Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803314 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: Judge M Treadwell (Chair)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Decision: 4 June 2026 _________________________________________________________________

DECISION ________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant [NAME_3] or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm because of his involvement in the farmers’ protests in 2021. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to

2 be recognised as a refugee or a protected person under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming refugee or protected person status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_3] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_3]. [6] On 1 May 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant’s counsel. It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. The Tribunal set out a brief summary of the appellant’s claim and gave him the opportunity to respond by 8 May 2026: “The Tribunal has received the above appeal. I am instructed by the Tribunal to write to you as follows. Whether to offer an oral hearing Normally, the Tribunal offers refugee and protected person appellants an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if an appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_3], the Tribunal may determine his or her appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The appellant was interviewed by the [NAME_3] on 4 August 2025. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing the appellant an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009. The appellant had the same responsibility in respect of his claim before the [NAME_3], including the obligation to put forward all information, evidence, and submissions that he wished to have considered in support of the claim or would wish to have considered in support of any other potential claim – see section 135 of the Act.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of the claim, as recorded in the decision of the [NAME_3] and its file, is: (a) The appellant was born into a [NAME_4] in [Z] village, Uttar Pradesh, in 1978. He has two sisters. He is married, and has a son and a daughter.

3 (b) In about 2010, the appellant took over ownership and management of his family's farm in [Z]. (c) In about 2015, the appellant attended a farmers' protest in [Y town], Uttar Pradesh and became a member of the [NAME_5], a farmers' union. He subsequently became the [NAME_5] village head for [Z]. His responsibilities included recruiting new union members and solving problems for the farmers. However, he only worked for the union when he did not have work to do on his own farm. (d) In 2020, the [NAME_6] enacted three laws that the appellant believed targeted farmers in Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. Widespread protests were organised. (e) Around this time, the appellant became the [NAME_5] block head for [X] Block, Uttar Pradesh, overseeing a division of 60 to 70 villages. His responsibilities involved recruiting new union members, attending a monthly union meeting in [Y town], informing farmers about their rights, and solving problems. He collected food and supplies with four to five other farmers and delivered them via tractor to the protest. When they had no other work to do on their own farms, they travelled back and forth between [W town] and Delhi, mostly at night-time. (f) One night in December 2020, the appellant was on his way to deliver provisions with three other farmers. Their tractor was stopped by the police, who told them that they could not deliver their provisions to the protest. The appellant and his friends began to argue so the police officers beat them with lathis. The appellant and his friends fled through the nearby field. When they returned to their tractor, they found that the police had seized their provisions and discarded them by the roadside. Following this incident, the appellant and his friends were stopped and beaten by police on many further occasions as they attempted to deliver goods to the protesters. (g) Later in December 2020, the appellant was again driving to the protest front with his friends. Police officers stopped their tractor and took the appellant to the [X] Block police station. He was detained for two to three hours until people from [Z] village had him released. The appellant believed that the police released him either due to a bribe or due to pressure from the crowd gathered outside the police station. The appellant believed that the [NAME_7] had instructed the police to beat up anyone delivering goods to the protests to keep provisions away from the protesters as much as possible. (h) In about January or February 2021, members of the [NAME_7] incited the appellant's neighbour (a [NAME_7] [NAME_7]) to provoke the appellant into a fight so as to then falsely incriminate him in an offence. The appellant's neighbour began to dig up the dirt road between their farms with a shovel to aggravate the appellant. The neighbour also tried to attack him with four other individuals, but the appellant was able to run away. He attempted to report the incident to the police, but they refused to take him seriously and did not file his complaint. (i) In about February 2021, the appellant was returning home on his motorbike with his wife after shopping. They stopped on the way near an intersection in [V town]. Four assailants arrived on two motorbikes and attacked them, trying to beat the appellant. A

4 crowd gathered and told the appellant to run away because he would not be spared. The assailants fled, however, taunting the appellant saying, ‘we will make you the union leader soon’. The appellant believed the assailants had been sent by members of the [NAME_7] to attack him. Bystanders took the appellant to a doctor who gave him pain relief for his bruises and swelling. The appellant reported this incident to the police, but they would not listen to him after they heard he was a [NAME_5] member. (j) Two days later, the appellant went to the sugar mill to have his sugar cane weighed. However, because the queue was long, [NAME_8] offered to wait in line for him while he attended a function at a relative's house. After weighing the sugar, the appellant's [NAME_8] was making his way home at around 10 or 11pm when he was attacked by four assailants. The appellant's [NAME_8] asked the assailants why they were beating him. When the assailants found out that it was not the appellant, they left him lying on the ground. The appellant's [NAME_8] suffered serious brain injuries and was admitted to [T] Hospital where he received 28 stitches. [NAME_8] reported the incident to the police and the four assailants were subsequently arrested. (k) In about July or August 2021, near the end of the farmers' protest, two individuals approached the appellant's son at a bus stop outside his college and told him that he should not think about joining the [NAME_5], otherwise they would kill him. (l) In December 2021, the three farm laws were repealed following the end of the farmers' protest. The appellant heard that a Punjabi singer and another youth leader were killed during the protests and began to fear for his own life. He believed that, since the government had been defeated by the protesters, they particularly resented farmers' union leaders such as himself. (m) On 17 January 2023, the appellant applied for a New Zealand visitor visa. His visa was granted on 30 January 2023. On 16 February 2023, he arrived in New Zealand. (n) On 22 January 2024, the he appellant filed a Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status. On 04 August 2025, he was interviewed. On 5 September 2025, an interview report was sent to the appellant and his representative. On 8 October 2025, the [NAME_3] received the appellant's response to the interview report. It declined his claim on 21 November 2025. No sufficient risk of qualifying harm Not all harm entitles an appellant to protection under the Act. For [NAME_3], an appellant must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in India, which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act, namely that he or she is in danger of: (a) being tortured; (b) cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or (c) arbitrary deprivation of life.

5 Additionally, the thresholds of both ‘a real chance of being persecuted’ and being ‘in danger of’ one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility – see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57], HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189, at [55]–[60], and [NAME_9]) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83]. Even assuming that the account advanced by the appellant is accepted and given full weight, the evidence does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation, or a remote or random possibility, for the following reasons: (a) The appellant suffered a number of incidents of aggression towards him in the period from 2020-2021, while the farmers’ protests were being held. Notably, he was stopped and assaulted by the police on a number of occasions, when he tried to take supplies to the protesters. He was also attacked by his neighbour on one occasion and he and his wife were assaulted when out shopping. [NAME_8] was, on one occasion, assaulted by people mistakenly thinking that it was the appellant. The appellant’s son was threatened once. (b) The singular feature of those incidents is that the aggression towards the appellant ended with the end of the protests. The last incident was in July or August 2021. The protests ended in December 2021 and the appellant recounts no further difficulty or problem thereafter. He did not depart India for a further 18 months, during which nothing adverse happened. There is nothing in the evidence pointing to risk in the future. Given these factors, it appears that the chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in India in the future is no more than speculative and remote. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim. He appears not to have established that he meets the requirements of Article1A(2) of the [NAME_10]. Nor does he appear to have demonstrated that there are substantial grounds for believing that he is at risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm in sections 130 and 131 of the Act. He appears not to be not entitled to the surrogate protection of another state. Internal protection alternative There is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. In respect of the refugee claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to assesses whether the risk of serious harm (assuming a risk to exist, which does not appear to have been established, for the reasons given above) in the appellant’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130 (2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217-218 and see also Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to

6 establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see Refugee and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [21]. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [NAME_10] itself. Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in his town (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) it appears that he could access, and reside safely in, any other large city in Haryana, such as Faridabad or Gurgaon (both of which have populations exceeding 1 million people), or further afield in Delhi (population estimated at 35 million). He has been able to afford to come to New Zealand and clearly has the ability to settle into a new environment. The evidence does not point to any risk in either of those locations of [NAME_7] or the police harming him or of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [NAME_10] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, the appellant is not outside India, his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of ‘a real chance’ and being ‘in danger of’ by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to Respond It appears that appellant has neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason nor grounds for being recognised as a protected person under s130 or s131 of the Immigration Act 2009. The claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer the appellant an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 8 May 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence your client wishes to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer your client an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice.” [7] On 8 May 2026, counsel filed written submissions which can be summarised as follows:

7 (a) The Tribunal did not consider that the appellant would continue his support for future protests at which he could be targeted again. It also did not consider the wider context and the targeting that perceived activists face. He appellant could be victimised, given the prevalence of violence in the country. (b) Multiple successful Tribunal cases have found an increased risk of harm for those who are seen as politically opposed to Hindu nationalism. The rise of Hindu nationalism since the election of the [NAME_7] (“[NAME_7]”) in 2014 has led to high-profile attacks and targeting of Sikhs. As a politically motivated [NAME_11], the appellant fits this category. (c) The Tribunal asserted that it would be safe for the appellant to reside in a major Indian city without considering the broad network of [NAME_7] influence that exists across India. (d) The fact that the police targeted the appellant showed they suspected something about him, hence their continuing interest. He was targeted from 2020-2021; hence, he was clearly known to the police and [NAME_7], who claimed they would make him the “leader” of the [NAME_12] (“[NAME_5]”), suggesting the appellant is well known to them. He was also attacked. (e) The IPT also failed to consider the extensive evidence of police corruption in India. The [NAME_7]’s strong influence over the police means they are much less likely to act on complaints against the [NAME_7] and more likely to target those politically opposed to it. He was often targeted by the police, so the police would likely take an interest in him again, despite the long lapse in time. (f) The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) records significant human rights issues, including arbitrary killings. It also details extensive corruption and human rights abuses. Further, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade reports DFAT Country Information Report: India (29 September 2023) also stated that there have been reports of police not investigating reports of violence and of an increase in communal attacks. Political attacks have been on the rise. The possibility of harm to the appellant is not

8 a remote risk, given the extensive evidence of human rights abuses and the ineffective state protection. (g) The increase in corruption within the central [NAME_6] and the targeting of groups of people were previously factors in the recognition of [NAME_3] in another case, RE (India) [2024] NZIPT 802321. (h) The appellant’s situation is also similar to SK (India) [2024] NZIPT 802322 which involved a [NAME_11] who was targeted for his activism. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [8] It is necessary to address first counsel’s submissions: Support for future protests (a) Counsel’s argument is that the appellant would continue his support for future protests at which he could be targeted again. However, he has given no evidence of any further activity for the [NAME_5] in the 18 months he remained in India after the protests ended. It is entirely speculative that there will be future protests, that the appellant would participate in them and that he would come to the adverse attention of the police if he did so. Increased risk of harm for those who are seen as politically opposed to Hindu nationalism (b) There is no evidence that the appellant is seen as opposed to Hindu nationalism. The 2020–2021 farmers’ protests were not about race or religion and, although involving many [NAME_11] farmers from the Punjab, many Hindu farmers from all over India were also involved. In reality, the movement was a huge, pan-Indian coalition, uniting diverse agricultural groups across multiple faiths and states. (c) In any event, the appellant is Hindu, not [NAME_11].

9 A broad network of [NAME_7] influence (d) Counsel’s bare submission that there is a ‘network’ of [NAME_7] influence is vague and unsupported by any evidence. It is vague because there is no explanation given for what such a network might comprise, what its purpose is, how it operates, who has access to it, how reliable it is or what levels of [NAME_7] administration might have access to it. (e) It is an assertion which is regularly made to the Tribunal in cases involving people professing a fear of the [NAME_7] but there is no substantive evidence supporting the existence or use of any such ‘network’. For all its faults, India remains a relatively open and functioning democracy where the rule of law is largely respected. While there are challenges for journalists, there is an open media. It is also a country where politicians are known to switch allegiances. Were such a network to exist, it is likely that it would be well- documented in country information. It is not. Clearly known to the police and [NAME_7] (f) There is, in fact, no claim made by the appellant that he is ‘well- known’ to the police. He says he was stopped at road-blocks on two occasions when trying to deliver supplies to protesters. On one of those occasions, he and his friends were struck with lathis when they argued with the police. On the other occasion, he was detained for a few hours. Nothing in that narrative points to the appellant being “known” to the police, or indicates any ongoing adverse interest in him. (g) As to [NAME_7], there were two incidents in which he was attacked (without suffering serious harm) and one in which [NAME_8] received a severe blow to the head. These incidents stopped in 2021 when the farmers’ protests ended. There is no suggestion that there is any risk of their repetition in the future.

10 Extensive evidence of police corruption (h) It is accepted that there is corruption among the police in India but it is not relevant to the appellant’s claim because he is not of any adverse interest to the police or the [NAME_7]. Significant human rights issues, including arbitrary killings (i) Again it is accepted that India, at a national level, across its many cultures, environments and social and political landscapes, sees many human rights violations of different kinds. But [NAME_3] is not predicated upon generalised conditions. It is dependent on the risk to the particular individual in their particular locality. Unrelated human rights issues, without more, are likely to have little bearing. RE (India) [2024] NZIPT 802321. (j) This appeal has little relevance to the present case. It concerned a highly active [NAME_13]. The Tribunal found that “the appellant will acquire an anti-government, pro-[NAME_11] profile with the authorities”. There was evidence that he had already come to the attention of government monitors because his Instagram account had been blocked for three days as a consequence of his online activity. There were other indicators that the government had an adverse interest in him. The case bears no resemblance to the present appeal. SK (India) [2024] NZIPT 802322 (k) As with RE (India), the appellant in SK (India) was a highly active pro-[NAME_11] person with an online presence. The Tribunal was satisfied that his pro-[NAME_11] beliefs would be discovered by the authorities. A singular feature of that case was that the man bore a prominent [NAME_11] tattoo on his forearm. Again, the case has little relevance to the present appeal. [9] The Tribunal is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter of 1 May 2026, is correct for the reasons stated in the letter and the appeal is manifestly unfounded.

11 [10] Pursuant to section 233 of the Act, the Tribunal determines not to offer the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [11] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to Refugee and Protection Status form, the decision of the [NAME_3] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview) and other material contained in the appeal file, together with the submissions provided in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 1 May 2026. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [12] The appellant was born into a [NAME_4] in Z village, Uttar Pradesh, in 1978. He has two sisters. He is married, and has a son and a daughter. [13] In about 2010, the appellant took over ownership and management of his family’s farm in Z. [14] In about 2015, the appellant attended a farmers’ protest in Y town, Uttar Pradesh and became a member of the [NAME_5], a farmers' union. He subsequently became the [NAME_5] village head for Z. His responsibilities included recruiting new union members and solving problems for the farmers. However, he only worked for the union when he did not have work to do on his own farm. [15] In 2020, the [NAME_6] enacted three laws that the appellant believed targeted farmers in Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. Widespread protests were organised. [16] Around this time, the appellant became the [NAME_5] block head for X Block, Uttar Pradesh, overseeing a division of 60 to 70 villages. His responsibilities involved recruiting new union members, attending a monthly union meeting in Y town, informing farmers about their rights, and solving problems. He collected food and supplies with four to five other farmers and delivered them via tractor to the protest. When they had no other work to do on their own farms, they travelled back and forth between W town and Delhi, mostly at night-time. [17] One night in December 2020, the appellant was on his way to deliver provisions with three other farmers. Their tractor was stopped by the police, who told them that they could not deliver their provisions to the protest. The appellant

12 and his friends began to argue so the police officers beat them with lathis. The appellant and his friends fled through the nearby field. When they returned to their tractor, they found that the police had seized their provisions and discarded them by the roadside. Following this incident, the appellant and his friends were stopped and beaten by police on many further occasions as they attempted to deliver goods to the protesters. [18] Later in December 2020, the appellant was again driving to the protest front with his friends. Police officers stopped their tractor and took the appellant to the X Block police station. He was detained for two to three hours until people from Z village had him released. The appellant believed that the police released him either due to a bribe or due to pressure from the crowd gathered outside the police station. The appellant believed that the [NAME_7] had instructed the police to beat up anyone delivering goods to the protests to keep provisions away from the protesters as much as possible. [19] In about January or February 2021, members of the [NAME_7] incited the appellant's neighbour (a [NAME_7] [NAME_7]) to provoke the appellant into a fight so as to then falsely incriminate him in an offence. The appellant's neighbour began to dig up the dirt road between their farms with a shovel to aggravate the appellant. The neighbour also tried to attack him with four other individuals, but the appellant was able to run away. He attempted to report the incident to the police, but they refused to take him seriously and did not file his complaint. [20] In about February 2021, the appellant was returning home on his motorbike with his wife after shopping. They stopped on the way near an intersection in V town. Four assailants arrived on two motorbikes and attacked them, trying to beat the appellant. A crowd gathered and told the appellant to run away because he would not be spared. The assailants fled, however, taunting the appellant saying, "we will make you the union leader soon". The appellant believed the assailants had been sent by members of the [NAME_7] to attack him. Bystanders took the appellant to a doctor who gave him pain relief for his bruises and swelling. The appellant reported this incident to the police, but they would not listen to him after they heard he was a [NAME_5] member. [21] Two days later, the appellant went to the sugar mill to have his sugar cane weighed. However, because the queue was long, [NAME_8] offered to wait in line for him while he attended a function at a relative's house. After weighing the sugar, the appellant's [NAME_8] was making his way home at around 10 or 11pm when he was attacked by four assailants. The appellant's [NAME_8] asked the assailants

13 why they were beating him. When the assailants found out that it was not the appellant, they left him lying on the ground. The appellant's [NAME_8] suffered serious brain injuries and was admitted to [COMPANY_14] where he received 28 stitches. [NAME_8] reported the incident to the police and the four assailants were subsequently arrested. [22] In about July or August 2021, near the end of the farmers’ protests, two individuals approached the appellant's son at a bus stop outside his college and told him that he should not think about joining the [NAME_5], otherwise they would kill him. [23] In December 2021, the three farm laws were repealed following the end of the farmers’ protest. The appellant heard that a Punjabi singer and another youth leader were killed during the protests and began to fear for his own life. He believed that, since the government had been defeated by the protesters, they particularly resented farmers' union leaders such as himself. [24] On 17 January 2023, the appellant applied for a New Zealand visitor visa. His visa was granted on 30 January 2023. On 16 February 2023, he arrived in New Zealand. [25] On 22 January 2024, the appellant filed a Confirmation of Claim. On 4 August 2025, he was interviewed. On 5 September 2025, an interview report was sent to the appellant and his representative. On 8 October 2025, the [NAME_3] received the appellant's response to the interview report. It declined his claim on 21 November 2025. ASSESSMENT [26] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [NAME_10]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_15] (section 130); and

14 (c) a protected person under the 1966 [NAME_17] (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [27] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a protected person, section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [NAME_10]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [28] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because, even taking the account at its highest, the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the Convention or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. [29] As to the completeness of the claim as presented, the Tribunal notes: (a) The appellant has at all times had the responsibility of establishing his claim and ensuring that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Act. He had the same responsibility in respect of his claim before the [NAME_3], including the obligation to put forward all information, evidence, and submissions that he wished to have considered in support of the claim or would wish to have considered in support of any other potential claim – see section 135 of the Act. (b) The appellant has had multiple opportunities to provide information about his claim – in his claim form, in his written statement, at interview by the [NAME_3], in response to the interview report, on filing his appeal and in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 1 May 2026. He has at all times been represented by counsel, who was able to make submissions to the [NAME_3] and to assist the appellant to respond to the interview report and on appeal. See here the discussion in ZB (India) [2025] NZIPT 802975, at [10]-[27].

15 THE [NAME_10] [30] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: “A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of the [NAME_10].” [31] Article 1A(2) of the [NAME_10] provides that a refugee is a person who: “... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” [32] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_16] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [33] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [34] In terms of Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellants being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? [35] It is necessary to address the relevant country information.

16 Country information [36] India is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in India in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by Maoist non-state groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [37] Regard is also had to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade reports DFAT Country Information Report: India (29 September 2023) cited by counsel. The farmers’ protests of 2020-2021 are record there as follows: “3.99 A recent prominent example of political activity, mainly in Punjab and Haryana (other states also to a less extent), was a year-long farmers’ protest against agricultural reform seeking to liberalise aspects of India’s agricultural sector in 2021. The protests were generally peaceful with some high-profile exceptions. For example, a vehicle ran into protesters causing fatal injuries in Uttar Pradesh. The son of a Union minister of state was charged with murder in relation to the incident. The protests were called off after the government acceded to the demands of protesters.” Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [38] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [39] In summary, the harm which has occurred to the appellant in the past is that: he suffered a number of incidents of aggression towards him in the period from 2020-2021, while the farmers’ protests were being held. Notably, he was stopped and assaulted by the police on a number of occasions, when he tried to take supplies to the protesters. He was also attacked by his neighbour on one occasion and he and his wife were assaulted when out shopping. [NAME_8] was, on one occasion, assaulted by people mistakenly thinking that it was the appellant. The appellant’s son was threatened once.

17 [40] Those incidents ended with the end of the protests. The last incident was in July or August 2021. The protests ended in December 2021 and the appellant recounts no further difficulty or problem thereafter. He did not depart India for a further 18 months, during which nothing adverse happened. He did not engage in any further protest for the [NAME_5] or in his personal capacity. There is nothing in the evidence pointing to any risk for him in the future. Given this, the chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in India in the future is no more than speculative and remote. [41] Taken cumulatively, the past events related by the appellant establish no more than a remote or speculative risk of his being seriously harmed in the future. He has not established that he meets the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the [NAME_10]. Internal protection alternative [42] Although not strictly necessary given the finding as to a lack of any risk to the appellant in India, the Tribunal records that, even of there were such risk in his local area, it would not have reached a different conclusion as to his entitlement to [NAME_3]. This is because, in respect of both the claim for protection as a refugee under section 129 of the Act, and as a protected person under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile (assuming, for the sake of the analysis, that one exists, which has not been found to be the case here) can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220 at [50]-[51], and in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. [43] It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205 at pp217-218 and see also Refugee Appeal No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. [44] Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [45] An internal protection alternative requires that:

18 (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [NAME_10] itself. [46] Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in his village and its environs (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) he could access, and reside safely in, any other large city in Haryana, such as Faridabad or Gurgaon (both of which have populations exceeding 1 million people), or further afield in Delhi (population estimated at 35 million). He has been able to afford to come to New Zealand and clearly has the ability to settle into a new environment. The evidence does not point to any risk in either of those locations of [NAME_7] or the police harming him or of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [NAME_10] are available there. [47] Those alternative places of relocation all meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. The appellant is not outside India, his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk falls short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not require the surrogate protection of another state. [48] The Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India.

19 Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [49] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in India, it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [NAME_3] [50] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a refugee under the [NAME_10] and section 129 of the Act. The [NAME_15] [51] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: “A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_15] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand.” [52] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME_15], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: “… any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” [53] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [NAME_3]. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [54] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the protected person categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the refugee enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [55] For the reasons explained above in relation to the refugee assessment (including the finding of an internal protection alternative), there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in India, to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with

20 any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_15]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_15] [56] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [57] Section 131 of the Act provides that: “(1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME_17] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [58] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [NAME_3]. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [59] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the refugee enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the refugee context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in India. [60] For the same reasons (including the finding of an internal protection alternative), it is satisfied that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in India. He is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [61] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act.

21 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

Judge M Treadwell Chair

CONCLUSION [62] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of the [NAME_10] and, therefore, is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME_15] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [63] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [64] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [65] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “Judge M Treadwell” Judge M Treadwell Chair