Indian Truck Driver's Humanitarian Appeal to Stay in NZ Rejected

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507138 RŌPŪ [NAME_1], [NAME_8]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: Judge M Treadwell (Chair)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Decision: 22 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 55-year-old citizen of India. His appeal was lodged at the same time as his refugee and protected person appeal. Having dismissed the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal in [NAME_2] (India) [2026] NZIPT 802961, the Tribunal must now consider the humanitarian appeal. THE ISSUE [2] The appellant advanced his refugee and protected person appeal on the ground that, as a truck driver from the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir, he had an altercation with another driver who, it transpired, has links to [NAME_5] and who is now said to be searching for the appellant.

2 [3] The Tribunal dismissed the appeal because it found that he was not at risk in his home region in India because the chance of encountering the man again was no more than remote and speculative. Further, the appellant could relocate to another part of India, well away from the man, where he would not be at any risk. The Tribunal identified cities such as Amritsar, Ludhiana or Jalandhar (all in the Punjab) or further afield in Delhi as examples of such sites of relocation. [4] The primary issue on the present appeal is whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand. [5] For the reason which follow, the Tribunal declines the appeal.

BACKGROUND [6] The appellant was born into a [NAME_3] in Jammu city, Jammu and Kashmir, in 1970. He has two younger brothers and an elder sister. He is married with three children. [7] In 1983, the appellant completed school and became a commercial vehicle driver. He drove all over Jammu and Kashmir, transporting produce. Occasionally, he drove to Delhi. [8] In February 2019, a militant carried out a suicide bomb attack against a convoy of Indian army personnel on a road through Kashmir. It killed 40 soldiers. After the attack, the army stepped up its security procedures, including searches and detention of suspected individuals. The militants responded by harassing drivers travelling through Kashmir. The appellant continued to drive through Kashmir and, at times, was stopped by supporters of the anti-government forces, who demanded that he return to India. [9] On 10 September 2022, the appellant was involved in a traffic accident with a truck, driven by [NAME_4], who tried to overtake the appellant and broke a side mirror on his vehicle. The appellant made a loud remark from his window, which resulted in a heated argument, during which [NAME_4] left his vehicle and attacked the appellant with an iron rod, breaking the windows of the appellant’s vehicle. [NAME_4] hit the appellant over the head with a large metal wrench. Although the appellant’s turban absorbed part of the blow, he was injured and started to bleed.

3 [10] When the police arrived, they collected the registration documents from the appellant’s and [NAME_4]’s vehicles, but allowed them to leave to be summoned to a police station at a later date. The police assisted the appellant to a [COMPANY_7], where he received seven stitches to his head. [11] Following the incident, the appellant helped the police compile a report. This resulted in [NAME_4] being dismissed from his employment, and his employer financially compensating the appellant for injuries and damages incurred as a result of the incident. The amount of compensation was Rs4,000. This was negotiated by the appellant’s employer, who called the police station and told the police that the appellant should receive monetary compensation for the damages and injury caused by [NAME_4]. [12] Approximately four to five days after the incident, the appellant returned to the police station, some 150 kilometres from where he lived, to collect the registration documents for his truck. When he entered the station, he ran into [NAME_4]’s employer, who informed him that [NAME_4] was associated with [NAME_5], and that the appellant should be careful. [13] Following the incident, the appellant took leave for approximately six weeks. When he returned to work, he limited his routes to other areas, where it was generally colder in winter. As he now had a head injury, he was especially sensitive to cold weather. Subsequently, he decided he should depart India. [14] The appellant submitted an application for a visa for Australia through an agent. The agent suggested that he apply for Australia as the job market was better there. However, when this visa was declined, the agent suggested New Zealand. [15] In May 2023, the appellant submitted his New Zealand visa application. While he was waiting, he was informed by his friends that [NAME_4] was actively searching for him on the road. [16] On 13 June 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. [17] There is no further information provided on this appeal, save that the appeal form records the appellant as living in a small North Island town and that his wife remains living in India. It also appears that the appellant has a son, aged 30, currently in New Zealand on a work visa, a daughter living in Canada and a

4 daughter living in India. The appellant’s parents, his two brothers and his sister continue to reside in India. STATUTORY GROUNDS [18] This appeal is brought under subsections 194(5) and (6) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”) and was lodged at the same time as the appellant’s refugee and protected person status appeal. The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [19] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand; Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [20] On 9 March 2026, the Tribunal advised the appellant that: “Any further information which you wish to lodge in relation to your humanitarian appeal must be received by the Tribunal within 10 working days of the date of this email. If the Tribunal allows the appeal, it may grant either a resident visa or a temporary visa. If the Tribunal does not allow the appeal, it may still delay your deportation, or order the grant of a temporary visa, for up to 12 months if it is necessary in order to allow you to get your affairs in order. If you wish to make submissions on the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion under s216 to delay your deportation, or to order the grant of a temporary visa, you should do so within the 10 working days, so that the Tribunal can [NAME_1] your views into account.” [21] The appellant made no response.

5 [22] The appellant has provided no submissions on appeal and has provided no further information concerning his case. The section which invited the appellant to record the reasons for the appeal was left entirely blank. The narrative at [6]−[16] above is drawn predominantly from the evidence he provided in the course of his refugee and protected person claim. [23] In the absence of any material regarding the basis of the appellant’s humanitarian appeal against deportation, the Tribunal will proceed on the basis that the appellant’s circumstances are as provided in connection with his refugee and protected person appeal and presumes that that claim is maintained. [24] Accordingly, it is presumed that the appellant maintains that: (a) In 2019, he was sometimes stopped and harassed by militants in Kashmir, who demanded that he return to India. He was not harmed. (b) In September 2022, his truck was struck by [NAME_4]’s truck, leading to a heated argument. The appellant’s vehicle’s windows were broken and he was hit over the head with a wrench causing a wound which bled. The police helped the appellant to a hospital, where he had stitches to his head. (c) The appellant helped the police compile a report. [NAME_4] was dismissed from his employment. (d) Some days after the incident, the appellant was told by [NAME_4]’s employer, that [NAME_4] was associated with [NAME_5] and he should be careful. (e) In May 2023, the appellant was informed by friends that [NAME_4] was actively searching for him on the road. While in New Zealand, he again heard from friends in India that [NAME_4] was still enquiring about him. [25] Most of the appellant’s family, including his wife and parents, remain living in India. One daughter lives in Canada and one son is temporarily in New Zealand.

6 ASSESSMENT [26] The Tribunal has considered Immigration New Zealand’s file in relation to the appellant’s temporary visa applications, its relevant electronic records and his refugee and protected person status appeal file. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [27] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”; Ye v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. Claimed risk of harm in India [28] As noted above, it is presumed that the appellant continues to assert a risk of harm from [NAME_4] in the Jammu region, who is angry with him over the loss of his employment. There is no further information given. [29] Section 231 of the Act provides: 231 Findings of credibility and fact (1) On any appeal or matter, the Tribunal may rely on any finding of credibility or fact— (a) by the Tribunal in any previous appeal or matter determined by the Tribunal that involved the appellant or affected person; or (b) by any appeals body in any previous appeal or matter determined by the appeals body that involved the appellant or affected person. (2) A person may not challenge any finding of credibility or fact that may be relied on by the Tribunal under subsection (1). [30] No material or submissions have been provided in relation to this humanitarian appeal which persuade the Tribunal to revisit the findings of credibility and fact made in relation to the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal. Those findings are relied on in this decision. However, the Tribunal reminds itself that, in this appeal, the focus is on whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand.

7 [31] Adopting the findings of fact and credibility in [NAME_2] (India), the Tribunal finds that the appellant has not established that he is at risk of harm if returned to India. There is therefore nothing in relation to his refugee and protected person appeal that requires further consideration in regard to his humanitarian circumstances. [32] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant holds concerns about [NAME_4] in Jammu. That concern has been addressed by the Tribunal in the course of its decision on his refugee and protected person appeal. There, the Tribunal found that he is not at risk of serious harm in India because it is no more than speculative that he would ever encounter [NAME_4] again. It would involve the appellant resuming work as a truck driver (which he is not obliged to do) and having the misfortune to be on the same road as [NAME_4], at the same time, and there would have to be conditions in which [NAME_4] was able to approach the appellant. It would not, for example, suffice that he passed the appellant going in the opposite direction. As of 2023 to 2024, there were 36,282 registered commercial vehicles in Jammu and Kashmir, according to “Vehicle Count in Jammu and Kashmir Doubles in Eight Years” [NAME_6] (22 February 2025) and over 41,000 kilometres of roading in that state, according to “J&K Road Network Crosses 41,000 km, Boosting Connectivity in Border Districts” [NAME_6] (6 February 2026). The prospect of [NAME_4] encountering the appellant in a way in which he could cause him harm is no more than speculative and remote. [33] Further, there are other safe places for the appellant to live, such as Delhi or any one of the major cities in the Punjab, such as Jalandhar, Ludhiana or Amritsar. There are millions of Sikhs living in the Punjab, including (according to the 2011 census) over 465,000 in Ludhiana, 185,000 in Jalandhar, 550,000 in Amritsar and 570,000 in Delhi. The appellant has previously worked as a truck driver, experience which would stand him in good stead in finding employment and getting settled. [34] While the appellant presumably does not want to live elsewhere in India (explaining his appeal to remain in New Zealand), such a desire does not, without more, constitute exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. Extent of settlement in New Zealand [35] The appellant has been living and working in New Zealand for nearly three years (having arrived here in July 2023). It is assumed that he currently has a settled existence in New Zealand, but there is nothing, on the information

8 available to the Tribunal, that suggests that the nature or quality of his settlement here can be described as exceptional. His desire to remain in New Zealand (implicit in his lodgement of an appeal) is also unexceptional. Circumstances in India [36] It is expected that, if the appellant returns to India, he will be able to resume his life with his wife there. He will also be reunited there with his daughter, his parents, his brothers and his sister. He will be able to seek work and resume life there without undue difficulty. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [37] For the foregoing reasons, assessed cumulatively, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional humanitarian circumstances in the appellant’s case. DETERMINATION [38] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [39] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test. [40] The appeal is declined. No Exercise of Discretion to Reduce or Remove Period of Prohibited Entry Under Deportation Order or to Delay Deportation or Grant a Temporary Visa [41] There are no reasons advanced on appeal or identified by the Tribunal which require the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion under section 215 or section 216 of the Act to alter the period of prohibition on re-entry or to find that extra time is required for him to get his affairs in order. Neither order is made.

9 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

Judge M Treadwell Chair Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [42] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. This is because the decision refers to the appellant’s refugee and protected person claim and the confidentiality provisions in section 151 of the Act apply. “Judge M Treadwell” Judge M Treadwell Chair