Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Appeal for Unlawful Worker

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507354 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 23 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 42-year-old citizen of [APPELLANT], against his liability for deportation which arose when he became unlawfully present in New Zealand. THE ISSUE [2] The primary issue for the Tribunal is whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand. [3] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional humanitarian circumstances and, therefore, the appeal is declined. However, the Tribunal orders the grant of a 10-month work visa, from the date of this decision, to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand while he gets his affairs in order.

2

BACKGROUND [4] The appellant’s wife, parents and brother live in [APPELLANT]. [5] On 18 June 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand from Singapore, where he had been working. He has remained here ever since. He initially held an accredited employer work visa, allowing him to work for [COMPANY] (“the [COMPANY]”) as a fabricator. The work visa was valid until June 2026. [6] Following a report from the appellant that he had been exploited by the [COMPANY], on 8 January 2024, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment ([NAME]) found that it was “credible that exploitation may have occurred”. [7] On 10 January 2024, the appellant applied for a [NAME] protection work visa. In April 2024, Immigration New Zealand granted him the visa, valid until 17 October 2024, replacing his accredited employer work visa. [8] On 10 October 2024, the appellant was granted an interim visa and then, on 4 November 2024, a second [NAME] protection work visa, valid until 17 April 2025. [9] On 15 April 2025, the appellant applied for a special work visa for victims of people trafficking, based on his reported exploitation by the [COMPANY]. On 28 August 2025, Immigration New Zealand declined the application because, while he had made a complaint of trafficking to the [NAME] [NAME], he had not been certified by the New Zealand police as being a suspected victim of people trafficking, as required by the relevant instructions. It denied a request from his counsel to delay its decision until the [NAME] had completed its investigation. [10] While the above application was being considered, the appellant was granted an interim visa so that he could remain in New Zealand lawfully until a decision on his visa application was made. Upon Immigration New Zealand declining his application for a special work visa for victims of people trafficking, the appellant’s interim visa expired on 18 September 2025. [11] Since that date, the appellant has been unlawfully present in New Zealand.

3 [12] On 20 September 2025, the appellant lodged this humanitarian appeal with the Tribunal. STATUTORY GROUNDS [13] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [14] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34]. [15] To determine whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for an appellant to be deported from New Zealand, the Supreme Court stated, in [NAME], at [35], that an appellant must show a level of harshness more than a “generic concern” and “beyond the level of harshness that must be regarded as acceptable in order to preserve the integrity of [NAME]”. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [16] The appellant’s case is set out in submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 28 November 2025. In summary, counsel submits that, while working in Singapore, the appellant paid [withheld] (borrowed from family, friends, and community members in [APPELLANT]) to the [COMPANY] (through its [NAME]) for a visa and the promise of employment in New Zealand. However, upon arriving here, the promised work for the appellant did not materialise. He had therefore been trafficked to New Zealand, and, with no ability to work, he has been unable to repay his debts in [APPELLANT]. It is submitted that, if he returns to

4 [APPELLANT] without the ability to repay his [NAME] he may suffer humiliation, and potentially, imprisonment. The [NAME] may also [NAME] legal action or resort to extrajudicial means to recover their money, meaning the appellant or his family members could be physically harmed. [17] Counsel further submits that the appellant’s wife and his elderly parents rely on him for financial support, which he would be unable to provide if deported to [APPELLANT]. It is also submitted that the current law and order situation in [APPELLANT] is chaotic. He is distressed about his situation and suffers psychological harm. It is also submitted that Immigration New Zealand’s decision to decline his application for a work visa for victims of people trafficking was not fair. The appellant seeks a work visa. Materials and Documents [18] In support of his appeal, the appellant provides the following documents: (a) a copy of the appellant’s passport, a work permit that allowed him to work in Singapore and a letter from Immigration New Zealand advising him of the grant of his prior accredited employer work visa; and (b) screenshots of correspondence between the appellant and his agent at the [COMPANY] between April and July 2023 discussing the arrangements, including amounts to be paid to the [COMPANY] for it to organise the appellant’s accredited employer work visa. ASSESSMENT [19] The Tribunal has considered the above submissions and documents, Immigration New Zealand’s file containing the appellant’s applications for visas, and Immigration New Zealand’s relevant electronic records. [20] Counsel’s submission that Immigration New Zealand was incorrect, and/or acted unfairly, in declining the appellant a special work visa for victims of people trafficking is noted. However, the submission is mis-founded in that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on a humanitarian appeal against deportation liability to review, consider the merits of, or overturn visa decisions by Immigration

5 New Zealand. This was affirmed by the High Court in [NAME] v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2017] NZHC 2977, [2018] NZAR 265, at [13] and [19]. [21] Where an appellant asserts that deportation liability is grounded upon an error or wrong decision by Immigration New Zealand, the proper forum for disputing that error or decision is not the Tribunal by way of an appeal on humanitarian grounds but the High Court, by way of judicial review. The Tribunal’s focus must be on the consequences or effects of deportation and whether these are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [22] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [APPELLANT] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. The appellant’s personal circumstances and his settlement in New Zealand [23] The appellant’s wife, parents and brother live in [APPELLANT]. He therefore has a strong familial nexus to [APPELLANT]. He has no familial ties to New Zealand. [24] The appellant has lived in New Zealand for slightly less than three years. There is nothing about the length of time that he has spent in the country, or his settlement (of which there is limited evidence), that could be considered out of the ordinary. People trafficking and [NAME] [25] As noted above, at [20]–[21], the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on a humanitarian appeal against deportation liability to review, consider the merits of, or overturn visa decisions by Immigration New Zealand. Counsel acknowledges that the appellant has not been certified by the New Zealand police as being a suspected victim of people trafficking (as required by the relevant special visa instructions), but submits he has made every attempt to contact the [NAME] Department and the New Zealand police to seek such a certification. Even without certification, counsel submits the appellant is a victim of the offence of trafficking in persons under section 98D of the Crimes Act 1961.

6 [26] The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine whether a trafficking offence has been committed under the Crimes Act. As noted above, it has not been provided with certification from the New Zealand police that the appellant is a suspected victim of people trafficking. However, the Tribunal does acknowledge that [NAME] previously found that it was “credible that exploitation may have occurred” and, for the purposes of this appeal, the Tribunal proceeds on the same basis. [27] However, on the evidence before the Tribunal, it has not been demonstrated that the appellant’s deportation would undermine New Zealand’s international obligations under the [NAME]’ 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the [NAME] (the Trafficking Protocol). That is because, after finding no employment awaiting him on his arrival in New Zealand, the appellant received the benefit of two [NAME] protection work visas (between April 2024 and April 2025), which allowed him to work in New Zealand. The [NAME] Protection work visa category of instructions (which now allows for the grant of one, not two, work visas) is the remedy provided by [NAME] for exploited migrants in New Zealand. [28] As a result of those two work visas, the appellant has had the opportunity to secure new employment in New Zealand (no evidence has been provided to show whether the appellant did gain employment). Given that the appellant was granted those two visas, the Tribunal finds that he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to [NAME] steps to put himself in the position he would otherwise have been in had the [COMPANY] provided him with employment here. [29] It may be that there continues to be an investigation into the appellant’s complaints of trafficking and exploitation, such as by the [NAME]. The evidence before the Tribunal does not demonstrate that the appellant needs to remain in New Zealand in order to assist with any investigation. Absence of fault [30] Counsel’s submission that the appellant was not at fault in that he arrived in New Zealand with the legitimate expectation of having employment here and, through no fault of his own, has become unlawful, is noted but it is not relevant to the question of whether there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances. As

7 stated by the Court of Appeal in Minister of Immigration v Q [2020] NZCA 288, at [33]: We agree … that absence of fault is similarly incapable of amounting to an exceptional circumstance of a humanitarian nature, because it is not a consequence or effect of the deportation. Rather, it is a relevant consideration at the next two stages of the inquiry … Country conditions in [APPELLANT] – the political scene [31] Counsel submits (as at 28 November 2025) that the law and order situation in [APPELLANT] is very weak due to a non-elected government and political chaos. [32] The Tribunal observes that, in February 2026, elections were held in [APPELLANT] resulting in a change in government. Even with recent elections being held, the Tribunal acknowledges that there have long been challenges in maintaining law and order in [APPELLANT] (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ([NAME]) [NAME]: [APPELLANT] (23 July 2025) at pp5 and 9−10). [33] However, the general country conditions in [APPELLANT] do not make the appellant’s circumstances well outside the normal run of circumstances. It has not been demonstrated that he would be at greater risk of harm than any other person in [APPELLANT] of similar characteristics. The appellant’s debt and risks presented by [NAME] [34] [COUNSEL] submits that the appellant has not yet been able to repay those who loaned him money to pay the [COMPANY] for his initial accredited employer work visa. On returning to [APPELLANT], his [NAME] may seek repayment or resort to extrajudicial means to recover their money, which raises concerns for the appellant’s personal safety. It is also submitted that he may be imprisoned for failing to repay the loans. [35] The Tribunal finds that there is no credible evidence in support of the submission that the appellant may be imprisoned or harmed on a return to [APPELLANT] due to his debts. The submissions do not, by themselves, constitute evidence from which the Tribunal could responsibly infer that the appellant is at risk, such that he has exceptional humanitarian circumstances.

8 Financial circumstances [36] Counsel submits that the appellant’s wife and his elderly parents in [APPELLANT] depend on him for financial support, and that his deportation would place an immense financial burden on his family as he has no means to support them if he returned there. However, if permitted to work in New Zealand, he will be able to earn an income so he can pay his debts and support himself and his family. [37] The Tribunal acknowledges that the appellant would benefit from being able to work lawfully in New Zealand. However, there is nothing about his circumstances that are exceptional. No evidence has been produced demonstrating that the appellant’s wife and parents have been unable to meet their essential needs in [APPELLANT] while he has been prevented from working in New Zealand. While it is likely that he would earn less in [APPELLANT] than is possible in New Zealand, there is nothing to suggest that he would be unable to work in [APPELLANT]. The Tribunal acknowledges that he may face a period of unemployment while looking for work in [APPELLANT], and he may well not have the same standard of living that is possible in New Zealand. However, as the High Court held in [NAME] v Chief Executive of Department of Labour [1995] NZAR 509 (HC): Mere economic betterment — the fact a person can live more comfortably in New Zealand than elsewhere — perhaps with employment instead of unemployment — is not the type of humanitarian consideration in contemplation in the statute … [38] The appellant previously spent time working in Singapore. Whether he would look to do so again, in an attempt to earn a higher income than in [APPELLANT], will be a matter for him to decide. Given that he faces deportation to [APPELLANT], the Tribunal’s focus is on his circumstances in his country of citizenship. The appellant’s psychological health [39] Counsel submits that the psychological toll of deception (by the [COMPANY]), isolation and fear of deportation has led to immense emotional distress for the appellant, which would be exacerbated by his deportation from New Zealand.

9 [40] The Tribunal accepts that the appellant is worried about the prospect of returning to [APPELLANT]. However, no medical evidence has been produced demonstrating that he has been diagnosed with any psychological conditions or that he will be unable to access therapeutic support in [APPELLANT] if needed. The Tribunal observes that, in [APPELLANT], he will not be isolated as he will be reunited with his wife and his parents who can provide emotional support. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [41] The appellant was granted temporary visas following a finding that he had credible claims of exploitation, and those visas provided him with sufficient remedy and opportunity to seek work in New Zealand. Despite his desire to remain in New Zealand to repay his debts in [APPELLANT] more quickly, he has no enduring ties or family in the country. Conversely, he maintains strong connections to [APPELLANT], where his family resides and where he can be expected to find employment to support them, even if his debt repayment takes longer than it would if he remained in New Zealand. [42] The Tribunal finds that the appellant's presence in New Zealand is not required for further investigations into his former employer. There is no evidence to demonstrate he is at any greater risk of harm in [APPELLANT] than any other person in his circumstances, nor is there evidence that he has any psychological conditions requiring professional support here. Ultimately, his return to [APPELLANT] will facilitate a reunion with his wife and family. DETERMINATION AND ORDERS [43] The appellant has failed to meet the requirements of section 207(1) of the Act and his appeal is declined. [44] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. The Tribunal’s finding makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test.

10 Exercise of Discretion to Grant Work Visa [45] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal has considered whether to exercise its discretion under section 216(1) of the Act, to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa to the appellant for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. [46] The High Court has held that the phrase “getting affairs in order” means “organising those personal, legal or financial matters that, by reason of personal need or obligation (legal or moral) must be attended to so that deportation will not leave the individual concerned, or those associated with him or her, disadvantaged”: see Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Singh [2018] NZHC 272, [2018] NZAR 434 at [20]. [47] Pursuant to section 216(1)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a work visa, for a period of 10 months, commencing on the date of this decision. The appellant has significant debt and has been unable to work lawfully in New Zealand since becoming unlawfully present here. He will require funds to pay for his return travel and to assist with his initial resettlement in [APPELLANT], and the Tribunal considers that he would be disadvantaged if not granted an opportunity to seek work in New Zealand to earn an income to assist with those costs. A visa would also afford the appellant more time to assist with any investigations into his trafficking complaints while being present in the country. [48] In Immigration New Zealand’s Visa Pak Issue 564 — Immigration New Zealand position where the Immigration and Protection Tribunal has made a s216 order (1 December 2023), Immigration New Zealand states that where the Tribunal orders the grant of a temporary visa under section 216 to an appellant whose liability for deportation arose from them being unlawfully in New Zealand, a deportation order cannot be served on them during the currency of this visa because they are lawful and no longer liable for deportation. This confirms the position taken by Immigration New Zealand in submissions to the Tribunal, in AD (Argentina) [2020] NZIPT 505056. On that basis, as long as the appellant leaves New Zealand before the expiry of the work visa ordered by the Tribunal, he will not be deemed to be deported under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act when he leaves.

11 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy and Abridged Research Copy [49] Pursuant to clauses 18(4) and 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant or the [COMPANY]. This order includes withholding portions of paragraphs [5] and [16] from the research copy of this decision. [50] This order is made for reasons including the need to preserve the integrity of any investigations into the [COMPANY]. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member