Immigration Appeal Dismissed: No Real Chance of Persecution Found

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] [NAME] [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: Judge M [NAME] ([NAME])

Representative for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 24 April 2026 _________________________________________________________________

DECISION ________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm because he is from the border region of the Jammu part of Jammu and Kashmir and fears being seriously harmed in the course of cross-border conflict between [NAME] and the [NAME]. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME] under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming [RESPONDENT] or [NAME] status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. [6] On 20 March 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim and gave him the opportunity to respond by 27 March 2026: “Normally, the Tribunal offers [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] [NAME] an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if an appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME], the Tribunal may determine his or her appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 29 April 2025. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing the appellant an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009. The appellant had the same responsibility in respect of his claim before the [RESPONDENT[NAME], including the obligation to put forward all information, evidence, and submissions that he wished to have considered in support of the claim or would wish to have considered in support of any other potential claim – see section 135 of the Act.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of the claim, as recorded in the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and its file, is: (a) The appellant was born in [Z village], in the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir in 2001. He has one younger brother. The appellant is Hindu. He has never married and has no dependents.

3 (b) The appellant's village was located 10 kilometres from the [APPELLANT]-Pakistan border. His family ran a [NAME] and owned a smaller piece of land on the other side of the village where they grew crops. In 2011 to 2013, the appellant witnessed his mother crying because of cross border firings between [NAME] and the [NAME]. (c) In 2012, the appellant's family evacuated their home after the government sent out a message telling people to evacuate due to a cross-firing. The [NAME] arranged shelter for the evacuated villagers. There were bunkers with a capacity of 200 people which were prioritised for the elderly. Other residents, especially the young, had to go further away. [NAME] took the family to a [COMPANY] in Dablehar, about 5 km away from their home. (d) These evacuations took place every month or two. The appellant's family would spend a week at the school each time. As the cross-firings took place during the night, [NAME] would go to the farm during the day to feed the cows. They were never harmed during these trips but noticed the damage to the farm. (e) In 2014 or 2015, cross-firings increased during daytime, but still took place mostly at night. In one incident, a couple who lived four or five houses away were killed in a bomb blast. However, neither the appellant nor his family were ever harmed due to these cross-firings. (f) The police suspected that villagers in the appellant's village and nearby villages who operated dairy farms and other businesses near the border were connected to the [NAME]. [NAME] and other business owners were questioned by the police on multiple occasions at a [NAME] in the village. This occurred after firing incidents or when the police had new information. [[NAME]] and the other villagers that were arrested were given a chance to defend themselves against the suspicions; they were never imprisoned as there was no proof against them. (g) In 2018, the appellant left school after he lost interest in studying. He began to work on the [NAME] with his father to learn the business. However, that year the farm was shut down after significant damage to its structure due to the fighting. The police also advised the family to shut down the farm as they had suspicions it was being used as a haven for [NAME]. The family sold their cows and [NAME] began working as a construction worker. (h) Sometime after the [NAME] was shut down, the appellant tried to join the [NAME]. He passed the physical test but was not accepted after he failed the written test. (i) In April 2022, the appellant, his family, and the entire village evacuated after receiving a warning from the government. His mother told the appellant to [NAME] his brother on a motorcycle and to drive away from the house. While driving, the motorcycle slipped, the appellant's brother fell, and the motorcycle landed on the appellant's leg. A passerby called [NAME], who took the appellant and his brother to a hospital in [NAME]. The appellant's brother sustained a minor injury to his head, while the appellant was hospitalised for three days due to a fractured leg. It took some time for the appellant to recover and return home.

4 (j) Following this accident, [[NAME]] feared for the appellant's safety and decided to send him overseas. On 29 June 2023, the appellant applied for a New Zealand visitor visa, which was approved. (k) On 29 July 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. (l) On 19 October 2023, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] received the appellant's Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form. (m) Following a terrorist attack in Srinagar, Kashmir in April 2025, about 200 kilometres from the appellant's family home, the appellant's family were forced to evacuate. No sufficient risk of qualifying harm The appellant’s relevant past experiences can be summarised thus: (a) Between 2011-2022, the appellant and his family were required to evacuate from their village, for up to a week at a time, because of indiscriminate shelling between the [NAME] and [NAME]. No member of the appellant’s family ever suffered any physical harm from such shelling but some nearby neighbours were killed in 2014 or 2015. (b) [NAME], as a [NAME] owner, was frequently questioned by the police. He was never harmed nor charged with any offence. (c) In 2018, damage to the [NAME] forced [NAME] to close that part of the family’s business. (d) In 2022, the appellant fell from his motorbike when trying to evacuate from his home. He and his brother suffered some injuries which required hospital treatment for a few days. Not all harm entitles an appellant to protection under the Act. For [RESPONDENT] status, an appellant must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in [APPELLANT], which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act, namely that he or she is in danger of: (a) being tortured; (b) cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or (c) arbitrary deprivation of life. Additionally, the thresholds of both ‘a real chance of being persecuted’ and being ‘in danger of’ one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility – see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57], HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189, at [55]–[60], and [NAME]) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83]. The evidence here does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: (a) While the appellant has periodically experienced the stress and anxiety of having to evacuate for short periods during times of increased military activity, he has not suffered any serious physical

5 harm at any time. Nor does the evidence point to any risk of it in the future. (b) The injuries suffered in falling from his motorbike are acknowledged but they were the result of a traffic accident, not state or militant action. (c) It is accepted that the stress and anxiety caused by shelling and by having to evacuate would have impacted on the appellant’s mental health to some degree but the evidence does not establish either a breach of rights or that the harm was serious. It is significant that the family has continued to live in the village over the past 15 years. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim. He appears not to have established that he meets the requirements of Article1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME]. Nor does he appear to have demonstrated that there are substantial grounds for believing that he is at risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm in sections 130 and 131 of the Act. He appears not to be not entitled to the surrogate protection of another state. [NAME] is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. In respect of both the [RESPONDENT] claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assesses whether the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130 (2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217-218 and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. Where an ‘[NAME]’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable [NAME]; see [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [21]. An [NAME] requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a [NAME] reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement.

6 (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] itself. Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) it appears that he could access, and reside safely in, any one of the major cities in the Punjab, such as Amritsar, Ludhiana or Jalandhar, or further afield in Delhi. There are large Hindu populations living in the Punjab and Delhi. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an [NAME]. If correct, the appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to Respond It appears that appellant has neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a [NAME] reason nor grounds for being recognised as a [NAME] under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. The claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 27 March 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence [NAME] wishes to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer [NAME] an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice.” [7] On 1 April 2026, counsel for the appellant filed written submissions and tendered a bundle of documents in evidence. They are addressed below. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [8] Counsel’s submissions are lengthy, at 62 paragraphs and, with respect, repetitive. No discourtesy is intended by summarising them here. They relevantly assert: (a) The appellant’s claim is founded on his status as a [NAME] residing in a Jammu border village where, he says, he faces a real chance risk of serious harm arising from indiscriminate cross-border shelling, which has persisted in the area, as well as the possibility of arrest, detention or ill-treatment at the hands of security forces. (b) New evidence is provided:

7 (i) death certificates for neighbours who were killed in 2014 or 2015 by indiscriminate shelling around the village; (ii) photographs of the appellant’s leg injury after he fell from his motorbike; (iii) photographs of damage to the appellant’s home and [NAME] said to have occurred during attacks in October 2025 and February 2026; and (iv) photographs of villagers in hospital who suffered serious injuries during border shelling incidents. (c) This evidence corroborates that [NAME] deaths and serious injuries have occurred near the appellant’s home and that the appellant’s April 2022 injury occurred in the context of flight from crossfire (and is therefore part of the harm/risk narrative rather than a purely unrelated “traffic accident”) and that there are ongoing and recent impacts in 2025–2026. Credibility & consistency (d) The Appellant has provided an account that is marked by overall consistency with respect to his personal history and the circumstances surrounding his claim. To the extent that the Tribunal considers aspects require clarification (for example, the timing of shelling, the proximity of deaths and injuries, the circumstances of the April 2022 evacuation injury and the details of police detention of his father when the appellant was under 18), these are best addressed by oral evidence. (e) The new evidence (death certificates and photographs) corroborates key aspects of the account and weighs against a conclusion that the appeal is plainly hopeless. Relevant legal principles (omitting the restatement of basic principles of protection law) (f) It is essential to weigh not only the objective evidence but also the Appellant’s particular circumstances, including the psychological impact of past trauma and the specific risks associated with his

8 political beliefs and ethnic identity. This encompasses his personal experiences and vulnerabilities, which provide important context for assessing the risk and the credibility of his claim. Such an approach ensures that the assessment is comprehensive and sensitive to the complexities inherent in his situation. (g) Harm must be assessed cumulatively. The combination of repeated forced displacement, exposure to indiscriminate violence, destruction of livelihood, and ongoing risk of death or injury amounts to serious harm reaching the threshold of persecution, or a real risk of treatment falling within sections 130 and 131 of the Immigration Act 2009, including threats to life. (h) The appellant’s evidence demonstrates that the risk is ongoing and escalating, particularly considering recent attacks in 2025 and 2026. (i) As to a [NAME] reason, individuals residing in the appellant’s village, particularly those operating farms and living near the border are subject to suspicion by state authorities of involvement with, or support for, [NAME]. This demonstrates that the appellant is at risk based on an imputed political opinion, namely that he is perceived by authorities as being sympathetic to or associated with, [NAME]. Further, the appellant belongs to a particular social group, namely [NAME] residing in militarised border villages in Jammu and Kashmir, who are exposed to heightened surveillance, subjected to suspicion by security forces, and are vulnerable to targeting by both state and [NAME]. [NAME] (j) It is well established that for an [NAME] to be viable, it must be accessible, safe, and reasonable. It is not sufficient that relocation is theoretically possible; it must be practically and realistically sustainable. (k) The appellant faces significant barriers to relocation: first, he has limited education and no formal qualifications, having left school early. His employment history is confined to assisting in the family’s dairy farming business. This limits his ability to secure employment in urban centres such as Delhi or Punjab.

9 (l) Second, the appellant would face significant societal discrimination on the basis of his origin from Jammu and Kashmir. The evidence indicates that such individuals are often perceived with suspicion, including being associated with militancy or terrorism. (m) Third, the appellant has no family, [NAME] or financial resources in the proposed areas of relocation. The absence of such support renders relocation unreasonable, particularly given his socio-economic vulnerability. (n) Finally, the appellant would not be able to enjoy basic socio- economic and civil rights in the place of relocation because the cumulative effect of the above factors indicates that he would face significant hardship and marginalisation. Whether manifestly unfounded (o) The Tribunal’s preliminary view that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded turns on evaluative and fact-sensitive matters (severity of harm, recurrence, prospectivity and whether risk is more than speculative), as well as on internal protection considerations. In addition, the appellant will be filing further corroborative evidence. (p) The appeal is not suitable for summary disposal and an oral hearing should be offered. Serious harm (q) The Appellant suffered an injury in April 2022 while attempting to escape an episode of intensified cross-border firing. He became acutely fearful for his safety and sought to evacuate the area as quickly as possible. During this urgent flight, while riding a motorbike, he fell and sustained injury. It is directly attributable to the broader security environment and the compulsion to flee immediate danger caused by ongoing hostilities. Risk on return – “real chance” (r) The risk is twofold: a risk to life and physical integrity from indiscriminate cross-border shelling and the risk of coercive policing

10 (arrest, detention, or ill-treatment) arising from the perception that border villagers may be [NAME] or, conversely, [NAME]. [NAME] (s) [NAME] confirms that [NAME] in Jammu border districts (including Poonch and Rajouri) continue to face serious risk from shelling, deaths, injuries, displacement, and property destruction, including in 2024–2025. (t) In May 2025, cross-border shelling following [NAME] caused dozens of [NAME] deaths and injuries, widespread damage to homes and livelihoods, and mass displacement from border villages. (u) Reporting documents entire villages evacuating, repeated reliance on bunkers, and ongoing [NAME] vulnerability despite ceasefire arrangements, demonstrating that harm is not merely historical or speculative. (v) News articles demonstrate the recurrence, prospectivity and seriousness of harm faced by [NAME] in the region. They illustrate that the risk environment remains active and ongoing, rather than being confined to the past or amounting to merely low-level hardship. As such, they corroborate the appellant’s claims and highlight the need for a comprehensive assessment of the risk factors involved. (w) The United States Department of State documents arbitrary detention, torture, custodial deaths, and impunity associated with Indian security forces, with Jammu and Kashmir specifically identified as a conflict-affected region. (x) Furthermore, the news articles demonstrate that the issues of state protection and credibility cannot be adequately resolved without oral evidence. They highlight the complexity and fact-sensitive nature of the risks encountered, as well as the limitations of state mitigation measures. As such, they underscore the necessity for a comprehensive assessment, including oral testimony, to fairly determine the appellant’s claims.

11 State protection (y) The state has been unable to effectively prevent harm to [NAME]. Despite the implementation of mitigation measures such as issuing warnings, establishing temporary shelters and constructing bunkers, the capacity of these interventions remains limited. These actions, while indicative of some level of response, do not amount to meaningful protection. (z) The central issue is whether these responses sufficiently reduce the risk faced by [NAME] to below the relevant threshold. The evidence suggests that, in practice, mitigation measures have not been adequate to ensure the safety and security of the population residing in the border area. Assessment of whether manifestly unfounded [9] It is convenient to address counsel’s submissions seriatim: The provision of new evidence as corroboration (a) The premise that corroboration of the appellant’s claim advances the argument against the appeal being manifestly unfounded is incorrect. As the Tribunal has repeatedly observed, the assessment of whether a claim is manifestly unfounded must [NAME], as its starting point, the assumption that the claim is true. Corroboration is not required for the assessment to be undertaken. In other words, the Tribunal already accepts that the claims asserted by the appellant, which the new evidence seeks to corroborate, are true. The corroboration adds nothing to the assessment. Credibility and consistency (b) The same point has to be made in response to counsel’s submission that the appellant’s credibility and consistency need to be tested by an oral hearing. They do not.

12 Relevant legal principles (c) That it is essential to weigh the appellant’s particular circumstances, including the psychological impact of past trauma and the specific risks associated with his political beliefs and ethnic identity, is self- evident and unremarkable. (d) So, too, is the assertion that harm must be assessed cumulatively. (e) It is not accepted that the appellant’s evidence demonstrates that the risk is escalating. Counsel provides no evidence whatsoever to support that proposition. The reality is that there has been conflict in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region since Partition. In [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) [2026] NZIPT 802988, the Tribunal recently examined the data relating to incidents of conflict in the Jammu region (particularly the area around [NAME], where the appellant’s village is located) and concluded that: “A further point to note is that, even factoring in that some parts of Jammu and Kashmir experience more conflict-related incidents than others, the risk of [NAME] casualties has been declining for many years and is now very low.” (f) As to counsel’s submissions concerning a [NAME] reason, it is not necessary to address them here, except to observe that individuals residing in a location are unlikely, for that reason, to constitute a particular social group because the defining characteristic can hardly be said to be one that is either immutable or so key to the members’ identity that they ought not to be expected to change it. [NAME] (g) Counsel submits that “it is well established that... an [NAME]... must be accessible, safe, and reasonable”. In fact, the requirements for an [NAME] were set out in the Tribunal’s letter of 20 March 2026. It does not assist the Tribunal for those long-standing and clear principles to be unaddressed in favour of the vague premise that a [NAME] must be “reasonable”. The suggestion that a generalised ‘reasonableness’ was an element of the test was firmly rejected by the Court of Appeal in Butler v Attorney-General [1999]

13 NZAR 205 (CA) at pp217–218; and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684 (29 October 1999) at p47 onwards. (h) As to the assertion that the appellant faces significant barriers to relocation, in terms of limited education and an employment history confined to assisting on the family’s farm, a degree of reality needs to be allowed to intrude. The appellant has been able to travel halfway around the world, to settle in a country with a different culture and primary language. To suggest that he could not manage to settle in a different city in his own country borders on the fanciful. (i) As to the claim that the appellant would face significant societal discrimination on the basis of his origin from Jammu and Kashmir, no evidence is provided to substantiate that. While people settling in a different area can sometimes face elements of discrimination (including in New Zealand), such challenges fall far short of disqualifying a place as a site of internal protection. (j) Counsel suggests that the appellant would have no family, [NAME] or financial resources in the proposed areas of relocation. No evidence is provided to support that however. He has clearly been able to cope without those supports in New Zealand (or he has, in fact, had familial support) and there is no reason advanced to establish that settling in another city in [APPELLANT] would be any different. Whether manifestly unfounded (k) Counsel submits that The Tribunal’s preliminary view “turns on evaluative and fact-sensitive matters”. With respect, such vague assertions are of no weight. (l) Counsel also submits that “the appellant will be filing further corroborative evidence”. But the opportunity to do that was in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 20 March 2026, which invited such filing. Counsel fails to identify what further evidence there is, what its relevance would be to either the issue of manifest unfoundedness or to the substantive claim. Counsel does not even identify what the further evidence is. As a submission, it lacks persuasion.

14 Serious harm (m) [COUNSEL] submits that the appellant’s injury in a fall from a motorcycle was because he was “acutely fearful for his safety and sought to evacuate the area as quickly as possible”. As to counsel’s submission that the appellant’s injury was “directly attributable to the broader security environment and the compulsion to flee immediate danger caused by ongoing hostilities”, that is a bridge too far in terms of identifying serious harm arising from breaches of human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection. He was injured in an unfortunate accident while complying with a lawfully issued evacuation order. Nor does the harm the appellant fears because of the conflict amount to his being in danger of torture, as that is defined under section 130, nor does it amount to his being in danger of cruel treatment or arbitrary deprivation of life within section 131 of the Act. As already noted above, the risk of him being killed is negligible and he is not in danger of any protection-relevant treatment. [NAME] (n) The [NAME] provided by counsel is considered later, in the context of the assessment of risk. For the present, it suffices to record that the [NAME] does not, in fact, establish a real chance of serious harm for the appellant in the [NAME] area, or a real chance of his detention and mistreatment by the [NAME]. State protection (o) Again, the issue of state protection is addressed later. For present purposes, nothing about it points to the need for an oral hearing. [10] The Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter of 20 March 2026, is correct for the reasons stated in the letter and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. [11] Pursuant to section 233 of the Act, the Tribunal determines not to offer the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers.

15 [12] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form, the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview) and other material contained in the appeal file, together with the submissions and evidence provided in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 20 March 2026. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [13] The appellant was born in Z village, in the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir in 2001. The village is about five kilometres from the town of [NAME]. He has one younger brother. The appellant is Hindu. He has never married and has no dependents. [14] The appellant's village is located close to the [APPELLANT]-Pakistan border. His family ran a [NAME] and owned a smaller piece of land on the other side of the village, where they grew crops. In 2011 to 2013, the appellant witnessed his mother crying because of cross-border firings between [NAME] and the [NAME]. [15] In 2012, the appellant's family evacuated their home after the government sent out a message telling people to evacuate due to a cross-firing. The [NAME] arranged shelter for the evacuated villagers. There were bunkers with a capacity of 200 people which were prioritised for the elderly. Other residents, especially the young, had to go further away. [NAME] took the family to a [COMPANY] in Dablehar, about five kilometres away from their home. [16] These evacuations took place every month or two. The appellant's family would spend a week at the school each time. As the cross-firings took place during the night, [NAME] would go to the farm during the day to feed the cows. They were never harmed during these trips but noticed the damage to the farm. [17] In 2014 or 2015, cross-firings increased during daytime, but still took place mostly at night. In one incident, a couple who lived four or five houses away were killed in a bomb blast. However, neither the appellant nor his family were ever harmed due to these cross-firings.

16 [18] The police suspected that villagers in the appellant's village and nearby villages who operated dairy farms and other businesses near the border were connected to the [NAME]. [NAME] and other business owners were questioned by the police on multiple occasions at a [NAME] in the village. This occurred after firing incidents or when the police had new information. [NAME] and the other villagers that were arrested were given a chance to defend themselves against the suspicions; they were never imprisoned as there was no proof against them. [19] In 2018, the appellant left school after he lost interest in studying. He began to work on the [NAME] with his father to learn the business. However, that year the farm was shut down after significant damage to its structure due to the fighting. The police also advised the family to shut down the farm as they had suspicions it was being used as a haven for [NAME]. The family sold their cows and [NAME] began working as a construction worker. [20] Sometime after the [NAME] was shut down, the appellant tried to join the [NAME]. He passed the physical test but was not accepted after he failed the written test. [21] In April 2022, the appellant, his family, and the entire village evacuated after receiving a warning from the government. His mother told the appellant to [NAME] his brother on a motorcycle and to drive away from the house. While driving, the motorcycle slipped, the appellant's brother fell, and the motorcycle landed on the appellant's leg. A passerby called [NAME], who took the appellant and his brother to a hospital in [NAME]. The appellant's brother sustained a minor injury to his head, while the appellant was hospitalised for three days due to a fractured leg. It took some time for the appellant to recover and return home. [22] Following this accident, [NAME] feared for the appellant's safety and decided to send him overseas. On 29 June 2023, the appellant applied for a New Zealand visitor visa, which was approved. [23] On 29 July 2023, the appellant arrived in New Zealand. [24] On 19 October 2023, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] received the appellant's Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form. [25] Following a terrorist attack in Srinagar, Kashmir in April 2025, about 200 kilometres from the appellant's family home, the appellant's family were again forced to evacuate.

17 ASSESSMENT [26] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 [NAME] to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT] [NAME]” or “the [NAME]”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [27] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a [NAME], section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [RESPONDENT] [NAME]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [28] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the [NAME] or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. THE [RESPONDENT] [NAME] [29] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: “A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME].” [30] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: “... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and

18 being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” [31] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the [NAME], the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v [NAME] (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [32] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [33] In terms of [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the [NAME] being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a [NAME] reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [34] It is necessary to address the relevant [NAME]. [NAME] [35] [APPELLANT] is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. [NAME] indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in [APPELLANT] in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by [NAME]; serious restrictions

19 on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against [NAME], unjustified arrests or prosecutions of [NAME], and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [36] Counsel has submitted four items of [NAME] (including the Department of State report referred to above). The other three reports are: (a) [NAME] “Forgotten at the Front Line” [NAME] (May 22, 2025). (b) “Residents Near Border in Jammu Clean Bunkers for Shelter After Pak Shelling” NDTV (29 October 2023). (c) “[NAME] by [NAME] in Jammu and Kashmir” Office of the [NAME] (24 November 2025). [37] It is necessary to discuss each of these in turn. [38] The report “Forgotten at the Front Line” does not relate to militant activity in the appellant’s area. It relates to an attack by [NAME] in Poonch, some 100 kilometres from the appellant’s home area, in the Pir Panjal hills in Kashmir. [39] The article “Residents Near Border in Jammu Clean Bunkers for Shelter After Pak Shelling” does relate to militant activity in the Jammu region. It records events three years ago and largely confirms what is already known. It is significant for its account of the shelters provided for residents, which helps to explain why casualty rates are low: “To safeguard the border residents from Pakistani shelling, the [COMPANY] had in December 2017 sanctioned the construction of 14,460 individual and community bunkers in five districts of Jammu, Kathua, and Samba covering the villages located along the IB [International Border] and Poonch and Rajouri villages on the LoC [Line of Conflict]. The government later sanctioned additional bunkers, in excess of 4,000, for the vulnerable population. The shelling by Pakistan Rangers, the first major ceasefire violation since 2021, started around 8 pm Thursday in the Arnia area of [NAME] sector and lasted around seven hours, leaving a BSF jawan and a woman injured. On October 17, two [NAME] were injured when their post came under fire from Pakistan. Many panic-stricken people, including migrant labourers engaged in harvesting paddy, fled to safer places amid heavy firing and mortar shelling Thursday night but returned to their homes the next morning after the guns fell silent.” [40] Finally, the article “[NAME] by [NAME] in Jammu and Kashmir”, by the High

20 Commissioner for Human Rights, notes with concern that, after the April 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in Kashmir, the [NAME] committed numerous human rights violations, including against [NAME]: “After the attack, [NAME] launched sweeping operations across Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in the arrest and detention of around 2,800 individuals, including [NAME] and human rights defenders. Some were detained and charged under the Public Safety Act or the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which permit prolonged detention without charge or trial and contain vague and overbroad definitions of terrorism. Some detainees were allegedly tortured, held incommunicado, and denied access to lawyers and family members.” [41] Such a response by the [NAME] is to be condemned, but there is no suggestion in the article that anyone in the appellant’s village, let alone in his family, was affected by this. The appellant is not a human rights activist, nor a journalist, nor a lawyer nor a [NAME]. Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [42] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [43] The appellant has had multiple occasions on which to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [RESPONDENT[NAME], in his interview with [RESPONDENT] and protection officer, in his response to the interview report and in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 20 March 2026. The Tribunal is satisfied that he has had ample opportunity, over an extended period and with the assistance of counsel, to present his claim. See here the discussion in ZB ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [10]–[27]. [44] In summary, the harm which has occurred to the appellant in the past is that: (a) Between 2011 and 2022, the appellant and his family were sometimes required to evacuate from their village, for up to a week at a time, because of indiscriminate shelling between the [NAME] and [NAME]. No member of the appellant’s family ever suffered any physical harm from such shelling but some nearby neighbours were killed in 2014 or 2015.

21 (b) [NAME], as a [NAME] owner, was frequently questioned by the police. He was never harmed nor charged with any offence. (c) In 2018, damage to the [NAME] forced [NAME] to close that part of the family’s business. (d) In 2022, the appellant fell from his motorbike when trying to evacuate from his home. He and his brother suffered some injuries which required hospital treatment for a few days. (e) In April 2025, the appellant’s family were again required to evacuate from their home. [45] As to what constitutes serious harm, not all harm arising from breaches of human rights will qualify. The threshold is that the harm must be serious. It must also result from a breach of a right or rights. In that regard, the purpose of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] is to provide the surrogate protection of another state when the claimant’s own state is unable or unwilling to protect the person. That surrogate protection is not intended to be available where the harm at issue is not serious. [46] The evidence here does not establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: (a) While the appellant has periodically experienced the stress and anxiety of having to evacuate for short periods during times of increased military activity, this of itself is not serious harm arising from a breach of a right and he has not suffered any serious physical harm at any time. Nor does the evidence point to any risk of it in the future beyond the speculative. As recorded in In [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) [2026] NZIPT 802988, the risk of [NAME] casualties in Jammu and Kashmir as a whole has been declining for many years and is now very low. Moreover, the [NAME] area is not a conflict hot-spot. Like the appellant in that appeal, this appellant has not produced any evidence establishing a localised pattern of conduct of sufficient constancy and intensity by the parties to the conflict which gives rise to a real chance of his suffering persecutory harm. (b) The injuries suffered by the appellant in falling from his motorbike are acknowledged but they were the result of a traffic accident, not state

22 or militant action. While the appellant may have been in the process of taking his brother away from the family home in response to an evacuation order, there is no sensible causative link between the actions of either the state (whose action in issuing the evacuation order appears lawful and does not breach any of the appellant’s rights) or [NAME] and the injury, which was caused by a failure to keep control of the motorbike. (c) It is accepted that the stress and anxiety caused by shelling and by having to evacuate would have impacted on the appellant’s mental health to some degree but this does not, of itself, amount to being persecuted; see [NAME] ([APPELLANT]) at [95]–[96]. The evidence does not establish either a breach of rights or that the harm was serious. It is significant that the family has continued to live in the village over the past 15 years without suffering serious harm, the disruption to the family’s livelihood with the sale of the farm notwithstanding. (a) The appellant says that his family had to evacuate in April 2025 because of terrorist activity in Srinagar. In fact, the (widely reported) incident occurred in Pahalgam, a village far up in the mountains in Kashmir (not Jammu) and some 150 kilometres from the appellant’s village. See, for example, [APPELLANT] “At Least 24 Killed in Kashmir Attack on Tourists - Indian Police Source” [NAME] (23 April 2025). [NAME] were required to evacuate is unclear but it is reasonable to assume that it was precautionary. [47] Taken cumulatively, the past events related by the appellant establish no more than a remote or speculative risk of being harmed by being ‘caught in the crossfire’ between [NAME] and the [NAME], akin to being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Given the sporadic nature of the conflict and its decreasing frequency in the Jammu border region, the risk to the appellant falls well short of a real chance. [48] As to the risk of the appellant being detained by the police and questioned (as has happened sometimes to his father), that may occur but in the context of insurgency and a need for security, it falls well short of amounting either to serious harm or an impermissible breach of the appellant’s rights. It is notable that [NAME] was not mistreated on any such questioning and was released without charge.

23 [49] It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim. He has not established that he meets the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME]. He is not entitled to the surrogate protection of another state. [NAME] [50] Further, in respect of both the claim for protection as [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220 at [50]–[51], and in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [51] An [NAME] requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a [NAME] reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] itself. [52] Even if the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm in the Jammu region of Jammu and Kashmir (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) he could access, and reside safely in, any one of the major cities in the

24 Punjab, such as Amritsar, Ludhiana or Jalandhar, or further afield in Delhi. There are large Hindu populations living in the Punjab and Delhi. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] are available there. [53] While counsel submits that the appellant lacks education and the means to support himself in one of those locations, he has not produced any evidence to support the implication that the appellant would either suffer other forms of harm or would be driven back to his home area. The reality is that he was able to find the resources to travel half-way round the world to New Zealand, and has managed to support himself here. The resources needed to move to the Punjab or Delhi, a few 100 kilometres away, and to support himself there while he finds work, must be significantly less. As stated, he has produced no evidence to establish otherwise. [54] Those alternative places of relocation all meet the criteria for an [NAME]. The appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk falls short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not require the surrogate protection of another state. [55] The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in [APPELLANT] is no more than speculative and remote. For this reason, he does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT]. Is there a [NAME] for the Persecution? [56] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [57] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a [RESPONDENT] under the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] and section 129 of the Act.

25 The [NAME] [58] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: “A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand.” [59] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: “… any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” [60] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [61] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the [NAME] categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [62] For the reasons explained above in relation to the [RESPONDENT] assessment (including the finding of an [NAME]), there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in [APPELLANT], to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [63] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act.

26 The ICCPR [64] Section 131 of the Act provides that: “(1) A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [65] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [66] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the [RESPONDENT] context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in [APPELLANT]. [67] For the same reasons (including the finding of an [NAME]), it is satisfied that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in [APPELLANT]. He is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [68] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act.

CONCLUSION [69] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] [NAME] and, therefore, is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act;

27 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

Judge M [NAME] [NAME] (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [70] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [71] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [72] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “Judge M [NAME]” Judge M [NAME] [NAME]