Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Status Claim

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 802779 [NAME_1], [NAME_19]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME_3] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Hearing: 29 January 2026

Date of Decision: 15 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm from a group of unidentified men who have slapped, followed and threatened him after he provided an incorrectly priced invoice to an unidentified man at his father’s tyre shop. [3] The principal issues to be determined are whether the evidence is accepted and whether the evidence establishes a risk of the appellant suffering serious harm that reaches the required threshold.

2 [4] For the reasons which follow, the Tribunal finds that core aspects of the appellant’s account, and that of his witness’ account, are not credible and that the aspects of his claim which are accepted do not establish that he is entitled to be recognised as a refugee or protected person. His appeal is dismissed. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [5] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant Background [6] The appellant, a Hindu man, was born in Z village, in Jammu district, Jammu and Kashmir, India, near the Pakistan border. The village is made up of a mix of Hindus, [NAME_5], Muslims and Christians. The appellant’s friends are mostly [NAME_5]. [7] The appellant’s parents and sibling remain living in Z village. His father owns a shop on the outskirts of Z village in which he sells, replaces and repairs tyres for various vehicle types. He has owned this business since before the appellant was born and has never had another occupation. The appellant’s family also live at the same address, with the main entrance to their home situated next to the shop. The shop is downstairs, and the home is upstairs. [8] The appellant left high school in 2023. He was part way though class 12 but did not sit the class 12 exams. He left school early because he was being threatened due to the incident at the tyre shop (see from [12] below) and his father told him to stay home until things cooled down. Prior to leaving high school, while in class 11 in 2022, the appellant began to work at his father’s shop either after school or on the weekends. He would do all jobs in the shop including repairing and replacing tyres and taking payments. Incident at the tyre shop [9] In either February or March 2023, the appellant was working in his father’s tyre shop when five men, aged around 22–23 years, came to the shop on three motorbikes. The appellant did not know who these men were and had not seen

3 them before. He describes them as “bike riders” and considers it likely that they performed stunts, such as wheelies, on their bikes because they had big motorbikes. The men were not armed. [10] The appellant mistakenly provided an incorrect price to one of the men, who wanted to buy a tyre, and they began to argue with him, accusing him of committing fraud. The appellant’s father, who had been working on a vehicle outside the front of the shop, heard the argument and came inside. He provided the correct price, and the appellant apologised for the mistake. One of the men grabbed the appellant by his collar and the man who was purchasing the tyre slapped him with an open palm once. The appellant’s father intervened and asked the appellant to stand to the side. He told the men that he would call the police, and they left. [11] The appellant and his father did not [NAME_2] the incident seriously and resumed their normal work at the shop without calling the police. The appellant was not injured during the incident. There were no other witnesses to the incident. After the incident at the tyre shop [12] Two or three days after the incident at the tyre shop, five men came in search of the appellant. He is not certain that these men were the same as those involved in the tyre shop incident, although he assumes that they were from their physiques which were their only distinguishing feature. Cloths or handkerchiefs covered their faces, and he could only see their eyes. [13] The appellant was in the shop when the men arrived. His mother and sister were upstairs in the house. One of the men had a pistol and another had a big knife. Both were holding their weapons in their hands. When the men entered the shop, one of them grabbed the appellant’s collar, tried to pull him towards them and told him to come outside. He pulled himself free and went inside the house while his father spoke to the men. One of them told his father that if he called the police or told anyone what was going on, they would kill his whole family. Customers then began to enter the shop, and the men left. [14] Some days later, the appellant was about four or five kilometres from home on his motorbike when he “felt” that he was being followed. He saw two people on motorbikes with their faces covered behind him, who would slow when he slowed and speed up when he sped up. They followed him for approximately 5 to

4 10 minutes as he returned home, driving past his home when he entered his family’s property. [15] Some days later, the appellant was on his motorbike travelling towards Y City. He saw three or four men coming the other way down the road. One of the men had his face uncovered but the appellant is unsure if that man, or any of the others, had been at the tyre shop previously. The men stopped him, and one of them grabbed his collar and slapped him a couple of times with an open palm. The men were swearing and yelling that when they had been to his home, he was not there. They told him that the next time they saw him, they would not spare him. One of the men had something in his hand with which he hit the appellant and scratched his finger. [16] Three or four passersby intervened by moving the men away from the appellant and telling them to leave. The men did so, and the appellant returned home. He did not seek medical attention but did put bandages on his cut at home. He told his father that some men had stopped him but not that they had slapped or cut him as he did not want to cause his father stress. [17] After this incident, the appellant did not leave his home very often. He spent his time either in the house or in the shop. His father had told him not to leave the house so that he would not be followed. [18] Approximately one-and-a-half-weeks later, a group of men came to the either the shop or the home while the appellant was out with their faces covered. The appellant does not know if they were the same men as had previously been at the tyre shop. His father later told him that people were asking about him and that he had told them he (the appellant) was not at home. The men instructed his father to let them know when the appellant was home, otherwise they would harm his family. They then left. [19] One week later, unknown men visited the shop again. This time, the appellant was at home, but his father told the men that he was not there. The men waited for about half an hour or so, before leaving. The appellant did not see the men. [20] A few months later, in either June or July 2023, the appellant began to receive telephone calls from an unknown number (the number was not displayed). After three to four of these telephone calls, the appellant answered one. The caller did not identify themselves and told the appellant that who was calling was

5 not his concern. The caller told him he would be killed if he stepped outside his home but did not explain why they were threatening him. The appellant then began to receive telephone calls during the night as well as the day. After some time, he spoke to his father who considered that the appellant should arrange to leave India. The telephone calls continued on a daily basis until the appellant left the country, although their frequency would vary. [21] The appellant did not report any of the above events to the police in India. This was because the men had threatened to do something to either him or his family if he told anyone. He considers that, if he had gone to the police and the men were arrested and then released on bail, they could have gone after him or his family members. While the appellant has been in New Zealand [22] Between April and June 2025, the appellant received frequent calls over [NAME_6] from unknown individuals. All the calls came from unknown individuals in various countries, including India and several European countries. Each call included around 20–25 persons (sometimes more, sometimes less). The appellant answered two or three of these calls, during which unknown individuals would swear at each other and target both the appellant and another unknown individual who was also on the calls. The appellant subsequently learned, through the news media, that the other targeted individual was being asked to pay around 20 lakhs. [23] The unknown individuals on the calls asked the appellant for ransom money. They threatened to harm him and his family and told him that they knew everything about his family, although they refused to give details, saying they could talk about that later, after he paid. The appellant never paid any ransom money, and he only received these calls between April and June 2025. He does not know why some of the calls were from or included individuals in Europe. [24] No members of the appellant’s family were harmed but, on four or five occasions, in 2025, people went to his family’s home in India during the night, asked about him, threw stones or bricks at the house, and fired firearms outside the property. As a result, his father filed a First Information Report (FIR) with the police.

6 [25] The appellant received a telephone call from an unknown number on 5 December 2025. The person called twice, and the appellant answered the first call. As soon as the caller started talking, he hung up because the caller began to swear. The appellant also received phone calls from unknown numbers early in 2024, although he did not mention these calls to the [NAME_7] because calls would come in while he was at work and unable to answer the phone. Inability to live elsewhere in India [26] Although the tyre shop incident and the events that followed took place in Jammu district, the appellant is unable to live elsewhere in India. He considers that if he relocated within India and the men, by chance, learned his location, it would “be a bigger problem” if they attacked or harmed him. Further, his village is close to the border of Jammu and Kashmir, near the “zero line”. Someone is always killed when crossfire between India and Pakistan occurs, as it is not targeted and can hit anyone. During these periods, the appellant’s parents stay with relatives. The appellant has no personal involvement with the border skirmishes with Pakistan and has not been involved in this conflict in anyway. [27] The appellant is unable to relocate to another city, such as New Delhi, because there is another conflict going on, involving [NAME_8], and that the [NAME_5] are targeting Hindus in this conflict and there is a threat that they (the [NAME_5]) may harm them (Hindus). The appellant’s previous statements to Immigration New Zealand and the [NAME_7] [28] The appellant was stressed when Immigration New Zealand interviewed him at the New Zealand border. He gave sufficient information for Immigration New Zealand to allow him entry to New Zealand and, once he had entered the country, he provided proper information. Although he told Immigration New Zealand at that time that he had been threatened in India by a man named [NAME_9], he does not know anyone by that name and no one called [NAME_9] has never threatened him. [29] The appellant did not mention the tyre shop incident or any of the following events in his Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status form (confirmation of claim) because, when he was writing out his “story”, he thought that it was getting quite long. When, in his confirmation of claim, he mentioned the police, he was referring to the [NAME_8] conflict. He has never personally had a

7 negative interaction with the police. He has no personal experience of being badly beaten. A few of his best friends are Sikh people but they have no friction or grudges with each other. Evidence of [NAME_10] [30] [NAME_10] is the appellant’s father. He gave his evidence by audiovisual link. He has always lived in Z village. However, approximately one year ago, in January 2025, he and his family moved from a home within the village to one outside the village which they had constructed. After selling the first home, the family lived between the two homes until the new owners took possession. [31] [NAME_10] has owned his own business, a tyre business, (or previous iterations thereof) for a long time, although he also has worked as a daily farm labourer. He last worked as a labourer approximately three or four years ago. He started the business, in its current form, approximately two and a half years ago. It is one of two tyre shops in the area, with the other being around three kilometres away. The shop is located at the front of the new property, on the road, with the double-story house built behind it. The appellant began to work in the shop when he was still studying. [32] [NAME_10] was unable to recall the year in which the tyre shop incident took place but states in his affidavit that it was on 10 March. Four or five men arrived at the shop on bikes with their faces covered. One of the men asked for a tyre replacement and [NAME_10]’s son quoted a price. [NAME_10] told the men that his son had mistakenly quoted an incorrect, higher price and provided the correct one. The men took offence to the fact that a higher price had been quoted, one of them grabbed his son’s collar and another slapped him. [NAME_10] freed his son from the man holding him, told him to go inside the house, informed the men that his son had made a genuine mistake and tried to pacify them. The men were aware that the price was incorrect prior to [NAME_10] correcting it. After he sent his son inside, the men left. [33] After this incident, the men returned to the shop on three occasions, asking for the son. The first occurred two days later, when the men returned to the shop and asked for the appellant. [NAME_10] told the appellant to go inside and hide and told the men he was not there. The men did not see the appellant, as they were standing outside the shop when they asked after him. Two weeks later, the men returned, when there were a few other customers in the shop, and again asked after the appellant. [NAME_10] told them he was not there, and they left. Two months

8 later, the men came again. [NAME_10] told them the appellant was not there. This time, the men created a ruckus and were shouting and screaming and asking where the appellant was. They threatened to kill him. [NAME_10] told them to let the incident go, as it was a genuine mistake, but they said they would not spare his son. [34] On each occasion, it was the same men who returned to the shop. Their faces were covered so [NAME_10] could not identify them. However, he knew it was the same men because the family did not have “anything going on with anyone else” and there was no one else it would be. On the third occasion, two of the men were armed: one had a pistol in his jacket, and another had a medium-sized knife in his hand. [35] After these visits, [NAME_10] sent the appellant overseas due to the threat to his life. There were no other incidents before the appellant departed for New Zealand. [36] In 2025, while the appellant was in New Zealand, [NAME_10] filed an FIR because the men had returned to the shop two or three times, and he felt threatened. He does not know exactly when the men returned, as he is a simple man who does not know much and is not well-educated. However, the men only returned to the shop on one occasion after the appellant left for New Zealand. [37] The FIR is related to the one time the men returned to the shop after the appellant left for New Zealand. The men asked for the appellant and [NAME_10] told them that he had gone somewhere. [NAME_10] does not know why the FIR references dates in 2019, records the offence reported date as Friday 9 September 2025 (9 September 2025 was a Tuesday) or why it refers to his occupation as “acriculture”. He did not pay much attention to the dates and he and his family are in a stressful situation, living close to the Pakistan border where anything could happen at any time. Although, in 2025 when the report was made, he was working at the tyre shop, having started the business in 2023, he had been a labourer before this. [NAME_10] is unable to read or write, and the police may have recorded his occupation incorrectly. [38] [NAME_10] does not know if the police have taken any actions or investigations following the filing of the FIR report. He has not returned to the police station to check.

9 Other Evidence and Submissions Received [39] The Tribunal and counsel for the appellant have both been provided with copies of the [NAME_7] files concerning the appellant’s claim for refugee or protected person status. [40] Counsel filed submissions (4 November 2025), opening written submissions (22 January 2026) and closing written submissions (10 February 2026). He made brief oral closing submissions at the hearing. [41] In support of the appeal, counsel has filed: (a) A written statement (10 November 2025) from the appellant. (b) A written affidavit (4 December 2025) from [NAME_10] and a copy of [NAME_10]’s [NAME_11] identity document. (c) A FIR (10 September 2025) detailing [NAME_10] as the complainant/ informant. (d) Screen shots of a [NAME_6] call log showing multiple calls from between 25 April and 10 June (year not given). The call log details that there were between 20 and 62 parties on each call, which included [NAME_6] numbers originating in India and Europe. (e) Undated screenshots of a telephone call from “Unknown” and of an “Unknown Contact”. (f) Undated and untitled images from the appellant’s village and a nearby village. (g) Various bundles of country information (10 November 2025 and 14 January 2026). ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [42] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning refugee or protection status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as:

10 (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_12] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [43] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [44] In determining whether the appellant is a refugee or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [45] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in [NAME_13] (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. [NAME_13] (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [46] The Tribunal has considered counsel’s submissions and reminds itself that is not uncommon for appellants and witnesses to have difficulty recalling specific past events and dates. However, the Tribunal is satisfied that the following core

11 elements of the appellant’s claim to be at risk of harm on return to India are not credible. Inconsistencies as to the basis of the appellant’s claim [47] To date, the appellant has given three different narratives as to why he claims to be at risk of serious harm in India: on 27 August 2023 at the New Zealand border; in his confirmation of claim (2 October 2023); and in a written statement (18 September 2024) provided to the [NAME_7]. [48] After being denied entry to New Zealand, the appellant claimed India was dangerous, he had been threatened there by “[NAME_9]”, and he came here to find somewhere safe. He had had some issues in his city, because of a fight approximately one and a half months earlier, and needed things to settle down. [49] The appellant then claimed, in his confirmation of claim, that he feared returning to India because of the conflict between India and Pakistan and the conflict between the [NAME_5]. The police considered his family to be part of the [NAME_8]. [50] The appellant then, in his written statement, raised the events that form the foundation of his current claim (that is, that he was slapped during a pricing dispute at his father’s tyre shop and subsequently followed and threatened). He included that his familial home is near the Pakistani border, there was a risk of being shot and the police considered his parents to be “members of the [NAME_8]” and took no action on their complaints regarding the conflict. [51] Counsel submits that the appellant’s youth and limited understanding of the refugee process, combined with his trauma and anxiety, has led to “variations in his narrative”. At the hearing, the Tribunal sought clarity on the appellant’s three narratives. The appellant stated that he had been stressed at the border and provided sufficient details to enter New Zealand, with the intention to provide further information later. [52] There is no medical evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant is experiencing trauma and anxiety. His youth and limited understanding of the refugee process are not compelling explanations for why he claimed to be at harm from an individual named [NAME_9] at the border, someone he now says he does not know and who has not threatened him, then changed that narrative twice.

12 [53] Nor is the Tribunal persuaded by the appellant’s explanation that he did not mention the tyre shop incident or any of the events that followed in his confirmation of claim, because his story was “getting quite long”. There is no restriction on the amount of information a claimant can include in their confirmation of claim — indeed the form instructs claimants to continue on a separate sheet of paper if necessary. [54] The Tribunal finds that the appellant’s provision of three different narratives as the basis for his claim to be at risk of serious harm in India negatively impacts his credibility. Inconsistencies regarding subsequent visits by, and actions of, unknown men [55] A core feature of the appellant’s claim is that he is at risk from unknown men who have continued to seek his whereabouts after an incident at the tyre shop during which he issued an incorrectly priced invoice to one man. His evidence is that these (or other) men have repeatedly sought to find him. — The location of the unknown men’s visits [56] The appellant provided inconsistent evidence to the [NAME_7] and the Tribunal as to whether the unknown men returned to his home or his father’s shop in search of him. Further, he and his father gave inconsistent evidence as to when they moved to a house attached to the shop (the appellant claiming this was in 2022 and the father that it was in 2025). [57] At the [NAME_7], the appellant said that the unknown men came to his house on one occasion and threatened to kill him. He described his home as being three to four kilometres away from the shop, on the other side of the village. Before the Tribunal, he initially described the men as coming to his house, then stated that he was in the shop when they first came looking for him. The appellant stated that the shop was on the ground floor of the family home. This is directly contradictory to his previous evidence that the home was three or four kilometres from the shop. [58] The appellant’s subsequent attempt to reconcile his evidence to the Tribunal with that given to the [NAME_7] was confused and uncompelling. He stated that the home on the other side of the village was sold at the end of 2022 and he and his family moved at that point to the home above the shop. However, he described the old home to the [NAME_7] because

13 he and his family lived between the two houses until the new owners moved in, in early 2023. By the time the men visited the appellant’s home the first time, the appellant’s mother and sister were living in the new house (above the shop). He reiterated this explanation, when the Tribunal sought clarification, again stating that the family had moved into the home over the shop by the time his issues with the men began. [59] As to why he told the Tribunal that the men came into the shop rather the house, the appellant explained that the first time the men came, they went to the shop. He was unable to explain how he was differentiating between them returning to the shop as opposed to visiting his home, and said he was unaware if the men knew where he lived. He was unable to explain why he did not tell the [NAME_7] that the men had gone into the shop and grabbed him. Rather, he stated that, at the interview, “whatever was coming in my mind, I was telling them”. [60] [NAME_10]’s evidence on the location of the family home and the unknown men’s return visits was inconsistent with that of the appellant. He stated that the family moved to the home by the shop in January 2025. Further, the new home was set behind the workshop, rather than above it. [61] When [NAME_10]’s evidence regarding the timing of the family’s move to the house by the shop was put to the appellant, he merely stated that he had already informed the Tribunal that his father did not have a good memory. The Tribunal acknowledges that, prior to the appellant giving evidence, counsel advised that the appellant had informed him that his father did not have a good memory. However, counsel did not produce any evidence as to this or question [NAME_10] about his memory. [62] There is no sensible explanation as to why the appellant would tell the [NAME_7] that the men went to one location (a house three or four kilometres away from the shop) and the Tribunal that they went to another (a dwelling attached to the shop). The appellant’s explanation regarding his inconsistent evidence as to where he and his family were living at the relevant time is uncompelling and inconsistent with the evidence of his father. [63] The appellant’s inability to consistently recount where his home was and where the men sought him out undermines his account of their returning at all.

14 — Times the unknown men returned in search of the appellant [64] The appellant and his father gave inconsistent evidence as to how many times the men returned to the shop or home in search of the appellant. [65] The appellant’s evidence to the Tribunal was that the men returned to the shop on three occasions following the initial tyre shop incident, as well as returning an additional four or five times while he has been in New Zealand. During the visits that occurred while he was in New Zealand, unknown individuals went to his family home, asked about him, threw stones or bricks at the house and discharged firearms outside the property. [66] [NAME_10]’s evidence was inconsistent with that of the appellant. He initially stated that the men returned only one occasion after the appellant departed for New Zealand. When the Tribunal pointed out to him that the FIR he provided stated that the men had returned twice after the appellant departed India, once in 2024 and once in 2025, he agreed that they had returned twice. At no stage did he describe the men throwing stones or bricks at the home and discharging firearms outside the property. [67] When the inconsistencies between the appellant’s and his father’s evidence were put to him, the appellant merely stated that his father would know exactly how many times the men had returned. His father had told him that the incidents during which the men threw things at the home and discharged firearms took place four to five times. He proffered that it could be that his father gave different information at the hearing. [68] The Tribunal does not accept the claim that unknown men ever threw projectiles at the home or discharged firearms outside the property, or that they visited the property after the appellant had travelled to New Zealand. — Whether the appellant was followed [69] The appellant provided inconsistent evidence of how many times the unknown men followed him, when they began to do so, and what happened during these incidents. [NAME_10]’s written and oral evidence is inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence. [70] The appellant told the [NAME_7] that the unknown men began to follow him two to three days after the incident at the tyre shop, they followed him “every time” he went out, and they beat and tortured him. He stated that they

15 stopped him and slapped him on two occasions, and his parents told him to remain home after the first occasion on which he was slapped. [71] The appellant told the Tribunal that he was followed on two occasions only. He variously stated that he did not leave his home after the first time he was followed, then that he left his home the next day because he did not [NAME_2] the first incident of being followed seriously. He gave inconsistent evidence as to when his parents told him not to leave his home. [72] The appellant conceded that he may have made a mistake in telling the [NAME_7] that the men began to follow him two to three days after the incident at the tyre shop. He may have made a further mistake in telling the [NAME_7] that he was stopped twice and slapped twice. He attributed this to the pressure he experienced at his interview. He was unable to explain why he did not correct these mistakes in his interview report response. [73] [NAME_10]’s oral evidence was that, other than the unknown men’s visits to the shop, there were no incidents prior to the appellant travelling to New Zealand. He did not mention that the appellant was followed until the Tribunal pointed out that his written evidence was that the appellant was followed and badly beaten, at which point he agreed that this had occurred. He was unable to explain why he had earlier stated there were no other incidents. Instead, he informed the Tribunal that he was a simple man who did not have much information about what was going on, that the family lived close to the border and in a stressful situation and that anything could happen, so he was not bothered about what is going on elsewhere. This does not adequately explain the inconsistences between his oral and written evidence. [74] The Tribunal does not accept that the appellant was followed by unknown men when on his motorbike on any occasion or that he was stopped, slapped and scratched by them. Telephone calls in India [75] The appellant informed the [NAME_7] that he began receiving telephone calls sometime in August 2023 from unknown callers. This was after the unknown men came to his house. He was unable to recall the last time he received a call from the men, but it was before he came to New Zealand.

16 [76] Before the Tribunal, the appellant’s evidence is that he received a number of telephone calls from unknown numbers. He first stated that the calls began in June or July 2023 but later told the Tribunal he was unsure if they began weeks or months after the last time the unknown men went to his home. He was not able to explain who called him as the callers told him that their identity was none of his business. He was unable to say why he was being threatened as the callers never told him this; rather, they simply told him he would be killed if he was found outside his house. [77] To the [NAME_7], the appellant explained that he thought the calls were happening because the callers were jealous. He told the Tribunal that he did not know why he said this but that the incident at the tyre shop was not a big thing, although “they” were making it one. While it is possible the callers are jealous, the appellant does not know if they are. [78] The Tribunal does not accept that the appellant received threatening phone calls from unknown individuals while in India. [NAME_10] is an unreliable witness [79] [NAME_10] provided a written affidavit ahead of his oral evidence. At the hearing, he confirmed that he wrote the affidavit although he later told counsel that he cannot read or write. [NAME_10]’s affidavit is inconsistent with his oral evidence in the following ways. [80] First, [NAME_10]’s written evidence was that the unknown men “began hitting my son with punches” during the tyre shop incident. He told the Tribunal that one of the men grabbed his son’s collar and a second person slapped him. When the Tribunal pointed out this inconsistency to [NAME_10], he repeated that the men grabbed his son’s collar and slapped him. [81] Second, [NAME_10]’s written evidence was that the unknown men came to his house two or three times, two months after the incident at the tyre shop. At the hearing, he stated that they first returned two days after the incident. When the Tribunal pointed out this inconsistency, [NAME_10] again repeated that they first returned two days after the incident. [82] Third, [NAME_10]’s written evidence is that the unknown men called, threatened, followed and badly beat the appellant. Until the Tribunal referred him to his written evidence, [NAME_10]’s oral evidence was that there were no incidents in India other than

17 the tyre shop incident and the three subsequent visits to the family’s home. He then agreed that the appellant had been called, threatened, followed and beaten up. Rather than explain the inconsistencies between his written and oral evidence, [NAME_10] stated that he is a simple man without much information and that he lives close to the border which is a stressful situation. [83] The Tribunal finds that [NAME_10] has been unable to adequately explain the inconsistencies between his written and oral evidence. His inability to do so leaves the Tribunal to conclude that he is not a reliable witness. Further inconsistencies [84] There are other inconsistencies between the appellant’s evidence to the [NAME_7] and the Tribunal that caused the Tribunal concern. While, of themselves, these inconsistencies may not have provided a sufficient basis on which to reject the appellant’s account, the Tribunal takes note of them in its overall assessment of the appellant’s credibility. [85] First, in his written statement provided to the [NAME_7], the appellant wrote that the tyre shop incident took place in July 2023. During both his interview and the hearing, he maintained that the incident took place in either February or March 2023. When asked to explain the different dates, he stated that February or March 2023 was correct. He did not offer an explanation as to why he had given a different date in his written statement. [86] Second, at the hearing, the appellant informed the Tribunal that he left school without completing year 12 due to the issues he was having with the unknown men. In his written statement to the [NAME_7], the appellant wrote that he had completed his education up to year 10. At the same time, he corrected information provided in his confirmation of claim form to reflect that he had completed year 10 in 2019. Initially, the appellant stated that he could have made a mistake during his interview. When advised that his written statement pre-dated his interview, he stated that he may have incorrectly recorded information regarding his schooling, however, he completed all of year 12 bar his exams.

18 Documentary evidence [87] The appellant and [NAME_10] provided a copy of an FIR created after [NAME_10] complained to the police. The FIR contains the following errors that [NAME_10] has been unable to satisfactorily explain to the Tribunal. [88] First, the FIR records: the FIR date and time as 10 September 2025 at “10.35hrs”; the date the offence occurred as Friday 9 September 2025; the date “information received” as Friday 10 September 2019 at “20:30 hrs”; and the general diary reference entry date as 5 September 2019 at “20:30 hrs”. [NAME_10] was unable to explain why the FIR variously referred to 2025 and 2019, and why 9 September 2025 was recorded as a Friday despite being a Tuesday. He stated that he did not pay attention to the dates, that people visited his home due to the tyre shop incident and that he lives close to the border where anything could happen at any time, and it is a stressful situation. [89] Second, the FIR records [NAME_10]’s occupation as “acriculture” when his evidence was that at the time of the incidents he worked in a tyre shop. He does not know why the FIR records his occupation as “acriculture”, but it may be that the police incorrectly recorded his occupation; [NAME_10] does not read or write. [90] The FIR must be weighted within the specific context of refugee status determination and its associated limits. These were set out by the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (the Authority) in Refugee Appeal No 72668: Ruling on Legal Issues (5 April 2002) and reviewed and further considered in DJ (India) [2017] NZIPT 801064, at [91]–[99], where the Tribunal concluded: [97] Against such a difficult evidential context, the Tribunal and the Authority have, for many years, adopted this practice of what may be described as weighting neutrality in respect of documents which, like these, are not credibly verified as genuine independently of the appellant. The reality is that many countries, including India, have well-known industries producing fake documents of often surprising sophistication to support immigration and refugee applications abroad. The long experience of the Tribunal and the Authority, as specialist tribunals operating in this area over the past 25 years, bears witness to this reality. Indeed, it is far from uncommon that purported verifications by supposedly independent actors such as lawyers or notaries public are themselves false. Corruption also plays its part there, with ‘verification’ able to be bought for a small fee. [98] This is not to say that all documentation provided in support of a refugee claim is inherently unreliable, even if originating from a country with a well-known documentation ‘industry’. What it does mean is that they must be approached with caution. Unlike in other legal domains, documents produced in the context of refugee claims are not easily capable of authentication. Inquiries cannot, generally, be made in the country of origin – a point recognised by the Court of Appeal in Jiao v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2003] NZAR 647 at [26]; authors cannot be summonsed. In such circumstances, the only prudent course is for the weight to be given to such documents to follow the credibility assessment

19 made of the appellant personally. Of course, where independent verification of any documentation does exist, this must be taken into account, including the reliability of the verification itself. [91] In this case, no such independent verification exists. The weight which the FIR can be afforded is inextricably bound to the overall credibility assessment of [NAME_10], whose document it is. Given the Tribunal’s finding that [NAME_10] is an unreliable witness, no weight is placed on the FIR which, in any case, is on its face an unreliable document due to the problems with dates recorded in it as noted above. Conclusion on credibility [92] The appellant’s evidence regarding the events he alleges to have experienced in India has been mobile and inconsistent with his evidence to the [NAME_7] and his father’s evidence. His father’s oral evidence is inconsistent with his own written evidence, and he is an unreliable witness. The father’s documentary evidence is similarly unreliable, and the Tribunal places no weight on it. [93] The cumulative impact of mobile and inconsistent nature of the appellant’s and his father’s evidence is such that the Tribunal rejects the appellant’s claim to be at risk of harm from unknown men in India who, following an incident at his father’s tyre shop in which he issued an incorrect invoice, have visited his home, followed him, and threatened him via telephone. No weight is placed on the evidence about the events comprising this claim. [94] Subject to the foregoing findings, the Tribunal accepts the balance of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. This includes the appellant’s evidence that he has received group [NAME_6] calls between April and June 2025 and phone calls from unknown numbers while in New Zealand. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION [95] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. [96] Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention provides that a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside

20 the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [97] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_14] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [98] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [99] The principal issues are, as explained in Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [100] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case. Relevant country information [101] Country information establishes that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, there are numerous significant human rights concerns in India, as set out in the executive summary of the United States Department of State’s report 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025): Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-

21 threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by Maoist nonstate groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilization. The government took minimal credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses. Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir, north-eastern states, and Maoist terrorism- affected areas committed abuses, including killing 20 security personnel and 18 civilians in Jammu and Kashmir as of September 10. There were reports of communal violence. Authorities investigated and prosecuted terrorism-related abuses. [102] Freedom House reports that the 2019 revocation of Kashmir’s autonomous status and the reconstitution of Jammu and Kashmir as union territories under the control of the central Indian government has “stripped residents of many of their previous political rights, and civil liberties were curtailed to quell public opposition” (Freedom House Freedom in the World 2025: Indian Kashmir (25 February 2025)). [103] The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT Country Information Report India (29 September 2023) noted that the Jammu and Kashmir area has experienced Islamic extremist, insurgent and violent separatist activity and that there has been armed conflict due to the region being claimed by Pakistan (at 2.52). The DFAT report noted a BBC article from August 2021 that stated that more young Muslims in the area are being “drawn towards militancy” (at 2.54). [104] In 2024, Human Rights Watch identified a spike in violence in the Jammu region, with an increase in attacks and casualties involving civilians, militants and security forces, along with restrictions on civil rights post-abrogation (Human Rights Watch India: Events of 2024 (7 May 2024)). [105] Violence continued during 2025, with suspected militants undertaking deadly terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir in April, killing at least 26 tourists ([NAME_15] “Terror Attack On Tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir Leaves At Least 26 Dead, Officials Say” CBS News (23 April 2025)). These were condemned by the United Nations Security Council among other international and national bodies (“UN Security Council Condemns Jammu and Kashmir Terror Attack” UN News (25 April 2025)).

22 [106] Following the 2025 attack, Indian authorities undertook counter-terrorism operations. These involved the arrest and detention of around 2,800 individuals. United Nations monitors “expressed alarm” at the serious human rights violations committed through these operations (“UN Experts Alarmed By Indian Counter Terrorism Operations Violating Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir” United Nations Office of the High Commission of Human Rights (24 November 2025)). [107] Counsel filed country information detailing the deaths of three young men: the first died by suicide after alleging police torture; the second was killed by the army during a traffic stop; and the third died after being detained by the police for questioning on alleged terror links (see “Fear Grips Kashmir as Young Man Kills Himself After Alleged Police Torture” [NAME_16] (19 February 2025) and “Kulgam Youth’s Death Sparks Outrage, Renews Custodial Killing Fears” [NAME_17] (5 May 2025)). [108] Counsel refers the Tribunal to country information on “organised biker groups” in Bengaluru, a city in one of India’s southern states, Karnataka. Having rejected the appellant’s claim to be at risk from men who ride motorcycles, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider this information in detail. Application to the facts [109] The Tribunal has rejected the appellant’s claim to be at risk of serious harm from unknown men in India who, following the issuing of an incorrect invoice, have slapped the appellant, visited his home, followed him and threatened him, including by telephone calls. [110] The Tribunal has accepted that the appellant received group [NAME_6] calls between April and June 2025 and telephone calls from unknown numbers while in New Zealand. Noting that the [NAME_6] callers were attempting to obtain money from both the appellant and another unknown individual, the Tribunal is satisfied that the [NAME_6] call logs do not demonstrate that the appellant is at risk of harm in India. Each group call contained between 20 and 62 parties and originated in either India or Europe. The appellant was unable to adequately explain why individuals in Europe would threaten him. The calls occurred within a limited timeframe, which ended approximately nine months ago, and he has not experienced any harm as a result of the calls, although he may well have found them stressful.

23 [111] Similarly, that the appellant has received calls from unknown numbers, as recently as December 2025, while in New Zealand, does not demonstrate that he is at risk of serious harm. While he was shouted at during one call, he has since elected not to answer calls from unknown numbers and has not experienced any harm as a result of such calls. Telephone calls from unknown numbers can be received for a variety of reasons and receipt of such does not necessarily attract a negative inference. [112] The appellant is a young Hindi man from the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir, near the Pakistan border. While there are difficulties in the Jammu and Kashmir region, nothing before the Tribunal suggests that he has a real chance of experiencing serious harm as a result of those difficulties. He is not involved in the [NAME_8] nor the conflict with Pakistan and has not demonstrated that he has a real chance of experiencing serious harm as an individual living close to both conflicts. He has not experienced police violence and has not demonstrated that he is at risk of serious harm from either the police or the military in India. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [113] For these reasons, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Conclusion on Claim to Refugee Status [114] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as a refugee. [NAME_12] [115] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME_12] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. Assessment of the Claim under [NAME_12] [116] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in [NAME_12], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is:

24 … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [117] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME_12]. THE ICCPR [118] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [119] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [120] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

25 [121] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the Refugee Convention (to which protected person status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035, at [82] and Taunoa v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [122] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR.

CONCLUSION [123] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention and, therefore, is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of [NAME_12] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [124] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [125] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellants and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others.

26 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME_3] Member [126] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “[NAME_3]” [NAME_3] Member