Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Grounds for Deportation Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507217−218 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, [NAME]: FP (India)

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for [NAME]: [NAME] represent themselves

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 24 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] These are humanitarian appeals by [NAME], respectively a [NAME] and a [NAME], both citizens of India. Their appeals were lodged at the same time as their refugee and protected person appeals. Having declined the refugee and protected person appeals, the Tribunal must now consider the humanitarian appeals. THE ISSUE [2] [NAME] advanced their refugee and protected person appeals on the ground that they were at risk of harm in India because of pressure from local Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) members for the husband in particular to switch his political allegiance to the BJP and support the local BJP candidate as he had supported a political rival in 2019. The same claim is repeated here. [3] The primary issue on appeal is whether [NAME] have established that either or both of them have exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature.

2 [4] The Tribunal finds that neither appellant has exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The appeals are dismissed.

BACKGROUND [5] [NAME] arrived in New Zealand in March 2023 as the holders of visitor visas. In September 2023, approximately two weeks after becoming unlawfully in New Zealand, [NAME] lodged their claims for refugee and protected person status with the Refugee Status Unit. On 13 October 2023, the wife was granted an asylum seeker work visa; the husband was granted his on 14 November 2023. These were later extended. The wife holds a current work visa valid until 18 August 2026; the husband’s work visa is current until 9 April 2027. After interviewing [NAME], the Refugee Status Unit declined [NAME]’ claims by decision dated 3 September 2025. On 7 July 2025, [NAME] lodged their appeals with the Tribunal against that decline of their claims. [6] Their refugee and protected person appeals were dismissed by the Tribunal in March 2026: see CY (India) [2026] NZIPT 803059−060. STATUTORY GROUNDS [7] This appeal is brought under subsections 194(5) and (6) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand.

3 [8] The Supreme Court stated that [NAME] ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104. [NAME]’ CASE [9] [NAME]’ case is set out in submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 20 April 2026. [NAME] are not legally represented and appear to believe that the current appeal is another chance to be recognised as refugees or protected persons as, in the submissions, they ask for such recognition by way of “relief sought”. [10] Regardless, [NAME] maintain their claims that they are at risk of serious harm on return to India because of the same reasons they advanced in support of their refugee and protected person claims. [11] To this, [NAME] add that they have exhausted their financial resources and rely on community support here, and that they live safely and peacefully here in New Zealand. Under the heading “Best Interests of the Children”, the submission refers to risks associated with “returning them” to India. The ‘them’ cannot refer to [NAME]’ two minor children (aged six and five years) as, in their appeal forms and in the course of their refugee and protected person claims, [NAME] indicated that their children remain living in India. The Tribunal reframes the submissions as being that it is in the best interests of their children for [NAME] — as the children’s parents — to be allowed to remain living in New Zealand because living in India with their parents would expose the children to unsafe conditions as well as psychological harm should the children witness violence against [NAME]. [12] No other documents have been filed in support of the present appeals.

4 ASSESSMENT [13] The Tribunal has considered the submissions provided by [NAME]. It has also considered Immigration New Zealand’s relevant electronic records and their refugee and protected person status appeal files. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [14] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. [15] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has noted “the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature”; see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45]. Claimed risk of harm in India [16] [NAME] continue to assert a risk of harm from local BJP members in India. In determining [NAME]’ refugee and protected person appeal, in CY (India), the Tribunal made the following findings of credibility and fact: (a) [NAME] have not in the past suffered serious harm arising from any breach of their rights. At most, it appears that they each have been subjected to intermittent and low-level harassment by local BJP members. Indeed, the primary focus appears to be on the husband; the wife has experienced only one direct instance of harassment, namely when she and the husband were harassed outside the home. (b) While, on one occasion, the BJP activists referred to [NAME] losing their lives this single utterance, while distressing, does not of itself constitute harm. Nor is there any evidence to indicate that the BJP activists have any intention of making good on this ‘threat’.

5 (c) [NAME]’ pollical activity was at a very low level and was many years ago now. There is no evidence that the BJP rival whom the husband supported in 2019 is even in India or, if he is, that he is currently, or will be, politically active in the future in their village or its surrounding area. (d) To the extent that [NAME] were fearful of the BJP, any risk to them was highly localised. There was no reason why they could not access and reside safely elsewhere in Haryana state such as Faridabad (2011 census population 1,809,733), Gurugram (2011 census population 1,514,432) or Rohtak (2011 census population 1,061,204) or further afield in Delhi with its population of over 34 million. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. Further, the basic human rights recognised by the Refugee Convention are available there. [17] Section 231 of the Act provides: 231 Findings of credibility and fact (1) On any appeal or matter, the Tribunal may rely on any finding of credibility or fact— (a) by the Tribunal in any previous appeal or matter determined by the Tribunal that involved the appellant or affected person; or (b) by any [NAME] in any previous appeal or matter determined by the [NAME] that involved the appellant or affected person. (2) A person may not challenge any finding of credibility or fact that may be relied on by the Tribunal under subsection (1). [18] No material or submissions have been provided in relation to this humanitarian appeal which persuade the Tribunal to revisit the findings of credibility and fact made in relation to [NAME]’ refugee and protected person appeal. Those findings are relied on in this decision. However, the Tribunal reminds itself that, in this appeal, the focus is on whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for [NAME] to be deported from New Zealand. [19] Adopting the findings of fact and credibility in CY (India), the Tribunal finds that [NAME] have not established that they are at risk of harm if returned to India.

6 Other circumstances in India [20] No information has been provided about [NAME]’ wider circumstances in India. What is clear, however, is that they have lived most of their lives in India. Further, according to Immigration New Zealand’s electronic records, the husband’s parents continue to live in India, as do the wife’s parents and [NAME]. Extent of settlement in New Zealand [21] [NAME] have been living in New Zealand for approximately [NAME] years. They have no family living here. Nevertheless, the Tribunal infers that [NAME] have a network of friends and acquaintances who are providing them with financial and other support. [NAME] may well be working given that they each hold a current work visa. These relationships will be disrupted should they be deported and both [NAME] and their friends can be expected to feel some upset at this disruption. Best interests of children [22] The best interests of [NAME]’ children are a primary consideration for the Tribunal in accordance with Article 3(1) of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The High Court has stated that the best interests of the child are neither paramount nor the primary consideration, but they are to be given important and genuine assessment: see [NAME] v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2012] NZHC 2599 at [32]. [23] [NAME] submit that it is in their children’s best interests for them, as their children’s parents, to be allowed to remain living in New Zealand because living as a family together in India would expose their children to unsafe living conditions and potentially psychological harm. [24] The submission is noted but, for the reasons already explained, the chance of the children being exposed to such harms is remote and speculative. If [NAME] are worried about such harm to the children, the risk of this arising can be mitigated by moving elsewhere in India. Also, in India, [NAME] will be reunited with their children who have now been deprived of direct contact with their parents for over half their young lives.

7 Discussion of exceptional humanitarian circumstances [25] [NAME]’ deportation to India will involve disruption to their current life in New Zealand. However, they have only been here for a short period of time and has no familial nexus to New Zealand. To the extent that they are established in their local community and have a network of friends here, this degree of settlement in New Zealand is limited and far from exceptional, both on the evidence provided and in relation to the circumstances of temporary migrants generally. [26] As regards to [NAME]’ situation in India, their children and other family remain living in India, where they have lived for most of their lives. To the extent that the local BJP members remain interested in the husband, [NAME] can avoid this interest by simply moving away and seeking employment or establishing a business in their new place of residence in India. Conclusion on exceptional circumstances [27] For the foregoing reasons, [NAME]’ circumstances when assessed cumulatively on the limited information before the Tribunal, do not meet the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature as required by the decision in [NAME]. This conclusion has been reached after considering their claimed predicament both singly and as a couple.

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional humanitarian circumstances in [NAME]’ case. DETERMINATION [28] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [29] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. That is the case for both appeals here. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test.

8 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Discretion to Reduce or Remove Period of Prohibited Entry (Section 215) or to Delay Deportation or Grant a Temporary Visa (Section 216) [30] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal turns its mind to: (a) its absolute discretion under section 215(1) of the Act to order the reduction or removal of any period of prohibition on re-entry to New Zealand that might otherwise apply under section 179; and (b) its discretion under section 216(1), to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa where it considers it necessary to enable the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. [31] There are no reasons advanced on appeal or identified by the Tribunal which require the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion to alter the period of prohibition on re-entry or to find that extra time is required for [NAME] to get their affairs in order. Neither order is made. [32] The appeals are declined in the above terms. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [33] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of [NAME]’ names and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of [NAME]. This is because the decision refers to [NAME]’ claims for refugee and protected person status, to which confidentiality attaches under section 151 of the Act. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member