Appeal Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] [NAME] RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Officer

Before: Judge M [NAME] (Chair)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 30 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. [2] This is the second time that the appellant has made a claim for [RESPONDENT] and protected person status. JURISDICTION [3] The Tribunal wrote to counsel on 17 April 2026, seeking comment on whether the appellant’s second claim met the jurisdictional requirement that there be a “significant change in circumstances material to the claim since the previous claim was determined”, to which counsel has responded by submissions dated 21 April 2026.

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[4] However, a further (and supervening) issue has emerged. The [RESPONDENT] [NAME] did not, in fact, decline the second claim under section 140(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 (the ‘changed circumstances’ issue) but, rather, under section 140(3) of the Act. Section 140(3) provides: “140 Limitation on subsequent claims ... (3) [RESPONDENT] and protection officer may refuse to consider a subsequent claim for recognition as [RESPONDENT] or a protected person if the officer is satisfied that the claim— (a) is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; or (b) repeats any claim previously made (including a subsequent claim).” [5] Here, it is clear from the decision of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME], that the appellant’s second claim was declined under section 140(3)(a), on the grounds that the officer was satisfied that the second claim was manifestly unfounded. Indeed, the officer expressly stated: “For the reasons given above, [the appellant’s] subsequent [RESPONDENT] and protection claim is manifestly unfounded in accordance with section 140(3)(a) of the Act.” [6] While there is a right of appeal to the Tribunal arising from decisions made under section 140(1), there is no right of appeal against a decision made under section 140(3), except in limited circumstances. In that regard, section 195(1) provides: “195 Right of appeal in relation to subsequent claims for [RESPONDENT] or protection status (1) A person may appeal to the Tribunal against a decision by [RESPONDENT] and protection officer— (a) under section 140(1) to refuse to consider a subsequent claim by the person to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a protected person: (b) under section 140(3) to refuse to consider a subsequent claim by the person to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a protected person, but only if the person’s most recent previous claim was declined under Part 6A of the former Act.” [7] In the present instance, the appellant’s first claim was not decided under Part 6A of the former Act (the Immigration Act 1987). Rather, it was determined by the Tribunal (differently constituted) on 23 December 2025 – see ZU ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802995. It follows that there is nothing in section 195 of the Act which provides a right of appeal to the appellant.

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Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

Judge M [NAME] [8] This is a matter which the Tribunal should have noticed before writing to counsel on 17 April 2026 but, equally, the appeal should never have been filed given that the letter of 13 April 2026 by the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] to counsel, enclosing the [RESPONDENT] [NAME]’s decision, expressly advised: “Please note that you have no right to appeal this decision to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, pursuant to section 195(1)(b) of the Immigration Act 2009.” [9] The Tribunal has considered whether it is necessary to seek comment from the appellant, but the reality is that the matter is one not amenable to persuasion. There are no natural justice or fairness issues arising. The Tribunal is satisfied that, as a matter of law, there is no jurisdiction for it to determine the second appeal.

CONCLUSION [10] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine a second appeal. It is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [11] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “Judge M [NAME]” Judge M [NAME]