Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] [NAME] RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 21 April 2026

Date of Decision: 29 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm from his former employer because he brought a complaint against him before the Employment Relations Authority (“ERA”) in New Zealand. He claims that his employer has threatened to have him killed on his return to [APPELLANT]. [3] The principal issue to be determined is whether the evidence is accepted.

2 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [4] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given by the appellant and his two witnesses at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. Evidence of the Appellant [5] The appellant, of the [NAME], was born in Z village, the Punjab, [APPELLANT] in the late 1980s. His parents are now deceased (his mother died in 2020 and his father in 2023). He has two older siblings, a brother who lives in Canada and a sister who lives in [APPELLANT]. [6] After completing secondary school, the appellant helped his father with farming. [7] On 24 February 2013, the appellant married his wife in an arranged marriage. In 2014, the appellant’s wife moved to New Zealand to study. Later, in August 2015, the appellant travelled to join his wife in New Zealand. However, when he arrived, she was not there to collect him at the airport. When he managed to contact her, she told him that she did not want to live with him. [8] The appellant later entered into a relationship with a New Zealand citizen who worked on a [NAME] for [NAME]. [NAME] also knew a friend of the appellant’s brother-in-law. [9] In 2016, the appellant found three months’ work at a [NAME] in Z town. [10] On 30 April 2017, the appellant became unlawfully present in New Zealand. He had applied for a partnership-based work visa, but this was declined as Immigration New Zealand was not satisfied that the appellant was in a genuine and stable relationship with his partner. [11] In December 2017, the appellant became employed in [NAME]’s [NAME] in Y town while living in X town. He was employed by the business [COMPANY] and the employer lived in X town. [NAME] agreed to pay him $12 an hour in cash on a weekly basis. They did not enter into any employment contract. [NAME] paid him at the end of the first week, but from this point onward, he did not pay him as agreed. Although the appellant worked 60 to 70 hours a week, he only paid the appellant $250 per week. When the appellant asked him for his full wages, [NAME] swore at him and threatened that if he did not come to work or complained to anyone about him,

3 he would report him to the immigration authorities. The employer treated others in this same manner. [12] [NAME] told him that because no official employment paperwork had been completed, he could not pay him more. The appellant privately hoped that [NAME] would pay him a lump sum at a later point. [13] At the end of 2017, the appellant’s relationship with his partner ended. [14] When visiting [APPELLANT], [NAME]’s wife, [NAME], visited the appellant’s parents and they became acquainted. [NAME] and [NAME]’s family villages are close to each other. [NAME] has uncles, cousins and a brother-in-law in [APPELLANT], he does not have siblings. He also has a mother living in New Zealand and his father has passed away. [15] During gatherings and festivals, [NAME] disclosed to people that he had links to [NAME] in W town and V town in the Punjab and in other areas in [APPELLANT], and these gang members included [NAME], [NAME] and [NAME]. He told people he could do anything he wanted in [APPELLANT] by giving money to [NAME] and that he had contact with them on social media. [16] In 2018 or 2019, the appellant asked [NAME] for $2,000. [NAME] later arrived at the appellant’s home drunk and asked if he still needed money. When he responded that he did, he was told to look in the back of [NAME]’s car, where he found a gun. [17] In November 2020, the appellant left his employment with [NAME]. There was no work during the COVID-19 lockdown period and the appellant went out of town for a few months. There was no work when he returned. As he lived in the same town as [NAME], when he saw him, he would ask for the money owed. [NAME] would respond to him, “we will see”. Around 2021, the appellant began to threaten him that he would lodge a complaint against him. [18] The appellant continued to live in X town until he was served with a deportation order. He then moved to Y town. He still saw [NAME] from time to time, such as at the grocery store. He also continued to visit X town to see friends. [19] On 7 September 2022, the appellant was served with a deportation order. He believed [NAME] had complained about him. The appellant applied to Immigration New Zealand for a ministerial resolution and on 27 March 2023, the Minister of Immigration declined to intervene.

4 [20] In 2023, [NAME] sold his business, [APPELLANT]. [21] In late 2023 or early 2024, the appellant, after accessing the Inland Revenue Department (“[NAME]”) website, learned that [NAME] had been paying tax using his [NAME] number. His [NAME] record stated that he had paid tax on a gross income of over $200,000. The appellant consulted a lawyer who told him he was owed around $147,000 and that he could lodge a complaint against [NAME]. [22] On 20 January 2024, the appellant filed an employment complaint at the ERA against [NAME] for reimbursement of $147,000. The appellant stopped visiting X town after this and has had no direct contact with [NAME] since. The appellant changed his telephone number. He also moved to another address in Y town. [23] In March 2024, the appellant’s sister, [NAME], received a call from an unknown number on her WhatsApp. The caller threatened that he would kill the appellant the day he arrived in [APPELLANT] due to the complaint he had made about [NAME]. His sister reported the matter to the police, but they did not take this seriously. [24] During this period, four people on two motorbikes, carrying firearms, went to the appellant’s village and questioned two people about when the appellant would return to [APPELLANT]. They told the [NAME] to warn the appellant’s family that they were waiting for him. [25] In April 2024, [NAME] met the appellant’s friend, [APPELLANT] at a park in X town and enquired about the appellant’s whereabouts and also sought his phone number. His friend refused to relay this information. [NAME] asked the friend if he had heard about the complaint the appellant had lodged against him and said he was going to teach the appellant a lesson when he returned to [APPELLANT]. [NAME] was living in Y town at the time. He has his own business and first met [NAME] when he was working for a different company on the same orchard. He is currently in [APPELLANT] on holiday. [26] In May 2024, [NAME] met with the appellant’s friend, [APPELLANT], outside a fast-food outlet and asked him for the appellant’s whereabouts and for his telephone number. He told him that if the appellant did not retract his complaint, he would face consequences on his return to [APPELLANT]. [NAME] also works in the [NAME] and lives in Y town. The appellant and these friends all lived in X town between 2017 and 2020. It is a small town and everyone knows everyone. [27] The appellant did not mention these threats to the ERA, as he had filed his complaint before he received these threats. He mentioned them to his lawyer but he told him to not worry as their priority was the ERA case and getting him a visa.

5 He also did not report these to the police as he was overstaying in New Zealand and reluctant to seek help from them. [28] In June 2024, a friend advised the appellant that he could apply for [RESPONDENT] status. [29] On 19 August 2024, the appellant lodged his claim for [RESPONDENT] and protected person status with the [RESPONDENT] (“RSU”). [30] On 17 October 2024, the ERA settled the employment complaint. It found the appellant had not established that he had been employed by [NAME] rather than the company [COMPANY] (which was no longer in existence) and that there was therefore no jurisdiction to consider the matter. Since this time the appellant has avoided community and public events to minimise the chance of seeing [NAME]. With his old friends he has the nickname [NAME] but his new friends call him [NAME]. He changed his nickname with new friends to be discreet so that [NAME] will not learn of his whereabouts. He is scared. [31] The appellant knew that [NAME] still felt enmity towards him due to him making the complaint and this had adversely impacted his reputation. [NAME] still fears that the appellant will continue to demand money from him and wants to finish him. The appellant does not know if [NAME] has ever harmed anyone, but he has guns and he has some friends who take drugs. [32] Persons in the appellant’s village have been approached by [NAME] asking about the appellant’s whereabouts. In 2025, they were approached some three to four times. [33] The RSU declined the appellant’s claim on 1 July 2025. [34] [NAME] inquired of persons in the appellant’s village about the appellant’s whereabouts several months ago. [35] The appellant is currently working on a temporary basis in the [NAME] and is living in Y town. He has also spent some time working in R town. [36] The appellant could not live elsewhere in the Punjab, such as Amritsar or Jalandhar districts, or in another state such as Delhi, as his employer’s contacts would find him everywhere.

6 Evidence of [NAME] [37] [NAME] provided a written statement (25 February 2026) and gave evidence by audio-visual link. She is the appellant’s sister. She is separated from her husband and lives in her deceased parents’ home with her younger daughter. Her elder daughter has left home. [38] In March 2024, [NAME] received a WhatsApp call from an unknown person who threatened to ‘finish’ the appellant if he came back to [APPELLANT]. She approached the police, but they failed to record the complaint, stating that it must have been a prank call. She showed the police the phone number, but she no longer has a record of this as her phone broke soon afterwards. [39] The same month, [NAME] told her that four gunmen had come to the village on two motorbikes enquiring about the whereabouts of the appellant. They threatened that the appellant’s life would not be spared. [40] Unknown persons have continued to make visits to the village enquiring about the appellant. In 2025, they visited two to four times. They are still making visits and visited several months ago. Evidence of [NAME] [41] [NAME] provided a statement (25 February 2026) and gave evidence through WhatsApp. He has known the appellant since 2017 as they worked on the same [NAME] in Y town through different contractors. He lived in X town but is now in Y town. [NAME] is now operating his own business. [42] In April 2024, while at a park with his son, [NAME] asked him where the appellant was and for his phone number. He told him it would be the appellant’s last day when he returned to [APPELLANT]. [43] [NAME] sees [APPELLANT] from time to time in X town, but they do not talk. The appellant has changed his nickname from [APPELLANT] to [APPELLANT] and this maybe because he wants to conceal his identity. The appellant has moved around with casual work from Y town to R town. [44] [NAME] is not aware whether anyone is looking for the appellant in [APPELLANT].

7 Other Evidence and Submissions Received [45] On 3 March 2026, counsel provided statements and identity documentary for the two witnesses. [46] On 14 April 2026, counsel provided opening submissions and on 16 April 2026, counsel provided one news report: M [COUNSEL] “’People Live in Fear’: [NAME] on NZ to Stand up to [NAME]” The Spinoff (7 July 2020). ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [47] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning [RESPONDENT] or protected person status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT]” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131). [48] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [49] In determining whether the appellant is [RESPONDENT] or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination.

8 [50] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. See AQ (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [51] The Tribunal has a copy of the ERA decision dated 18 October 2024 and a copy of the appellant’s filing in that proceeding dated 20 January 2024. The decision records that the appellant raised claims of failure of his employer, [NAME], to pay wages, holiday entitlements, to keep wage and time records and to unjustified dismissal. This application was dismissed as the ERA found the evidence did not establish that the appellant was employed by [NAME] and not the business [APPELLANT]. [52] This evidence corroborates the appellant’s account of his regarding that his employer [NAME] had irregular practices, including his not paying the appellant the wages he owed, and having lodged a complaint with the ERA, which ultimately dismissed the application for failure to have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised. However, for the reasons elaborated on below, the Tribunal has evidential concerns, which cumulatively assessed, cause it to find the appellant’s account that he has been threatened by his former employer to be unreliable. [53] First, notwithstanding that the appellant had made a complaint to the ERA about [NAME], and his claim that during the ERA hearing process he was subjected to threats (albeit indirectly, to two of his friends in New Zealand and to his sister in [APPELLANT]), he did not mention these threats at any time to the ERA. Asked by the Tribunal why he did not do so, he stated that this was because the ERA matter was already underway. When the Tribunal advised him that it is recorded in the ERA decision that he mentioned his employer’s threats to report him to Immigration New Zealand (but not those to kill him), the appellant could provide no sensible response. Relevantly, too, the appellant had claimed that early in his employment, his employer had threatened him with a gun, but he had also not

9 mentioned this to the ERA, despite the matter predating the lodgement of his complaint to the ERA. [54] The Tribunal asked the appellant whether he had reported the death threats to his counsel at the time and he stated that he had. However, he stated that the lawyer had simply told him not to worry about it as their priority was the ERA case and getting him a visa. Moreover, it was not this lawyer who later recommended that he lodge [RESPONDENT] and protection claim, but a friend of his. [55] Second, against this implausible backdrop is the claim that [NAME] affiliated with the employer are repeatedly visiting the appellant’s village and making enquiries about him, not just during the ERA proceeding, but some four times in 2025 and as recently as two months ago. That time and resources would be spent doing so is difficult to fathom when the appellant’s continued presence in New Zealand will be known to [NAME]. Afterall, the appellant continues to live some 20 kilometres away from the employer’s town; the fact that they share many business and personal connections; and that the appellant is still employed in a close-knit [NAME] in that region. As the appellant told the Tribunal at one point in his evidence, “everyone knows everyone”. The appellant’s claim that he does not attend public gatherings and has a new nickname with his new friends does not allay the Tribunal’s concern that, if the employer was so motivated to harm and even kill the appellant, it would not be difficult for him to locate the appellant and learn of his continued presence in New Zealand. This significantly undermines his claim that the employer has [NAME] looking for him repeatedly over an extended period in [APPELLANT]. Added to this is the inherent implausibility of the disgruntled [NAME] sending [NAME] to the appellant’s family home in [APPELLANT] to warn him of the very harm he was intending to perpetrate against the appellant, thereby ensuring that the appellant was highly unlikely ever return to the village in order that harm could ever be inflicted. [56] The evidence of the appellant’s sister was unpersuasive and is given no corroborative weight as to the asserted threats. Although the appellant’s sister claimed to have received a threatening WhatsApp call, and to have reported this to the police, showing them evidence of the call, when the Tribunal asked if she had a record of this call to provide to the Tribunal, she stated that soon after the call she had broken her phone and could not provide this to the Tribunal. She also told the Tribunal that two months prior to the hearing, [NAME] had told her that [NAME] had been asking about the whereabouts of the appellant and threatening to harm him. However, her statement provided to the Tribunal, dated

10 25 February 2026, written less than two months prior to the hearing did not record these threats. By way of explanation, the sister stated that she was stressed and could have been mistaken about timeframes. While it is possible that the sister may have provided an inaccurate estimate of the timeframe of the threats, there are further irregularities in her evidence, for instance, while she mentioned to the Tribunal that the [NAME] had made death threats, she did not mention this anywhere in her written statement. [57] The sister was also unable to explain why, if the men were looking for the appellant in his home village, they did not approach his family directly. The employer would have known the appellant’s family address as his wife visited his family there previously. [58] The appellant’s evidence of these ongoing threats in [APPELLANT] was also mobile. In his RSU interview, he was given repeat opportunities to relay evidence of these threats and only told the RSU that his sister had received one WhatsApp call. However, at the very end of the interview, when asked if he wanted to add anything, he suddenly stated that there had been ongoing visits and threats. The appellant told the Tribunal that he did not remember these matters earlier as he was stressed at the time. The Tribunal accepts that stress can have an impact on memory and recall. However, in the context of the above evidential concerns, the Tribunal rejects this explanation, finding that his failure to consistently recall the degree to which his family and been approached by the [NAME] reflects that the appellant has given a false account of the threats his employer has made towards him in New Zealand and in [APPELLANT]. [59] In summary, the Tribunal accepts that the appellant had an employment dispute with his former employer in New Zealand but does not accept that he has threatened to harm the appellant directly or indirectly through persons in New Zealand or [APPELLANT]. THE [RESPONDENT] [60] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT].

11 [61] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [62] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v [NAME] (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; and HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [63] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [64] The principal issues are, as explained in [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [65] It is necessary to record relevant country information to provide context to the appellant’s case. Relevant country information [66] [APPELLANT] is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur; United States

12 Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 August 2025) (“DOS report”). The DOS report records, in its executive summary, numerous human rights concerns in [APPELLANT], including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by [NAME]; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation. [67] Counsel has also provided one country source, [COUNSEL] “’People Live in Fear’: [NAME] on NZ to Stand up to [NAME]” The Spinoff (7 July 2020), referencing right-wing Hindu nationalism in [APPELLANT] and abuses against minorities, prompting mass protests across [APPELLANT]. Application to the facts [68] The appellant, as a [NAME] in his late 30s, would likely return to the Ludhiana region of the Punjab, where he has lived with his family. His sister remains there with one of her daughters. The appellant has previously worked in farming there. [69] The evidence does not establish that he is at risk of serious harm from [NAME] associated with his former employer in New Zealand. The Tribunal has not accepted as credible his evidence that the employer directly or indirectly threatened him either in New Zealand or in [APPELLANT]. Although the employer may hold some hostility towards him, he has not had contact with the appellant since finalisation of the ERA matter in October 2024, which was resolved in the employer’s favour. He has not expressed any ongoing interest in the appellant despite the appellant living in close proximity to his town in New Zealand. [70] The evidence falls well short of establishing any breach of the appellant’s rights giving rise to serious harm to him on return to [APPELLANT].

13 Conclusion on risk of being persecuted [71] For these reasons, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm arising from breaches of human rights. The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Is there a Convention Reason for the Persecution? [72] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. Internal Protection Alternative [73] Although not necessary to address in any detail given the finding that there is no real chance of the appellant being persecuted in his town, for the sake of completeness, the Tribunal turns to the question of an internal protection alternative. [74] In cases where there has been found to be a real chance of serious harm in an appellant’s home area (which is not the case here), the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country of origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [75] An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The proposed site of internal protection must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the proposed site of internal protection, there is no risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted.

14 (c) In the proposed site of internal protection, there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the proposed site of internal protection, basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT] itself. [76] The Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant could access and reside safely in any one of the major cities in the Punjab, such as in Jalandhar or Amritsar where there is also a significant [NAME] population. According to the 2011 census, there are over 185,000 Sikhs living in Jalandhar and 550,000 in Amritsar. The appellant speaks Punjabi, which is spoken there. The appellant could also live in Delhi where there is a significant proportion of [NAME] living. [77] The evidence does not point to any risk there of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT] are available there. The appellant has experience working in farming and the horticulture industry which will help him source new employment and will be able to maintain an adequate standard of living. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. The appellant is not outside [APPELLANT], his country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of “a real chance” and being “in danger of” by a significant margin. The appellant does not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. [78] For the above reasons, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the appellant has a viable internal protection alternative available to them. Exclusion [79] There is nothing in the evidence before the Tribunal which raises any issue under Article 1F of the [RESPONDENT]. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [80] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as [RESPONDENT].

15 The [NAME] [81] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [82] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [83] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [84] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the protected person categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [85] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in [APPELLANT], to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as protected persons in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [86] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [87] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds

16 for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. [88] By virtue of section 131(5) of the Act: (a) treatment inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment, unless the sanctions are imposed in disregard of accepted international standards: (b) the impact on the person of the inability of a country to provide health or medical care, or health or medical care of a particular type or quality, is not to be treated as arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [89] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [90] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the [RESPONDENT] context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in [APPELLANT]. [91] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in [APPELLANT]. He is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR.

CONCLUSION [92] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT] and therefore is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act;

17 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [93] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [94] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [95] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member