him, and where he will retain [NAME]. The appellant’s parents remain in India, where they are financially self-supporting and evidently share a caring and supportive relationship with their only child. The Tribunal expects that they will be able to provide the appellant with any necessary practical, financial and/or emotional support on his initial return to India. [46] The appellant’s New Zealand work experience in hospitality and the practical skills he has acquired here would appear to be readily transferable and may assist him to locate employment there. [47] Finally, it is submitted that the appellant’s deportation, if upheld, would affect his future ability to travel. This concern is acknowledged. It may be that his deportation will have consequences if he wishes to travel overseas in the future. Having to declare that he had been deported from New Zealand would mean that he would be unlikely to automatically qualify for visas to visit or work in New Zealand or other countries. However, this a routine consequence for persons who become liable for deportation through being served with a DLN. Neither this outcome, or its impact on the specific appellant, can be considered exceptional. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [48] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” is a high threshold and cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”: see [APPELLANT] at [45]. [49] The appellant has spent the last three years living and working in New Zealand and wants to remain here to pursue a future in this country. He lives in a region that relies on tourism and hospitality and can struggle to secure and retain hospitality workers, and he is contributing through his employment in this sector. The appellant has developed connections to New Zealand, principally through his involvement in several [NAME], and, notably, he has

15 a familial nexus through a number of [NAME] family who have settled in the South Island with their families. [50] The appellant is 25 years of age and has been in New Zealand for a reasonably short period of time of some three years, and there is nothing about his circumstances as disclosed; in particular his contribution through employment and to the community, his wider settlement and integration in this country, or his connections through his New Zealand-based extended family, that establishes that his circumstances are exceptional in nature. His strong desire to remain in New Zealand is not well outside the normal run of circumstances for temporary visa holders. [51] The Tribunal accepts that a return to India will entail disappointment and possible distress for the appellant, and it will likely also be disappointing for his family, who shared in his desire to develop his future in New Zealand. However, the appellant has only held temporary visas with no right to remain here. A return to India was always a foreseeable possibility, no matter how unwelcome, and the emotional and practical impact of his departure from New Zealand and return to life in India, in the current circumstances, while a compassionate factor, is nothing more. [52] Having considered all of the appellant’s circumstances as disclosed, the Tribunal finds that, when considered both individually and cumulatively, they do not meet the high threshold required for exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. DETERMINATION [53] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [54] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test.

16 Exercise of Discretion to Order Delay of Deportation (Section 216) [55] The Tribunal has considered whether to exercise its discretion under section 216(1) of the Act, to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa to the appellant for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. [56] The High Court has held that the phrase “getting affairs in order” means “organising those personal, legal or financial matters that, by reason of personal need or obligation (legal or moral) must be attended to so that deportation will not leave the individual concerned, or those associated with him or her, disadvantaged”; see Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v [APPELLANT] [2018] NZHC 272, [2018] NZAR 434 at [20]. [57] As the appeal has been unsuccessful, the appellant’s existing visa will be cancelled 28 days after the date of this decision (see section 64(1)(ab) and section 175A(2)(b)(ii) of the Act) or upon the grant of the visa ordered by the Tribunal, whichever occurs first. [58] Pursuant to section 216(1)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a work visa, for a period of three months, commencing on the date of this decision. This will allow him to remain in New Zealand lawfully while getting his affairs in order. [59] In particular, this order is to enable the appellant to continue in his employment whilst making any financial arrangements that may be necessary for his return to India. It will also give his employer time to recruit a replacement employee. [60] Sections 10(3)(a)(i) and 175A(2)(b)(ii) of the Act provide that, if an unsuccessful appellant does not depart from New Zealand within 28 days of the Tribunal’s decision (or any appeal therefrom), he will be deemed to be deported on departure. However, the appellant should note that the Act is silent as to whether an order by the Tribunal under section 216, delaying deportation or ordering the grant of a temporary visa, overrides or extends the 28-day rule or whether any such order is subject to sections 10(3)(a)(i) and 175A(2)(b)(ii), so that the appellant is still deemed to be deported even though the Tribunal has ordered that a visa be granted. [61] The view of Immigration New Zealand was set out in its submissions attached to AC (Argentina) [2020] NZIPT 504915. It regards section 216(1) as being subject to sections 10(3)(a)(i) and 175A(2)(b)(ii) when a person is being deported for cause (section 157). This means that even where the Tribunal makes an order granting a

17 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member temporary visa, Immigration New Zealand may deem the appellant to be deported on departure after 28 days. In Immigration New Zealand’s Visa Pak Issue 564 — Immigration New Zealand Position Where the Immigration and Protection Tribunal has Made a S216 Order (1 December 2023), Immigration New Zealand stated that a deportation order may be served during the currency of a section 216 visa but that this would be determined on a case-by-case basis. The appellant may wish to seek legal advice on this point. Removal of Period of Prohibited Entry (Section 215) [62] Pursuant to section 215(1) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the prospective period of prohibition on entry to New Zealand that may otherwise apply under section 179 be removed. This order is made so that the appellant is not precluded from being granted a visa, should he make a successful visa application in the future, given that he has family living here. The grant of any such future visa is entirely a decision for Immigration New Zealand. [63] The appeal is declined in the above terms. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member