Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Appeal Against Deportation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507210 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 28 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 30-year-old citizen of [APPELLANT]. His appeal was lodged at the same time as his refugee and protected person appeal. Having declined the refugee and protected person appeal, the Tribunal must now consider the humanitarian appeal. THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue on appeal is whether the appellant’s fear of harm and other circumstances amount to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. [3] The Tribunal finds that the appellant’s circumstances do not meet the high statutory test of exceptional humanitarian circumstances. The appeal is declined.

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BACKGROUND [4] The appellant is a single man who arrived in New Zealand in early August 2023 as the holder of a visitor visa. In September 2023, the appellant lodged his claim for refugee and protected person status with the [NAME]. On 13 September 2023, the appellant was granted an asylum seeker work visa, valid for one year. This was later extended. He holds a current work visa valid until 30 January 2027. After interviewing the appellant, the [NAME] declined the appellant’s claim by decision dated 19 June 2025. The Tribunal received his appeal against this decision on 3 July 2025. [5] The Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the decline of his claim on 17 March 2026; see [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) [2026] NZIPT 803051. STATUTORY GROUNDS [6] This appeal is brought under subsections 194(5) and (6) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [7] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [8] The appellant’s case is set out in the submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 30 March 2026 and can be summarised as follows:

3 (a) The appellant has become settled in New Zealand, which he now considers to be his home. He is in employment and is committed to his work which provides him with not just an income but a means to a dignified life. (b) He has formed meaningful connections with people through his work and daily life in New Zealand. (c) If he is required to leave New Zealand and to return to live in [APPELLANT], he will face serious hardship including “uncertainty about my safety, livelihood, and future.” [9] In support of the present appeal, the appellant provides a letter (26 March 2026) from a work colleague who speak highly of him, noting his humility, honesty, and hard-working nature. He states that the appellant is someone who “adds value” to the workplace and his wider community. ASSESSMENT [10] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered Immigration New Zealand’s relevant electronic records and his refugee and protected person status appeal file. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [11] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. [12] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has noted “the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature”; see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45].

4 Claimed risk of harm in [APPELLANT] [13] The appellant’s refugee and protection claim centred on an asserted risk of harm from local members of the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) because of his religion as a Muslim, and because he has protected his father, who had been the [NAME] of the [NAME] in their area, from their threats. While the appellant does not continue to directly assert such a risk in this appeal, insofar as the appellant refers in his letter of 30 March 2026 to uncertainty around his “safety”, for completeness’ sake, the Tribunal notes that, in determining the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal, the Tribunal found that the evidence does not establish a risk of the appellant suffering harm entitling him to protection as refugee or as a protected person was any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility. Furthermore, he could avoid any risk to him by moving elsewhere in [APPELLANT]; see [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) at [50], [62]–[63] and [71]–[78]. [14] No material or submissions have been provided in relation to this humanitarian appeal which persuade the Tribunal to revisit the findings of credibility and fact made in relation to the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal. Those findings are relied on in this decision; see section 231 of the Act. Other circumstances in [APPELLANT] [15] No information has been provided about the appellant’s wider circumstances in [APPELLANT]. What is clear, however, is that he has lived most of his life in [APPELLANT]. Further, according to Immigration New Zealand’s electronic records, the appellant’s parents continue to live in [APPELLANT]. He told the [NAME] that he has been in regular contact with them since bring in New Zealand. Extent of settlement in New Zealand [16] The appellant has been living in New Zealand for approximately two-and-a-half years. He has no family living here. Nevertheless, the letter provided to the Tribunal from the appellant and his work colleague establish that the appellant has a network of friends and acquaintances here and may well have become integrated into the [NAME]. He is also working. These relationships will be disrupted should he be deported and both the appellant and his friends can be expected to feel some upset at this disruption.

5 Discussion of exceptional humanitarian circumstances [17] The appellant’s deportation to [APPELLANT] will involve disruption to his current life in New Zealand. However, he has only been here for a short period of time and has no familial nexus to New Zealand. To the extent that he is established in his [NAME] and has a network of friends here, this degree of settlement in New Zealand is limited and far from exceptional, both on the evidence provided and in relation to the circumstances of temporary migrants generally. [18] As regards to his situation in [APPELLANT], his family remain living in [APPELLANT], where he has lived for most of his life. To the extent that the [NAME] remain interested in the appellant despite the passage of time, the appellant can avoid this interest by simply moving away and seek employment or establish a business in his new place of residence in [APPELLANT]. [19] As with the general Muslim population in [APPELLANT], the appellant may experience occasional discrimination his daily life and livelihood because of general inter-communal tensions and anti-Muslim prejudice. But there is no evidence to establish that this has caused him any significant hardship in the past such as might amount to a past exceptional circumstance of a humanitarian nature. There is no reason to think that it would do so in the future. Conclusion on exceptional circumstances [20] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant’s circumstances when assessed cumulatively on the limited information before the Tribunal, do not meet the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature as required by the decision in [NAME].

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional humanitarian circumstances in the appellant’s case. DETERMINATION [21] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [22] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test.

6 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member No Exercise of Discretion to Reduce or Remove Period of Prohibited Entry Under Deportation Order (Section 215) or to Delay Deportation or Grant a Temporary Visa (Section 216) [23] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal turns its mind to: (a) its absolute discretion under section 215(1) of the Act to order the reduction or removal of any period of prohibition on re-entry to New Zealand that might otherwise apply under section 179; and (b) its discretion under section 216(1), to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa where it considers it necessary to enable the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. [24] There are no reasons advanced on appeal or identified by the Tribunal which require the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion to alter the period of prohibition on re-entry or to find that extra time is required for him to get his affairs in order. Neither order is made. [25] The appeal is declined in the above terms. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [26] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. This is because the decision refers to the appellant’s claim for refugee and protected person status, to which confidentiality attaches under section 151 of the Act. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member