Immigration & Protection Tribunal Rejects Refugee Appeal

OUTCOME: Dismissed

IMMIGRATION AND PROTECTION TRIBUNAL NEW ZEALAND [2026] NZIPT 803188 [NAME], [NAME]

Appellant: [redacted]

Respondent: [redacted] Officer

Before: [NAME] (Member)

Counsel for the Appellant: [redacted]

Counsel for the Respondent: [redacted] 28 April 2026 ___________________________________________________________________

DECISION ___________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal against a decision of [RESPONDENT] and protection officer declining to grant [RESPONDENT] status or [NAME] status to the appellant, a citizen of [APPELLANT]. The Principal Issues on Appeal [2] The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], or to be in danger of being subjected to another qualifying form of harm, by members of the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) and [NAME] (“[NAME]”), due to his involvement in the [NAME]’ protests. [3] The principal issues to be determined are: (a) whether the claim by the appellant is manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether the Tribunal should offer the appellant an oral hearing; and

2 (b) whether the evidence establishes that there is a real chance of his being persecuted or suffering another form of harm entitling him to be recognised as [RESPONDENT] or a [NAME] under the Immigration Act 2009 (“the Act”). Decision Not to Offer an Oral Hearing [4] Ordinarily, the Tribunal must provide an oral hearing to an appellant claiming [RESPONDENT] or [NAME] status. However, an oral hearing may be dispensed with if the appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] in the course of determining the claim at first instance and the Tribunal considers that the appeal is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; see section 233(3) of the Act. [5] The appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. [6] On 26 March 2026, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant (who was self- represented at that time). It advised that it considered that the appeal was, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if that was the case, it could be determined without an oral hearing. It gave him the opportunity to respond by 2 April 2026, before providing an extension for the response due to the appellant instructing counsel. In its letter, the Tribunal stated the following: Normally, the Tribunal offers [RESPONDENT] and [NAME] appellants an oral hearing. However, pursuant to section 233(3) of the Immigration Act 2009, if you (the appellant) were interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME], the Tribunal may determine the appeal without providing an oral hearing if it considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. You were interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] on 10 March 2025. In view of the following, the Tribunal considers that the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. If so, the appeal could be determined without providing you with an oral hearing. In reaching its preliminary view, the Tribunal takes into account:

1. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish his claim and to ensure that all information, evidence and submissions which he wishes to have considered are provided to the Tribunal before it makes its decision – see section 226(1) of the Immigration Act 2009 [(“the Act”)]. The appellant had the same responsibility in respect of his claim before the [RESPONDENT[NAME], including the obligation to put forward all information, evidence, and submissions that he wished to have considered in support of the claim or would wish to have considered in support of any other potential claim – see section 135 of the Act.

2. A summary of the relevant parts of the claim, as recorded in the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and its file, is: (a) The appellant was born in [Z village], Rajasthan, [APPELLANT] [in] 2000. He was raised and identifies as [APPELLANT] and belongs to the [NAME]. The appellant's family supported the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) and had been supporters for generations. (b) The appellant’s parents and brother remain living in [APPELLANT]. (c) In 2005, the appellant's paternal grandfather sold a plot of farmland that he owned and there was a dispute related to the terms of that sale. (d) The appellant undertook 12 years of schooling in Rajasthan, attended a [COMPANY] and completed his secondary studies in 2017. (e) After completing his studies, the appellant began working. From 2018 to 2022 he worked a variety of labouring jobs, including construction and, hospitality work in cafes and restaurants, and housekeeping. Whilst undertaking these various jobs, the appellant primarily resided in Rajasthan with two exceptions. In 2019, for a period of approximately eight months, the appellant was employed as a trucking assistant and would travel in trucks to various other states in [APPELLANT], including Jammu, Punjab and Haryana. Additionally, some time prior to 2022 the appellant was employed to undertake housekeeping work in Gurgaon, Delhi for a period of four or five months, and resided in Delhi during the period of that employment. (f) From February to October 2022, the appellant lived and studied in Singapore. He did not complete the Diploma of Hospitality Management which he commenced. (g) In late 2022, the appellant attended a protest held by [NAME] seeking to enforce their rights ("the [NAME]' protest"). He arrived at the protest area which was located on the border between Shambhu and Haryana, and remained there for one day. The following day, the authorities began to use tear gas on the protesters. As a result, the appellant departed the protest area the following morning to return to Rajasthan. (h) On 22 May 2023, the appellant lodged an application for a visitor visa to travel to New Zealand. He applied for a visitor visa to New Zealand as he did not feel safe anymore in [APPELLANT] as a Sikh person. (i) On 27 May 2023, the appellant went out for a walk in the evening after dinner. He was walking near a park that was located close to his home in [Z village]. Whilst walking in the park the appellant was attacked from behind and struck on the head. He fell forward and lost consciousness for approximately 30 minutes. When he regained consciousness, he was met by a [NAME] who had stopped when he saw the appellant unconscious. This [NAME] transported the appellant back to his home address, where he rested for the night. The appellant was bleeding from his ear throughout the night. (j) At approximately 4am the following morning, the appellant's parents returned home from a [NAME] they had attended. They saw his condition, and the appellant informed them of his encounter in the park. The appellant and his parents believed that he had been attacked by the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) and [NAME] (“[NAME]”) supporters

4 who had identified him at the [NAME]' protest. The appellant's parents went to a police station in an attempt to file a report, but were told to return the next day. The appellant's parents then drove him in a rental car to a hospital, which was located approximately 70 kilometres away from the appellant's home. (k) On 28 May 2023, the appellant was admitted to this hospital with swelling on the left side of his head and injuries sustained to his face. During his stay in hospital the appellant was referred to a neurosurgeon due to the swelling on his head. He resided in the neurosurgery ward of the hospital for a period of approximately five days, and then he was discharged and returned home. (l) While the appellant was still in the hospital, his father returned to the police station to file a complaint in relation to the appellant's encounter in the park. However, he was prevented from doing so and told by police officers that a complaint could not be filed without knowing the identities of the persons about whom the complaint related. (m) On 1 June 2023, the appellant's application for a visitor visa was approved. (n) After the appellant was discharged from hospital in early June, he remained at home resting for a period of 10 days. He returned to the hospital for a check-up appointment and was administered a hearing test. (o) On 3 August 2023 the appellant departed [APPELLANT]. He arrived in New Zealand on 4 August 2023. (p) On 21 November 2023 the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (“[NAME]”) received the appellant's Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status form dated 20 November 2023. (q) In late 2024, the appellant's brother [APPELLANT] was struck from behind by a vehicle while travelling on his bike at night. (r) On 10 March 2025, the appellant was interviewed by the [NAME]. His representative was present at the interview. (s) On 2 May 2025 an interview report was sent to the appellant via his representative. (t) On 19 June 2025 the [NAME] received the appellant's response to the interview report. (u) On 23 September 2025, the [NAME] declined the appellant’s application. No sufficient risk of qualifying harm The appellant’s relevant past experiences can be summarised thus: (a) The appellant attended a [NAME]’ protest in late 2022. After tear gas was used on the protestors, the appellant departed. (b) In May 2023, the appellant was struck on the head while walking in a park. He lost consciousness and sustained injuries to his head and face. He was admitted to hospital, and then discharged five days later. His attackers are unknown, but he and his family believe they were members of the [NAME] and [NAME].

5 (c) The appellant’s brother was struck from behind by a vehicle while travelling on his bike at night. Not all harm entitles an appellant to protection under the Act. For [RESPONDENT] status, an appellant must establish a predicament amounting to ‘being persecuted’ in [APPELLANT], which is serious harm arising from breaches of human rights; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183]. Otherwise, the harm must be of the limited kind falling within the scope of sections 130 and 131 of the Act, namely that he or she is in danger of: (a) being tortured; (b) cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; or (c) arbitrary deprivation of life. Additionally, the thresholds of both ‘a real chance of being persecuted’ and being ‘in danger of’ one of the other forms of harm are higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility – see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008), at [57], [NAME] (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189, at [55]–[60], and [NAME]) [2011] NZIPT 800050–053, at [81]–[83]. The evidence here does not appear to establish a risk of any such harm any higher than mere speculation or a remote or random possibility for the following reasons: (a) The appellant attended one [NAME]’ protest. He was not harmed or personally targeted at the protest. He did not attend any further protests. (b) The injuries suffered from the park attack are acknowledged. However, the attackers have not been identified and there appears to be insufficient evidence connecting this attack to the [NAME], [NAME] or the appellant’s attendance at one [NAME]’ protest. (c) The police were unable to respond to the complaint about the park attack, as the attackers were unknown. This is a reasonable response and does [not] appear to establish a lack of state protection. (d) The appellant’s brother being struck while travelling on his motorbike could be for any number of reasons. There is no evidence that it is in any way linked to the appellant. It is your responsibility to establish your claim. You appear not to have established that you meet the requirements of Article1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. Nor do you appear to have demonstrated that there are substantial grounds for believing that you are at risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm in sections 130 and 131 of the Act. You appear not to be not entitled to the surrogate protection of another state. Internal protection alternative There is a further reason why the claim appears to be manifestly unfounded. In respect of both the [RESPONDENT] claim under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the appellant’s usual place of domicile (assuming such a risk to exist) can be reduced to below the real chance level by their relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection there for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008),

6 BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], and AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, 217–218 and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684/99 (29 October 1999), at [47] onwards. Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706, at [21]. An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a [NAME] reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] itself. Even if you were at risk of serious harm in your home area of Rajasthan (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) it appears that you could access, and reside safely in, any one of the major cities in Rajasthan: Jaipur, Jodhpur or Kota. You could also live in Delhi, where you have lived without difficulty previously, or in the Punjab, where there is a large Sikh population. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. Those alternative places of relocation all appear to meet the criteria for an internal protection alternative. If correct, you are not outside [APPELLANT], your country of nationality, owing to there being a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights occurring in the future. The risk appears to fall short of the thresholds of ‘a real chance’ and being ‘in danger of’ by a significant margin. You do not appear to require the surrogate protection of another state. Opportunity to Respond It appears that you (the appellant) have neither a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a [NAME] reason nor grounds for being recognised as a [NAME] under section 130 or section 131 of the Immigration Act 2009. Your claim appears to be, prima facie, manifestly unfounded. The Tribunal must now consider whether to offer you an oral hearing. You are invited to forward to the Tribunal, by 5:00 pm, on 2 April 2026, any submissions responding to the matters raised above and any other submissions or evidence you wish to tender to support the appeal. The Tribunal will then determine whether or not the appeal is, prima facie, manifestly unfounded and, if so, whether or not to offer you an oral hearing. If it decides not to offer an oral

7 hearing, it will determine the appeal on the information available to it, without further notice. [7] On 10 April 2026, the Tribunal received written submissions from the appellant’s counsel. [8] Counsel submits that the Tribunal’s approach to credibility does not align with the settled approach as adopted in EF v [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer [2024] NZHC 1999 at [74], adopting [NAME] v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 449 (EWCA) and reaffirmed in BE (Nigeria) v [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer [2023] NZCA 372, that credibility is not a threshold test and the Tribunal must assess future risk by weighing the evidence as a whole, including material that carries probative value even if not conclusively established. [9] Counsel submits that the Tribunal placed undue weight on the absence of identified attackers. The evidence was internally consistent, coherent and supported by objective indicators. None of the appellant’s evidence “falls into the category of material to which no credible can be attacked”. The appellant’s evidence should be accepted and given appropriate weight. [10] The state’s refusal to accept a complaint on the basis that the attackers were unknown demonstrates that protection is not effective in practice, particularly in circumstances involving targeted harm. [11] Counsel further submits that there is no internal protection alternative available to the appellant. He has “previously travelled and resided in multiple regions, demonstrating that relocation does not eliminate risk”. In addition, it would be unduly harsh given the absence of support, ongoing fear and impact of past harm. [12] The appellant should be given an oral hearing as where “credibility is in issue, fairness requires that the appellant be given an opportunity to be heard in person”. Whether the appeal is manifestly unfounded [13] The Tribunal has considered the submissions provided on appeal. For the reasons below, it is satisfied that its preliminary view, set out in its letter to the appellant, is correct and the appeal is manifestly unfounded. [14] In relation to counsel’s submissions on credibility, these are misguided. In the context of the assessment of the Tribunal’s ‘manifestly unfounded’ jurisdiction,

8 all evidence is accepted as credible and given full weight. It is concerning that counsel should be suggesting that the Tribunal investigate her client’s credibility in these circumstances. [15] The Tribunal has considered counsel’s submission that an internal protection alternative is not available to the appellant. However, it finds the reasoning for this submission unconvincing. His previous relocations within [APPELLANT] did not result in him being seriously harmed in those other locations on any occasion. He has lived safely and effectively in other parts of [APPELLANT] previously. Further, he has successfully relocated to New Zealand, another country, without difficulty. [16] Furthermore, the Tribunal finds the submission that the refusal by the police to accept the complaint demonstrates that protection is not effective in practice not to be compelling. The police would have little ability to investigate an offence where there is no possibility of identifying the culprits. They are legitimately and reasonably able to require identification of persons responsible. Doing so does not render state protection ineffective. [17] Pursuant to section 233 of the Act, the Tribunal therefore determines not to afford the appellant an oral hearing. The appeal will be determined on the papers. [18] Given that the same claim is relied upon in respect of all limbs of the appeal, it is appropriate to record it first. What follows is a summary of the details as recorded in the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim to [RESPONDENT] and Protection Status (“Confirmation of Claim”) form, the decision of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] (which incorporated any changes or corrections which the appellant made to the record of his interview), other material contained in the appeal file and in counsel’s submissions. THE APPELLANT’S CASE [19] In June 2000, the appellant was born in Z village, Rajasthan, [APPELLANT]. He is of the [NAME] and [NAME]. The appellant’s family supported the [NAME] (“[NAME]”) and had been supporters for generations. The appellant’s parents and brother remain living in [APPELLANT]. [20] In 2005, the appellant's paternal grandfather sold a plot of farmland that he owned and there was a dispute related to the terms of that sale.

9 [21] After completing his education, the appellant commenced working. From 2018 to 2022 he worked a variety of labouring jobs, including construction and, hospitality work in cafes and restaurants, and housekeeping. Whilst undertaking these various jobs, the appellant primarily resided in Rajasthan except for approximately eight months in 2019 when he worked as a trucking assistant, travelling to other states in [APPELLANT], including Jammu, Punjab and Haryana. Some time prior to 2022, the appellant worked and lived in Delhi for a period of four or five months. [22] From February to October 2022, the appellant lived and studied hospitality in Singapore. [23] In late 2022, the appellant attended a protest held by [NAME] seeking to enforce their rights (“the [NAME]’ protest”). He arrived at the protest area which was located on the border between Shambhu and Haryana, and remained there for one day. The following day, the authorities began to use tear gas on the protesters. As a result, the appellant departed the protest area the following morning to return to Rajasthan. [24] On 22 May 2023, the appellant lodged an application for a visitor visa to travel to New Zealand. [25] On 27 May 2023, the appellant went out for an evening walk in a local park when he was attacked from behind and struck on the head. He fell forward and lost consciousness for approximately 30 minutes. When he regained consciousness, he was assisted by a [NAME] who transported the appellant back home. He was bleeding from his ear throughout the night. [26] At approximately 4am the following morning, the appellant’s parents returned home. The appellant and his parents believed that he had been attacked by [NAME] and [NAME] supporters who had identified him at the [NAME]’ protest. The appellant’s parents went to a police station in an attempt to file a report, but were told to return the next day. The appellant's parents then drove him in a rental car to a hospital, which was located approximately 70 kilometres away from the appellant’s home. [27] On 28 May 2023, the appellant was admitted to this hospital with swelling on the left side of his head and injuries sustained to his face. During his stay in hospital the appellant was referred to a neurosurgeon and stayed in the

10 neurosurgery ward of the hospital for a period of approximately five days. He was then discharged and returned home. He remained resting at home. [28] While the appellant was still in the hospital, his father returned to the police station to file a complaint in relation to the appellant's encounter in the park. However, the police refused to accept the complaint without knowing the identities of the persons about whom the complaint related. [29] On 1 June 2023, the appellant's application for a New Zealand visitor visa was approved. [30] On 3 August 2023 the appellant departed [APPELLANT]. He arrived in New Zealand on 4 August 2023. [31] On 21 November 2023 the [RESPONDENT[NAME] received the appellant’s Confirmation of Claim form dated 20 November 2023. [32] In late 2024, the appellant's brother [APPELLANT] was struck from behind by a vehicle while travelling on his bike at night. [33] On 10 March 2025, the appellant was interviewed by the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. [34] On 23 September 2025, the [RESPONDENT[NAME] declined the appellant’s application. ASSESSMENT [35] Under section 198 of the Act, on an appeal under section 194(1)(c) the Tribunal must determine (in this order) whether to recognise the appellant as: (a) [RESPONDENT] under the 1951 [NAME] to the Status of Refugees (“the [RESPONDENT[NAME]” or “the [NAME]”) (section 129); and (b) a [NAME] under the 1984 [NAME] (section 130); and (c) a [NAME] under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) (section 131).

11 [36] In relation to a claim to be recognised as a [NAME], section 198(1)(c) of the Act requires that the Tribunal must also determine matters analogous to the Article 1F exclusion clause in the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. In this appeal, no exclusion issues arise. Assessment of the Appellant’s Evidence [37] For a claim determined to be manifestly unfounded (that is to say, incapable of success because the person does not meet the requirements of Article 1A(2) of the [NAME] or sections 130 or 131 of the Act), the decision-maker is required to treat the claim as credible for the purposes of the assessment. As the appellant has not been offered an oral hearing, the details of his claim as recorded above are accepted for the purposes of the appeal. THE [RESPONDENT[NAME] [38] Section 129(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as [RESPONDENT] in accordance with this Act if he or she is [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT[NAME]. [39] Article 1A(2) of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] provides that [RESPONDENT] is a person who: ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [40] In determining what is meant by “well-founded” in Article 1A(2) of the [NAME], the Tribunal adopts the approach in [NAME] v [NAME] (1989) 169 CLR 379 (HCA), where it was held that a fear of being persecuted is established as well-founded when there is a real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring. The standard is entirely objective; see [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) at [57]; and [NAME] (China) [2023] NZIPT 802189 at [55]–[60]. [41] “Being persecuted” requires serious harm arising from the breach of internationally recognised human rights, demonstrative of a failure of state protection; see DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788, at [114]–[130] and [177]–[183].

12 [42] In terms of [RESPONDENT] No 70074 (17 September 1996), affirmed by the Tribunal in DS (Iran) [2016] NZIPT 800788 at [213], the principal issues are: (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted in the country of nationality? (b) If the answer is yes, is there a [NAME] reason for that persecution? Objectively, on the Facts as Found, is there a Real Chance of the Appellant Being Persecuted in [APPELLANT]? [43] The appellant has had multiple occasions on which to advance and explain his claim, including in his Confirmation of Claim form, in his statement provided to the [RESPONDENT[NAME], in his interview with [RESPONDENT] and protection officer, in his response to the interview report and in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 26 March 2026. The Tribunal is satisfied that he has had ample opportunity, over an extended period and with the assistance of counsel, to present his claim. See here the discussion in ZB ([APPELLANT]) [2025] NZIPT 802975 at [10]–[27]. Country information [44] It is necessary to address the relevant country information. None has been provided by the appellant or counsel, but the Tribunal’s own research establishes the following. [45] [APPELLANT] is a vast country of many ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages. Country information indicates that, while it is a democratic state which generally respects the rule of law, human rights violations occur. The United States Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: [APPELLANT] (12 August 2025) records numerous human rights concerns in [APPELLANT] in its executive summary, including credible reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings; disappearances; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country; serious abuses in a conflict; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflicts by [NAME]; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; and instances of coerced abortion or forced sterilisation.

13 Assessment of a well-founded fear of being persecuted [46] To establish a real chance of being persecuted, it is the responsibility of the claimant to point to evidence indicating a real chance of serious harm arising from breaches of internationally recognised human rights. [47] As to what constitutes serious harm, not all harm arising from breaches of human rights will qualify. The threshold is that the harm must be serious. In that regard, the purpose of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] is to provide the surrogate protection of another state when the claimant’s own state is unable or unwilling to protect the person. That surrogate protection is not intended to be available where the harm at issue is not serious. [48] In summary, the relevant incidents which have occurred to the appellant in the past are: (a) The appellant attended a [NAME]’ protest in late 2022. After tear gas was used on the protestors, the appellant departed. (b) In May 2023, the appellant was struck on the head by an unknown assailant while walking in a park. He lost consciousness and sustained injuries to his head and face. He was admitted to hospital, and then discharged five days later. His attacker is unknown, but he and his family believe they were members of the [NAME] and [NAME]. (c) The appellant’s brother was struck from behind by a vehicle while travelling on his motorbike at night. [49] While the assessment is forward-looking, past harm can sometimes be an indicator of future harm. Here, however, the evidence does not establish any linkage or nexus between the appellant’s attendance (among many thousands) at a [NAME]’ protest and the two later incidents (the park incident and his brother’s motorbike incident), beyond the appellant’s speculation. The events are, on the evidence, unconnected. It follows that they do not point to any risk of harm in the future. [50] While the appellant and his family suspect that the May 2023 park attack may be linked to the appellant’s attendance at one [NAME]’ protest, this is simply not established by the evidence. The attackers are unknown. The incident occurred more than six months after his attendance at the protest. He has not been sought and targeted again. There is no link whatsoever between the attack

14 and the appellant’s attendance at the [NAME]’ protest, or being Sikh. The risk of any future harm reaching the level of being persecuted is remote and speculative. [51] The appellant’s father sought to lodge a complaint with the police on behalf of the appellant. He was told this could not be pursued without the attackers being identified. The Tribunal finds this was a legitimate response and does not establish that state protection is not available, if it was needed. [52] The Tribunal is satisfied that the risk to the appellant of serious harm arising from breaches of human rights in [APPELLANT] is no more than speculative and remote. For this reason, he does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT]. Internal Protection Alternative [53] In respect of both the claim for protection as [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act, and as a [NAME] under sections 130 and 131 of the Act, the Tribunal is statutorily required to assess whether the risk of serious harm in the person’s usual place of domicile can be reduced to below the real chance level by them relocating elsewhere in the country or origin and securing meaningful domestic protection for that harm; see sections 130(2) and 131(2) and the discussion of this principle in [RESPONDENT] No 76044 (11 September 2008) and BI (Afghanistan) [2018] NZIPT 801220, at [50]–[51], as set out in AC (Russia) [2012] NZIPT 800151. [54] Where such protection exists, a claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. [55] It is not a matter of a claimant’s convenience or of the attractiveness of the place of relocation. See Butler v Attorney-General [1999] NZAR 205, pp217–218 and see also [RESPONDENT] No 71684 (29 October 1999), at [47] et seq. [56] Where an ‘internal protection alternative’ exists, the claim must be declined as the claimant cannot have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or being subjected to another qualifying harm in the country of origin and the need for surrogate international protection simply does not arise. It is the appellant’s responsibility to establish that there is no viable internal protection alternative; see [RESPONDENT] and Protection Officer v BA (Nigeria) [2022] NZHC 706.

15 [57] An internal protection alternative requires that: (a) The [NAME] must be accessible to the individual. This requires that access be practical, safe and legal. (b) In the [NAME], there is no risk of being persecuted for a [NAME] reason. In this regard, the appellant cannot be expected to forego the exercise of human rights to avoid being persecuted. (c) In the [NAME], there are no new risks of being persecuted or of being exposed to other forms of serious harm or of refoulement. (d) In the [NAME], basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights are respected by the state. In this inquiry, reference is to be made to the human rights standards suggested by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] itself. [58] Even if the appellant were at risk of serious harm in Rajasthan (which is not accepted, for the reasons explained above) he could access, and reside safely in, any one of the major cities in Rajasthan: Jaipur, Jodhpur or Kota. In addition, the appellant could also live in Delhi, where he lived without difficulty previously, or in the Punjab, where there is a large Sikh population. The evidence does not point to any risk in any of those locations of other forms of harm, or persecution for other reasons. The basic human rights recognised by the [RESPONDENT[NAME] are available there. Is there a [NAME] for the Persecution? [59] In light of the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in [APPELLANT], it is not necessary to address this issue. However, the Tribunal notes that even if it had found in the affirmative, there is no nexus to one of the five [RESPONDENT[NAME] grounds. Conclusion on Claim to [RESPONDENT] [60] For the above reasons, the appellant is not entitled to be recognised as a [RESPONDENT] under the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and section 129 of the Act.

16 The [NAME] [61] Section 130(1) of the Act provides that: A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the [NAME] if there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported from New Zealand. [62] Section 130(5) of the Act provides that torture has the same meaning as in the [NAME], Article 1(1) of which states that torture is: … any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. [63] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as he does for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [64] As the Tribunal has explained consistently since the creation of the [NAME] categories of its jurisdiction, the risk required to be established (being ‘in danger of’) is, like the real chance test in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry, a low threshold, but it requires more than speculation or a mere possibility. [65] There are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being subjected, in [APPELLANT], to severe mental or physical pain or suffering for any of the prescribed purposes with any of the prescribed involvement of a public official.

Accordingly, the appellant is not recognised as [NAME] persons in New Zealand under the [NAME]. Conclusion on Claim under [NAME] [66] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act. The ICCPR [67] Section 131 of the Act provides that: (1) A person must be recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if there are substantial grounds

17 for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel treatment if deported from New Zealand. ... (6) In this section, cruel treatment means cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Assessment of the Claim under the ICCPR [68] The appellant relies upon the same evidence for this part of his appeal as for his claim to [RESPONDENT] status. The same findings of credibility and fact apply. [69] The breaches of human rights inherent here in arbitrary deprivation of life or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment are not different to breaches of those same rights in the [RESPONDENT] enquiry. The Tribunal has already found that, in the [RESPONDENT] context, the appellant does not face a real chance of any such breach of rights in [APPELLANT]. [70] Equally, it is satisfied here that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant is in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or subjected to cruel treatment in [APPELLANT]. He is not recognised as a [NAME] in New Zealand under the ICCPR. Conclusion on Claim under the ICCPR [71] For the above reasons, the appellant is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act.

CONCLUSION [72] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal finds that the appellant: [redacted] is not [RESPONDENT] within the meaning of the [RESPONDENT[NAME] and, therefore, is not [RESPONDENT] under section 129 of the Act; (b) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the [NAME] and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 130 of the Act;

18 Certified to be the Research Copy released for publication.

[NAME] Member (c) is not a [NAME] within the meaning of the relevant elements of Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR and, therefore, is not a [NAME] under section 131 of the Act. [73] The appeal is dismissed. Order as to Depersonalised Research Copy [74] The Tribunal is satisfied that publication of this decision beyond the parties (and those to whom disclosure is permitted by section 151(2)(a), (b) or (c)) would tend to identify the appellant. [75] Pursuant to clause 19 of Schedule 2 of the Act, the Tribunal orders that, until further order, the research copy of this decision is to be depersonalised by removal of the appellant’s name and any particulars likely to lead to the identification of the appellant. “[NAME]” [NAME] Member