Appellant’s Deportation Appeal Dismissed by Immigration & Protection Tribunal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507148 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 29 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 36-year-old citizen of India, against his liability for deportation which arose when he became unlawfully in New Zealand. THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue on appeal is whether the appellant’s relationship with his New Zealand-resident partner means that his deportation would give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. [3] For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that the appellant has not established that his circumstances give rise to exceptional humanitarian circumstances. His appeal is declined.

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BACKGROUND [4] The appellant is a 36-year-old male from the Punjab in India, where his mother and two brothers reside. [5] In July 2019, the appellant unsuccessfully made an offshore application for an essential skills work visa. In its decision (December 2019), Immigration New Zealand found that he had provided false and misleading information to support his work experience. [6] In March 2023, the appellant married. His wife is an Indian citizen with permanent resident status in New Zealand. She returned to New Zealand following their marriage due to her employment. [7] The appellant has applied to visit his wife in New Zealand several times. His first visitor visa application (June 2023) was initially declined for lack of bona fides, as he was found to have provided fraudulent tax records with that application. His request for a reconsideration was approved (24 May 2024) after providing independent evidence that he was not directly involved in the preparation of the disputed documents. On this basis, Immigration New Zealand granted the appellant a character waiver. [8] In June 2024, together with his wife, the appellant arrived in New Zealand as holder of a six-month visitor visa, valid to December 2024. Prior to the expiry of this visa, the appellant made several attempts to extend his stay in New Zealand. [9] The appellant applied for a partnership-based work visa in August 2024. This, and his subsequent reconsideration request, were declined on character grounds. This was because of two new character concerns. First, the appellant had withheld from his 2019 essential skills work visa application that he had lived in Dubai (2014 to 2018). This contradicted work experience he had declared as a metal fabricator in India (2011 to 2019). Second, this also meant he had provided false and misleading information in his prior successful visitor visa application (for which he had been granted a character waiver). [10] The appellant made a further partnership-based visitor visa application in December 2024. An interim visa was granted pending the outcome of this application. [11] On 4 April 2025, this visitor visa application was declined.

3 [12] Following the expiry of the appellant’s interim visa (25 April 2025), the appellant’s presence in New Zealand became unlawful. On 2 June 2025, the appellant filed this appeal. STATUTORY GROUNDS [13] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [14] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34]. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [15] The appellant’s case is set out in the appeal submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 24 July 2025. In summary, it is submitted that: (a) The appellant is in a genuine and enduring relationship with his New Zealand permanent resident partner. Of their two years and four-month relationship, they have been living together for around 18 months. (b) In January 2025, the [NAME] suffered a miscarriage, which they consider was largely due to the stress and uncertainty of the appellant’s immigration situation. Deportation would renew emotional stress, particularly for the wife, and impede the [NAME]’s plan to start a family in New Zealand.

4 (c) [NAME] has established ties to New Zealand through her employment and [NAME]. It is unreasonable to expect her to choose between living here without the appellant, or relocating to India where she has not lived for a significant period. (d) If deported, the appellant would also lose his social networks, and the sense of community and stability he enjoys in New Zealand. The stigma associated with deportation would also impact his ability to establish a meaningful life in India. (e) In granting his visitor visa upon a reconsideration, Immigration New Zealand clearly considered that mitigating factors applied. As for the new character issues raised, the appellant had sought a character waiver in good faith. He admitted to relying upon his aunts to prepare his work visa application together with a professional adviser and acknowledged that he should have reviewed his application more thoroughly. He has an otherwise clean record. (f) Further, in terms of these character concerns, deportation would undermine “his efforts at reform and rehabilitation” and deter future applicants from coming forward, if similarly placed. To deport him now would be contrary to the principles of natural justice, fairness and proportionality. (g) Given the likely emotional and psychological burden on his wife, it would be unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported. It would not serve the public interest to separate a lawfully married [NAME] in a stable, committed relationship and allowing the appellant to remain here would also support the principle of “family life”. Allowing the appellant to remain in New Zealand would also not be contrary to the public interest. Materials and Documents [16] In support of his appeal, in addition to documents that already form part of the Immigration New Zealand file, the representative provides a bundle of documents including: (a) a statutory declaration from the appellant (16 July 2025), including his explanation of the circumstances in which certain fraudulent

5 documents were submitted without his knowledge and other information omitted from his visa applications. The appellant declares he did not intend to mislead Immigration New Zealand. (b) a statement from his wife (15 July 2025) referring, among other things, to the effect that the appellant’s uncertain immigration status has had and the pressures of being the sole income earner; her subsequent miscarriage; and desire to establish a family together in New Zealand, a place she considers her home. (c) hospital records (January 2025) relating to the wife’s pregnancy and subsequent hospitalisation due to her miscarriage. (d) the [NAME]’s marriage certificate (10 March 2023), evidence of their living together (copies of courier delivery slips and utility invoices), bank statements (June 2024 to July 2025), flat sharing agreement (22 May 2025); and copies of numerous social media posts of their time together in both India and New Zealand (2024) and photographs. (e) letters of support (dated between 30 June 2025 and 14 July 2025) from the appellant’s family and friends generally attesting to the [NAME]’s marriage and the appellant’s good character. (f) a reference letter (10 July 2025) from the president of the [COMPANY] confirming the appellant’s participation among his [NAME]. [17] In late September 2025, a medical certificate (10 September 2025) was provided on appeal regarding the wife’s medical status. ASSESSMENT [18] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand files in relation to his temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records.

6 [19] The representative’s submissions regarding Immigration New Zealand’s character waiver considerations and that the appellant did not intend to mislead Immigration New Zealand is noted but is mis-founded. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on a humanitarian appeal against deportation liability to review, consider the merits of, or overturn visa decisions by Immigration New Zealand. This was affirmed by the High Court in [NAME] v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2017] NZHC 2977, [2018] NZAR 265 at [13] and [19]. [20] The proper forum for disputing that Immigration New Zealand made an error or wrong decision is not the Tribunal, by way of an appeal on humanitarian grounds, but the High Court, by way of judicial review. The Tribunal’s focus must be on the consequences or effects of deportation and whether these are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature; Minister of Immigration v Q [2020] NZCA 288 at [31]. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [21] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: Ye v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. The appellant’s partnership and effect of separation [22] Immigration New Zealand accepted that the [NAME] are in a genuine partnership. For the purposes of this appeal, and based on the evidence provided, the Tribunal accepts that the [NAME] first met online through an Indian match-making service in March 2022. From their respective countries of residence, they remained in regular communication via phone and social media. [23] Immigration New Zealand’s electronic records show that the wife subsequently travelled to India on three occasions to be with the appellant: [redacted] marriage ceremony (confirmed by the marriage certificate and testimonial letters submitted on appeal); and in February 2024, staying with the appellant until the appellant was granted his visitor visa upon a reconsideration of his application.

7 [24] The [NAME] arrived together in New Zealand in June 2024. A copy of the flat-sharing agreement (May 2025) and letter of support from the head-tenant (July 2025) confirm that they live together in residential premises in Auckland. Relying on this evidence, the Tribunal acknowledges that the appellant and her partner have lived together in New Zealand since February 2024, for just over two years. [25] The Tribunal accepts that the [NAME] will be disappointed that they are unable to continue their lives together in New Zealand, particularly given their shared desire to establish a family and life together in New Zealand. The deportation of the appellant means that they may be separated, possibly for some length of time, should the wife decide to remain in New Zealand when he departs. [26] Nevertheless, as has been noted by the Tribunal in many previous appeals of this type, the fact that a temporary migrant in New Zealand develops a relationship with a New Zealand resident does not, in the normal course of things, indicate exceptionality and is not an uncommon occurrence. The [NAME] entered their relationship aware that the appellant had no right to live in New Zealand. His permitted stay by way of a visitor visa was to be for only a limited duration. Their current predicament therefore cannot have been unexpected. [27] The [NAME] will need to make decisions on how they will conduct their relationship in future. They have demonstrated previously that they have been able to maintain their relationship at a distance before, by phone and through social media. If financially viable, the wife, who is also a citizen of India, could travel to India to spend time with him there as she did before. Alternatively, if the appellant and his wife did choose to reside together in India, each would also have some support from the presence of family members being resident there. This would be a matter for them to decide. Impact of separation on New Zealand partner [28] [NAME] is a 41-year-old woman from India. She came to New Zealand in 2015, initially in her early thirties, as a student. She subsequently held various temporary visas allowing her to remain here and found employment. She obtained residence in December 2021 under the 2021 Resident Visa category of immigration instructions and permanent residence in January 2024.

8 [29] The Tribunal accepts that after living in New Zealand for 10 years, [NAME] has established a life here and considers New Zealand her home. She has developed strong friendships and social networks. One of her sisters also resides in New Zealand. She currently works here as a hairdresser. [30] [NAME] retains a strong nexus to India where she holds citizenship. The wife was born and raised in India, and spent some 30 years (more than half her life) living there prior to coming to New Zealand. She shares with the appellant the same cultural connections to India and would also have his assistance and support in resuming a life there, should the [NAME] decide to live there together. [31] The evidence before the Tribunal does not suggest that the wife would be unable to find employment on her return to India. Nor is there anything to indicate that, in addition to the appellant’s support, her family (her parents and two other siblings), could not also help, whether practically, emotionally or financially, as she adjusts back to life in India. The appellant’s circumstances in New Zealand [32] The appellant initially arrived in New Zealand as a visitor in June 2024. However, because of the decline of his application for a further visitor visa (because of false or misleading evidence provided with his prior visas applications), the appellant has not been able to maintain lawful presence here. [33] The appellant’s nexus to New Zealand is largely through his partnership with his New Zealand permanent resident wife. In the 16 months he has been here he has integrated into the local community alongside her. He also regularly attends and volunteers at his local temple, as recorded in the letter from the president of the local Sikh society. However, the degree of his settlement will have been limited given his circumstances, and the relatively brief time he has lived here. [34] The appellant has a strong nexus to India as this is where he has lived and worked for most of his life. He is a qualified aluminium fabricator, with prior work experience there. Given the relatively brief period he has been away from his home country, he would be well placed to resume his life there upon his return. He also has family members in India (his mother, brother, sister, and members of his extended family), that he could call on should he need any supplementary support.

9 [35] The representative has referred to the appellant’s efforts in dealing with the character concerns raised by Immigration New Zealand openly, and by admitting his past mistakes. However, it is to be expected that most visa applicants would seek to be transparent before Immigration New Zealand when dealing with such concerns. This is neither uncommon nor unusual. Further, the suggestion that deportation would otherwise undermine the appellant’s efforts, or deter future applicants from being similarly transparent, is not a circumstance of a humanitarian nature. [36] The Tribunal similarly rejects any submission that the appellant would be ‘stigmatised’ in any way upon his return to India. It is relatively commonplace for Indian migrants, as holders of temporary visas, to travel to New Zealand and then have to return to their home country when they no longer have the right to legally remain here. Uncertainty of appellant’s immigration status [37] The Tribunal acknowledges the [NAME] have faced emotional stress due to the uncertainty of the appellant’s uncertain immigration status, particularly the wife. Both refer in their letters on appeal to their inability to plan a future together, the associated stress of living on a sole income, and their desire to establish a family in New Zealand. This is a common predicament shared by many temporary visa holders seeking to remain in New Zealand and are not circumstances that can be described as either uncommon or unusual. [38] The [NAME] attribute their miscarriage in January 2025 to this same uncertainty, and according to her general practitioner (10 September 2025), the wife continues to struggle with anxiety for this reason. While this can be described as a humanitarian circumstance, this is not, in and of itself, an exceptional one. Clean criminal record [39] The Tribunal acknowledges that the appellant has provided a clear police certificate from India (21 August 2024). However, it is a not a humanitarian circumstance that the appellant has no criminal convictions.

10 Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [40] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has also noted “the high threshold for a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature”; see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45]. [41] For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal accepts, for the purposes of this appeal, that the appellant and her partner are, at present, living together in a committed marriage. [42] It is understandable that the appellant, as a recently married man, wishes to remain in New Zealand where his wife has settled. Both he and his wife will no doubt experience disappointment on his having to return to India. However, their relationship has been of relatively short duration and given their shared cultural ties and strong family nexus to India, they do have options available to them on how they can maintain their relationship. [43] The Tribunal finds, considering all the circumstances cumulatively, including the prospects of the [NAME]’s separation in the context of the length of their relationship, their wish to establish a family here together, and strong nexus to India, that the high statutory threshold of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature has not been reached. DETERMINATION [44] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test. [45] An appeal must fail if there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding that there are none in this case makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test.

11 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member No Exercise of Discretion to Reduce or Remove Period of Prohibited Entry Under Deportation Order (Section 215) or to Delay Deportation or Grant a Temporary Visa (Section 216) [46] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal turns its mind to: (a) its absolute discretion under section 215(1) of the Act to order the reduction or removal of any period of prohibition on re-entry to New Zealand that might otherwise apply under section 179; and (b) its discretion under section 216(1), to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa where it considers it necessary to enable the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. [47] The appellant will not be subject to a period of prohibition on re-entry if he departs New Zealand voluntarily before the date on which he may be served with a deportation order (sections 10, 75A and 179(2) of the Act). Therefore, an order under section 215(1) of the Act is unnecessary. [48] There are no reasons advanced on appeal or identified by the Tribunal which require the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion under section 216(1) to find that extra time is required for him to get his affairs in order. [49] Neither order is made. [50] The appeal is declined in the above terms. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member