Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Appeal for Deportation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 506980 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 15 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT] aged in his mid-20s. His appeal was lodged at the same time as his refugee and protected person appeal. Having dismissed the refugee and protected person appeal, the Tribunal must now consider the humanitarian appeal. THE ISSUE [2] The appellant advanced his refugee and protected person appeal on the ground that he was at risk of harm in [APPELLANT] because of his status as a [NAME] convert. The same claim is repeated here. [3] In addition, the appellant claims that the level of his settlement in New Zealand, and the difficulties he would face obtaining employment in [APPELLANT] give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature.

2 [4] The primary issues on appeal are whether the Tribunal should rely on its previous finding that the appellant’s claim to have converted to Christianity in [APPELLANT] was not credible, and whether the balance of issues the appellant raises (his settlement here and expected employment difficulties in [APPELLANT]) give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. [5] For reasons which follow, the Tribunal determines to rely on its previous findings regarding the appellant’s Christianity and finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The appeal is declined. [APPELLANT] [6] The appellant was born into the Hindu faith. He is from X city in Jammu and Kashmir where his parents and two [NAME] remain. [7] In June 2023, the appellant applied for a visitor visa which was granted. He travelled to New Zealand in August 2023 and in September 2023 lodged a claim for refugee and protected person status. He claimed to be at risk in [APPELLANT] because of his conversion to Christianity. [8] The appellant’s refugee and protection claim was declined by the [NAME] ([NAME]). His appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal in March 2026: See DI ([APPELLANT]) [2026] NZIPT 802842. STATUTORY GROUNDS [9] This appeal is brought under subsections 194(5) and (6) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”) and was lodged at the same time as the appellant’s refugee and protected person status appeal. The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand.

3 [10] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the [NAME] Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [11] The appellant’s case is set out in counsel’s submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 7 April 2026 and can be summarised as follows: (a) The appellant maintains his claim that he is at risk of serious harm on return to [APPELLANT] because of his [NAME] faith. He disagrees with the Tribunal’s findings in relation to his faith and maintains that he is a [NAME] and his beliefs are genuine and important to him. (b) Deportation would cause the appellant to lose the stability he has built in New Zealand, including the community he lives in and the employment he has here. He would also lose the connection with and support of people he knows in New Zealand. (c) The appellant would face difficulties if he were to return to X city in Jammu and Kashmir. There are problems there including acute drinking water shortages and prolonged power cuts. In addition, there is an economic and employment crisis in Jammu and Kashmir. There are very high levels of unemployment. This would affect the appellant who has limited prospects and would likely be pushed into informal or insecure work, significantly affecting his ability to support himself and live with dignity. In contrast, he has stability and employment in New Zealand. (d) The humanitarian circumstances relied on place the appellant’s situation outside the normal run of cases for persons liable for deportation and meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature.

4 [12] In support of the present appeal, the appellant provides the following documents: (a) A bundle of country information concerning conditions in X city and unemployment in [APPELLANT] generally. ASSESSMENT [13] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered Immigration New Zealand file in relation to the appellant’s temporary visa applications, its relevant electronic records and his refugee and protected person status appeal file. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [14] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. Claimed risk of harm in [APPELLANT] [15] The appellant continues to assert a risk of harm in [APPELLANT] because of his conversion to and practice of Christianity. [16] In determining the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal, the Tribunal made the following findings of credibility and fact: (a) The appellant was not a credible witness in relation to his refugee and protected person claim. (b) The appellant was not baptised in [APPELLANT]. (c) No weight can be given to the appellant’s claim to have attended a [NAME] in [APPELLANT]. (d) No weight can be given to the appellant’s claims to have been subjected to attacks by local [NAME] in Jammu. (e) The appellant presented no credible evidence of any genuine religious practice on his part in New Zealand.

5 (f) The appellant is not a genuine [NAME] convert. [17] Section 231 of the Act provides: 231 Findings of credibility and fact (1) On any appeal or matter, the Tribunal may rely on any finding of credibility or fact— (a) by the Tribunal in any previous appeal or matter determined by the Tribunal that involved the appellant or affected person; or (b) by any [NAME] in any previous appeal or matter determined by the [NAME] that involved the appellant or affected person. (2) A person may not challenge any finding of credibility or fact that may be relied on by the Tribunal under subsection (1). [18] Counsel’s submissions invite the Tribunal to revisit the findings of fact and credibility it made in DI ([APPELLANT]) concerning the appellant’s claimed conversion to and practice of Christianity. Reference is made to the appellant’s consistency concerning his account of his baptism, evidence provided regarding the variety of baptism practices, and the appellant’s belief that he needed to be baptised again in New Zealand because he had no documentary evidence of his baptism in [APPELLANT]. Reference is also made to the appellant adequately addressing concerns relating to his faith and involvement in the church in [APPELLANT]. It is submitted that the Tribunal was incorrect to place no weight on this aspect of his claim. Further, the appellant stands by his claim to have been attacked by [NAME] in [APPELLANT] on two occasions. [19] The Tribunal questioned the appellant in person during a full day hearing of his refugee and protection appeal. It also questioned his witness, his [NAME]. The Tribunal’s findings regarding the appellant’s claimed conversion and practice of Christianity in New Zealand followed an assessment of his evidence, and an assessment of his responses when given the opportunity to comment on and clarify the inconsistencies that arose in his evidence and the matters that appeared to be implausible. Counsel elected not to re-examine the appellant on any aspect of his evidence during that hearing. The Tribunal accepts, as submitted and supported by witness statements, that the practice of baptism can vary. This does not negate the Tribunal’s credibility concerns regarding the appellant’s evidence about baptism, church attendance in [APPELLANT], practice of Christianity in both countries, and the claimed attacks.

6 [20] The Tribunal is not persuaded to revisit the findings of credibility and fact made in relation to the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal. Those findings are relied on in this decision. However, the Tribunal reminds itself that, in this appeal, the focus is on whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand. [21] Adopting the findings of fact and credibility in DI ([APPELLANT]), the Tribunal finds that the appellant has not established that he is at risk of serious harm if returned to [APPELLANT]. [22] In addition to questioning the findings made on the refugee and protected person appeal, the appellant claims that his deportation would give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature due to his level of settlement and support in New Zealand and instability and the lack of employment opportunities in Jammu. It is to those matters the decision now turns. Extent of settlement in New Zealand [23] The appellant has been living in New Zealand for over two and a half years. It is submitted that he has built stability here including the community he lives in and the employment opportunities available to him. At the refugee and protection appeal hearing, the appellant gave evidence about his circumstances in New Zealand. He said that he was doing orchard work and had had the same job for between one and a half and two years. He also said that he lived in a flatting situation and had recently changed flats in order to live somewhere cheaper. He had attended three different churches in his area on a number of occasions each, but gave no evidence of any particular connections he had made at church, other than text messages he received from a member of one of those churches encouraging him to attend. [24] There is no evidence before the Tribunal of any particularly close relationships the appellant has formed in New Zealand. It is accepted however that he has had stable employment and has been living in the same community and will have formed connections and achieved a level of settlement commensurate having spent several years in the same place. [25] There is nothing about the appellant’s level of settlement in New Zealand that is uncommon, out of the normal run of things, or suggests a level of connection that would give rise to humanitarian concerns.

7 Circumstances in home country [26] As noted earlier, the appellant is from X city in Jammu. His father and mother (a farmer and a housewife) and [NAME] remain there. At the time of the appellant’s [NAME] interview (August 2024) his [NAME] were employed as a chef and driver respectively. The appellant gave evidence that he maintains contact with his family and speaks to his mother once or twice a month, although can go for two months without contact. He sends them some financial support when needed. The appellant was living at home before he came to New Zealand, apart from a claimed period of approximately three months when he stayed with an [NAME] in Jammu city. It is expected that should the appellant return to [APPELLANT] he will resume living with his family in X city or with other relatives, such as his [NAME] in Jammu city. [27] Two articles about conditions in X city filed in support of this appeal indicate that there are issues there relating to unemployment, interruptions in the power and water supply and other administrative difficulties: “[NAME]” [NAME] (7 January 2026); and “[NAME] [NAME] by People in Daily Life” [NAME] (23 February 2026). The latter article notes the concerns raised by a politician regarding the growing hardships faced by traders and the business community. Further country information filed concerns the high unemployment rates in Jammu and Kashmir and difficulties that Kashmiri Muslims in particular have in relocating outside of the area. Further articles filed concern the lack of opportunities and jobs for graduates in [APPELLANT]. [28] Before coming to New Zealand, the appellant was employed as a salesman for a [NAME] in X city. It is accepted that this employment will no longer be available to him and that obtaining employment in Jammu and Kashmir may be difficult given the high unemployment rate there. However, the appellant will be returning to [APPELLANT] having had the opportunity to work and save in New Zealand. He will be able to live with his family, and there is nothing before the Tribunal to suggest that they will not provide him with support. [29] It is accepted that the appellant may face a lower standard of living in [APPELLANT] than in New Zealand, that he may have difficulty obtaining employment and that his return to [APPELLANT] may entail some level of hardship. However, in [NAME] v Chief Executive of Department of Labour [1995] NZAR 509 (HC) at 529–530, the High Court noted that:

8 Mere economic betterment — the fact a person can live more comfortably in New Zealand than elsewhere — perhaps with employment instead of unemployment — is not the type of humanitarian consideration in contemplation in the statute. [30] [ADDRESS] went on to observe that the assessment of economic harm as a potential humanitarian circumstance is contextual; while poverty, of itself, may not meet the requisite statutory threshold, “[p]overty, starvation, and disease might do so”, as such would have an element of physical or emotional harm. [31] The appellant has not established that the difficulties he will face in [APPELLANT] are at the level where they would cause him physical or emotional harm. His circumstances in [APPELLANT], while challenging, are not established to be so difficult that his basic needs would not be met. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [32] For the foregoing reasons, assessed cumulatively, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances in the appellant’s case. DETERMINATION [33] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [34] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test. Reduction or Removal of the Period of Prohibited Entry [35] The Tribunal has considered whether to reduce or remove the period of prohibition on entry to New Zealand pursuant to section 215(1) of the Act but declines to do so.

9 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Discretion to Delay Deportation or Grant a Temporary Visa [36] The Tribunal has considered whether to exercise its discretion under section 216(1) of the Act, to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa to the appellant for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. He is living in a flatting situation and working in an orchard. He has had the benefit of the same employment for nearly two years. He has a family to return to in [APPELLANT]. There is nothing before the Tribunal concerning his circumstances that suggests he requires a visa or a delay in deportation in order to get his affairs in order. [37] The Tribunal determines not to delay the deportation of the appellant pursuant to section 216(1)(a) of the Act or to order the grant of a temporary visa pursuant to section 216(1)(b) of the Act. [38] The appeal is declined in the above terms. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [39] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. This is because the decision discusses his refugee and protection appeal and therefore engages the confidentiality provisions in section 151 of the Act. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member