Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Deportation Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507098 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted] only)

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 16 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 37-year-old citizen of Tuvalu, against his liability for deportation which arose when he became unlawfully present in New Zealand. THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue on appeal is whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature stemming from the appellant’s desire to remain in New Zealand and circumstances of return to Tuvalu. [3] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal declines the appeal. However, the Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a six-month work visa for the purpose of getting his affairs in order in anticipation of his return to Tuvalu.

2

BACKGROUND [4] The appellant is a single man. His father is from Vaitupu island and continues to live there. His mother died about 15 years ago and the appellant’s only sibling, a younger brother, is currently living in Australia. [5] Prior to traveling to New Zealand, in October 2024, the appellant lived with [NAME] in Funafuti and held employment there. [6] The appellant arrived in New Zealand as the holder of a six-month visitor visa. He had previously made one trip to New Zealand for a week in May 2023. [7] On 12 May 2025, the appellant lodged this appeal against his deportation liability after his visitor visa had expired. STATUTORY GROUNDS [8] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [9] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34]. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [10] The appellant’s case is set out in evidence lodged with the Tribunal on 8 May 2025 and 1 August 2025 and can be summarised as follows:

3 (a) The appellant struggles to survive in Tuvalu. He is forced to live with [NAME] in Funafuti as that was where he could find work. While he previously held employment, the wages were so low that he struggled to meet his own needs and provide for his aging father. Since he has remained in New Zealand he has had to resign from his employment as a radio announcer in Tuvalu. It would be very hard for him to find employment again, if he has to return there. (b) The appellant came to New Zealand to find a better future and hoped to find employment which would be sufficient to support both himself and his father. There are many more health and other services in New Zealand than in Tuvalu. Materials and Documents [11] In support of his appeal, the appellant provides a written statement and support letters from friends, family and leaders in the community. ASSESSMENT [12] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand files in relation to his temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [13] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [APPELLANT] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. The appellant’s circumstances in New Zealand [14] The appellant arrived in New Zealand in October 2024 as the holder of a visitor visa to visit friends and family and has remained here for the last 18 months. In his statement to the Tribunal, the appellant articulates his desire to remain in New Zealand where it is easier to meet his basic needs and where he sees a more financially secure future.

4 [15] The appellant has no immediate family recorded as living in New Zealand. While here, he has been living with his [NAME] who has provided a letter of support. [NAME] affirms the appellant’s good character and recounts how he has been helping with caring for [NAME]’s children by taking them to and from school. Other support letters provided have commented on the appellant’s strong relationship with the children, reflecting on his ability to build a relationship where they seek his advice and support. [16] The appellant has also joined the [NAME] and a [NAME] where he is a member of the [NAME], organising fundraisers and supporting the [NAME]. In addition, the appellant formed a [COMPANY] to keep young people in positive and constructive activities and has lent his talents as a cultural attire designer to the [NAME]. The Tribunal accepts that the appellant would likely positively contribute to his community if he were to remain in New Zealand. Country conditions in Tuvalu [17] The generalised effects of climate change in Tuvalu have also been mentioned in the appellant’s support letters and, as briefly set out below, are relevant to the circumstances of his return to the country. [18] The Tribunal has addressed the general conditions in Tuvalu in a number of recent decisions, including Taloka [2024] NZIPT 506477, Limoni [2023] NZIPT 505874 and Tamatoa [2024] NZIPT 506284–285. As the Tribunal states in Taloka at [36]: … life in Tuvalu, a small country comprised of nine low-lying islands and atolls and a population of approximately 11,000 people, has become increasingly difficult. Problems confronting those in Tuvalu include the impacts of climate change (a source of distress for many there), population growth and density (which places pressure on Tuvalu’s limited natural resources and causes increased waste generation and pollution), challenges in growing food (which has led to reliance on food imports), critical water shortages in times of drought, increasing poverty, limited and overcrowded housing, and high unemployment. The appellant’s circumstances in Tuvalu [19] The appellant’s only immediate family consists of his father and a brother who no longer lives in Tuvalu. His father remains living on Vaitupu island (which is about 130 kilometres from Funafuti). Like many of the country’s residents, the appellant migrated to Funafuti to find employment. This meant that he lived with

5 [NAME] in housing described by the appellant as crowded and lacking bedrooms. [20] The appellant has stated that he struggled to cover his costs and support his father with his employment as a radio announcer. The appellant states he has no right to ancestral land. The specific details of the father’s circumstances in Vaitupu have not been disclosed to the Tribunal, although the appellant reports that his father is still living there, and the appellant grew up on the island. [21] The appellant is renowned for his talent in dance and traditional attire design and has developed a network through his [COMPANY] and past teaching of dance in Tuvalu. He and his [COMPANY] have performed at important national functions and the appellant has represented Tuvalu internationally at a cultural exposition. This and other previously established communities will be available to him on his return. The appellant continues to have a strong nexus to Tuvalu, a country where he was born and raised, lived throughout his adult years and where his father continues to live. [22] The Tribunal accepts that if the appellant were to remain in New Zealand, he would likely be in a better financial position which would enable him to also support his father. However, the Tribunal notes that in terms of the support of his father, the appellant’s brother in Australia also has some responsibility. In New Zealand, the appellant would have greater employment opportunities with higher levels of remuneration and an improved standard of living than in Tuvalu. However, these factors are not sufficient to establish exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. As the High Court held in [NAME] v Chief Executive of Department of Labour [1995] NZAR 509 (HC) at pp529–530: Mere economic betterment — the fact a person can live more comfortably in New Zealand than elsewhere — perhaps with employment instead of unemployment — is not the type of humanitarian consideration in contemplation in the statute. … [23] Nor does the evidence demonstrate that the appellant would be unable to meet his basic needs or that he would face a level of deprivation that would put his wellbeing at risk of harm. The appellant has previously found employment and he has not demonstrated that he would be unable to find employment again. He has also demonstrated the capacity to build community and use his skills and talents for the community, both in New Zealand and Tuvalu. While the appellant states that he has no property of his own, he has previously lived with his father on Vaitupu Island and had the support of extended relatives in Funafuti with whom he shared rental accommodation.

6 [24] The Tribunal accepts that conditions in Tuvalu are difficult, even for those only facing the generalised impact of climate change on the country. However, broad humanitarian concerns are not sufficient under the statutory test, and the Tribunal must be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [25] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has also noted “the high threshold” for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature; see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45]. [26] While recognising the appellant’s concern at his prospects on return to Tuvalu and his hope to live in New Zealand, the Tribunal finds that the appellant’s circumstances do not meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. His circumstances are not “well outside the normal run of circumstances”; [NAME] v Minister of Immigration (supra). DETERMINATION [27] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [28] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test. [29] The appellant has failed to meet the requirements of section 207(1) of the Act and his appeal is declined. Exercise of Discretion (section 216) [30] The Tribunal has considered whether to exercise its discretion under section 216(1) of the Act, to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa to the appellant for the purposes of getting his affairs in order.

7 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member [31] The High Court has held that the phrase “getting affairs in order” means “organising those personal, legal or financial matters that, by reason of personal need or obligation (legal or moral) must be attended to so that deportation will not leave the individual concerned, or those associated with him or her, disadvantaged”: see Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Singh [2018] NZHC 272, [2018] NZAR 434 at [20]. [32] Pursuant to section 216(1)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a work visa, for a period of six months, commencing on the date of this decision. This is because the appellant will face costs in returning to Tuvalu and establishing himself there and will need to fund the initial period of transition until he is able to find employment. [33] The appeal is declined in the above terms. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member