Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Status Claim

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803046 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Officer

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 14 April 2026

Date of Decision: 28 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm because of his romantic relationship with a woman from a higher caste than him whose family has threatened him. [3] The principal issue to be determined is whether the evidence is accepted and whether the risk of the appellant suffering such harm reaches the required threshold.

2 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [4] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [5] The appellant is from Z city in Y state. He is a member of the [NAME] (a scheduled caste) which is discriminated against by members of higher castes. [6] Because of his caste membership, the appellant received a scholarship to attend a college in Z city, where he studied mechanical engineering. He commenced his course in 2016. One of his classmates was a girl called [NAME], who was from a higher caste. Her father was a local politician (a [NAME] ward member) and was a member of the [NAME] ([NAME]). [7] The appellant and [NAME] formed a friendship which became a romantic relationship. This relationship continued for around six years until July 2023. They spent time together during their relationship going on outings including with their [NAME]. Neither of their families were aware of the relationship. [8] The college course they did together lasted for three years. After this, the appellant found employment and [NAME] pursued further studies. [9] During 2023, [NAME] came under pressure from her family to enter into an arranged marriage with a member of her own caste. In June 2023, she disclosed to her family that the reason she did not wish to do so was because she was in a relationship with the appellant and wished to marry him. She wanted her family to meet him, but they declined and told her that she could not marry outside her caste. [10] Shortly afterwards, on 2 July 2023, the appellant and [NAME] met at a market to discuss what to do. [NAME] wanted to try again to persuade her family to accept their match. They were both on the appellant’s motorcycle when they began to be followed by men on another motorcycle. When they stopped in traffic, the men came up in front of them. One of them grabbed the appellant’s collar and threatened him with a knife. [NAME] was shouting at them to stop. After they got away from the men, the appellant left [NAME] at the market. He has not seen her in person since then.

3 [11] The appellant received threatening telephone calls after [NAME] disclosed their relationship to her family. He received five or six such calls from two or three different numbers. The callers told him to stay away from [NAME] or there would be consequences. [NAME] also received some calls telling him to tell the appellant to stay away from her. After the confrontation with the men on the motorcycle, the appellant also told his family about the relationship, the threatening calls and the confrontation at the market. They also disapproved and his father told him he should not be in such a relationship. After this, the appellant stopped answering [NAME]’s calls. He has had no further contact with her. [12] A couple of days after the incident at the market, the appellant attempted to report it to local police. He was accompanied by his father. The police told him they would see what they could do but also admonished him and said that he should stay away from rich and powerful people. [13] The appellant was not attacked again but thought he was being followed. His family suggested that he should go stay elsewhere for a while and he went and stayed with some [NAME] who lived some distance from his family home. He continued to receive the threatening calls. He had not initially thought that he would go overseas but someone told him that visas for New Zealand were “open” so he decided to try his luck. He applied for and was granted a New Zealand visitor visa in July 2023 and travelled here in August 2023. If he had not come to New Zealand, he probably would have gone somewhere far away in [APPELLANT] like Bangalore or Mumbai. He probably would have been able to stay somewhere like that, but those places are also far from home. He would have found it hard not to make visits to his family if he was still in [APPELLANT]. [14] In February 2024, the appellant lodged a claim to be recognised as a [RESPONDENT] or protected person. [15] The appellant no longer wishes to have a relationship with [NAME]. He believes that it would cause too many problems including threats to himself and his family. He believes that if [NAME] has now married, he would not be at risk but does not know whether or not this has happened. He has not tried to find out. He thinks she is probably restricted in her ability to contact him but also thinks she could get a message to him through [NAME] if she wished to. He has not heard from her since arriving in New Zealand.

4 [16] The appellant is not certain that it is safe for him to return home now, even though he and [NAME] have had no contact for almost three years. He considers that it is “possible” that he would be in danger there and that there is “potential risk”. Other Evidence and Submissions Received [17] Prior to the hearing counsel filed: (a) A memorandum of submissions. (b) Written statements together with identity documents from two of the appellant’s [NAME] and [NAME]. All three statements confirmed the relationship between the appellant and [NAME], the fact that her father objected to the relationship, and the intimidation and threats that had resulted. (c) Four photographs showing the appellant and a young woman together in various settings. (d) A bundle of country information concerning caste issues and the issue of “honour killings”. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [18] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning [RESPONDENT] or protection status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [19] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim:

5 It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [20] In determining whether the appellant is [RESPONDENT] or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [21] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. See AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [22] The Tribunal found the appellant to be a generally credible witness. It is accepted that he is from a scheduled caste and spent almost six years in a serious romantic relationship with a young woman from a higher caste. It is accepted that her family objected to the relationship and that the appellant was subjected to threats and intimidation intended to persuade him to end the relationship. [23] There were some aspects of the appellant’s evidence that were inconsistent with his previous accounts and others which appeared to be embellishments. [24] Prior to the Tribunal hearing the appellant had variously described [APPELLANT] father as a “big political leader”, “a person with wealth and political power”, “a powerful leader”, “a politician and a legislator”. Prior to the hearing, the Tribunal sought further information from the appellant about [COUNSEL] father so that he could be identified. Counsel responded that [COUNSEL] father “held a minor role within the party but had connections with other members who were more politically active and influential”. During the hearing, the appellant advised that the father was a [NAME] ward member of [APPELLANT] (the governing body of the city). A

6 list of the 40 ward members for Z city obtained by the Tribunal from the Internet did not include his name. This was disclosed to the appellant at the hearing. However, it was of members elected in January 2025 and it is possible his name would appear on an earlier list. The Tribunal has been unable to locate such earlier list. It extends the benefit of the doubt in the circumstances and accepts that the father was previously a [NAME] ward member in the city. [25] There were also some inconsistencies regarding whether a complaint was made to the police by the appellant, whether the appellant’s attackers were on one or two motorbikes, and their numbers. The Tribunal extends the benefit of the doubt to the appellant and accepts for the purpose of this decision, that his collar was grabbed, and he was threatened with a knife as he described, and that he made a complaint to the police about this. The balance of the appellant’s evidence is accepted for the purposes of this appeal. THE [RESPONDENT] [26] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT]. [27] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [28] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v [NAME] (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [29] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183].

7 [30] The principal issues are, as explained in [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [31] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case. Relevant country information [32] A report by the [COMPANY] on attitudes about caste in [APPELLANT] records that caste segregation remains prevalent. Most Indians conduct their social lives largely within caste hierarchies and the report records that a substantial share of Brahmins (the highest caste) say they would not be willing to accept a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste as a neighbour. It further records that most respondents to the [NAME] survey say it is very important to stop both men and women in their community from marrying into other castes, although this view varies widely by region: [COMPANY] in [APPELLANT]: Tolerance and Segregation (29 June 2021) at p96. [33] A [NAME] article regarding an interfaith “honour killing” in February 2026 states that more than 93 per cent of marriages in [APPELLANT] are arranged by families within their own caste and faith and that couples who deviate from this tradition are routinely forced to seek protection from police or courts: A [NAME] “‘Never imagined this’: Indian village grapples with interfaith couple’s killing” [NAME] (4 February 2026). [34] A number of Tribunal decisions have examined the phenomena of “honour” killings in [APPELLANT] in recent years. In MF ([APPELLANT]) [2022] NZIPT 802000, the Tribunal noted the comments in United States Department of State 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 April 2022) that “honour” killings remained a

8 problem in [APPELLANT], especially in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana and that they were usually attributable to the victim marrying against the wishes of their family. [35] A journal article viewed by the Tribunal similarly noted that pre-marital relationships are one of the main causes of “honour” killings. It also notes that “honour” killings are common among [APPELLANT]’s extremely patriarchal communities, sometimes known as “honour-based” societies, such as the [NAME]: [NAME] and [APPELLANT] “Impact of Honour Killings in Haryana, [APPELLANT]” (2021) 1(2) [NAME]

33. Application to the facts [36] It has been accepted that the inter-caste relationship between the appellant and [NAME] was unacceptable to both of their families. [NAME] disclosed the relationship, the appellant was subjected to intimidation and threats, in person on one occasion and through phone calls. The callers told him not to pursue his relationship with [NAME]. [37] Apart from the single incident at a market in July 2023, when the appellant had his collar grabbed and was threatened with a knife, the appellant was not physically harmed because of the relationship. He moved away to stay with [NAME] in the same region before leaving for New Zealand approximately six weeks after the incident. Importantly, while still in [APPELLANT] he ceased his contact with [NAME], neither seeing her in person nor answering her telephone calls. His evidence to the Tribunal was that he had no intention of pursuing the relationship because of the problems he had experienced. He had had no contact with her from New Zealand and accepted that had she wished to get a message to him she could have done so through [NAME]. The fact that she has not indicates that she has also accepted that the relationship is finished. [38] When interviewed by the [RESPONDENT] [NAME], the appellant expressed the view that once [NAME] married somebody else it will be possible for him to go back to [APPELLANT]. At the hearing, he stated that he had made no enquiry with their mutual [NAME] in [APPELLANT] as to whether she had in fact married although said that at the time of his [RESPONDENT] (in January 2024), she had not. Had the relationship continued to be a source of danger to the appellant, it would be expected that he would maintain an interest in whether [NAME] had entered a different marriage.

9 [39] No evidence was presented of any recent interest in the appellant or his family on the part of [NAME]. No evidence was presented of any ongoing telephone threats or visits. The Tribunal finds that while the relationship was unacceptable to [NAME], it does not currently give rise to a risk of serious harm to the appellant. This is underscored by the appellant’s failure to make any enquiry about [NAME]’s current marital status. The Tribunal finds that while the relationship was unacceptable to [NAME], it is now in the past, the couple having had no contact now for three years. In addition, even were the relationship a source of risk, the appellant’s evidence was that he could live safely in a different part of [APPELLANT] although it would be hard to stay away from his family. He is qualified in mechanical engineering and has work experience both in [APPELLANT] and is therefore well-placed to secure employment. The appellant has been given the benefit of the doubt that [NAME]’s father was previously a ward member for [NAME]. There is no evidence before the Tribunal establishing that he has any influence beyond Z city. Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [40] For these reasons, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in [APPELLANT]. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [41] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [42] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as [RESPONDENT] under the [RESPONDENT] and section 129 of the Act.

10 [NAME] [43] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. Assessment of the Claim under [NAME] [44] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [45] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of their appeal as they do for their claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [46] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. THE ICCPR [47] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand.

11 ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [48] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [49] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for the claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [50] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the [RESPONDENT] (to which protected person status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035 at [82]; and [NAME] v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [51] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under ICCPR [52] For the above reasons already given, the appellant does not require protection under the ICCPR. They are not a protected person within the meaning of section 131(1) of the Act.

CONCLUSION [53] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and, therefore, is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act;

12 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of [NAME] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [54] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [55] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellant and/or be likely to endanger the safety of the appellant or others. [56] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member