Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Humanitarian Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 507281 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 20 April 2026

__________________________________________________________________ DEPORTATION (NON-RESIDENT)

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ [1] This is a humanitarian appeal by the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT] in his early 60s. His appeal was lodged at the same time as his refugee and protected person appeal. Having dismissed the refugee and protected person appeal, the Tribunal must now consider the humanitarian appeal. THE ISSUE [2] The appellant advanced his refugee and protection claim on the ground that he was at risk of serious harm from [NAME] [NAME] ([NAME]), [NAME] and police because of his involvement in protests against the mistreatment of Kuki Christian women. [3] The essential issue on appeal is whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand.

2 [4] The Tribunal finds that the appellant does not have exceptional humanitarian circumstances, and the appeal must be declined.

BACKGROUND [5] The appellant was born in Mumbai, Maharashtra, [APPELLANT] and is a citizen of [APPELLANT]. He was born into the [NAME] and has nine siblings. His parents and eight of his siblings live in [APPELLANT] and one brother who lives in the United States of America. [6] The appellant is married, and the couple have one daughter, now aged in her late 20s. [7] From early 1982, the appellant trained as a welder. He then worked from abroad between 1990 to 2007 as a welder in Saudi Arabia. In 2007, he returned to [APPELLANT] and worked as an independent contractor performing welding work. [8] In June 2023, the appellant applied for a visitor visa to come to New Zealand. This was approved in July 2023. [9] In September 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. He claimed refugee and protection status on 18 October 2023 and has been issued three asylum-seeker work visas, the most recent valid until 1 November 2026. [10] The appellant was interviewed by Immigration New Zealand on 3 April 2025. A copy of the interview report was sent to the appellant and his representative on 29 April 2025 and the appellant responded to this report on 6 May 2025. [11] On 1 August 2025, the RSU declined the appellant’s claim leading to his refugee and protection appeal to the Tribunal. Pursuant to section 233 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal determined that his appeal was prima facie manifestly unfounded and therefore determined not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. His appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal in March 2026: see [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) [2026] NZIPT 803116.

3 STATUTORY GROUNDS [12] This appeal is brought under subsections 194(5) and (6) of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”) and was lodged at the same time as with the appellant’s refugee and protected person status appeal. The grounds for determining a humanitarian appeal are set out in section 207 of the Act: (1) The Tribunal must allow an appeal against liability for deportation on humanitarian grounds only where it is satisfied that— (a) there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand; and (b) it would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the appellant to remain in New Zealand. [13] The Supreme Court stated that three ingredients had to be established in the first limb of section 47(3) of the former Immigration Act 1987, the almost identical predecessor to section 207(1): (i) exceptional circumstances; (ii) of a humanitarian nature; (iii) that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand: Ye v Minister of Immigration [2009] NZSC 76, [2010] 1 NZLR 104. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [14] On 7 April 2026, former counsel advised the Tribunal that they had withdrawn their representation. In response to the Tribunal’s inquiries, counsel confirmed that the appellant had been provided with all the documents on appeal including the Tribunal’s refugee and protection decision and the Tribunal wrote to him on 9 April 2026 asking him whether he intended to provide any response. No submissions or response to the Tribunal’s communication have been provided by the appellant on appeal. ASSESSMENT [15] The Tribunal has considered the appellant’s Immigration New Zealand file in relation to the appellant’s temporary visa applications and its relevant electronic records and his refugee and protected person status appeal file.

4 Whether there are Exceptional Circumstances of a Humanitarian Nature [16] Exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature “must be well outside the normal run of circumstances” and, while they do not need to be unique or very rare, they do have to be “truly an exception rather than the rule”: [NAME] v Minister of Immigration, at [34]. Claimed risk of harm in [APPELLANT] [17] The appellant has made no submissions on appeal. Out of an abundance of caution, in these circumstances, the Tribunal proceeds on the basis that the appellant maintains his assertions in his refugee and protection appeal that he is at risk of serious harm at the hands of [NAME], [NAME] and police because of his involvement in protests against the mistreatment of Kuki Christian women. These matters were considered in the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal and the Tribunal which, in finding the appeal to be manifestly unfounded, made the following findings of credibility and fact: (a) That there was a real chance that members of the [NAME] and [NAME] may locate the appellant and act on their threats which may give rise to breaches of his rights to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life and to security of the person as contained in Articles 6 and 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The local police had been unresponsive to the appellant’s complaints about these men and that protection from the state so as to reduce the risk of serious harm to him would not be forthcoming. (b) That there was no real chance that members of the [NAME] and [NAME] would make any false complaint to the police about him. They had not done so in the years since the appellant was involved in the protests and there was no suggestion by the appellant or any of the witnesses that any such complaint against the appellant had been made to the police. (c) As to the appellant’s fear of the police, the Tribunal was not satisfied that they maintained any interest in him. They looked for the appellant on one occasion after his involvement in a protest which was now remote in time. Since this time, the appellant visited the police station to complain about the men and the police had

5 demonstrated no ongoing interest in him due to his involvement in the protest or for any other reason. (d) Notwithstanding the risk to the appellant of breaches to his rights to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life and to security of the person, the appellant could safely reside in Y State, where his wife and daughter were currently living, or elsewhere, such as, New Delhi, if he wished. The appellant is fluent in Hindi and Marathi. Further, he is an experienced welder having worked in [APPELLANT] and abroad in the Middle East and could live with his family safely, work and enjoy his basic human rights in either Y State or New Delhi. (e) The events that the appellant experienced were highly localised and it was speculative that any of the men who had expressed interest in him would look for him beyond his home state. There was no real chance of him facing serious harm in Y State or New Delhi and he would enjoy his human rights there as provided for in the Refugee Convention. [18] Section 231 of the Act provides: 231 Findings of credibility and fact (1) On any appeal or matter, the Tribunal may rely on any finding of credibility or fact— (a) by the Tribunal in any previous appeal or matter determined by the Tribunal that involved the [NAME]; or (b) by any [NAME] in any previous appeal or matter determined by the [NAME] that involved the [NAME]. (2) A person may not challenge any finding of credibility or fact that may be relied on by the Tribunal under subsection (1). [19] No material or submissions have been provided in relation to this humanitarian appeal which persuade the Tribunal to revisit the findings of credibility or fact made in relation to the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal. Those findings are relied on in this decision pursuant to section 231. However, the Tribunal reminds itself that, in this appeal, the focus is on whether there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from New Zealand.

6 [20] Adopting the findings of fact and credibility in [NAME] ([APPELLANT]), the Tribunal finds that the appellant has not established that he is at risk of serious harm if returned to [APPELLANT]. It now turns to the balance of his circumstances. Settlement in New Zealand and circumstances in [APPELLANT] [21] The appellant has been living in New Zealand for two and a half years. He has held a succession of asylum-seeker work visas, although his specific employment in New Zealand has not been advised to the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepts that he will have made friends and connections during this time. However, it is not uncommon for migrants to come to New Zealand, to find modest employment and to seek to remain here. The appellant has not declared any relatives living here and his family nexus remains to [APPELLANT]. [22] Should the appellant return to [APPELLANT], he will be returning to a country where he has lived most of his life. This is where his family, including his parents and all but one of his many siblings live. He was educated there and is familiar with the lifestyle and customs there. [23] The appellant would return to [APPELLANT] with specialist skill as a welder. Previously, he has been self-employed as a welder in [APPELLANT] and abroad. He is a resourceful man and even at 62 years of age, with his history of self-employment, would be likely to find employment and be able to maintain an adequate standard of living for himself and his family. He also has assets to fall back upon having owned his own home in [APPELLANT]. His wife and daughter are currently living in Y State, and he may choose to reunite with them and settle there, or in a different place such as New Delhi, if he wished to do so. Conclusion on exceptional circumstances [24] The appellant has a strong nexus to [APPELLANT] where he grew up and his parents and the majority of his siblings continue to reside. He has no family in New Zealand and has been here for only a short period. The reality is that many migrants come here as the holders of temporary visas and, like the appellant, become employed and develop social and other ties to the country over time. However, there is nothing about the appellant’s ties to, and settlement in, New Zealand, that is exceptional.

7 [25] The Tribunal finds that the high statutory threshold of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature has not been reached in this case. DETERMINATION [26] For the reasons given, the Tribunal finds that there are no exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test and so the appeal must fail. This finding makes it unnecessary to consider either the “unjust or unduly harsh” or “public interest” stages of the inquiry under the statutory test. [27] The appellant has failed to meet the requirements of section 207(1) of the Act and his appeal is declined. The Tribunal’s Discretionary Powers [28] Having declined the appeal, the Tribunal turns its mind to its discretion under section 216(1) of the Act to delay deportation or order the grant of a temporary visa where it considers it necessary to enable the appellant to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of getting her affairs in order. [29] The High Court has held that the phrase “getting affairs in order” means “organising those personal, legal or financial matters that, by reason of personal need or obligation (legal or moral) must be attended to so that deportation will not leave the individual concerned, or those associated with him or her, disadvantaged”: Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Singh [2018] NZHC 272, [2018] NZAR 434 at [20]. [30] The Tribunal considers that the appellant’s circumstances do not warrant the Tribunal exercise its discretion pursuant to section 216(1) of the Act. The appellant has held work visas here since January 2024 and it is reasonable to expect that he would have the funds necessary to finance his return airfare to [APPELLANT]. [31] The appeal is declined on the above terms.

8 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [32] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 2009, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. This is to ensure compliance with section 151 of the Act as this humanitarian appeal follows the appellant’s refugee and protected person appeal. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member