Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Appeal to Avoid Deportation

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507280 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 30 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a 43-[NAME]-old citizen of [APPELLANT], against his liability for deportation which arose when he became unlawfully in New Zealand following the expiry of an interim visa. THE ISSUE [2] The issue on appeal is whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand. [3] The Tribunal finds there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature, at this time, however, when weighed against the reasons the appellant is liable for deportation, it would not be unjust or unduly harsh for him to be deported. The appeal is declined. The Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a temporary, work visa, for a period of six months commencing on the date of this decision for the purpose of getting his affairs in order.

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BACKGROUND [4] The appellant was born in [APPELLANT] and was given the name [APPELLANT] and it was by this name that his birth was registered. His parents are deceased, his brother lives in the United States and his sister lives in [APPELLANT] with her husband and children. He met his wife (who is a citizen of [APPELLANT]) online in 2021. [5] Following an incident in [APPELLANT] in 2021, the Fijian Police charged the appellant with one charge of aggravated robbery. In 2022, the appellant was charged with breaching the conditions of his bail. [6] The appellant and his wife first met in-person in [APPELLANT] in February 2022. In October 2023, they participated in a nikah (a Muslim marriage ceremony). [7] The Ministry of Justice in [APPELLANT] has confirmed to Immigration New Zealand that, on 7 February 2024, the appellant changed his name from [APPELLANT] to [NAME]. [8] On 2 April 2024, the appellant, under the name [NAME], lodged an application with Immigration New Zealand seeking a work visa on the basis of his partnership with his wife. On 9 May 2024, he was granted the work visa, and he arrived in New Zealand for the first time on 28 May 2024. [9] Since his arrival, the appellant has lived with his wife. His wife has four children aged 22, 14, 12 and 11 years old. The [NAME] child (a son) lives independently. The younger three children (two daughters and a son) live with the wife and the appellant. The [NAME], who has medical conditions, has lived with his [NAME] for periods. [10] On 17 February 2025, Immigration New Zealand received information that the appellant had changed his name and that he had pending criminal charges in [APPELLANT] under his previous name. Immigration New Zealand sought confirmation from the relevant authorities in [APPELLANT]. [11] On 2 April 2025, the appellant lodged an application for a further partnership-based work visa. The appellant did not disclose his change of name or pending criminal charges in the application. [12] On 19 June 2025, the appellant and his wife were married in New Zealand.

3 [13] On 11 July 2025, Immigration New Zealand declined the appellant’s application for a work visa because he had provided false or misleading information and had withheld information in his current and previous applications. He did not disclose his change of name or that he had pending criminal charges. [14] Following the expiry of his interim visa on 1 August 2025, the appellant became unlawfully present in New Zealand. STATUTORY GROUNDS [15] The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act): (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [16] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104 at [34]. [17] To determine whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for an appellant to be deported from New Zealand, the Supreme Court stated, in Ye, at [35], that an appellant must show a level of harshness more than a “generic concern” and “beyond the level of harshness that must be regarded as acceptable in order to preserve the integrity of New Zealand’s immigration system”. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [18] The appellant’s case is set out in the appeal form and submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 11 March 2026 and can be summarised as follows:

4 (a) The appellant is apologetic for failing to declare his change of name and pending criminal charges to Immigration New Zealand. The omission was not intentional as he changed his name to reflect his commitment to his faith and as a symbolic fresh start in his marriage. (b) The appellant believes a family member reported his change of name and pending criminal charges to Immigration New Zealand as an act of retaliation against him arising from the breakdown in their relationship. (c) The appellant states that he does not have a good relationship with his sister, who is the only family member who remains living in [APPELLANT]. (d) The appellant and his New Zealand citizen wife have a genuine and stable marriage and the appellant provides vital support to his wife, who has full-time care of her three [NAME] children, one of whom has significant care needs. The wife also has health conditions, and therefore relies significantly on the appellant. Materials and Documents [19] In support of his appeal, the appellant provides the following documents: (a) Two statements (2 and 9 March 2026) from the appellant. In the first he describes his relationship with his wife and the involvement he has in the daily care of her three [NAME] children. In the second, he describes the incident which led to him being charged with aggravated robbery. The appellant states he does not clearly remember what happened that day in 2021 as he was drunk but states he got in an argument with a [NAME] who had posted insulting videos about his wife and his mother online. He “understands that there was an assault” and that he was later told the [NAME] assaulted was not permanently injured. (b) Two statements (2 March 2026 and 4 March 2026) from the [NAME]. In the first, she describes how the appellant assists in the care of her children, particularly [NAME]. In the second, she describes conduct by the appellant’s sister which the wife describes as “online harassment”.

5 (c) Statements from the wife’s two daughters (14 and 11 years) and her [NAME] (all dated in March 2026) describing the appellant as their uncle and someone who helps them in their day to day lives. The wife’s son describes the important role the appellant has in the care of his younger brother. (d) A statement (1 March 2026) from [NAME] stating that as she has her own health issues, she is unable to assist in caring for her grandson with medical needs. (e) A statement (1 March 2026) from [NAME] stating that, although she lives nearby to her sister, she is also unable to assist in caring for her nephew with medical needs as she is a solo mother of three children herself. (f) Two letters (29 June 2025 and 3 October 2025) from the appellant’s [NAME] attesting to his valued work in labouring and delivery roles. (g) A letter (3 July 2025) from the officiant of the couple’s nikah ceremony confirming it took place on 7 October 2023 in [APPELLANT]. (h) A letter (2 October 2025) of support from a member of the [NAME]. (i) Various medical reports in relation to the wife’s [NAME] son who has certain neurodevelopmental conditions, including the report (20 November 2025) of developmental paediatrician Dr [NAME]. (j) A letter (9 March 2026) from Health New Zealand confirming the [NAME] daughter’s surgery for a medical condition on 16 March 2026. (k) A letter (3 March 2026) from the wife’s psychiatrist confirming she is receiving regular follow-up treatment. (l) Prescriptions issued to the [NAME] in February 2026 for her medical conditions.

6 (m) The Lautoka Magistrate Court Registry Cause List recording the appellant’s criminal charges were listed for hearing in July 2025 and for “Judgment/sentence/ruling” in November 2025 and early March 2026. (n) The appellant’s Fijian birth certificate (extracted 2 February 2022) in the name [NAME] and a further birth certificate (extracted 13 February 2024) in the name [NAME]. (o) The New Zealand birth certificates for the wife’s three [NAME] children. (p) The appellant and wife’s joint bank account statement as at 12 December 2025. (q) A letter (2 March 2026) from the appellant and his wife’s insurance provider. [20] On 13 March 2026, the appellant’s representative provided a further medical report (12 March 2026) describing the wife’s son’s increasing behaviour difficulties since commencing at a new [COMPANY] at the start of the 2026 academic [NAME]. ASSESSMENT [21] The Tribunal has considered the submissions and documents provided by the appellant. It has also considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand file in relation to his temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records. Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [22] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. Circumstances in New Zealand [23] The appellant has lived in New Zealand for almost two years. Prior to his work visa expiring, in May 2025, he was employed in an unspecified role by a civil

7 works and drainage company and as a delivery boy for a concrete company. Since then, he has supported his wife and assisted her in the care of her three [NAME] children, who are now aged 14, 12 and 11 years old. [24] The appellant lives with his wife and her three [NAME] children. The [NAME] daughter (14 years old) states the appellant helps them within the family by cooking food, taking the children to [COMPANY] and playing sports with them. The [NAME] (22 years old) lives independently. Medical and developmental needs of the wife’s [NAME] [25] As at November 2025, the wife’s [NAME] was living at home with the appellant, his wife and the wife’s two daughters, all of whom are citizens of New Zealand. The children’s father lives in Australia. [26] A report (20 November 2025) by developmental paediatrician Dr [NAME] records that the wife’s [NAME] has neurodevelopmental conditions with pronounced challenges in learning. [27] Dr [NAME] recorded that the son receives Ongoing Resourcing Scheme (ORS) funding at [COMPANY]. In August 2025, the son was stood down from his [COMPANY] [withheld]. He described the son’s educational difficulties. The son had since been enrolled at a new [COMPANY]. [28] The wife’s [NAME] (who is 22 years old) states the appellant helps his mother care for his 12-[NAME]-old brother by helping him with dressing, toileting, mobility and supervision, particularly during the night. The [NAME] states that, because his mother struggles with her health conditions, the appellant’s presence allows her to rest and manage her health. In the [NAME]’s view, the appellant’s involvement has brought stability, emotional support and practical help to all of the family. [29] The wife’s 11-[NAME]-old daughter states (17 September 2025) that her 12-[NAME]-old brother lived with their [NAME]. However, in submissions (11 March 2026) to the Tribunal, the representative asserts that this arrangement came to an end as the [NAME] was no longer able to look after the [NAME] due to her own health needs. The representative states the wife stopped working in order to care for her son full-time at home where he currently lives.

8 Wife’s health conditions [30] The [NAME] was born in [APPELLANT]. She was granted residence in New Zealand in 1997 and has since become a citizen. [Information about the wife’s health and how these impact on her daily functioning.] [31] The wife describes the appellant as an essential caregiver within the household. She states he cares for her [NAME] during the day and takes responsibility for him at night when she is affected by medication or lack of sleep. She states her extended family members are not able to provide the same level of daily support that the appellant does, as her mother has her own health needs and her sister has her own children to care for. Best interests of the children [32] Under Article 3(1) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Tribunal is obliged to have regard to the best interests of any children affected by the outcome of the appeal. The best interests of a child must be considered having regard to their particular circumstances including their age, any known medical conditions, and the nature of the relationships they have with the significant persons in their lives. [33] The Tribunal finds that, at this time, the best interests of the wife’s 14-, 12- and 11-[NAME]-old children are served by the appellant remaining in the home. In helping to care for the [NAME], particularly in the context of the wife’s own health conditions, the appellant provides relief for the 14- and 11-[NAME]-old children from the difficult domestic circumstances that they face. Nevertheless, the Tribunal notes that there are other supports available to the family such as through the ORS funding for the [NAME], the presence of the [NAME], and through [COMPANY] which the family could access for support. Circumstances in [APPELLANT] [34] The appellant’s evidence is that his parents are deceased. One brother lives in the United States and one sister lives in [APPELLANT] with her husband and children. The appellant states that he no longer has a relationship with his sister. The Tribunal observes the appellant is 43 years’ old and has lived independently and worked in [APPELLANT] until his arrival in New Zealand in 2024.

9 [35] Information provided to Immigration New Zealand establishes that in 2021, the appellant was charged with one charge of aggravated robbery and, in 2022, he was charged with one charge of breaching his bail conditions. [36] The representative submits the appellant has not been proven guilty of the charges and states the [NAME] has been adjourned to 5 June 2026 for judgment when the appellant is required to appear in-person at the Magistrates Court in Lautoka. It is submitted that a work visa should be granted to the appellant to allow him to return to [APPELLANT] and respond to the charges. [37] The Tribunal rejects the submission that there are exceptional humanitarian circumstances arising from the pending charges in [APPELLANT], or that the appellant requires a work visa in order to return to [APPELLANT] to face those charges. The appellant has been free to return to [APPELLANT] at any point and the grant of a visa to return to New Zealand is not necessary for him to do that. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant would be denied due process or subjected to extrajudicial treatment upon his return. The existence of an active [NAME] in [APPELLANT] constitutes a legitimate domestic matter, and it is appropriate for the appellant to return there to face the criminal allegations against him. Conclusion on exceptional humanitarian circumstances [38] The High Court has held that the stringent statutory test of “exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature” cannot be equated with “compassionate factors”, circumstances that are more than simply “routine”, or “genuinely concerning circumstances”. The High Court has also noted that there is a “high threshold” for making a finding of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature: see Minister of Immigration v Jooste [2014] NZHC 2882, [2015] 2 NZLR 765 at [45]. [39] The Tribunal finds that any disappointment for the appellant on having to return to [APPELLANT] arises in circumstances where he knew that he had pending criminal charges there and, nevertheless, chose to depart [APPELLANT]. He then entered New Zealand, after failing to disclose in his visa application that he had changed his name and had criminal charges pending under his previous name. The Tribunal is satisfied the appellant’s circumstances in [APPELLANT] arising from these matters do not give rise to exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature

10 [40] However, the Tribunal finds that the appellant’s circumstances in New Zealand, in particular the medical and developmental needs of his wife’s [NAME], for whom the appellant provides some of the daily care are (at this time) outside the normal run of circumstances. That is particularly so when viewed in the context of the wife’s health conditions which limit her ability to care for her son (or her two other daughters). [41] The Tribunal finds that, for now, the appellant does have exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature. Whether it would be Unjust or Unduly Harsh for the Appellant to be Deported [42] Whether deportation would be unjust or unduly harsh must be assessed in light of the reasons why the appellant is liable for deportation and involves a balancing of those considerations against the consequences of deportation – [NAME] v Minister of Immigration [2015] NZSC 132, [2016] 1 NZLR 248, at [9]. [43] To determine whether it would be unjust or unduly harsh for an appellant to be deported from New Zealand, the Supreme Court stated, in [APPELLANT] at [35], that an appellant must show a level of harshness more than a “generic concern” and “beyond the level of harshness that must be regarded as acceptable in order to preserve the integrity of New Zealand’s immigration system”. [44] The appellant is liable for deportation because he failed to disclose that he had criminal charges pending in [APPELLANT] under his birth name. His application for a work visa was declined in July 2025 because Immigration New Zealand found he had provided false or misleading information and had withheld information in that application and his previous application. Following that decision, his interim visa expired on 1 August 2025. [45] The appellant has provided a statement in relation to the incident leading to the charge of aggravated robbery. The appellant states he does not clearly remember what happened as he was drunk but says he got into an argument with a [NAME] who had posted videos about his wife and his mother online. He states he “understands that there was an assault” and that he was later told the [NAME] was not permanently injured. The Tribunal observes the proceedings remain on foot in [APPELLANT].

11 [46] The Tribunal finds that the appellant’s failure to disclose his pending criminal charges for violence, which were initiated under a previous name that was also not disclosed, was a serious affront to the integrity of New Zealand's immigration system. The appellant’s lack of candour undermined the fundamental requirement of good faith that underpins all visa and residency applications. [47] Against this, the Tribunal must balance the exceptional humanitarian consequences of deportation for the appellant, his wife and her three [NAME] children. [48] For his wife and her children, if the appellant is deported, they will experience significant disruption in their daily care, particularly for the [NAME] and the wife. However, the Tribunal notes that the family was able to function before the appellant came to New Zealand two years ago. It is acknowledged that [NAME] and sister may not now be able to provide additional support or support to the level that the appellant has recently, however, as New Zealand citizens, the wife and her children will be entitled to seek in-home support to help care for the [NAME] and/or respite care for the wife. Conclusion on injustice or undue harshness [49] Balancing the reason for the appellant’s liability for deportation (his failure to declare pending criminal charges for violence and his change of name as required when applying for a visa) against the consequences of his deportation (the wife’s loss of his ongoing support in New Zealand, and the disruption to the care arrangements for the wife’s children) the Tribunal is satisfied it would not be unjust or unduly harsh for him to be deported from New Zealand. DETERMINATION [50] While the Tribunal has found that there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature for now, it has found, for the reasons given above, that deportation would not be unjust or unduly harsh. The Tribunal’s finding in this regard means the appeal must be declined and it is unnecessary for it to consider the “public interest” stage of the inquiry under the statutory test.

12 Exercise of Discretion to Grant a Temporary Visa [51] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal turns its mind to its discretion under section 216(1), to delay deportation or to order the grant of a temporary visa where it considers it necessary to enable the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of getting his affairs in order. [52] The High Court has held that the phrase “getting affairs in order” means “organising those personal, legal or financial matters that, by reason of personal need or obligation (legal or moral) must be attended to so that deportation will not leave the individual concerned, or those associated with him or her, disadvantaged”: see Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Singh [2018] NZHC 272, [2018] NZAR 434 at [20]. [53] Pursuant to section 216(1)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal orders that the appellant be granted a temporary work visa, for a period of six months, commencing on the date of this decision. This is granted to provide the appellant and his wife with time to put in place alternative arrangements for the care of the wife’s [NAME], and for the daily support of the wife, including time to apply for any social services or other assistance for which they may be eligible. [54] In Immigration New Zealand’s Visa Pak Issue 564 — Immigration New Zealand position where the Immigration and Protection Tribunal has made a s216 order (1 December 2023), Immigration New Zealand states that where the Tribunal orders the grant of a temporary visa under section 216 to an appellant whose liability for deportation arose from them being unlawfully in New Zealand, a deportation order cannot be served on them during the currency of this visa because they are lawful and no longer liable for deportation. This confirms the position taken by Immigration New Zealand in submissions to the Tribunal, in AD (Argentina) [2020] NZIPT 505056. On that basis, as long as the appellant leaves New Zealand before the expiry of the visa ordered by the Tribunal, he will not be deemed to be deported under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act when they leave. [55] The appeal is declined in the above terms.

13 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [56] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant’s family members. This is to protect the privacy of the wife and her family members who may suffer emotional harm from publication, particularly in the context of the disclosed medical conditions. The Tribunal is satisfied their privacy interests outweigh the presumption of publication. Order as to Abridged Research Copy [57] Pursuant to clause 18(4) of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, [9], [18(d)], [19(c), (i), (j), (l)], [26], [27], [28] and [30] (or portions thereof) are to be withheld from the research copy of this decision. This is to protect the privacy of the [NAME] and her children in relation to their health conditions. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member