Immigration Appeal: Humanitarian Grounds Rejected for Deportation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507285 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 30 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 33-[NAME]-old citizen of China, against her liability for deportation which arose when she became unlawfully in New Zealand. THE ISSUE [2] The central issue is whether there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances that would make it unjust or unduly harsh to deport the appellant having regard to her family’s intentions in New Zealand and her separation from her [NAME]. [3] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that the appellant has not established that her circumstances give rise to exceptional humanitarian circumstances. The appeal is declined.

2

BACKGROUND [4] The appellant and her husband wished to migrate their family to New Zealand, and to further that intention they travelled to New Zealand in March 2024 holding visitor visas valid until September 2024. They left their young son with the appellant’s parents whilst they arranged the resettlement. The couple were granted second visitor visas, which expired in March 2025. [5] The appellant secured an employment offer and applied for an accredited employer work visa in December 2024. The application was declined by Immigration New Zealand in July 2025 because it considered she had provided false and misleading information in her earlier application for a visitor visa, and her character waiver was declined. [6] The appellant sought reconsideration of the decision, however that was also declined on 29 July 2025. [7] The appellant’s interim visa expired on 29 July 2025, and she subsequently became unlawfully present. This appeal was lodged on 15 August 2025. STATUTORY GROUNDS [8] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [9] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34].

3 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [10] The appellant’s case is set out in the appeal form lodged with the Tribunal on 15 August 2025, and her statements, and can be summarised as follows: (a) The appellant and her husband have been working towards a future in New Zealand and to that end have been separated from their [NAME] for two years. He is in the care of the appellant’s parents who have significant health issues and are finding it difficult to continue to care for him. The couple need to be reunited with their son who is suffering due to the separation, with anxiety and insecurity. They are worried that a protracted separation will negatively impact his growth, education and overall well-being. (b) To facilitate the migration, the appellant had given up stable and well-paid employment in China. She therefore does not have employment to return to. (c) The appellant’s husband’s application for a work visa was also declined which has been difficult. Any separation would cause hardship to their relationship and the upbringing of their child who needs both parents. (d) The appellant has secured an employment offer as a project administrator with a [COMPANY]. Her potential employer remains willing to employ her when she is granted a work visa as they consider she will be a valued employee. If she is deported, the appellant would lose her employment opportunity which would result in financial hardship to her and her wider family. (e) Since arriving in New Zealand, the appellant has integrated into the community, has been paying taxes and volunteering in charity activities. She has actively improved her English and contributed to the economy. (f) The appellant’s application for a work visa was declined because a false bank statement had been provided by the [NAME] agent she had employed to obtain her visitor visa. She had provided genuine bank statements to the agent, but it appears the agent altered them to ensure a positive visa outcome. There was however no reason to

4 alter the bank statement as she met all visa requirements. She is taking legal action against the agent for their actions. (g) Should she be permitted to remain in the country, the appellant would be in a position to positively contribute to the local economy and well-being of the community. She would not be a burden on public resources and is of good character. Materials and Documents [11] In support of her appeal, the appellant provides the following documents (alongside those already provided to Immigration New Zealand): (a) Three statements (undated and 11 August 2025 (x2)) of the appellant. (b) A statement (11 August 2025) of the appellant’s husband. (c) A statement (2 September 2025) from the appellant’s potential employer confirming their continued willingness to employ the appellant as a project administrator. (d) A statement (27 September 2025) and translation by the appellant’s mother confirming that she is under physical and mental pressure in caring for the appellant’s young son and her husband, and often feels overwhelmed. Also that her daughter (the appellant) and [NAME] are her and her husband’s only source of income. (e) A statement (26 September 2025) and translation by the son’s kindergarten teacher supporting his reunion with his parents in New Zealand. (f) Various identity documents. (g) Evidence of volunteer activities by the appellant in New Zealand. (h) Chat communications between the appellant and her [NAME] agent regarding their practices. (i) Confirmation (26 September 2025) that the appellant’s employment in China ended on 1 April 2025.

5 ASSESSMENT [12] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand files in relation to her temporary visa applications, and its relevant electronic records. [13] The appellant submits that she was not at fault for the decline in her application, as it was her agent that submitted the false documents. However, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on a humanitarian appeal against deportation liability to review, consider the merits of, or overturn visa decisions by Immigration New Zealand. This was affirmed by the High Court in [NAME] v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2017] NZHC 2977, [2018] NZAR 265 at [13] and [19]. [14] Where an appellant asserts that deportation liability is grounded upon an error or wrong decision by Immigration New Zealand, the proper forum for disputing that error or decision is not the Tribunal by way of an appeal on humanitarian grounds but the High Court, by way of judicial review. The Tribunal’s focus must be on the consequences or effects of deportation and whether these are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [15] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [APPELLANT] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. The appellant’s circumstances in New Zealand [16] The appellant has been in New Zealand a little over two years. She initially arrived as a visitor in March 2024 and was granted a second visitor visa which expired in March 2025. The appellant’s husband arrived with her, and they spent some time touring the country. [17] The appellant obtained a job offer as a project administrator from a [COMPANY] in late 2024. On the basis of this employment offer she applied for an accredited employer work visa in December 2024. Her application was declined in July 2025 because Immigration New Zealand found that she had

6 provided false and misleading information in her previous visitor visa application, and her character waiver was declined. [18] The appellant accepts that false and misleading information had been provided as a part of her visitor visa application. The application had been made on her behalf by a [NAME] agent who, she says, had amended her bank statements with respect to her salary. She says that she provided the agent with the actual bank statements, however the agent amended them before submission to Immigration New Zealand. Because of this, the appellant is taking legal action against the agent. [19] Whilst the Tribunal acknowledges that the family’s prospects in New Zealand have been significantly impacted by the provision of fraudulent documents with the appellant’s application for a visitor visa, this is an unfortunate circumstance that has arisen for a number of migrant families, and therefore is not well outside the normal run of circumstances. [20] Furthermore, when assessing whether there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances, the Tribunal’s focus is on the consequences or effects of deportation. The reason that a person is made liable for deportation is not a consequence of deportation, see the Court of Appeal decision in Minister of Immigration v Q [2020] NZCA 288, at [33]: We agree … that absence of fault is similarly incapable of amounting to an exceptional circumstance of a humanitarian nature, because it is not a consequence or effect of the deportation. Rather, it is a relevant consideration at the next two stages of the inquiry … [21] Moreover, given the appellant enjoys the continued support of her prospective employer, there is no reason why she cannot apply for a further accredited employer work visa from offshore where she could work whilst she awaits the application’s assessment. [22] The Tribunal does note at this juncture that in the appellant’s appeal form she states that in New Zealand she is “gainfully employed, pays taxes, and support[s] [herself] and [her] family without relying on public welfare”. She refers to her “employer” and says she wishes to “keep contributing positively to the local economy”. It is unclear to the Tribunal how the appellant is undertaking employment given she does not have the lawful ability to work in New Zealand.

7 [23] The appellant’s husband had also applied for an open work visa on the basis of the appellant’s application for an accredited employer work visa. His application was declined in August 2025 after hers had been. He has remained in New Zealand with the appellant, his last interim visa expiring on 9 September 2025. [24] Both the appellant and her husband have been volunteering at charitable events whilst in New Zealand. Whilst this is commendable, it does not amount to an exceptional humanitarian circumstance. [25] In summation, there is nothing inherently special about the appellant’s level of settlement in New Zealand. She and her husband have been in the country for a relatively brief period of time holding visitor visas and therefore without the lawful ability to work. There was never any guarantee they would be able to settle longer term in the country, and the fact that the appellant has a job offer is not an exceptional circumstance. The appellant’s circumstances in China [26] The appellant’s [NAME] remains living in China with her parents. Her father has a disability and is ill, and her mother cares for them both. She is reportedly finding it increasingly difficult to do so. [27] The appellant’s parents and son financially rely on the appellant and her husband. Whilst the Tribunal accepts that should the appellant be successful in obtaining a work visa this would be financially beneficial to her parents, she, as their principal financial support, chose to resign from her employment in China and travel to New Zealand where she faced uncertainty. It is unclear how she has been supporting them financially for the last two years, when she has been unable to work lawfully in New Zealand. [28] The appellant advises that she had well-paid employment in China prior to her visit to New Zealand. It is likely therefore that she will be able to obtain employment upon her return. She has a bachelor’s degree and is evidently employable. [29] The appellant’s familial nexus is clearly to China where her parents and son remain living. Her and her husband therefore have a place to live upon their return. She grew up in China and has only been absent for a little over two years.

8 There is nothing therefore about a return to China for the appellant that would amount to exceptional circumstances. Best interests of the son [30] The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides at Article 3(1) that, in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration — see also Puli’uvea v Removal Review Authority [1996] 3 NZLR 538 (CA). The High Court has stated that the best interests of the child are not the paramount or primary consideration, but they are to be given important and genuine assessment — see [NAME] v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2012] NZHC 2599 at [32]. [31] The appellant’s [NAME] had been granted a visitor visa alongside his parents in January 2024, however they travelled to New Zealand without him. He remained in the care of his maternal grandparents, one of whom has a severe disability. [32] The appellant’s son has now not seen his parents for over two of his [NAME] years. He is apparently suffering from anxiety, insecurities and distress because of this separation. This is unsurprising given his young age and that he is being cared for by elderly and unwell grandparents. As stated by the appellant, a “reunion is critical for the child’s emotional and social development”. [33] The appellant and her husband never had the right to remain in New Zealand long-term, nor the legitimate expectation to do so. They left their son in China under those circumstances. Given his formative age, a reunion of the family, regardless of where, is clearly in the son’s best interests. [34] The Tribunal accepts that the son might be better supported financially by the appellant working in New Zealand. However, that proposition is common to many other children in China who could be better supported financially by a parent working overseas, and is not an exceptional circumstance of a humanitarian nature. There are also no identified vulnerabilities for the son and there is no evidence that the appellant could not financially provide for him in China, as her and her husband did before they came to New Zealand. [35] The appellant further submits that her son would benefit from a life in New Zealand because the education and healthcare systems are superior to those in China. However, disparities in economic opportunities and standards of living do not, of themselves, amount to exceptional humanitarian circumstances;

9 [NAME] v Minister of Immigration (HC Wellington AP56/99, 26 September 2000); and [NAME] v Chief Executive of the Department of Labour [1995] NZAR 509 (HC). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the son cannot access sufficient education or healthcare in China; the evidence to the contrary, set out in the letter from the kindergarten that he attends, is that he is doing well at kindergarten there. [36] The Tribunal finds that it is in the best interests of the appellant’s son for him to be cared for by his parents, in all likelihood in China given he has spent his life there and is unlikely to speak English. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [37] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has also noted “the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature”; see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45]. [38] The appellant and her husband have been in New Zealand for a relatively short period of time. As they have not been entitled to employment, they have not been in a position to settle meaningfully, and have no family here. Their [NAME] remains in China and the Tribunal has found that it is in his best interests for the family to be reunited. [39] A desire to obtain employment and settle in New Zealand, along with steps taken to achieve that goal, is a common situation among migrants. A future in New Zealand was never guaranteed to the appellant and her family by her visit to the country, and she retains options to apply for further visas from offshore. Moreover, a return to China will be a return to a country with which she remains familiar and retains close familial and cultural ties, and where she has previously worked. In summary, there is nothing about the appellant’s level of settlement in, or connections to New Zealand, the modest length of time she has been here, or her situation upon return to China that make her circumstances well outside the normal run of circumstances. [40] Therefore, considering the appellant’s circumstances on an individual and cumulative basis, the Tribunal finds that she has not established that they meet the high threshold for exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature.

10 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member DETERMINATION [41] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. This finding makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test. As such, the appeal must fail. [42] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal turns its mind to: (a) its absolute discretion under section 215(1) of the Act to order the reduction or removal of any period of prohibition on re-entry to New Zealand that might otherwise apply under section 179; and (b) its discretion under section 216(1), to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa where it considers it necessary to enable the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of getting her affairs in order. [43] The appellant will not be subject to a period of prohibition on re-entry if she departs New Zealand voluntarily before the date on which she may be served with a deportation order (sections 10, 175A and 179(2) of the Act), which is 28 days after the date of this decision. Therefore, an order under section 215(1) of the Act is unnecessary. [44] There are no accepted reasons advanced on appeal or identified by the Tribunal which require the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion under section 216(1) to find that extra time is required for the appellant to get her affairs in order. She entered the country on a visitor visa and was never guaranteed the ability to work. There was always the possibility that she and her husband would have to return to China upon the expiry of their visitor visas, they therefore should have financially accounted for such an eventuality. [45] Neither order is made, and the appeal is declined in the above terms. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member