Claimant’s Refugee Status Appeal Rejected by Immigration & Protection Tribunal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803017 RŌPŪ TAKE MANENE, TAKE WHAKAMARU AOTEAROA

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted]

Before: B A Dingle (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted]

Date of Hearing: 13 April 2026

Date of Decision: 24 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION __________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee and protection officer declining to grant refugee status or protected person status to the appellant, a citizen of India. The Principal Issue on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to be at risk of serious harm because he is being pursued by men associated with [NAME_2], a [NAME_3] ([NAME_3]) politician in the appellant’s state. The principal issue to be determined is whether the relevant evidence is accepted as credible. [3] For the reasons outlined below, the Tribunal finds that core aspects of the account given by the appellant are not credible. Those aspects of the account that are accepted do not establish that any risk the appellant will face reaches the required thresholds. The appeal is declined.

2 THE APPELLANT’S CASE [4] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given at the appeal hearing. It is assessed later. [5] The appellant was born and raised in a [NAME_4] in Z village in northern India. His family are reasonably well off and own a number of properties including retail shops, farmland and the family home. The appellant qualified in a trade and ran a successful business in a nearby town. [6] The appellant is married and has four children. He, his wife and the children all lived with his parents in the family home until April 2023. [7] From the time of Prime Minister Modi’s first term in 2014, the situation for [NAME_4] in India has deteriorated. They are increasingly the target of discrimination, assaults and other corrupt actions such as land-grabs and business take-overs. The appellant and his family did not suffer significant problems until 2023, but they knew of other [NAME_4] in their area who did suffer difficulties because of their religious identity. [8] On or around 8 June 2023, the appellant visited a restaurant in a nearby town for lunch. He had visited the restaurant previously and had never encountered difficulties there. On this day however, once he was eating his meal (which contained beef), approximately five or six men entered the restaurant and began hitting the patrons and abusing them for eating beef. Two of the attackers were known to the appellant because they were from Z village. The appellant knew them to be associated with a local [NAME_3] politician [NAME_2]. These men, [NAME_5] and [NAME_5] recognised the appellant as being from the same village and reprimanded him for eating beef. The attackers were using sticks to hit people and the appellant sustained a broken collarbone and hand as a result of being hit. After two to three minutes of the attack, the appellant managed to escape and run away from the restaurant. As he ran away, someone shouted after him that they would find and kill him. The appellant then took a rickshaw to a hospital and was treated for his injuries. [9] Because of the attack and the threat that he would be pursued and killed, the appellant was too frightened to return to his home in Z village. Instead, he travelled to his wife’s parents house some distance away and stayed with them before moving to stay with another relative. After a month or two, he moved to

3 X city so that he did not jeopardise the safety of anyone else he was staying with. The appellant did not return to the family home in Z village at all after the attack. [10] Following the attack, the appellant became concerned for the safety of his wife and children and so arranged for them to live with the wife’s parents. They moved there within weeks of the 2023 attack and have remained living there since and have not been identified or harassed in that locality. [11] While the appellant’s parents were still living in the family home, they were approached on several occasions (or possibly more regularly) by men looking for the appellant. [12] On 2 November 2023, two young children related to the appellant were killed on account of the appellant’s adverse profile with those associated with [NAME_2]. The son of the appellant’s deceased sister and the son of one of the appellant’s cousins were both visiting the appellant’s parents at the family home in Z village. The men pursuing the appellant must have known that the children were there and they killed the children and made it look like a drowning. The powerful people associated with the perpetrators prevented the family from having an autopsy done. The appellant heard about the tragedy from his family some days after it happened. He also heard from villagers that the men associated with [NAME_2], including [NAME_5] and [NAME_5] were responsible. [13] On 25 February 2025, the appellant’s wife visited the family home in Z village to retrieve some documents. While there, she was attacked and hit by [NAME_5] and [NAME_5] who wanted to locate the appellant. As a result of the attack, she fell unconscious and her eardrum burst. She was transported to a hospital by a neighbour ([NAME_6]) who rang the appellant the same day to tell him what had happened to the wife. At the time of the appellant’s [NAME_7] interview, two days after the attack, his wife remained in hospital. [14] The appellant’s parents remained living in the family home in Z village until early 2026 when their health needs meant that they needed increased support. They now live with the appellant’s wife and her parents. [15] The appellant believes that, if he returns to India, he will be identified and targeted for serious harm by people associated with [NAME_2]. Because the people who will target the appellant are associated with the [NAME_3], they will be able to locate and harm the appellant wherever he lives in India. While he was not located in X city, he cannot relocate his family there.

4 Other Evidence and Submissions Received [16] On 7 April 2026, counsel lodged opening submissions which asserted that the [NAME_7] erred in rejecting the appellant’s claim and focused on the reasons why the decision was incorrect. Counsel submits that, in relation to inconsistent and mobile evidence, the benefit of the doubt should be applied in the appellant’s favour and his appeal should be allowed. [17] At the close of the hearing, the Tribunal gave leave for the appellant to provide further documents relating to his medical treatment in 2023 and previous business operations. The Tribunal also wrote to the appellant (via counsel), inviting him to explain apparent inconsistencies in his evidence which the Tribunal had not clarified during the hearing. No responses have been forthcoming. On 14 April 2026, counsel provided another copy of the appellant’s wife’s records regarding her ear and a document which appears to be a translation of a news article regarding the drowned children. [18] At the close of the hearing, leave was also given for counsel to make written closing submissions by 15 April 2026, once all of the material had been provided. Counsel wrote to the Tribunal on 15 April 2026 to note that the deadline for the provision of documents had passed and that none had been received from the appellant. Counsel did not provide closing submissions or seek leave to provide them at a later date. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM [19] Under section 198 of the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”), on an appeal concerning refugee or protection status under section 194(1)(c), the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention” or “the Convention”) (section 129); and (b) a protected person under the 1984 [NAME_8] (section 130); and (c) a protected person under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131).

5 [20] There is a statutory obligation on the appellant, under section 226(1) of the Act, to establish their claim: It is the responsibility of an appellant or affected person to establish his or her case or claim, and the appellant or affected person must ensure that all information, evidence, and submissions that he or she wishes to have considered in support of the appeal or matter are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision on the appeal or matter. [21] In determining whether the appellant is a refugee or a protected person, it is necessary to identify the facts against which the assessment is to be made. Section 218(1) of the Act recognises that the Tribunal is a “specialist body” that has the role of deciding appeals and matters by: … making findings of fact, applying the relevant law and making a determination. [22] This requires the assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case. As explained in [NAME_9] (Democratic Republic of Congo) [2025] NZIPT 802417, in line with New Zealand’s obligations under international law, the Act and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court, the Tribunal makes an assessment of the evidence presented in support of the appellant’s case in order to make findings of fact, including through an assessment of credibility. In this assessment, only evidence to which no credence can be attached is discounted. The rest of the evidence is either accepted or afforded the benefit of the doubt, and given full weight. A risk assessment proceeds on the findings of fact. [NAME_9] (Democratic Republic of Congo), at [78]. Assessment of the Evidence [23] Many core aspects of the appellant’s account of being attacked by associates of [NAME_2] are impugned by inconsistent or mobile evidence over the course of the appellant’s claim. The most notable examples follow. [24] For ease of reference, this decision refers to the appellant’s interview at the [NAME_7] as “the interview”. The restaurant attack in April 2023 [25] Important aspects of the appellant’s evidence about the 2023 restaurant attack have been inconsistent.

6 [26] First, when the appellant arrived in New Zealand in October 2023 and claimed refugee status at the airport, he was asked about the basis of his claim. He stated that the restaurant attack had happened on 8 June 2023. In contrast, when he gave evidence at the interview, he said that the attack happened on 7 or 8 April 2023. Asked by the Tribunal to explain the inconsistency, the appellant said that he was stressed on arrival in New Zealand and so made a mistake. [27] Second, in the interview the appellant stated that he had never been to the restaurant before the day of the attack. He told the Tribunal, in contrast, that he had been there before the attack. Specifically, when asked by the Tribunal whether he went there regularly, he answered: “not regularly, but sometimes”. When the Tribunal asked him why he had told the interviewing officer that he had never been there before, he tried to avoid the question by stating that his evidence was the same about where the restaurant was and the fact that he went there to eat lunch. Pressed to explain the inconsistency about whether or not he had been to the restaurant before the attack, the appellant looked at the transcript of the interview and then simply said “confused”. Offered another chance to explain the inconsistency, he said “I don’t know”. [28] The appellant was also inconsistent about whether the attackers spoke to him during the attack. He told the Tribunal that two of the attackers (the ones he recognised) had spoken directly to him about the fact that he was from the same village (Z village) and that he was eating beef. However, at the interview the appellant said that the attackers did not say anything specific to him. When invited to, the appellant gave no explanation for the different evidence. [29] As to the identity of the attackers that the appellant knew from Z village, the evidence has been inconsistent. At the interview, the appellant named them as [NAME_10] and [NAME_5]. However, at the appeal hearing he said that the names had been incorrectly recorded at interview and their names were [NAME_5] and [NAME_5]. As to whether the interview record was the appellant’s mistake (in giving the wrong names) or a mistake in the record of evidence, the appellant said that he had given the correct names in the interview but that they had been recorded incorrectly. When the Tribunal noted that the appellant had repeated those names, [NAME_10] and [NAME_5], twice in his response to the interview report, he was not able to explain why he had done so. [30] The appellant told the Tribunal that he was present for about 2−3 minutes of the restaurant attack. He said that he did not know how long the attack lasted in total because he then escaped. In contrast, when he was asked earlier, at the

7 interview, he said that the interaction lasted for about half an hour. Asked to explain the fundamental difference, the appellant did not respond. [31] Considered cumulatively, the unexplained and inconsistent evidence about the claimed restaurant attack leads the Tribunal to conclude that the evidence is not credible. It is rejected. [32] If more were needed, the Tribunal also records the following matters which strengthen the view that the appellant’s core account is not credible. Police report [33] The evidence as to whether the restaurant attack was reported to the police is inconsistent. [34] When questioned at the border in New Zealand, the appellant indicated that the matter was not reported to the police. [35] However, during the interview the appellant said that he did go to the police station to try to report the matter and that he was threatened by telephone that he should not do so. The interview transcript records the following questions and answers: Did you go to the police after? Yes, we did go to the police station but they didn’t file any report. You tried going there? Yes Did someone stop you from claiming at police? Yes, because they were calling me and threatening me if you go there then we will do this. Even after that I still tried to go and make a complaint, but inspector there didn’t write the report. [36] At the appeal hearing, the appellant changed his evidence again and said that he did not go to the police station but that his father went to the police station on his (the appellant’s) behalf. Asked why he had not mentioned that at the border, the appellant said that it was because his father did not tell him about going to the police station until after the appellant’s interview (in February 2025) in New Zealand. Asked to clarify the timing, the appellant again confirmed that he only learned of his father going to the police station after the interview. However, this raised a further inconsistency because the appellant had said during the interview that he had gone to the police (see [35] above). When invited to explain

8 the apparent inconsistencies, the appellant answered “I don’t know”. He also told the Tribunal that he turned his mobile telephone off after the attack and did not answer any calls, which is inconsistent with his interview evidence that he received threats by way of calls to his mobile. The nephews’ drowning [37] The claim that two children were drowned as a result of the enmity against the appellant is undermined by inconsistent and mobile evidence. [38] In the interview, the appellant said that the two children were the sons of his deceased sister and he gave their full names. He said that they were three and five years old at the time of the drowning and they lived in Y village with their father. They drowned on 14 or 15 March 2024. [39] In contrast, the appellant told the Tribunal that one child was the child of his sister and the other was the child of his cousin. His cousin’s child was about seven at the time of the drowning and his sister’s child was four or five. After initially telling the Tribunal that the children died in 2022, before the restaurant attack, the appellant then said that they were killed on 2 November 2023, soon after the appellant arrived in New Zealand. Asked the name of his cousin’s son who drowned, the appellant could not recall it because he rarely saw them. [40] When the Tribunal asked the appellant to explain his contrasting accounts, he initially suggested that it was a mistake in the way the refugee status officer had recorded his evidence. When the Tribunal read to him the record of his evidence from the interview which, in response to more than one question, was unequivocal that the two children who drowned were both the sons of his sister, the appellant still maintained that he had said it was his cousin’s son in the interview. He could not explain why he did not, in his response to the [NAME_7]’s interview report, correct the record that the two children were the children of his deceased sister. [41] The document said to be a news article reporting on the drowning of the two relatives of the appellant does not advance matters. Rather, it raises further unresolved inconsistencies with the appellant’s evidence. The article says the boys were from V village (not Z village where the appellant says they were visiting or Y village where the sister’s child lived). The article also names the river in which the boys died but the appellant said that the river had no name. The article states that the boys were eight and nine years respectively, whereas the appellant

9 told the Tribunal that they were five and seven (and said in his earlier interview that they were three or four). The Tribunal also notes that there is no reference provided as to when the article was published or in which publication. Nor has the “English translation” been produced by a certified translator — the cover note on the English text inexplicably records that the document is an affidavit, not a translation. [42] For all of these reasons, the Tribunal rejects the appellant’s claim that his two nephews were intentionally drowned because of their association with the appellant. On the basis of the evidence provided, the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the appellant’s nephews have drowned or otherwise died, or that the news document is genuine or relates to anyone known by the appellant. Corroborative documents [43] There are some documents which have been provided to corroborate the appellant’s account. However, the Tribunal affords them no weight for the following reasons. [44] The weight to be given to documents which cannot be independently verified will generally follow the credibility of an appellant’s account; see here the discussions in DJ (India) [2017] NZIPT 801064, at [91]–[99], and BD (Iraq) v Refugee and Protection Officer [2019] NZHC 987, at [22]. In short, where documents are consistent with an account that is otherwise credible, they may be given weight. Conversely, where an account is not credible, the existence of documents such as those produced by the appellant will add little to an assessment. Second, the documents themselves do not contain any information that directly and credibly corroborates the appellant’s account. The document relating to the children drowning has already been addressed at [41]. [45] The medical information relating to the wife’s burst eardrum does not appear to indicate that the eardrum was damaged by a physical assault. As far as the Tribunal can ascertain, she was diagnosed with a perforation of the right eardrum membrane and the advice was “conservative management at present”. During the hearing, the appellant was asked to identify information in the document which suggested that the ear had been injured through an intentional assault but he was unable to do so. The Tribunal notes that a burst eardrum can have any number of causes, including ear infections.

10 [46] As to the copy of a screen shot of calls from the appellant’s neighbour in the file, this document is inconsistent with the appellant’s interview and hearing evidence. During his interview on 27 February 2025, the appellant stated that his wife has been assaulted by men seeking the appellant on 25 February 2025 (two days before the interview) and the appellant was aware of it because his friend and neighbour [NAME_6] had rung the appellant to tell him. However, the appellant’s call logs recording the time and date of calls to and from [NAME_6] show no such call. The first call from [NAME_6] on or after 25 February 2025 was on 5 March 2025 (after the interview). Given that the appellant attended the interview only two days after the purported call, it is reasonable to expect that he could remember the timing with some accuracy in the interview. [47] The Tribunal also has concerns that other relevant documents have not been provided, in particular documents relating to the medical treatment the appellant says he received for his broken collarbone and hand on the day of the April 2023 attack. During the interview, the appellant offered to produce medical documents (which he said were at his home) but, despite the appellant’s parents still living in that home until 2026, the appellant has not done so. At the appeal hearing, he again offered to provide the documents but they have not been forthcoming. Summary of credibility assessment [48] On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant was not attacked and injured in a restaurant in 2023 by individuals associated with [NAME_2]. Nor was he, his parents or anyone else in his family approached, threatened or targeted in any adverse way because of the 2023 restaurant attack. The core account of the appellant as to his past experience of serious harm and related events is rejected. It follows that the appellant was not “in hiding” in 2023 and did not travel to New Zealand for the genuine purpose of seeking protection from serious harm at the hands of associates of [NAME_2]. [49] For the purpose of this appeal, the Tribunal accepts the remainder of the appellant’s evidence as to his immediate family members (including the death of his younger sister from a medical event), the family’s current location and the general information about the appellant’s marriage, business and the family’s assets. The Tribunal accepts that the appellant’s wife suffered a burst eardrum in February 2025 but does not accept that it was sustained in an attack related to the appellant’s profile.

11 [50] The decision now turns to assess the appellant’s predicament in India on the basis of these findings. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION [51] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a refugee in accordance with this Act if he or she is a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. [52] Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention provides that a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [53] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME_11] v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective — see Refugee Appeal No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57]; HX (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [54] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection — see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. [55] The principal issues are, as explained in Refugee Appeal No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [213]: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution?

12 Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is There a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in India? Relevant country information [56] In general, country information indicates that, while India is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State, in its 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: India (12 August 2025) (“the USDOS report”), records in its executive summary the existence of numerous human rights concerns in India, which include: credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; enforced disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; arbitrary arrest or detention; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of ethnic and caste minorities. [57] As to the situation of [NAME_4] in India, The Tribunal acknowledges country information which outlines that there is discrimination against [NAME_4] in some areas and particularly amongst some socio-economic sectors of society. For example, [COMPANY_12] report ([COMPANY_12] [NAME_4] in India https://minorityrights.org) regarding the situation of [NAME_4] in India records the following India’s Muslim population, particularly the poorest sections, experience some of the most acute social marginalization of any community. This situation, reflected in their access to education, health and employment, is also driven by the limited enforcement of minority rights protections in India and the persistence of discriminatory provisions in the country’s domestic law. For instance, the exclusion of [NAME_4] (as well as Christians) from the officially recognized scheduled castes has meant that even the most impoverished of [NAME_4] have not been able to benefit from those affirmative action programmes in place. The limited and poorly funded minority rights structures in place in India at present have also come under increasing threat since the [NAME_3] ([NAME_3]) took power in 2014. Key institutions such as the Ministry of Minority Affairs and the National Commission of Minorities are now under threat and in some states budgets for minority issues have been slashed. While major differences exist between [NAME_4] in their religious, cultural and social outlook, in many cases the religious divide may be only a contributing factor to intercommunal discord. The main causes of dissension and divisiveness are equally likely to be poverty, access to resources, unemployment, illiteracy and so on. Hindu extremist groups such as the Shiv Sena and the [NAME_13] ([NAME_13]) consider [NAME_4] to be disloyal to the Indian state. On the other hand, Muslim extremist groups preach a militant Islam that argues for a separate way of life for [NAME_4].

13 Sectarian violence, common in India, impacts [NAME_4] disproportionately. While often instrumentalized for political gains, communal violence and other forms of communal targeting draws on and exacerbates a climate of entrenched discrimination against India’s religious minorities, with far-reaching social, economic, cultural and political dimensions. Such violence is frequently met with impunity and in certain instances direct complicity from state actors, ranging from inciting violence through hate speech to refusing to properly investigate communal incidents after they have occurred. This includes a significant number of state officials affiliated with the ruling [NAME_3]. [58] Notwithstanding the issues identified by [COMPANY_12] report, the appellant has not established that he has the characteristics which would put him at risk of serious harm to the real chance threshold. Neither he nor his family have had significant problems of discrimination in Z village or in the wife’s village and so the appellant can choose to live in either location. The appellant completed a trade education and ran a successful business. His family own farmland and retail shops and have been able to support themselves in a comfortable lifestyle. They are far from impoverished. Nor does the appellant claim that he has been seriously affected by communal or inter-religious violence in his home area. [59] There is no credible evidence before the Tribunal that the appellant has experienced serious infringements of internationally recognised human rights in the past. [60] Looking forward, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the risk of the appellant facing serious harm is anything more than remote to the point of being entirely speculative. It finds that, objectively, on the facts as found, there is not a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in India. [61] The appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he returns to India. Conclusion on Claim to Refugee Status [62] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not recognised as a refugee. [NAME_8] [63] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME_8] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand.

14 Assessment of the Claim under [NAME_8] [64] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in [NAME_8], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [65] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

For the reasons given above, the appellant is not at risk of being subjected to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under [NAME_8]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME_8] [66] For the above reasons already given, the appellant is not a protected person within the meaning of section 130(1) of the Act. THE ICCPR [67] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [68] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of the appeal as for the claim to refugee status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply.

15 [69] The Tribunal reminds itself that the threshold for the gravity of the harm required under the ICCPR is not less than the threshold required to establish “being persecuted” in the context of the Refugee Convention (to which protected person status is complementary, not dominant). That is to say, the harm must be serious. See, in this regard, AC (Syria) [2011] NZIPT 800035, at [82] and Taunoa v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429. [70] For the reasons given above, the appellant is not in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as a protected person in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under ICCPR [71] For the above reasons already given, the appellant is not a protected person within the meaning of section 131(1) of the Act.

CONCLUSION [72] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Convention and, therefore, is not a refugee under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a protected person within the meaning of Article 1(1) of [NAME_8] and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 130 of the Act; (c) is not a protected person within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a protected person under section 131 of the Act. [73] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised and Abridged Research Copy [74] The disclosure of parts of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)) would tend to identify the appellant.

16 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

B A Dingle Member [75] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the indicated parts of the decision are to be redacted by removal of names and particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant from the research copy of this decision. “B A Dingle” B A Dingle Member